Morgan v. USA

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 30, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 10-12709
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:09-cv-00172-JA-GJK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllll ll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RICHARD E. MORGAN,
MARY A. MORGAN,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants-Appellants,
TRI-MORGAN FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, et al.,
lllllllllllllllllllllllDefendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(March 30, 2011)

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Before WILSON, ANDERSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Richard and Mary Morgan (“the Morgans”), proceeding pro se, appeal from
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the government in its
action to reduce its tax liens against the Morgans to judgment, and to foreclose
upon their property, pursuant to Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) §§ 7401, 7403.1
On appeal, the Morgans argue that the district court erred by granting summary
judgment to the government because the accounting performed by the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) regarding the Morgans’ tax liabilities was incorrect
under the Morgans’ interpretation of the I.R.C. The Morgans also argue that the
district court abused its discretion in denying their motions under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 59(e) and 52(b).
Whether the court properly granted the government’s motion for summary
judgment is a question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Ryals, 480
F.3d 1101, 1104 (11th Cir. 2007). A tax assessment made by the IRS constitutes a
“determination that a taxpayer owes the Federal Government a certain amount of
Although the Morgans’ notice of appeal references only the date of the order1
denying their motion for the court to declare the law of the case, their brief clearly is intended as
an appeal of the district court’s summary judgment order, and both parties have briefed the issues
on appeal as such. For that reason, we consider the Morgans’ appeal to be of the district court’s
summary judgment order. See KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 465 F.3d 1256, 1260
(11th Cir. 2006).
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unpaid taxes,” and such a determination “is entitled to a legal presumption of
correctness.” United States v. Fior D’Italia, Inc., 536 U.S. 238, 242, 122 S. Ct.
2117, 2122, 153 L. Ed. 2d 280 (2002). Accordingly, taxpayers have the burden of
proving that the IRS’s computations in this regard were erroneous. Pollard v.
Comm’r, IRS, 786 F.2d 1063, 1066 (11th Cir. 1986).
The Morgans’ arguments that the IRS’s assessments were incorrect are
frivolous. Their arguments raise issues of statutory interpretation related to the
meaning of the words: (1) “includes” and “including”; (2) “employment” and
“self-employment”; (3) “trade or business”; (4) “self-employment income,” “net
earnings from self-employment,” and “wages”; (5) “United States”; and (6)
“State.” Their specific argument that income from work in the private sector is not
subject to income tax has been rejected as frivolous by this Court in United States
v. Morse, 532 F.3d 1130, 1132-33 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), and United States
v. Motes, 785 F.2d 928, 928 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (rejecting as frivolous
the claim that “only public servants are subject to tax liability”). The specific
argument that only employment within the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa qualifies as employment “within the
United States” is likewise frivolous under United States v. Ward, 833 F.2d 1538,
1539 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (finding “utterly without merit” the claim that
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the Income Tax Code limits the definition of “United States” to the District of
Columbia and the aforementioned territories).
Accordingly, because the government’s assessments were presumptively
correct, and because the Morgans did not meet their burden of showing that the
assessments were incorrect, the government possessed valid liens on the Morgans’
property and the district court properly granted summary judgment. See Pollard,
786 F.2d at 1066; I.R.C. §§ 6321, 6322.
We review the denial of a Rule 59(e) or Rule 52(b) motion for abuse of
discretion. Lambert v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 253 F.3d 588, 598 (11th Cir. 2001);
Triago v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 847 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1988).
Furthermore, in order for a Rule 59(e) motion to be granted, a party must identify
“newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.” Arthur v. King,
500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007). Rule 59(e) may not be used “to relitigate
old matters, raise argument[s] or present evidence that could have been raised
prior to the entry of judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, Fla.,
408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).
In both motions, the Morgans sought to relitigate old arguments that the
court had already found to be frivolous and to add facts to the record that were not
material to the outcome of the case. In their amended Rule 59(e) motion for
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reconsideration, the Morgans failed to allege, much less show, that they could not
have submitted their purported newly discovered evidence prior to the court’s
grant of summary judgment. The district court, therefore, did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motions.
Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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