USA v. Paul Matthew Schmitz

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 27, 2012
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-12745
Non-Argument Calendar
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Docket No. 3:10-cr-00156-MMH-TEM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
PAUL MATTHEW SCHMITZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________________________
(March 27, 2012)
Before EDMONDSON, MARCUS, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Paul Matthew Schmitz appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e), for which he was

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sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment. No reversible error has been shown; we
affirm.
On appeal, Schmitz challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress the gun and ammunition discovered during a search of his home. In
particular, Schmitz argues that the district court clearly erred in concluding that his
wife’s consent to search their home was voluntary. In considering the district
court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review fact determinations for clear
error and application of law to the facts de novo. United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d
1102, 1105 (11th Cir. 2003). And we construe all facts in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below -- here, the government. Id.
Police officers may conduct a warrantless search of a home if they first
obtain voluntary consent of a person “possessing ‘common authority’ over the
premises.” Bates v. Harvey, 518 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2008). Whether
consent to a search is voluntary is a question of fact to be determined based on the
totality of the circumstances; and the government bears the burden of proving both
(1) that consent existed and (2) that the consent was voluntary and not an
acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. United States v. Blake, 888 F.2d 795,
798 (11th Cir. 1989).
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The record reveals that Deputy Robert Sands responded to a 911 call from
Schmitz’s neighbor accusing Schmitz of assaulting the neighbor with a gun.
When Deputy Sands ran Schmitz’s name through a computer database, he
discovered that Schmitz also had an outstanding arrest warrant for violating his
probation in connection with a previous conviction for being a felon in possession
of a firearm. Deputy Sands then knocked on the front and back doors of Schmitz’s
home and -- when no one answered -- had dispatch contact Schmitz’s wife to
determine Schmitz’s whereabouts and to ask her to come home. When Mrs.1
Schmitz arrived home, she gave Deputy Sands permission to search the house.
After discovering ammunition, a gun holster, and marijuana seeds in the home,
Deputy Sands contacted the drug task force to continue the investigation. He also
provided information for a search warrant affidavit to conduct a more thorough
search of the house and to search a locked bunker in the back yard. While
executing the search warrant, officers found the gun at issue.
That Mrs. Schmitz consented to a search of her home after arriving at the
scene -- including signing a permission-to-search form -- is undisputed. At the
suppression hearing, however, the magistrate judge heard conflicting testimony
Sometime after contacting Mrs. Schmitz -- but before she arrived home -- Deputy Sands1
discovered Schmitz hiding at a neighbor’s house and arrested him.
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about whether her consent was indeed voluntary. According to Deputy Sands,
only two marked patrol cars were parked on the street when Mrs. Schmitz arrived
home and Deputy Sands was the only officer involved in obtaining her consent.
Deputy Sands treated Mrs. Schmitz politely, never raised his voice, kept his
weapons holstered, allowed her to use her phone to call family and friends, and
never threatened to arrest her. Although Mrs. Schmitz was crying and upset when
she first arrived home, she calmed down and stopped crying before consenting to
the search. Deputy Sands also testified unequivocally that he read the entire
consent form to Mrs. Schmitz, including informing her that she had a right to
refuse a search.
Mrs. Schmitz, on the other hand, testified that 9 or 10 police cars were
parked in front of her home when she arrived. She stated that two uniformed
officers -- Deputy Sands and Officer Bunton -- spoke with her about consenting2
to a search and that she believed that she had no choice but to consent because
Deputy Sands promised not to arrest her if she cooperated. She contended that she
was terrified, crying hysterically, and shaking so much when she signed the
Officer Ryan Bunton, a member of the drug task force, testified that he was wearing plain clothes2
on the day of the search and that he was not present when Mrs. Schmitz consented to the search or
during the initial search of the home. In fact, Officer Bunton did not speak with Mrs. Schmitz until
after the task force had obtained and executed the search warrant.
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consent form that she had to steady her right hand with her left just to sign her
name. On direct examination, Mrs. Schmitz testified that the officers never read
her the consent form, but later -- in response to the magistrate judge’s inquiry --
stated that she was not sure whether they read her the form or not.
After considering the testimony of the witnesses, the magistrate judge
credited Deputy Sands’s version of the events over Mrs. Schmitz’s testimony and,
thus, concluded that Mrs. Schmitz’s consent was voluntarily obtained. In
particular, the magistrate decided not to credit Mrs. Schmitz’s testimony because
she could not recall the events at issue with precision, her testimony wavered, her
testimony was “not completely forthright,” and she had a personal interest in the
outcome of the case.
“Credibility determinations are typically the province of the fact finder
because the fact finder personally observes the testimony and is thus in a better
position than a reviewing court to assess the credibility of witnesses.” United
States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002). Where the
testimony of two witnesses is in “direct conflict,” the district court’s credibility
determination “is conclusive on the appellate court unless the judge credits
exceedingly improbable testimony.” Id. Thus, “we must accept the evidence
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unless it is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its
face that no reasonable factfinder could accept it.” Id.
In this case, Deputy Sands’s testimony conflicted directly with Mrs.
Schmitz’s testimony. Because we are unconvinced that Deputy Sands’s version of
the events was “exceedingly improbable” or “contrary to the laws of nature,” the
district court’s credibility determination is entitled to our deference. See id.
We also reject Schmitz’s argument that Deputy Sands’s testimony was
inherently unreliable because he either knowingly allowed false information to be
included in a search warrant affidavit, or acted with reckless disregard for the truth
when he told the officer preparing the affidavit that Schmitz threatened his
neighbor with a gun. First, the search warrant affidavit reflected accurately that
the neighbor’s story was just an accusation and did not indicate that evidence
existed yet to corroborate that accusation.
Second, we are unpersuaded that Deputy Sands should have realized that the
neighbor was allegedly lying after seeing the large opaque tarp that would have
blocked the neighbor’s view of Schmitz. As the magistrate judge noted, although
Deputy Sands noticed the tarp in Schmitz’s back yard as he approached Schmitz’s
back door, he was focused on searching for a man who “(1) was a convicted felon;
(2) had an outstanding felony warrant for his arrest . . . ; (3) may have just
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threatened to kill his neighbor with a handgun; and (4) was not answering his door
or otherwise presenting himself to law enforcement.” We agree that Deputy
Sands’s approach was reasonable and we will not second-guess decisions he made
in the field. See United States v. Sharpe, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575-76 (1985).
Considering the totality of the circumstances and construing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government, the district court did not clearly err in
concluding that Mrs. Schmitz’s consent was voluntary.3
AFFIRMED.
Because we conclude that Mrs. Schmitz’s consent was obtained voluntarily, we need not address3
Schmitz’s argument that -- absent the information gathered as a result of Mrs. Schmitz’s coerced
consent -- the search warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause.
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