US v. Darville

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APR 19, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 10-11999
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-20890-UU-4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
REO DARVILLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
No. 10-12387
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-20890-UU-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
VINCENT SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.

-- 1 of 5 --

________________________
No. 10-12503
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-20890-UU-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CLIVE GORDON,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 19, 2011)
Before HULL, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this consolidated appeal, codefendants Reo Darville, Vincent Smith, and
Clive Gordon appeal their convictions for conspiracy to import marijuana into the
United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 963. The defendants argue
2

-- 2 of 5 --

that the district court erred in denying their motions to withdraw their guilty pleas.
After review, we affirm.
I.
“We review the denial of a request to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006)
(quotation marks omitted). “We will reverse a district court’s decision on a
motion to withdraw only if it is arbitrary or unreasonable.” United States v.
Najjar, 283 F.3d 1306, 1307 (11th Cir. 2002).
A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea before a sentence is imposed if he
shows a “fair and just reason” for the withdrawal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). A
pre-sentence motion to withdraw is to be liberally construed, but “[i]t is well
settled . . . that there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea prior to
imposition of a sentence.” United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 471 (11th Cir.
1988). To determine whether the defendant has met his burden, the district court
considers the totality of the circumstances, including: “(1) whether close
assistance of counsel was available; (2) whether the plea was knowing and
voluntary; (3) whether judicial resources would be conserved; and (4) whether the
government would be prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his
3

-- 3 of 5 --

plea.” United States v. Freixas, 332 F.3d 1314, 1318 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
The defendants’ arguments focus on the second factor, whether their guilty
pleas were knowing and voluntary. See Buckles, 843 F.2d at 471. We have
explained that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary if it satisfies the three core
concerns underlying Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, which are that: “(1) the guilty plea must
be free from coercion; (2) the defendant must understand the nature of the charges;
and (3) the defendant must know and understand the consequences of his guilty
plea.” United States v. Mosley, 173 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation
marks omitted). The defendants assert that they were tricked into pleading guilty
by their attorneys and that they never intended to bring marijuana into the United
States.
During their plea colloquies, the defendants swore that no one had
threatened, coerced, or forced them into entering a guilty plea. The defendants
also swore that they intended to import marijuana into the United States. There is
a strong presumption that statements made during a plea colloquy are true. United
States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994); see also United States v.
4

-- 4 of 5 --

Rogers, 848 F.2d 166, 168 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[W]hen a defendant makes
statements under oath at a plea colloquy, he bears a heavy burden to show his
statements were false.”). The district court was entitled to rely on the veracity of
the defendants’ statements. See Medlock, 12 F.3d at 187. For that reason, the
district court’s denial of the defendants’ motions to withdraw their guilty pleas
was not arbitrary or unreasonable. See Najjar, 283 F.3d at 1307. No abuse of
discretion occurred.
AFFIRMED.
5

-- 5 of 5 --