Cierra Geter v. Schneider National Carriers, Inc.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11285
____________________
CIERRA GETER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-01148-SCJ
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
Before J ORDAN, L AGOA , Circuit Judges, and C ANNON,* District
Judge.
L AGOA , Circuit Judge:
Cierra Geter worked for several years as a full-time, night-
shift area planning manager (“APM”) for Schneider National Carri-
ers, Inc., a transportation and logistics company. After being diag-
nosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), Geter took
temporary leave from Schneider, as was her right under federal
law. When her period of leave elapsed, Geter returned to work,
but with an accommodation from Schneider: the company tempo-
rarily allowed her to work part-time, and partly from home, for
several months, even though the company did not employ any
other part-time APMs. Geter requested that Schneider continue to
accommodate her several more times, and Schneider obliged. But
after about three months, Geter requested another accommoda-
tion—a continuation of her part-time schedule and the ability to
work remotely any time she was scheduled to work alone. Schnei-
der denied this request and terminated her employment.
Geter sued Schneider under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), asserting failure-to-accommodate, discrimination,
and retaliation claims. Those claims hinged largely on whether
Geter is a “qualified individual” within the meaning of the ADA.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12111(8). A person is a qualified
* Honorable Aileen M. Cannon, United States District Judge for the Southern
District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 3
individual if she can “perform the essential functions of [her job]
with or without reasonable accommodations.” Lucas v. W.W.
Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001); see also
§ 12111(8). Schneider moved for summary judgment on the
ground that Geter was not a qualified individual because full-time
work and in-person work were essential functions of her job that
she could not perform. The district court agreed with Schneider
and granted the motion for summary judgment.
This appeal followed. After careful consideration, and with
the benefit of oral argument, we hold that, on the record before us,
there is no genuine dispute of material fact that full-time and in-
person work were essential functions of Geter’s role. We thus af-
firm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Geter Is Diagnosed with PTSD and Panic Disorder.
Schneider is a transportation and logistics company that op-
erates twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. In July 2014,
Schneider hired Geter as a full-time dispatch analyst. That position
was—and Geter knew it to be—a full-time role. Schneider soon
changed the “dispatch analyst” job title to “area planning manager”
(“APM”).
Geter’s responsibilities as an APM included coordinating dis-
patching drivers with customer loads, assisting drivers in gathering
paperwork and load information, taking calls and messages from
drivers, and resolving any driver issues. One of her primary re-
sponsibilities was supporting drivers. A job description for the role
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
noted that the APM position was an “Exempt (Salaried)” role and
listed a variety of “[e]ssential [j]ob [d]uties and [r]esponsibilities,”
such as “[e]stablish[ing] [a] market plan,” “[g]enerat[ing] actions to
improve key factor results,” and “regular and consistent attendance
and timeliness.” The description clarified that these responsibilities
were “not an exhaustive or comprehensive list of all job responsi-
bilities, tasks, and duties,” as “[o]ther duties and responsibilities
may be assigned and the scope of the job may change as necessi-
tated by business demands.” Under another heading titled,
“Skills/Behaviors Necessary to Perform Job,” the job description
listed “[a]bility to develop relationships through interpersonal
skills” and “[a]bility to work well in a fast paced, high pressure en-
vironment.” This overall job description, according to Geter, “ac-
curately reflected APM job duties.” And Geter specifically con-
ceded that Schneider considered the ability to develop relationships
with drivers to be an important part of the APM job.
Geter worked at Schneider’s site in Fairburn, Georgia. She
worked on Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Sunday from 11:00
p.m. to 10:00 a.m.—a schedule Schneider called the “third shift.”
Geter reported to operations team lead Travis Torrence, who su-
pervised second- and third-shift APMs as well as driver team leads.
Torrence reported to operations manager Doug Horton, who, in
turn, reported to operations director Marianne Biskey-Rose. Be-
tween 2018 and 2019, Audreianna Williams, Desmond Seymour,
and Elaine Young also worked the third shift at the Fairburn loca-
tion. Sometimes, Geter worked her shift alone, but there is a dis-
pute in the record about how often she did. Geter insists she
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 5
typically worked alone only on Thursdays, while Torrence attests
that she often worked alone, especially on Sundays. Geter testified
that Schneider had lightly staffed her shift for “several years” and
that she had often asked for additional support but received none.
The Fairburn location had a lounge for drivers to visit before
or after their workday. Near the lounge was Schneider’s opera-
tions office, where APMs worked. Drivers often visited the opera-
tions office to ask APMs for assistance with obtaining paperwork
and load information. Between the office and the lounge, there
was a printer located behind a locked door.
