USA v. Preston Angelo Williams

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEB 9, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 10-12221
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:09-cr-00173-GAP-DAB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellee,
versus
PRESTON ANGELO WILLIAMS,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(February 9, 2011)
Before TJOFALT, CARNES and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Preston Angelo Williams appeals his conviction for aiding and abetting
credit card fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(5) and (c)(1)(A)(ii) and

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18 U.S.C. § 2. On appeal, Williams argues that his indictment in this case violated
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. Specifically, he contends that his
sentence in his first trial for filing false FEMA claims was “enhanced” by the
credit card fraud and therefore that the indictment in this case amounted to a
second attempt to punish him for the same offense.
Generally, a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional challenges to a
conviction. United States v. Smith, 532 F.3d 1125, 1127 (11th Cir. 2008).
However, the Supreme Court has recognized that some double jeopardy challenges
are an exception to this rule. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 96 S. Ct. 241, 46
L. Ed. 2d 195 (1975). This exception applies when the defendant does not seek to
produce evidence that goes outside of the plea hearing to establish the factual
nature of the double jeopardy challenge. United States v. Bonilla, 579 F.3d 1233,
1240-41 (11th Cir. 2009). Williams’s appeal is not waived because he does not
seek to introduce evidence from outside of the plea hearing to demonstrate that the
conduct at issue in the sentencing phase of the first trial and the conduct at issue in
the indictment of the second trial were the same offense.
We review de novo an alleged violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
United States v. McIntosh, 580 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 2009). The protection
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause applies both to successive prosecutions
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and to successive punishments for the same offense. Witte v. United States, 515
U.S. 389, 395-96, 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2204, 132 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1995). In Witte, the
Supreme Court held that using evidence of related criminal conduct to enhance a
defendant’s sentence for a separate crime does not constitute punishment for that
conduct within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 399, 115 S. Ct.
at 2206; see also United States v. Carey, 943 F.2d 44, 46 n.4 (11th Cir. 1991)
(noting that although consideration of such criminal conduct has the practical
effect of penalizing the defendant for that conduct, it does not constitute
punishment for purposes of double jeopardy).
As an initial matter, Williams argues throughout his brief that the district
court’s consideration of his credit card fraud violation during the sentencing phase
of his first trial was used to “enhance” his sentence. This contention is not
accurate. Rather, the district court declined to award Williams an acceptance of
responsibility reduction to his sentence because it found that he had not
voluntarily withdrawn from criminal conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(b).
Williams offers no authority for the proposition that a court’s denial of a
sentencing reduction amounts to punishment in the double jeopardy context.
Williams also fails to persuade us that the holding of Witte is not
controlling in this case. He argues that Witte is distinguishable because the credit
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card fraud was not “true relevant conduct” for the purposes of sentencing him in
the FEMA claims case. Williams fails to explain what he means by “true relevant
conduct,” why he deems such conduct to be lacking in this case, or why the
existence of such conduct would provide a meaningful distinction between the
instant case and Witte. He does point out that the two cases are factually distinct
because the counts in the instant case, unlike Witte, bear little relation to one
another. Williams fails to explain why this distinction is meaningful, and we are1
not persuaded that Witte is inapplicable here.2
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
Williams cites as another distinction the fact that in Witte there were two1
proceedings that advanced different statutory violations. This description is also applicable to
this case, where there was one proceeding for fraudulent FEMA claims and one for credit card
fraud.
Williams also asserts that his right against self-incrimination was violated because2
his testimony from the sentencing hearing in his first case could have been used against him in
his second case. This argument was waived when he pleaded guilty in the second case. See
Smith, 532 F.3d at 1127. Furthermore, the argument is frivolous because Williams has not
established that his testimony was in any way involuntary. See Taylor v. Singletary, 148 F.3d
1276, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 1998)
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