Julie Regina v. The Weiss Gifted and Talented School, Inc.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-11111
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
JULIE REGINA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE WEISS GIFTED AND TALENTED SCHOOL, INC.,
d.b.a. The Weiss School,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 9:19-cv-80913-RKA
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11111
____________________
Before WILSON, L UCK , and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Julie Regina, through counsel, appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff’s former
employer, The Weiss Gifted and Talented School, Inc. (“the
School”). Plaintiff asserts against the School claims for age discrim-
ination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (“ADEA”), and the Florida Civil Rights Act of
1992, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a) (“FCRA”).1 No reversible error has
been shown; we affirm.
Plaintiff began working as a teacher for the School in 2004.
During her tenure at the School, Plaintiff assumed more responsi-
bility and worked in a variety of roles. Plaintiff was promoted to
Assistant Head of School in 2013.
The School is a private, non-profit school accredited by the
Florida Council of Independent Schools (“FCIS”). As part of FCIS’s
routine reaccreditation process, FCIS performed a “comprehensive
review and evaluation” of the School in September 2015. Follow-
ing this evaluation, FCIS issued a report noting concerns about the
1 We examine age-discrimination claims made under both the ADEA and the
FCRA using the same legal framework.
See Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int’l,
LLC, 746 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014). Our analysis of Plaintiff’s ADEA
claim applies equally to Plaintiff’s FCRA claim.
See id.
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21-11111 Opinion of the Court 3
School’s asset-to-liability ratio: a ratio that fell below FCIS stand-
ards. The report advised that the School “must work to bring its
asset-to-liability ratio into compliance with” the pertinent FCIS
standard.
Shortly after the FCIS issued its report, the School’s then-
Head of School announced her resignation. The School hired Dr.
Ferguson as the new Head of School. Dr. Ferguson assumed day-
to-day control of the School in March 2016. In a sworn declaration,
Dr. Ferguson said her “top priority” upon being hired “was to in-
crease the asset to liability ratio for the school to meet accrediting
standards.”
As Head of School, Dr. Ferguson had sole authority to make
hiring and firing decisions. Shortly after taking over as Head of
School, Dr. Ferguson implemented several staffing changes.
Among those changes, Dr. Ferguson notified Plaintiff in May 2016
that Plaintiff’s employment contract would not be renewed for the
following school year. Plaintiff was then 56 years’ old.
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). After receiving a
right-to-sue notice from the EEOC, Plaintiff filed this age-discrimi-
nation employment action against the School. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the School. This appeal
followed.
We review
de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, viewing the record and drawing all factual inferences in
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-11111
the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
See Mazzeo v.
Color Resolutions Int’l, LLC, 746 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014).
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is “no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The ADEA prohibits private employers from firing an em-
ployee who is at least 40 years of age “because of” the employee’s
age.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a). To prevail on a disparate-
treatment claim under the ADEA, “a plaintiff must prove that age
was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.”
Gross
v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
We ordinarily evaluate ADEA claims based on circumstan-
tial evidence -- like the claims involved in this case -- under the bur-
den-shifting framework established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).2
See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229
F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (
en banc).
Under the
McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff first
must establish a
prima facie case of age discrimination.
Id. Once a
plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
2 A plaintiff can also survive summary judgment on an ADEA claim “if the
record, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents a convincing
mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional
discrimination by the decision maker.”
See Simms v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d
1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff has presented no argument under a con-
vincing-mosaic theory; we need not address that theory on appeal.
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21-11111 Opinion of the Court 5
employer to “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the challenged employment action.”
Id. If the employer does so,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer’s proffered rea-
son is a pretext for discrimination.
Id.
To establish pretext, the plaintiff must show “
both that the
reason was false,
and that discrimination was the real reason.”
See
Brooks v. Cty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163
(11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original). A plaintiff may show falsity
by identifying “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, inco-
herencies, or contradictions in the proffered explanation.”
Id. (quo-
tations omitted). “Provided that the proffered reason is one that
might motivate a reasonable employer, an employee must meet
that reason head-on and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed
by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.”