Geter maintains that her presence in the office was not nec-
essary. She attests that she could access the printer remotely when
she worked from home. Williams also attests—in general terms—
that it was common for Fairburn APMs to work from home. But
Geter acknowledges that Schneider’s Atlanta-based drivers appre-
ciated when APMs were in the office and that Schneider wanted its
APMs in the office for that reason. She also concedes that being in
the office was necessary when drivers asked for help finding trucks
or retrieving keys from the office lockbox. At least sometimes,
driver team leads and intermodal operating specialists also assisted
drivers with finding keys. But these employees did not work the
third shift.
Geter experienced significant mental health issues while em-
ployed with Schneider. Shortly before Geter began working at
Schneider, she was the victim of attempted sexual assault at a truck
stop. In 2015, a healthcare provider diagnosed her with major
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
depressive disorder. Later, in September 2018, Geter attempted su-
icide. Geter then sought and obtained a leave of absence from
Schneider under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).
Geter’s psychiatrist, Dr. Cassandra Wanzo, subsequently diag-
nosed Geter with PTSD and panic disorder in October 2018. Geter
testified that her suicide attempt sprang from a combination of her
“personal demons” and an excessive workload that she had, unsuc-
cessfully, asked Schneider to alleviate. The parties do not dispute
that Geter had a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
B. Schneider Accommodates Geter After Her FMLA Leave.
Schneider maintains a “Flexible Work Accommodation”
(“FWA”) policy for “work arrangement[s] other than full time on-
site, that [have] been agreed to by the associate and leader, and con-
tinue[] to meet the business needs of the position.” A description
of the FWA policy states that “[f]lexible work arrangements are at
the sole discretion of Schneider.” Similarly, Schneider maintains a
“Remote Work Policy” that allows employees to work remotely or
“telework” if their supervisor approves the arrangement. The Re-
mote Work Policy does not “apply to situations where associates
work from home in remote locations on an occasional, incon-
sistent, or temporary basis.” Schneider’s director of operations,
Biskey-Rose, and a human resources (“HR”) employee for Schnei-
der testified that supervisors had the discretion to allow employees
to work from home because of emergencies or for specific personal
reasons, but Schneider did not allow perpetual remote work.
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 7
Schneider at first approved Geter’s FMLA leave from Octo-
ber 9, 2018, through December 31, 2018. During that time, Schnei-
der relied on Torrence, Williams, and Seymour to cover Geter’s
shifts, with Torrence usually being the one to cover Geter’s Sunday
shifts.
Before Geter’s approved leave period ended, Geter submit-
ted a “Return-to-Work” form completed by Dr. Wanzo. Dr.
Wanzo stated that Geter could return to work at the beginning of
January 2019 with restrictions—specifically, a work schedule of
three days per week, ten hours per day, until mid-February. Geter
also requested that she not be scheduled to work her Sunday shift
so that she could attend a weekly PTSD support group on Monday
mornings. Schneider agreed to provide Geter with these accom-
modations.
Dr. Wanzo wrote another medical note that Geter submit-
ted to Schneider on January 21, 2019. The note requested an ex-
tension of Geter’s part-time work schedule to March 20, 2019.
Schneider again agreed. Around February 2019, Geter worked
from home on several days when she was scheduled to work alone
with Torrence’s permission.
Geter’s reduced schedule burdened other Fairburn employ-
ees, but Geter disputes the extent of the burden. Torrence, for his
part, insists that he worked Geter’s Sunday night shift in addition
to fulfilling his regular duties. Picking up the night shift meant that
he would leave the office after an eight-hour shift at 7:00 a.m. and
return to work at 1:00 p.m. to work another eight-hour shift. In all,
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
Torrence claimed that he worked between fifty-five and sixty hours
per week while Geter worked part-time.
Geter disputes Torrence’s account. She asserts that Tor-
rence only “sporadically” covered her shifts and that other APMs
who covered her shifts did not work overtime. But Geter does not
dispute that because she, a night-shift APM, often worked alone,
Schneider needed to staff other employees to cover any shifts that
she missed or that those other employees had more work because
of her absence. Indeed, Geter concedes that the Schneider employ-
ees who covered for her “had to work harder on their scheduled
shifts if other employees were absent.”
On March 9, 2019, Dr. Wanzo submitted medical docu-
ments and another request to keep Geter working part-time. But
this time, Geter requested permission to work from home on
Thursday, Friday, and any time she had to work alone. Dr.
