Isaac Flowers v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10568
____________________
ISAAC FLOWERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-01075-MHH
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10568
Before NEWSOM , BRANCH , and L UCK , Circuit Judges.
B RANCH, Circuit Judge:
This social security case revolves around an unusual but not
unheard-of scenario. A person applies for Social Security Disability
benefits and the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denies his claim,
finding in the process that the applicant can perform jobs involving
“sedentary work”—the lightest work capacity in the Social Security
regulations. After that proceeding becomes final, the person
applies for benefits again. This time, without referencing or
distinguishing the prior ALJ’s finding that the claimant could only
perform “sedentary work,” the ALJ denies benefits, finding in the
process that the claimant can perform jobs involving “light
work”—a work capacity slightly more intensive than “sedentary
work.” In a line of unpublished cases, we have held that this sort
of scenario does not pose a res judicata problem because the ALJs
are considering the claimant’s capacity in distinct (though close-in-
time) periods.
In this case, claimant-appellant Isaac Flowers urges us to
view such cases through a different lens. He argues, pointing to
decisions of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, that the problem with
ALJs reaching these seemingly inconsistent findings about the level
of work that an applicant can perform is not res judicata, but
substantial evidence. The argument goes that, if an ALJ finds a
claimant is limited to “sedentary work,” a subsequent finding that
the claimant can do “light work” would lack substantial evidence if
the ALJ did not acknowledge and distinguish the previous finding
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22-10568 Opinion of the Court 3
by showing some improvement in the claimant’s condition.
Because the ALJ below did not do so, Flowers maintains that the
decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument,
we reject Flowers’s position. First, we conclude that Flowers failed
to raise this legal issue below, and we decline to consider it for the
first time on appeal. Second, even if Flowers had raised the issue
below, any error would be harmless because (given the outcome
of his last application) Flowers has not shown that he would have
a right to disability benefits even if the ALJ had once again found
that he was limited to “sedentary work.” Finally, and regardless,
we reject Flowers’s suggestion that the ALJ’s decision was not
supported by substantial evidence. We therefore affirm.
I. Background
Flowers suffers from back, neck, shoulder, and joint
problems and related pain. Flowers is also obese, complains of
vision loss in his left eye, and has depression and opioid
dependence.
Flowers applied for social security disability benefits in 2014
based on a disability onset date of August 9, 2013, and his claim was
denied on April 17, 2017. See Flowers v. Berryhill, No. 4:18-cv-00529-
JEO, 2019 WL 2469792, *1 (N.D. Ala. June 13, 2019), aff’d Flowers v.
Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 817 Fed. App’x 942 (11th Cir. 2020). The
ALJ found Flowers “had the residual functional capacity (‘RFC’) to
perform sedentary work with postural, reaching, and
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10568
environmental limitations.” Id. The regulations define “sedentary
work” as follows:
Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10
pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying
articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.
Although a sedentary job is defined as one which
involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and
standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties.
Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are
required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are
met.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). Because Flowers could perform sedentary
work and there were jobs in the national economy he could do, the
ALJ denied benefits. Flowers, 2019 WL 2469792, *1. The appeals
council denied Flowers’s request for review. Id. And we affirmed
on appeal. Flowers, 817 Fed. App’x at 946.
After the appeals council denied review of the first claim,
Flowers applied again, this time claiming a disability as of April 18,
2017—the day after his first application was denied. Flowers
argued that he “just [did] not have the physical residual functional
capacity to perform full-time employment.”
But this time, the ALJ found that Flowers “has the residual
functional capacity to perform light work” with minor
modifications.1 As defined by the regulations,
1 Specifically the ALJ found that Flowers could perform light work with the
following limitations: Flowers could “occasionally climb stairs and ramps;”
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22-10568 Opinion of the Court 5
[l]ight work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds
at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects
weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight
lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when
it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or
when it involves sitting most of the time with some
pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be
considered capable of performing a full or wide range
of light work, [one] must have the ability to do
substantially all of these activities.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b); id. § 416.967(b) (same); Social Security
Ruling (SSR) 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *5 (Jan. 1, 1983) (further
defining light work).
