22-10887•USA v. Antony Junior Harris
22-10887Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit28 de set. de 2023
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10887
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANTONY JUNIOR HARRIS,
a.k.a. Anthony Harris,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 9:20-cr-80088-RS-1
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10887
____________________
Before W ILSON , L UCK , and E DMONDSON , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Antony Harris appeals his convictions for conspiracy to pos-
sess and for attempt to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl
and methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
846. Harris challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence obtained following the search and seizure of a
package at a FedEx distribution facility. The district court con-
cluded that Harris lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
package and, thus, lacked standing to raise a Fourth Amendment
challenge. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
We review the denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed
standard of review, examining the district court’s factual determi-
nations for clear error and reviewing the district court’s application
of law to those facts de novo. See United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d
1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 2007). We construe all facts in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party -- here, the government. See id.
The Supreme Court has recognized that mailed packages
constitute “effects” that are subject to Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984). A person
has Fourth Amendment standing to challenge a search when he has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. See United
States v. Cohen, 38 F.4th 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 2022). To demonstrate
a legitimate expectation of privacy, a defendant must show (1) that
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22-10887 Opinion of the Court 3
he “manifest[ed] a subjective expectation of privacy in the object
of the challenged search,” and (2) that “society [is] willing to recog-
nize that expectation as legitimate.” See United States v. McKennon,
814 F.2d 1539, 1542-43 (11th Cir. 1987). In determining whether a
defendant has made the requisite showing, courts consider the to-
tality of the circumstances, including “preliminary statements of
ownership asserted . . . at the motion to suppress hearing.” See
United States v. Hawkins, 681 F.2d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 1982).
Generally speaking, a person who is neither the sender nor
the addressee of a package can demonstrate no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the contents of the package. See United States v.
Smith, 39 F.3d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1994). Under certain circum-
stances, we have recognized that a person may assert a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a package addressed to them under an
alternate name. See United States v. Garcia-Bercovich, 582 F.3d 1234,
1238 (11th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the defendant -- Angel Gar-
cia-Bercovich -- had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a package
addressed to “Angel at Natural Heat Systems”); United States v. Rich-
ards, 638 F.2d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding that a package
addressed to a business entity established by the defendant was “in
effect” addressed to the defendant).
Here, Harris sought to suppress evidence discovered follow-
ing the search of a FedEx package containing fentanyl and meth-
amphetamine. The shipping label listed the package’s sender as a
Mailbox Plus location in California. The package was addressed to
“C. Bucklin” at an apartment in Lantana, Florida. The Lantana
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10887
apartment was the personal residence of Alexis Bucklin: a woman
Harris was then dating.
At the suppression hearing, Harris testified that he arranged
for his California drug supplier to mail the package to a fictitious
person (“C. Bucklin”) at the Lantana address. The package was de-
livered to a common area in front of the Lantana apartment build-
ing. Harris then instructed Alexis Bucklin to move the package
from the common area to her apartment where she was expected
to hand the unopened package over to Harris. Harris later took the
package from the Lantana apartment to his residence in Boynton
Beach, Florida.
Officers observed Harris enter the Boynton Beach address
and arrested Harris shortly thereafter. Upon searching the
Boynton Beach address, officers found the package (which already
had been opened) and its contents, a drug ledger, and other drug
paraphernalia. Officers also found Harris’s clothing, shoes, jewelry,
and other personal belongings.
At the suppression hearing, Harris testified that he had been
expecting a package of marijuana. While the package was in
transit, however, Harris said his drug supplier notified him that the
package had been sent in error and contained the wrong contents.
As a result, Harris testified that he intended to return the package
to the sender.
Under the circumstances involved in this case, the district
court committed no error in concluding that Harris failed to
demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the package.
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22-10887 Opinion of the Court 5
Harris was neither the sender nor the listed addressee on the pack-
age. And Harris raises no challenge on appeal to the district court’s
determination that Harris failed to establish a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the Lantana apartment listed on the package as
the delivery address.
The district court also determined reasonably that Harris
failed to establish “a strong nexus or alter ego relationship” be-
tween himself and the fictitious name “C. Bucklin.” Harris pre-
sented no evidence showing that he had fake identification using
the name “C. Bucklin” or that he had set up a corporation, bank
account, utility, or bill using that name. On appeal, Harris contends
that he used the fictitious name “C. Bucklin” on at least three drug-
filled packages. But Harris also testified inconsistently at the sup-
pression hearing that the package was addressed mistakenly to “C.
Bucklin” after his drug supplier misheard Harris’s instruction to ad-
dress the package to “Fredrick Bucklin.” The evidence -- viewed in
the government’s favor -- supports the district court’s determina-
tion that Harris failed to demonstrate a connection to the fictitious
name “C. Bucklin” sufficient to establish Fourth Amendment
standing.
The district court committed no error in concluding that
Harris lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the package.*
* We also agree with the district court’s alternative ruling that -- even if Harris
could show a legitimate expectation of privacy -- he demonstrated no Fourth
Amendment violation. The record evidence supports the district court’s
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10887
We affirm the district court’s denial of Harris’s motion to suppress
evidence.
AFFIRMED.
.
determination that the package was opened by a FedEx employee: a private
person who was not acting as an instrument or agent of the government.
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