Wanzo’s proposal would have kept this arrangement intact until
the end of April 2019.
On March 18, 2019, a Schneider HR employee, Anissa
Gauthier, emailed Dr. Wanzo to request more information about
the new request. Dr. Wanzo responded with more medical docu-
mentation and a request that Schneider allow Geter to work three
days a week, ten hours a day, and from home on two of those days
(Thursday and Friday) until June 5, 2019. Gauthier emailed Dr.
Wanzo and Geter a copy of a letter with questions that had to be
answered for Schneider to determine whether to accommodate
Geter’s request. Gauthier observed that “[t]he end date of this
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 9
restriction has been extended 4 times and is appearing to be a per-
manent restriction.” The email asked for a response “no later than”
April 8, 2019. Geter provided the questions, which were contained
in a letter attached to Gauthier’s email, to Dr. Wanzo.
C. Schneider Terminates Geter’s Employment and Tempo-
rarily Alters Its Policies During the COVID-19 Pan-
demic.
1. Schneider Terminates Geter’s Employment
Biskey-Rose, Torrence, and Schneider HR employee Ashley
Jansen considered Geter’s accommodation request. Biskey-Rose
asked Geter if she would switch her PTSD support group appoint-
ment so that she could work the Sunday overnight shift, but Geter
rejected this option because the other available support group ap-
pointment conflicted with a doctor’s appointment. Torrence at-
tested that Schneider considered reassigning Geter to another po-
sition, but chose not to because Fairburn had only full-time posi-
tions. Jansen and Biskey-Rose discussed the alternative of hiring a
temporary employee to fill in for Geter, but they decided that this
option was not prudent because of the time it would take to hire
and train the new employee, as well as the difficulty of assigning a
new employee to work the third shift by herself.
These discussions were consistent with Torrence’s sworn
testimony. Torrence attested that full-time work was an essential
function of the APM position because Schneider could ensure that
it had the resources necessary to support drivers and dispatch loads
at all hours of the day only by hiring full-time APMs. Torrence also
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
attested that while Geter worked for Schneider, in-person work
was an essential function for second- and third-shift APMs because
they needed to develop relationships with drivers, retrieve spare
keys for drivers from the secure lock box, and print drivers’ paper-
work.
Thus, after consulting Jansen, Torrence and Biskey-Rose de-
cided to terminate Geter’s employment effective April 12, 2019. A
couple of weeks later, Dr. Wanzo finally responded to Gauthier’s
letter, asserting that Geter could not work a Monday-through-Fri-
day schedule and that Geter could not work in a fast-paced, high-
pressure environment. In a declaration, Geter attests that other
than her conversation with Biskey-Rose about switching her Mon-
day group session so that Geter could work Sunday night, nobody
from Schneider discussed a possible accommodation with her.
Geter also insists that if Schneider had provided a short leave of
absence through June 5, 2019, or offered to transfer her to the sec-
ond shift, she would have accepted either accommodation. After
Schneider fired Geter, it transferred Ryan Wheeler, another APM,
from first shift to third shift when Williams resigned and hired two
new people.
2. Schneider Accommodates Other Employees in Various Circum-
stances.
Geter contrasts her experience with that of several other
Schneider employees. The first employee is Tiffany Kitchens, a
first-shift APM. Kitchens always worked with other APMs on her
shifts and never alone. Kitchens once requested and obtained three
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 11
weeks of FMLA leave. The same year she took leave, her mother
suffered a stroke, and Schneider approved her for additional inter-
mittent FMLA leave. But Kitchens testified that she did not use her
approved leave and instead obtained permission from her supervi-
sor to work remotely while her mother was in the hospital. Kitch-
ens used vacation time for days that she needed to take off, and she
continued to work full-time. Kitchens’s mother left the hospital
after four months, at which point Kitchens returned to full-time
work from the office.
The record, however, is unclear regarding whether Kitchens
worked remotely only as needed during those four months. Geter
cites her own deposition testimony as establishing that Kitchens
“worked remotely for at least four months.” Geter testified that,
during that period, she knew from conversations with the first-shift
staff that Kitchens was sometimes not in the office and that Kitch-
ens sometimes worked reduced hours, sometimes worked re-
motely, and sometimes was off.1 When pressed for specifics, Geter
testified that she did not know exact days but that “[Torrence]
would definitely know that, and [Kitchens’s supervisor] would
know that.” Geter also admitted that she was not in charge of
1 “The general rule is that inadmissible hearsay ‘cannot be considered on a
motion for summary judgment.’” See Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322
(11th Cir. 1999) (footnote omitted) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d
46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990)). We find that, on this point, Geter’s testimony is inad-
missible hearsay, as there is nothing in the record to indicate that her state-
ment would lead to admissible evidence at trial. Therefore, we do not con-
sider this portion of Geter’s testimony.