To reach this determination, the ALJ reviewed the medical
evidence, including Flowers’s statements regarding his functional
limitations and restrictions in daily activities.2 The ALJ concluded
that Flowers’s “medically determinable impairments could
could not “climb[] . . . ladders and scaffolding;” could “occasionally balance,
stoop, and crouch;” could not “kneel[] or crawl[];” should
“avoid[] . . . concentrated exposure to temperature extremes;” and would
“require a sit stand option defined as a brief positional change from sitting to
standing and vice versa with no more than one change in position every 20
minutes[.]” These modifications are not at issue in this appeal.
2 The ALJ noted that, since the denial of his first claim, Flowers has used
Hydrocodone for pain relief, managing “really bad days” with ice and
medication, “acknowledg[ing] that his medication [keeps] his pain under
control for the most part.” But the ALJ also acknowledged that Flowers
continues to have limited range of motion in his spine, as well as “body aches
and joint pain causing sleep disturbance.”
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10568
reasonably be expected to cause” pain and limitations, but his
“statements concerning the intensity, persistence[,] and limiting
effects of these symptoms [we]re not entirely consistent with the
medical evidence and other evidence in the record[.]” Further, the
ALJ said, “imaging studies do not support a finding of disability and
treatment notes do not document any significant physical
examination findings.” The ALJ noted that, “[o]verall, while the
medical evidence demonstrate[d] a history of degenerative disc
disease of the cervical and lumbar spine and obesity, it . . . d[id] not
support [Flowers’s] allegations” about its severity and his
limitations “given the effectiveness of conservative treatment.” As
for medical opinions given in the case, the ALJ credited the
functional assessments of the Agency’s consultative examiner and
the State Agency medical consultant (including on necessary
modifications to the usual light work standards) because those
opinions “[were] consistent with and supported by the objective
evidence[.]” On the other hand, the ALJ found that Flowers’s
medical experts were “not persuasive” because their work
“predate[d] the alleged onset date and cover[ed] a period already
adjudicated by a prior ALJ denial decision” and “[was] not
supported by the subsequently received medical evidence[.]” The
ALJ did not explicitly note or reference any improvement in
Flowers’s condition.
“In sum,” the ALJ found, a modified light work RFC was
“supported by the medical evidence of record.” The ALJ
concluded that, “[a]lthough the evidence establishe[d] underlying
medical conditions capable of producing some pain or other
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22-10568 Opinion of the Court 7
limitations, the substantial evidence of record [did] not confirm
disabling pain or other limitations” or “support a conclusion” that
Flowers had “disabling pain or other limitations.”
Applying that RFC, the ALJ found that there were “jobs that
exist[ed] in significant numbers in the national economy that
[Flowers could] perform,” and, therefore, that Flowers was not
disabled. The appeals council again denied review.
Flowers sought judicial review. He argued that his
condition had only worsened since the earlier benefits denial for his
first claim and therefore that the denial of his new claim was not
based on substantial evidence. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s
decision, and Flowers appealed.
II. Standard of Review
When, as here, “an ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals
Council denies review, we review the ALJ’s decision as the
Commissioner’s final decision.” Samuels v. Acting Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 959 F.3d 1042, 1045 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). The
factual findings of the Commissioner are “conclusive” if
“substantial evidence” supports them. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “We
review de novo both the Commissioner’s legal conclusions and the
district court’s decision about whether the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Walker v. Soc. Sec.
Admin., Comm’r, 987 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal
citations omitted).
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10568
III. Discussion
On appeal, Flowers argues that the ALJ erred because it did
not consider or distinguish the previous RFC determination that he
could perform only “sedentary work,” and instead found that
Flowers could perform “light work” even though there was no
substantial evidence that his condition had improved. In other
words, Flowers’s position is that the RFC determination from a
prior application should be a factor considered by the ALJ and,
while not necessarily binding, should not be disturbed absent
substantial evidence of a change in his condition. We disagree. We
reject Flowers’s legal argument because Flowers did not raise the
issue below—and we do not usually consider issues raised for the
first time on appeal. But even if Flowers had preserved the issue,
his argument would still fail because he has not shown that the
difference between “sedentary work” and “light work” would
make any difference to his disability status. And, finally, we reject
Flowers’s argument that the ALJ’s RFC finding was not supported
by substantial evidence.
