Deandre Lovertur Jackson v. JPAY, Incorporated, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-13309
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-20341-MGC
DEANDRE LOVERTURE JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JPAY, INCORPORATED,
UNITED STATES,
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Harold W. Clarke, Director,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(June 22, 2021)
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Before MARTIN, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
DeAndre Jackson, a state inmate proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of
his civil suit asserting a copyright infringement claim under 17 U.S.C. § 501(a),
and an unspecified claim under federal maritime law, against the Virginia
Department of Corrections (“VDOC”) and a third-party payment processor, JPay,
Incorporated (“JPay”).1 Jackson’s amended complaint essentially alleged that
because he had copyrighted his own name, and the defendants used that name
without his permission, he should be awarded damages for copyright infringement.
On appeal, Jackson argues that he alleged facts sufficient to support his claims and
avoid dismissal.2
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and
construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hill v. White, 321 F.3d
1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). We may affirm the district court’s judgment on any
1 Jackson also named “the United States” as a defendant in his amended complaint.
Because he does not mention any claim against the federal government on appeal, however, any
such claim is abandoned. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680-81 (11th
Cir. 2014).
2 Jackson also filed a motion in this Court requesting an “Order to Grant Petition for
Appeal.” In essence, the motion simply seeks a favorable decision on the merits of his claims.
Accordingly, in light of our decision on the merits described below, Jackson’s motion is
DENIED AS MOOT.
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basis supported by the record. Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th
Cir. 2017).
While pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to less stringent
standards than those drafted by attorneys, they still must suggest some factual basis
for a claim. Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015).
Further, the leniency afforded pro se litigants does not give the courts license to
serve as de facto counsel or permit them to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading.
Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir.2014).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint
that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This standard “calls
for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence” of the claim. Id. at 556. “[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted
deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent
dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir.
2002).
To establish copyright infringement, a claimant must allege facts showing
“(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the
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work that are original.” See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 361 (1991). Although the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102, allows individuals
to copyright certain works, “[w]ords and short phrases such as names” are not
copyrightable. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (emphasis added). “[A]pplications for
registration of such works cannot be entertained.” Id.
Maritime and admiralty law only governs conduct and commerce that
occurred on the high seas or navigable waters. See E. River S.S. Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 863-64 (1986); see also U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2. To invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction, a party must show that his or
her suit has some “connection with marine activity.” See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc.
v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995). Maritime
jurisdiction extends to a contract dispute only if the contract at issue is a maritime
contract. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 23-24 (2004).
Even under a liberal reading of Jackson’s amended complaint, we conclude
that he has failed to state a copyright claim or a claim under maritime law.3
Because names are not copyrightable works, Jackson cannot sue for copyright
infringement based on the use of his name. Jackson also cannot recover under
maritime law because none of the conduct in dispute—concerning his landlocked
3 As an initial matter, we disagree with JPay’s assertion that Jackson abandoned his
maritime claim. Although Jackson’s allegations are certainly not a model of clarity, we conclude
that Jackson adequately raised a maritime claim in his amended complaint.
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incarceration in Virginia, the use of his name, or the procedures for depositing
money into his inmate account—bore any connection to the high seas or navigable
waters. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Jackson’s amended
complaint for failure to state a claim.
AFFIRMED.
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