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
approving Kitchens’s time off and had no access to her time rec-
ords; as she stated, “[o]nly management and HR [have] those abil-
ities.” Biskey-Rose, however, testified that Kitchens worked re-
motely only as needed during that time.
Additionally, Sarah Kopf, a second-shift APM, testified that
she knew “there were people that were able to have” reduced
schedules, but that she did not “know specifics.” Geter’s lawyer
asked Kopf at her deposition who worked reduced schedules
“[b]ased on [Kopf’s] personal knowledge.” Kopf testified that Geter
had a reduced schedule “when [she] came back” and that Kitchens
“had a reduced schedule when she came back as well.” But Kopf
then qualified her testimony about Kitchens, saying, “I didn’t know
the details though because I didn’t work with her on first shift.”
Despite Geter’s and Kopf’s testimonies regarding their understand-
ing that Kitchens worked reduced hours, however, Kitchens testi-
fied that she worked full-time throughout the four-month period
during which she sometimes worked remotely.
The second employee Geter points to is Kopf. Kopf was a
second shift APM who reported to Torrence and sometimes
worked alone. Kopf testified that Torrence permitted her to work
from home a few times in the case of an emergency, but she never
requested or was approved for sustained remote work. She also
testified that she never worked a reduced schedule and did not ask
to work from home when she was scheduled to work alone.
The third employee is Williams, who, as noted, was a third-
shift APM whom Torrence allowed to work remotely throughout
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 13
the later stages of her pregnancy in late 2018 and early 2019. Be-
ginning in February 2019, Williams took FMLA-covered maternity
leave, and Schneider hired a temporary employee to replace her
during that time.
Finally, Geter points to Torrence, who she asserts “took off”
approximately eighty days in 2018 and supports her contention
with an attestation that she drew this information from the Fair-
burn work calendar. But Geter did not append the calendar as an
exhibit to any of her filings in the district court, and Schneider
never produced it. The calendar is not part of the record on appeal.
3. Schneider Reallocates Job Responsibilities After the Onset of the
COVID-19 Pandemic.
About a year after Geter’s termination, the COVID-19 pan-
demic began. Schneider responded by making temporary adjust-
ments to protect the safety of its employees. At first, Schneider
transitioned APMs to full-time remote work, but it later adjusted
the policy to two days a week of in-person work and three days a
week of remote work. In March 2021, Schneider returned to a full-
time, in-person schedule. Schneider also modified its protocol for
printing in Fairburn during the pandemic. The company moved
the printer to the drivers’ lounge so that APMs could remotely
print paperwork for drivers. Further, during the pandemic, Schnei-
der left the office unlocked for drivers to retrieve their keys while
Fairburn employees worked from home, but since returning to in-
person work, the company has kept the office locked.
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14 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
In April 2020, Schneider moved all of its APMs to Green Bay,
Wisconsin, the site of its corporate office. Schneider planned this
change before the pandemic. After the APMs moved to Green Bay,
Schneider reassigned in-person driver-assistance responsibilities to
the senior operating specialist (“SOS”) position. SOSs remained in
Fairburn to retrieve keys from the lockbox as needed. Schneider
also reassigned other in-person responsibilities that previously be-
longed to APMs to other employees.
D. Geter Sues Schneider and the District Court Enters
Summary Judgment in Schneider’s Favor.
Geter filed suit against Schneider on March 12, 2020, assert-
ing claims under the ADA for failure to accommodate, disability
discrimination, and retaliation, and claims for race discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.2 Even-
tually, Schneider moved for summary judgment on all claims.
Schneider argued that Geter’s failure-to-accommodate claim failed
because she was not a qualified individual, she was not discrimi-
nated against when her unreasonable request was denied, and she
herself caused a breakdown in the interactive, accommodation pro-
cess. Schneider similarly contended that Geter’s ADA discrimina-
tion claim lacked merit because she was not a qualified individual
and Schneider did not treat any similarly situated employee more
2 The magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny Geter's race
discrimination claims. Because Geter neither objected to the magistrate's rec-
ommendation, nor raised the issue on appeal, we consider these claims aban-
doned.