A. Flowers failed to preserve the legal issue he argues on
appeal.
Flowers’s primary argument is that the ALJ erred because he
did not consider and distinguish Flowers’s previous RFC finding.
He acknowledges a line of unpublished cases from our court
explaining that an ALJ’s RFC findings are not res judicata on later
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22-10568 Opinion of the Court 9
such findings3—even if the relevant applications and disability
onset periods are close in time—but he urges us to “treat the
findings in earlier ALJ decisions as prominent facts and analyze the
deviation from those prominent facts . . . through the lens of
substantial evidence.” Because Flowers did not raise this issue
before the ALJ or the district court, we decline to consider it for the
first time on appeal.
Arguments not raised before the agency or the district court
are forfeited, and we generally do not consider them on appeal,
Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999), absent
extraordinary circumstances, United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860,
872–73 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022).4
As an initial matter, Flowers’s argument makes little sense based
on this record. Flowers himself points out that he argued to the
3 See, e.g., Spence v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-12909, 2022 WL 1415888 (11th
Cir. May 4, 2022); Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 828 Fed. App’x 560 (11th Cir.
2020); Torres v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 819 Fed. App’x 886 (11th Cir. 2020); Griffin
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 Fed. App’x 837 (11th Cir. 2014).
4 Such “extraordinary circumstances” include situations where
(1) the issue involves a pure question of law and refusal to
consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice; (2) the party
lacked an opportunity to raise the issue at the district court
level; (3) the interest of substantial justice is at stake; (4) the
proper resolution is beyond any doubt; or (5) the issue presents
significant questions of general impact or of great public
concern.
Campbell, 26 F.4th at 873. Flowers has not argued any such circumstances
exist, and we see none.
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-10568
ALJ and the district court that his condition had only worsened
since the earlier benefits denial and therefore that the denial of his
new claim was not based on substantial evidence. But Flowers
never made the argument he makes now—i.e., that, as a legal
matter, an ALJ has to consider a prior RFC determination, and to
reach a different RFC determination, the ALJ must have substantial
evidence demonstrating a change in claimant’s condition. Thus,
under ordinary forfeiture principles, we decline to consider it. See
Apfel, 185 F.3d at 1215.
We recognize, of course, that “there is a difference between
raising new issues and making new arguments on appeal.” In re
Home Depot Inc., 931 F.3d 1065, 1086 (11th Cir. 2019). But Flowers’s
submission here is not merely a different argument on the same
issue—it is a new issue altogether. To put a finer point on it: below,
Flowers argued a factual point—his condition had worsened, not
improved. Here, he makes a legal point: the ALJ was categorically
required to consider and distinguish a particular fact (the prior RFC
finding) and, if it did not do so, its decision necessarily lacked
substantial evidence. Under our precedents, those are two separate
issues. Compare In re Home Depot, 931 F.3d at 1086 (permitting the
appellant to pivot between legal arguments for negating a lodestar-
multiplier), and Bourtzakis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 940 F.3d 616, 620–21
(11th Cir. 2019) (allowing the appellant to raise a new legal
argument about the scope of a Washington statute because it fit
within the preserved question of “whether [his] Washington drug
conviction qualifie[d] as an aggravated felony”), with Crawford v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004) (declining
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22-10568 Opinion of the Court 11
to “address Crawford’s contention that the ALJ’s hypothetical
question to the VE was inadequate” because Crawford had only
argued that the district court should build certain medical opinions
into the hypothetical).
Nor, for similar reasons, is the issue preserved under the
broader question of whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by
substantial evidence. “Substantial evidence is . . . such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Samuels, 959 F.3d at 1045 (alteration in
original) (quotations omitted). Whether substantial evidence
exists is an intensely factual question, and the standard of review
“does not allow us to decide the facts anew, make credibility
determinations, or re-weigh evidence.” Id. (quotations omitted).
