Edward E. Baker v. Lee Sanford, et al.

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 4, 2012
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-14015
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-14114-JEM
EDWARD E. BAKER,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LEE SANFORD,
H.S.A.,
K. BARNES,
H.S.A.,
DR. BRODSKY,
Chief Health Officer,
MR. REID,
Superintendent of Martin
Correctional Institution,
DR. DAVIS,
Chief Health Officer, et al.,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants-Appellees.

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________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(June 4, 2012)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, EDMONDSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Edward E. Baker, incarcerated and proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his civil rights complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, Baker argues that his
claims of inadequate medical treatment at the prison, dating back to 2003, were
not barred by Florida’s four-year statute of limitations because the prison’s
tortious misconduct was ongoing until 2011.
We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a prisoner’s
complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), relying on the same standard that governs
dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Alba v. Montford, 517
F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). Under this standard, we view the complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept the well-pleaded facts presented
therein as true. Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th
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Cir. 2007). Further, we liberally construe a pro se complaint. Alba, 517 F.3d at
1252. Finally, we may affirm a decision of the district court on any ground
supported by the record. Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th
Cir. 2001).
The complaint need not set forth detailed factual allegations, but it must
provide more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.
Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to render the claim
“plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on
statute of limitations grounds is appropriate only if it is facially apparent that the
claim is time-barred. Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1288
(11th Cir. 2005). In this respect, the court considers the attached exhibits as part of
the complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c); Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189,
1205 (11th Cir. 2007).
Inadequate medical treatment of a prisoner violates the Eighth Amendment
only when it amounts to deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291-92, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251
(1976). Generally, the prison’s medical judgment on how to best diagnose or treat
a prisoner, even if negligent or in error, does not satisfy this standard. Id. at 105-
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06, 97 S. Ct. at 291-92. However, knowledge of the need for medical care and an
intentional refusal to provide that care constitutes deliberate indifference, as does
treatment that is so cursory or delayed as to amount to unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain. Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543-44 (11th Cir. 1995).
With respect to such complaints, the PLRA incorporates state law regarding
personal injury torts to establish the length of the statute of limitations. Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 1094,166 L. Ed. 2d 973 (2007). Florida
law provides for a residual four-year statute of limitations. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(p)
(2011). However, federal law controls when the underlying cause of action
accrued, triggering this limitations period to begin. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388, 127
S. Ct. at 1095.
Generally, accrual occurs when the prisoner knows or should know that he
has suffered the injury that forms the basis of his complaint and can identify the
person who inflicted the injury. Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir.
2003). However, an “allegation of a failure to provide needed and requested
medical attention constitutes a continuing tort, which does not accrue until the
date medical attention is provided.” Lavellee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129, 1132 (5th
Cir. 1980). The critical distinction in the continuing violation analysis is whether
the prisoner complains “of the present consequence of a one time violation, which
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does not extend the limitations period, or the continuation of that violation into the
present, which does.” Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, we conclude from the record that the district court erred in dismissing
Baker’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
because his claims were not barred by the four-year statute of limitations. Baker’s
amended complaint alleged that although he specifically requested medical
treatment for his ongoing fungal infection multiple times in 2007 and 2010, prison
medical staff refused his requests. Further, he incorporated various grievance
forms documenting these unsuccessful requests for treatment. Therefore, Baker
properly alleged that the prison officials’ prolonged failure to provide adequate
medical treatment despite his repeated grievances constituted a continuous injury
during the statute of limitations period.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment of dismissal and
remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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