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 15
favorably. And Schneider argued that it should be granted sum-
mary judgment on the ADA retaliation claim because Geter had
not shown a causal relationship between her request for an accom-
modation and her termination. Geter urged the district court to
reject each of these arguments.
A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation on
Schneider’s motion and recommended that the motion be granted.
The magistrate judge first addressed Geter’s failure-to-accommo-
date claim. Outlining the evidence, the magistrate judge observed
that Schneider considered full-time, and in-person work essential
for the APM position and concluded that under the governing law,
Schneider’s determination was due substantial weight. The mag-
istrate judge next considered Schneider’s FWA and remote-work
policies. He concluded that the policies did “little to support
[Geter’s] argument that working full-time or from the office are not
essential functions” because the policies expressly depend on super-
visors’ judgment and circumstance-dependent needs of each posi-
tion. The magistrate judge also noted Geter’s own testimony that
certain parts of her job could not be performed from home, as well
as Kopf’s and Torrence’s testimonies to the same effect.
The magistrate judge rejected Geter’s arguments that events
postdating her termination supported her failure-to-accommodate
claim. In particular, the magistrate judge deemed it insignificant
that Geter could have accessed the Fairburn printer remotely be-
cause while she was employed, the printer was in a locked office
that drivers could not access without an APM. The magistrate
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16 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
judge then explained that the relocation of APMs to Green Bay did
not help Geter because at that time, Schneider reassigned the in-
person aspects of APMs’ jobs to other positions, thus changing the
nature of the APM role after Geter had left. The magistrate judge
similarly reasoned that Schneider’s temporary transition to remote
work during the pandemic showed that temporary remote work
“may have been feasible with . . . extra measures in place,” but ul-
timately conflicted with APMs’ essential functions and Schneider’s
preferences.
Ultimately, the magistrate judge concluded that full-time
work, in-person work “when only one APM was scheduled,” and
working in a fast-paced, high-pressure environment were all essen-
tial functions of APMs at the time Geter was terminated. Whether
Geter was a qualified individual for ADA purposes turned on
whether she could perform those essential functions with or with-
out a reasonable accommodation. The magistrate judge concluded
that Geter could not do so and that she had not argued that she
could.
Next, the magistrate judge considered Geter’s discrimina-
tion and retaliation claims. The magistrate judge found that
Geter’s ADA discrimination claim failed because she had not
shown that she was a qualified individual—the same showing she
failed to make in support of her failure-to-accommodate claim. Ad-
ditionally, the magistrate judge concluded that the ADA discrimi-
nation claim failed because Geter did not show that Schneider
treated a similarly situated comparator more favorably than her
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 17
nor produce other compelling circumstantial evidence in support
of her claim.
The magistrate judge then turned to the ADA retaliation
claim. He concluded that the close temporal proximity of Geter’s
termination to her request for an accommodation amounted to a
prima facie showing of causation. He considered whether Schnei-
der had articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for Geter’s
firing. Here again Schneider argued that it had a legitimate reason
for terminating Geter’s employment: she could not perform the es-
sential functions of the APM position. The magistrate judge agreed
that Schneider had carried its burden of showing a legitimate, non-
retaliatory reason for Geter’s termination because Biskey-Rose,
Torrence, and Jansen arrived at the decision to terminate Geter af-
ter considering alternatives and determining that she could not per-
form the essential functions of her job. And the magistrate judge
found that Geter had not pointed to any probative evidence sug-
gesting that their explanation for her termination was pretextual.
Thus, the magistrate judge recommended granting summary judg-
ment in favor of Schneider on the retaliation claim. Geter then
filed objections to the report and recommendation.
Over Geter’s objections, the district court affirmed the re-
port and recommendation and dismissed Geter’s case. Tackling
the failure-to-accommodate claim first, the district court found that
the APM job description weighed more in Geter’s favor than
Schneider’s. But the district court held that other factors, including
the experiences of other APMs, Schneider’s judgment, and the
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18 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
increased workload on other APMs resulting from Geter’s reduced
schedule—including the undisputed absence of any part-time em-
ployees in Geter’s APM position—favored Schneider. The district
court also agreed that Geter’s testimony about Torrence’s taking
around eighty days off in 2018 was inadmissible hearsay and, in any
event, did not move the needle on Geter’s claim because Torrence
had a different job. Based on these conclusions, the district court
found that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that full-
time work was an essential function of Geter’s job. It therefore did
not consider whether in-person work or working in a fast-paced,
high-pressure environment were essential.