By contrast, Flowers’s argument that the ALJ was categorically
required to consider the prior finding is a question of law, which
we review de novo. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th
Cir. 2005); see also Keeton v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 21 F.3d
1064, 1066 (11th Cir.1994) (“The . . . failure to apply the correct law
or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for
determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted
mandates reversal.”). These differing standards of review
demonstrate that Flowers’s position has shifted into new territory,
and his new argument does not raise the same issue as his
argument below simply because both fall under the broader rubric
of substantial evidence.
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-10568
Thus, Flowers’s legal argument raises a different issue than
his argument below and is not preserved for our review.5
5 Though Flowers’s failure to make the argument below is enough to dispose
of the issue, we are skeptical that there is any per se rule like the one he
advocates. Substantial evidence is inherently a case-by-case inquiry. Cf.
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1157 (2019) (“Where Biestek goes wrong, at
bottom, is in pressing for a categorical rule, applying to every [Social Security]
case in which a vocational expert refuses a request for underlying data. . . . The
inquiry, as is usually true in determining the substantiality of evidence, is case-
by-case.”). The cases Flowers relies on to persuade us otherwise are out-of-
circuit res judicata cases, Lively v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 820 F.2d 1391,
1391–92 (4th Cir. 1987), Drummond v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 126 F.3d 837, 842 (6th
Cir. 1997), recast by more recent precedents to be substantial evidence cases,
Albright v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 477 (4th Cir. 1999), Earley
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 893 F.3d 929, 932–35 (6th Cir. 2018). And even those
more recent cases did not go so far as to say an ALJ must always consider and
distinguish a past RFC finding.
Besides—Flowers’s own situation shows that the substantial evidence
standard does not necessarily require ALJs to consider and distinguish a prior
RFC finding. Flowers’s designations were “sedentary work” for his first claim,
Flowers, 2019 WL 2469792, at *1, and “light work”—the next capacity level
up—for his second claim. See also Drummond, 126 F.3d at 838–39 (considering
an initial RFC of “sedentary work” versus a subsequent RFC of “medium
work”—two capacity levels away). It is not inherently suspect that the same
person, in roughly the same condition, could be found to be capable of either
light or sedentary work. To the contrary, the capacity levels demonstrated by
these two RFCs are not far apart. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) (defining
sedentary work as “involv[ing] lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and
occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small
tools” as well as “involv[ing] sitting[ and] a certain amount of walking and
standing”), with id. § 404.1567(b) (“Light work involves lifting no more than
20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to
ten pounds. . . . [A] job is in this category when it requires a good deal of
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22-10568 Opinion of the Court 13
B. Even if Flowers had preserved his legal argument, he
has not shown prejudice from the purported error.
Flowers has also failed to show that his argument would
make any difference to his application for disability benefits. See
Raper v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 89 F.4th 1261, 1274 n.11 (11th Cir. 2024)
(“Remand is unwarranted unless an error creates fundamental
unfairness or prejudice.”). Here, although Flowers’s RFC changed
from “sedentary” to “light work,” he was denied benefits even
under the lower RFC designation of “sedentary.” Flowers, 2019 WL
2469792, at *1. Flowers does not argue that he would have been
entitled to benefits if the ALJ had once again found him limited to
“sedentary work.” See Raper, 89 F.4th at 1274 n.11. So even if
Flowers were right that the ALJ should have considered his prior
RFC finding, winning that point does not help him. Thus, we
conclude any such error was harmless.
walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some
pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.”); see also id. § 404.1567 (b) (“If
someone can do light work,” the SSA “determine[s] that he or she can also do
sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors[.]”). It is simply in
the nature of deferential standards like “substantial evidence” that reasonable
fact finders could reach slightly different conclusions on the same facts.
Mitchell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014)
(explaining that even if we would have reached a contrary result as the finder
of fact, and even if a preponderance of the evidence weighs against the
Commissioner’s decision, this Court must affirm if substantial evidence
supports the Commissioner’s decision). And since fact finders can reach
slightly different conclusions supported by substantial evidence, it is (at a
minimum) not necessarily the case that an ALJ must distinguish a prior RFC
finding in order to support his own finding with substantial evidence.
