Carlos Urquilla Diaz v. Kaplan University

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 26, 2010
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 09-13704
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-60368-CV-PAS
CARLOS URQUILLA DIAZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
KAPLAN UNIVERSITY,
a.k.a. Kaplan College,
a.k.a. Iowa College
Acquisition Corp.,
KAPLAN HIGHER EDUCATION CORP.,
WASHINGTON POST CO.,
ANDY ROSEN,
BEN WILCOX, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(August 26, 2010)

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Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Carlos Urquilla Diaz appeals following entry of summary judgment in favor
of the defendants on his employment discrimination and retaliation claims under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) and 3(a), and 42
U.S.C. § 1981. On the discriminatory termination claim, because the actions and
statements of the decision-makers did not demonstrate race discrimination without
inference, they did not constitute direct evidence. Diaz also failed to establish a
prima facie case of race discrimination with circumstantial evidence: he did not
show he was qualified for the jobs he held, and he did not identify a similarly
situated comparator who was treated more favorably. Moreover, even if he had
established a prima facie case, he did not show that the legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons his employer proffered for terminating him were pretextual.
As for his retaliation claim, even if Plaintiff showed a prima facie case, Diaz still
failed to show that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating him
were pretextual and that the true purpose was retaliatory. Accordingly, the district
court did not err in granting the employer summary judgment on Diaz’s claims.
AFFIRMED.
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