Accordingly, the district court adopted the report and rec-
ommendation’s finding that Geter was not a qualified individual
under the ADA. And, like the magistrate judge, the district court
determined that Geter’s ADA discrimination and ADA retaliation
claims failed for the same reason. Thus, the district court adopted
and affirmed the report and recommendation’s finding that the
claims failed.
The district court entered judgment in favor of Schneider,
and Geter timely appealed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary
judgment. Mech v. Sch. Bd., 806 F.3d 1070, 1074 (11th Cir. 2015).
“Summary judgment is appropriate if ‘the evidence before the
court shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 19
law.’” McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must
“construe the facts and draw all inferences in the light most favor-
able to the nonmoving party” and, if a conflict arises between the
facts evidenced by the parties, “credit the nonmoving party’s ver-
sion.” Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir.
2013) (quoting Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006)).
“On motions for summary judgment, we may consider only that
evidence which can be reduced to an admissible form.” Rowell v.
BellSouth Corp., 433 F.3d 794, 800 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)(2).
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion, even when those rulings come at the summary-judg-
ment stage. Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 919 (11th Cir.
2018). And we may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any
ground that finds support in the record. Roy v. Ivy, 53 F.4th 1338,
1346 (11th Cir. 2022); Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1256.
III. ANALYSIS
Geter argues on appeal that the district court erred in grant-
ing summary judgment to Schneider on her failure-to-accommo-
date, discrimination, and retaliation claims. She maintains that a
reasonable factfinder could have concluded that she is a “qualified
individual” under the ADA. Construing the undisputed facts in the
light most favorable to Geter, we disagree and address each claim
in turn.
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20 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
A. Failure-to-Accommodate Claim
Geter first challenges the entry of judgment against her on
her failure-to-accommodate claim.
The ADA provides as follows: “No covered entity shall dis-
criminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a) (emphasis added). The ADA defines a “qualified individ-
ual” as “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommo-
dation, can perform the essential functions of the employment po-
sition that such individual holds or desires.” Id. § 12111(8). And it
defines the phrase “discriminate against a qualified individual on
the basis of disability” as including “not making reasonable accom-
modations to the known physical or mental limitations of an oth-
erwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or
employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the ac-
commodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation
of the business of such covered entity.” Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). That
definition forms the basis of failure-to-accommodate claims.
A plaintiff can establish a prima facie failure-to-accommo-
date claim under the ADA by showing that: “(1) he is disabled; (2)
he was a ‘qualified individual’ at the relevant time, meaning he
could perform the essential functions of the job in question with or
without reasonable accommodations; and (3) he was discriminated
against because of his disability,” i.e., his employer failed to
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 21
reasonably accommodate him. Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1255. An accom-
modation is reasonable “only if it enables the employee to perform
the essential functions of the job.”3 Id.
The parties do not dispute that Geter is disabled within the
meaning of the ADA, so only the second and third failure-to-ac-
commodate elements are at issue. Additionally, Geter does not
contest that, at the time of her termination, she could not work
full-time or in-person whenever she was scheduled to work alone.
Nor does Geter dispute that Schneider had no designated part-time
employees in the APM position at the time she sought the accom-
modations, or that Schneider had to have another employee cover
Geter’s in-office duties when she worked reduced hours or worked
remotely. Instead, she argues that neither full-time work nor in-
person work was an essential function of her job. The district court
concluded that Geter was not a qualified individual because full-
time work was an essential function of Geter’s job that she could
3 We have held that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies
to ADA discrimination claims, and we have passingly suggested that it governs
failure-to-accommodate claims. See Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d
1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2007) (suggesting that the framework applies at least to
discrimination claims); Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir.
2000) (suggesting in passing that the framework applies in considering a fail-
ure-to-accommodate claim). But in an unpublished case, we held that the
McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply to failure-to-accommodate
claims. Nadler v. Harvey, No. 06-12692, 2007 WL 2404705, at *9 (11th Cir. Aug.
24, 2007) (“[W]e join [our sister circuits] today and hold that McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting is not applicable to reasonable accommodation cases.”). We
need not resolve this matter because Geter has not shown that she is a quali-
fied individual, which is her initial burden under either approach.
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22 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
not perform. The magistrate judge, however, determined that
both full-time work and in-person work when only one APM was
scheduled to work were essential functions of Geter’s position.