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14 Opinion of the Court 22-10568
Flowers urges us to adopt the reasoning of cases from the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits, but even if we set aside the numerous
reasons why those cases do not help Flowers, the supposed error
in those cases was not harmless.6 See Albright, 174 F.3d at 474;
Earley, 893 F.3d at 930. In Albright and Earley, the ALJ’s subsequent
RFC findings effectively denied the claimant benefits; had the
second RFC findings in those cases been the same as the first, the
claimants would have been disabled by operation of law simply
because they were older. See, e.g., Drummond, 126 F.3d at 839, 842
(explaining that claimant would have been entitled to benefits as a
person fifty years or older if she were limited to “sedentary work,”
as found initially, but the ALJ concluded she could perform
“medium work”); Lively, 820 F.2d at 1392 (explaining that claimant
had turned 55, “thus qualifying as a person of ‘advanced age’” who
6 There are at least three reasons why Albright and Earley do not help Flowers.
For one thing, the decisions of other circuits obviously do not bind us. See
Pitts v. United States, 4 F.4th 1109, 1116 n.3 (11th Cir. 2021). For another,
Albright and Earley both concluded that ALJs should not give conclusive weight
to prior RFC findings, Albright, 174 F.3d at 474–76; Earley, 893 F.3d at 931–32,
so the actual holdings of those cases do not support the proposition that the
ALJ should have considered and distinguished the prior RFC finding. See United
States v. Files, 63 F.4th 920, 926 (11th Cir. 2023) (explaining that the holding of
the case is determined from what the decision “does”—not what it “says”).
And finally, Flowers’s argument (which relies not on the holdings of those
cases as such, but how they describe previous decisions (Lively and Drummond))
also fails to appreciate that Lively and Drummond were avowedly res judicata
cases, not substantial evidence cases, see Lively, 820 F.2d at 1392; Drummond,
126 F.3d at 839, 842–43—so even the descriptions of them by Albright and
Earley do not persuasively support Flowers’s point.
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22-10568 Opinion of the Court 15
would be “considered disabled” if he was limited to “light work,”
as found initially, but the second ALJ found him capable “of work
activity at any exertional level”). Once again, Flowers does not
argue that he would be entitled to benefits if only the RFC finding
below was “light work.” Nor can he, as he was denied benefits for
his first claim when it was found he could perform sedentary work.
At best, he points out that the jobs that the ALJ relied on would not
be suitable if he had been found limited to “sedentary work.” But
that argument just shows that the analysis would be different, not
that the error was harmful.
We therefore conclude that, even if Flowers had preserved
(and prevailed on) his legal argument, it would be harmless error.
See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983).
C. Regardless, the ALJ’s finding was supported by
substantial evidence.
Finally, Flowers argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination of
“light work” was “not supported by substantial evidence” because
the ALJ did not substantiate the implicit “finding that Flowers[’s
condition] had improved[.]” We find no error.
Explaining the flaw in Flowers’s argument requires some
background. A disability under the Social Security Act is an
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “The burden is primarily on
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16 Opinion of the Court 22-10568
the claimant to prove that he is disabled[.]” Doughty v. Apfel, 245
F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001).
“The social security regulations establish a five-step
evaluation process . . . to determine disability[.]” Moore, 405 F.3d
at 1211; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). First, the claimant has the
burden to show that he is not currently engaged in substantial
gainful activity. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). Second, the claimant
must show that he has a “severe impairment,” id. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c), meaning an impairment or combination of
circumstances that significantly limits the claimant’s “physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities,” id. § 404.1520(c), and
“causes more than a minimal limitation on a claimant’s ability to
function,” Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 532 (11th Cir. 1993); see 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Third, the claimant gets the chance to show
that his impairment meets or equals a list of specified (or pre-
approved) impairments—if it does, he is eligible for benefits; if not,
the analysis goes on. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d).
Flowers’s argument deals with the fourth step. At step four,
the claimant must show that he has an impairment that prevents
him from performing his past work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e), (f),
(h). This step requires the ALJ to assess the claimant’s RFC and its
compatibility with the claimant’s past work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4).
