IOU Central, Inc. v. Premier Metals Recovery LLC, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-12405
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
IOU CENTRAL, INC,
d.b.a.
IOU Financial, Inc.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PREMIER METALS RECOVERY LLC,
DAVID RAY PACE,
LYNN RAWL PACE,
Defendants-Appellees.
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12405
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-04270-MHC
____________________
Before L UCK , LAGOA , and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
IOU Central, Inc. (“IOU”) appeals the district court’s dismis-
sal for lack of personal jurisdiction of its lawsuit against one of the
three Defendants it sued, Lynn Rawl Pace (“L. Pace”). Because the
district court’s order is not a final order within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
I.
The facts of this case are straightforward.1 IOU, the plaintiff
in the trial court, is a company incorporated in Delaware, with its
principal place of business in Georgia. L. Pace, along with David
Pace (“D. Pace”) and Premier Metals Recovery (“Premier”) (to-
gether, the “Defendants”) are citizens of North Carolina that have
borrowed money from IOU since 2019. L. Pace and D. Pace are
married.
1 At the motion to dismiss stage, we accept the allegations in the complaint as
true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
See Mesa
Valderrama v. United States, 417 F.3d 1189, 1194 (11th Cir. 2005).
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21-12405 Opinion of the Court 3
The case arises from one of those loan applications. On July
16, 2020, D. Pace applied for a loan on behalf of Premier to IOU’s
Georgia office through the company’s online application portal.
Through the same website, D. Pace executed a Promissory Note
(“Note”) for a principal sum of $84,800.00 in exchange for the
equivalent value of funds, and he granted a security interest to IOU
on property, proceeds, and assets as collateral for the loan. D. Pace
also executed a Personal Guaranty Agreement (“Guaranty”) on the
same day via IOU’s website. Both parties agree that only D. Pace,
on behalf of Premier, communicated with IOU regarding the loan
and related documents. L. Pace is a non-party to these agreements.
IOU eventually sued the Defendants, arguing that they
made misrepresentations to IOU about their intent or their ability
to repay the Loan, and breached the agreements in the Note and
Guaranty shortly after receipt of the funds. The Defendants moved
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the district court
originally granted that motion in favor of all the Defendants on
June 8, 2021, entering judgment dismissing the action on the same
day. With respect to L. Pace, the district court explained that it
lacked jurisdiction over her because she was not party to and did
not sign the loan documents, Note, or Guaranty, and because IOU
did not allege any facts to support finding that L. Pace transacted
business in Georgia.
IOU moved for reconsideration pursuant to Rules 59 and 60
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on July 7, 2021, but on the
very next day, IOU appealed to this Court. After IOU filed its
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-12405
notice of appeal, the district court granted in part and denied in part
IOU’s motion for reconsideration, on November 9, 2021.
On December 22, 2021, a panel of this Court entered an or-
der directing the parties to provide their opinions on IOU’s motion
for reconsideration and on whether the district court had jurisdic-
tion when it issued its November 9 order regarding that motion.
We then entered an order holding that the district court lacked ju-
risdiction when it granted in part IOU’s motion for reconsidera-
tion, treating the trial court’s November 9 order as an indicative
ruling, and remanding the case on a limited basis to have the trial
court rule as it had indicated.
See Griggs v. Provident Consumer
Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (“The filing of a notice of appeal is
an event of jurisdictional significance -- it confers jurisdiction on the
court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over
those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.”). On this limited
remand, the district court held that it could properly exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over D. Pace and Premier because they expressly
submitted to personal jurisdiction in Georgia in the Note and Guar-
anty -- but it did not change its ruling with respect to L. Pace.
II.
Before considering the merits of IOU’s appeal, we must ask
whether we have appellate jurisdiction over it. We do not and we
therefore dismiss this appeal.
“As a court of limited jurisdiction, we may exercise appellate
jurisdiction only where ‘authorized by Constitution and statute.’”
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21-12405 Opinion of the Court 5
Jenkins v. Prime Ins. Co., 32 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2022) (quot-
ing
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994)). By statute, Congress has authorized us to review “final de-
cisions of the district courts.”
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291;
see also
SmileDirectClub, LLC v. Battle, 4 F.4th 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2021)
(en banc) (quotation marks omitted) (“As a circuit court, we gener-
ally only have jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of the
district courts.”). There are a select few limited exceptions to this
“final order” rule, none of which apply here.
See Jenkins, 32 F.4th
at 1345–46 (discussing 28 U.S.C. 1292(b), Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 54(b), and the collateral order doctrine).
A final decision “is one that ends the litigation on the merits
and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judg-
ment.”
Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in
Lake Cnty., 947 F.3d 1362, 1370 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks
omitted). In order to qualify as a final decision, “the district court’s
order generally must adjudicate all claims against all parties,
thereby ending the litigation.”
Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 276 F.3d
1229, 1230 (11th Cir. 2001).
The district court’s original order dismissing all the Defend-
ants for lack of personal jurisdiction was, at one point, a final order.
We issued a limited remand, however, allowing the district court
to reconsider its previous order. On remand, the district court con-
cluded that it did indeed have personal jurisdiction over D. Pace
and Premier, although not over L. Pace. The district court noted,
“the pending appeal as it relates to the prior finding of the Court
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-12405
that it did not have personal jurisdiction over [D. Pace and Premier]
is likely moot.” This means that the case against D. Pace and Prem-
ier is still ongoing in the trial court. It also means, for our purposes,
that the district court’s original order is no longer a final order be-
cause it does not adjudicate all claims against all parties. It only
makes a final adjudication as to L. Pace.
Because IOU does not appeal a “final order” within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and no other basis for our appellate
jurisdiction exists, we DISMISS this appeal.
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