Although the district court did not reach the magistrate judge’s rec-
ommendation that in-person work when only one APM was sched-
uled to work was also an essential function of Geter’s position, the
parties fully briefed this issue to the Court and, as noted above, we
can consider and affirm the judgment on any ground that finds sup-
port in the record. See Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1256. On appeal, Geter
raises both issues. We thus address both whether full-time or in-
person work were essential functions of Geter’s job.4
“‘Essential functions’ are the fundamental job duties of a po-
sition that an individual with a disability is actually required to per-
form.” Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000).
“Whether a function is essential is evaluated on a case-by-case basis
by examining a number of factors.” Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co.,
205 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000). An important factor is the
employer’s judgment as to whether a function is essential.
4 Geter concedes in her initial brief that “[s]he had trouble working in a fast-
paced, high-pressure environment throughout her employment with Schnei-
der, not beginning with her need for accommodations in 2018 and 2019.” Ad-
ditionally, Geter did not dispute that working in a fast-paced, high-pressure
environment was an essential function of her position, instead challenging
Schneider’s position that she could not perform this function. The magistrate
judge thus concluded that working in a fast-paced, high-pressure environment
was an essential function of Geter’s position. The district court, however, did
not address whether working in such an environment was an essential func-
tion, and we likewise do not address the issue here.
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 23
Congress provided in the ADA that “consideration shall be given
to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essen-
tial, and if an employer has prepared a written description before
advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description
shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.”
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). We have said that the employer’s assessment
deserves substantial, but not conclusive, weight. See Holly v. Clair-
son Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1258 (11th Cir. 2007).
Federal regulations identify several other relevant factors,
including “(1) the amount of time spent on the job performing the
function, (2) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to
perform the function, (3) the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement, (4) the work experience of past incumbents in the job,
and (5) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.”
D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1230 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Davis, 205 F.3d at 1305); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).
These regulations also enumerate several bases for concluding that
a job function is essential, e.g., if the position exists to perform the
function, if there are a limited number of employees available
among whom the performance of the job function can be distrib-
uted, or if the function is highly specialized and the incumbent in
the position was hired for his or her ability to perform the particu-
lar function. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2).
1. Full-Time Work
We begin with the district court’s conclusion that working
full-time was essential for third-shift APMs.
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24 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
First, we must consider Schneider’s judgment as to what
functions are essential. See Holly, 492 F.3d at 1258. Geter acknowl-
edges that we must consider Schneider’s assessment that full-time
work was essential for Geter’s position, but argues that Schneider’s
APM job description “is substantial evidence that in Schneider’s
judgment full-time work is not essential” and weighs in her favor.
Geter overstates her case. It is true that the description did not
explicitly state that the APM role was full-time. But it did identify
the APM position as “Exempt (Salaried)” and noted that it was not
“an exhaustive or comprehensive list” of all essential duties. This
is further supported by the offer letter submitted to Geter in July
2014, which explicitly characterized the position as “[f]ull time; 40
hours per week.” The APM job description thus does not reveal a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether full-time work was
an essential part of the job.
But other available evidence supports the conclusion that
Schneider deemed a full-time schedule essential to the third-shift
APM role. Despite the job description, Geter testified that she
knew she was assuming a full-time position when she was hired.
Schneider did not hire any part-time APMs at Fairburn. Torrence,
Geter’s supervisor, attested that full-time work was essential to
supporting drivers, considering that drivers were on the road and
could encounter problems twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week. Further, because the third shift was lightly staffed such that
third shift APMs often worked alone, it was particularly critical for
third shift APMs to work each of their scheduled shifts.
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 25
To counter this evidence, Geter argues that Schneider’s
FWA policy shows that APMs could be accommodated with part-
time arrangements because the policy itself “contains no carve-out
for APMs.” But Geter’s logic is flawed. The FWA policy was, on
its face, not generally applicable to all Schneider employees; the
policy permits flexible work arrangements only on a case-specific
basis, upon approval by the employee’s supervisors, and when the
arrangement mutually benefits both Schneider and the employee.
Thus, because the FWA policy does not apply to employees except
in very specific circumstances, there was no need for the policy to
carve out the APM position. And again, other record evidence in-
dicates that the third-shift APM position was not well-suited for
part-time work because third-shift APMs were often assigned to
work alone. That is one reason why Geter’s reduced schedule
caused others, including Torrence, to be reassigned to her shifts.
Thus, for these reasons, the FWA policy does not cast doubt
on Schneider’s judgment that full-time work was essential. And
that judgment is due substantial weight. See Holly, 492 F.3d at 1258.