The RFC assessment is “based upon all of the relevant evidence[]
of a claimant’s remaining ability to do work[.]” Lewis v. Callahan,
125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). To flesh out the RFC analysis,
the Social Security Administration has adopted terms from the
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22-10568 Opinion of the Court 17
Dictionary of Occupational Titles defining physical exertion from
“sedentary” (at the very bottom of the scale) to “very heavy work”
(at the very top). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. As discussed, the
regulations provide that a person is capable of “light work” if they
are able to lift up to 20 pounds, lift and carry 10-pound objects
often, and can walk, stand, and push or pull arm or leg controls.
See id. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b) (same).
But the fourth step does not exist in a vacuum—if the
claimant manages to show that he cannot perform his past relevant
work because of some severe impairment, then we go to step five,
where the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that a
significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that the
claimant can perform. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g), 416.920(a)(4);
Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004). At this
point, “[t]he ALJ must articulate specific jobs that the claimant is
able to perform, and this finding must be supported by substantial
evidence, not mere intuition or conjecture.” Wilson v.
Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002).
Because “we review the [ALJ’s] decision only to determine
whether it is supported by substantial evidence,” the ALJ’s decision
stands if its decision was based on “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Samuels, 959 F.3d at 1045 (quotations omitted). This
threshold is “not high” and appellate courts generally defer to the
ALJ, “who has seen the hearing up close.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at
1154, 1157. Thus, even if we would have reached a different result
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18 Opinion of the Court 22-10568
and even if a preponderance of the evidence weighs against the
Commissioner’s decision, we must still affirm if the ALJ’s decision
clears the low evidentiary bar. See Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 782.
Here, the ALJ diligently walked through the evidence and
concluded that Flowers could perform a modified form of light
work, for which there are “jobs that exist in significant numbers in
the national economy[.]” The ALJ explained that “[a]lthough the
evidence establishes underlying medical conditions capable of
producing some pain or other limitations,” it “does not confirm
disabling pain or other limitations arising from those impairments,
nor does it support a conclusion that the objectively determined
medical conditions were of such severity that they could
reasonably be expected to give rise to disabling pain or other
limitations.” The ALJ found Flowers’s expert’s opinions to the
contrary “not persuasive” because “they predate[d] the alleged
onset date [of disability] and cover[ed]” the prior period,
adjudicated by the previous ALJ. Moreover, the ALJ found, “these
opinions are not supported by the subsequently received medical
evidence of mild physical and radiographic findings, the
effectiveness of ongoing conservative care, and the lack of specialty
care[.]” And the ALJ concluded, based on the testimony of a
vocational expert, that there are around 115,000 jobs available in
the national economy for someone with Flowers’s functional
capacity. Based on our review of the record, we find no error in
that reasoning—let alone an error sufficient to say that the decision
was not supported by substantial evidence.
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22-10568 Opinion of the Court 19
Flowers fails to show otherwise. His argument that the
decision lacks substantial evidence presumes that, to be capable of
“light work,” his condition must have improved since the prior
determination. He notes, for example, that the ALJ found that
many of Flowers’s conditions “continued” on their previous
course. He points out that “[t]here is no notation in the ALJ
decision of [any] improvement” in his condition. And he
emphasizes that the ALJ here found more severe impairments than
did the ALJ who found his RFC to be “sedentary work.” The
problem is that all of Flowers’s observations of the ALJ’s decision
rely on the prior ALJ’s finding—and assume the “sedentary work”
finding was not only correct but also set a benchmark that must be
distinguished. Nothing about Flowers’s argument shows that the
modified “light work” finding here was not supported by
substantial evidence in its own right. And Flowers completely fails
to grapple with the ALJ’s finding that there is work available
despite his reduced capacity.
So, having rejected Flowers’s argument that the ALJ was
required to consider and distinguish the prior RFC finding, we are
satisfied that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence.
IV. Conclusion
In sum: because Flowers raises his legal argument for the
first time on appeal; because any error was harmless; and because
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20 Opinion of the Court 22-10568
the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence in any
event; we affirm the judgment below.
AFFIRMED.
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23-10459 Newsom, J., Concurring 1
NEWSOM , Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment:
I join all but Part III.B of the Court’s opinion. Cf. United
States v. Files, 63 F.4th 920, 931–35 (11th Cir. 2023) (Newsom, J.,
concurring) (expressing skepticism about the value and propriety
of alternative holdings).
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