Chapman,
229 F.3d at 1030.
The parties disagree about what elements Plaintiff must
show to establish a
prima facie case. Plaintiff contends she can
prove a
prima facie case under the standard “discriminatory-dis-
charge” test. On the other hand, the School asserts that -- because
Plaintiff’s position was eliminated -- Plaintiff must satisfy a modi-
fied version of the
prima facie test applicable to reduction-in-force
cases.3 We need not resolve this dispute today as the outcome of
this appeal is the same under either analysis.
3 Under the discriminatory-discharge theory, a plaintiff establishes a
prima
facie case by showing that she (1) was a member of the protected age group;
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-11111
If we assume -- without deciding -- that Plaintiff established
a
prima facie case of age discrimination (under either theory), the
School presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termi-
nating Plaintiff’s employment: to improve the School’s financial
position. Dr. Ferguson said her chief goal as the new Head of
School was to bring the school’s asset-to-liability ratio into compli-
ance with FCIS standards. In furtherance of that goal, Dr. Fergu-
son said she assessed the School’s existing teaching and administra-
tive staff, made adjustments to ensure that each employee was fully
scheduled, and determined whether there were job responsibilities
that she could “absorb.” Based on this assessment, Dr. Ferguson
determined that some positions -- including Plaintiff’s position --
could be eliminated.
Because addressing the School’s budgetary concerns -- and
bringing the school into compliance with FCIS accreditation stand-
ards -- are reasons that would motivate a reasonable employer,
Plaintiff must rebut the School’s proffered reason head-on.
See
Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. But Plaintiff failed to do so.
(2) was subjected to an adverse employment act; (3) was qualified to do the
job; and (4) was replaced by a “substantially younger person.”
See Mazzeo,
746 F.3d at 1270. To prove a
prima facie case under a reduction-in-force anal-
ysis, a plaintiff must show these things: (1) she belonged to a protected group;
(2) she was qualified for the job; and (3) “sufficient evidence from which a rea-
sonable jury could find that the employer intended to discriminate on the basis
of age through its employment decision.”
See id. at 1270-71.
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21-11111 Opinion of the Court 7
Plaintiff does not dispute that the School was experiencing
financial difficulty. Nor does Plaintiff dispute that the School
needed to reduce its asset-to-liability ratio to comply with FCIS’s
accreditation standards.
Plaintiff, instead, argues that the School’s proffered reason
was a pretext for discrimination because alternative ways existed
to reduce the School’s expenditures without terminating Plaintiff’s
employment. Plaintiff also contends that Dr. Ferguson’s efforts to
improve the asset-to-liability ratio were unsuccessful.
But Plaintiff cannot establish pretext merely by arguing with
the wisdom of Dr. Ferguson’s decision to terminate Plaintiff’s em-
ployment.
See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. That other -- and
maybe even better – ways might have existed to resolve the
School’s financial situation does not demonstrate pretext. We have
said that an “employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a
bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at
all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.”
See id.
And we will not “second-guess the business judgment of employ-
ers.”
Id.
Plaintiff has presented no evidence rebutting head-on Dr.
Ferguson’s testimony that Dr. Ferguson believed that terminating
Plaintiff’s employment would reduce the School’s costs and that
Plaintiff’s job responsibilities could be absorbed effectively by oth-
ers.
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-11111
Nor has Plaintiff presented evidence showing that her age
was the real reason she was fired. Plaintiff points to a purported
conversation between a Board member and the former Head of
School during which the Board member expressed her opinion that
one of the School’s teachers should be replaced by “someone
younger and with more energy.” Nothing evidences, however,
that Dr. Ferguson -- the sole decisionmaker in this case -- knew
about this earlier conversation or had had similar conversations.
Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to show that the
School’s proffered reason for terminating her employment was
pretextual. Plaintiff has not established that age discrimination was
the “but-for” cause of her adverse employment action; we affirm
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
School.4
AFFIRMED.
4 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion on appeal, the district court addressed ade-
quately Plaintiff’s failure-to-promote claim. In its written order, the district
court rejected Plaintiff’s assertion that she should have been retained as the
School’s language-arts teacher. The district court explained expressly that
Plaintiff failed to produce evidence sufficient to show either that Dr. Fergu-
son’s stated reasons for making the complained-of hiring decision were false
or that Plaintiff’s age factored into the hiring decision.
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