We next consider “the consequences of not requiring the in-
cumbent to perform the function”—i.e., of not requiring Geter to
work full-time. D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1230 (quoting Davis, 205 F.3d
at 1305). The record speaks directly to this factor because Schnei-
der allowed Geter to work part-time for several months. Accord-
ing to Geter, Torrence covered for her only “sporadically” and
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26 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
other employees who covered for her did not work overtime.5
But these assertions are largely beside the point. Geter does not
dispute that because she often was assigned to work alone—as
were other third-shift APMs—Schneider needed to staff other em-
ployees to cover for any shifts that she missed, or that other em-
ployees had more work as a result of her absence. Indeed, she
acknowledges in her brief that other employees “had to work
harder”—and had to work the night shift—in her absence. The
burdens that Geter’s part-time schedule caused other Schneider
employees to bear weigh in Schneider’s favor. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(n)(2)(ii) (stating that a “function may be essential because
of the limited number of employees available among whom the
performance of that job function can be distributed”); Holbrook v.
City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming
grant of summary judgment and explaining that a “minor ‘reshuf-
fling’ of . . . assignments proposed by [the plaintiff] necessarily
would require the reallocation of an essential part of his job”).
And the mere fact that Schneider managed to get by for
three months while Geter worked part-time does not create a gen-
uine dispute of material fact. In Holbrook, for example, we affirmed
the grant of summary judgment to an employer despite evidence
that the employer temporarily “was able to accommodate [the
plaintiff]” because the previous accommodation “may have ex-
ceeded that which the law requires” and the “decision to cease
5 Because the parties dispute the extent to which Torrence covered Geter’s
shifts, we must credit the nonmoving party’s account at summary judgment.
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 27
making those accommodations” does not violate the ADA. 112
F.3d at 1528. We follow the same course here.
Next, we turn to “the current work experience of incum-
bents in similar jobs.” D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1230 (quoting Davis,
205 F.3d at 1305). Geter argues that the experiences of other APMs
show that full-time work was not essential. In particular, Geter
emphasizes Kopf’s testimony that some people worked reduced
hours and Geter’s own testimony that Torrence took off around
eighty days throughout 2018.
A review of the record shows that Kopf’s testimony does not
create a genuine dispute of material fact. Kopf testified that she
knew of only two other APMs who worked reduced hours—Geter
and Kitchens. But Kopf also made clear that she knew no “specif-
ics” or “details” about Kitchens’s arrangement because she did not
work the same shift. Kitchens, by contrast, testified that although
she worked remotely during the period she was approved for
FMLA leave, she did not work a reduced schedule. Given Kitch-
ens’s testimony about her own schedule, Kopf’s vague and equiv-
ocal testimony that Kitchens worked part-time is not enough to
create a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Kitchens
worked full-time. See, e.g., Wolf v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.3d 1337,
1343 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that the testimony supporting the
non-moving party at summary judgment “simply [was] too indefi-
nite to meet” that party’s burden and that other testimony was “too
ambiguous to create a genuine dispute of material fact”); Jefferson,
891 F.3d at 924–25 (affirming district court’s exclusion of
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28 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
conclusory testimony because the affiant did not provide sufficient
facts to conclude that the witness had personal knowledge of the
issue, and observing that we have “consistently held that conclu-
sory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative
value” (quoting Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th
Cir. 2020))); see also Kernel Recs. Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1308
(11th Cir. 2012) (discounting “general and ambiguous deposition
testimony, without the inclusion of specific facts,” at summary
judgment as “insufficiently probative”).
Moreover, even if Kopf were right that Kitchens temporarily
worked a reduced schedule, that would not be material to Geter’s
claim. Kitchens worked a different, more heavily staffed shift that
could be more easily covered by others, reported to a different su-
pervisor, and she was approved for FMLA leave—i.e., was entitled
not to work at all—for at least much of the time that she worked
from outside the office.6 Kitchens’s situation is thus a poor com-
parison to Geter’s request for further accommodation. And the ex-
periences of Schneider employees in similar positions reinforces
Schneider’s view that full-time work was essential for APMs, and
particularly for third-shift APMs like Geter.
6 An employee who is eligible for FMLA leave is entitled to take leave, but, in
contrast, a qualified individual with a disability is entitled only to a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(a) (explaining that
“the leave provisions of the [FMLA] are wholly distinct from the reasonable
accommodation obligations of employers covered under the [ADA]” (altera-
tions in original)).
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 29
Relatedly, Geter argues that the district court abused its dis-
cretion in excluding her testimony that Torrence took time off in
2018. See Jefferson, 891 F.3d at 924 (reviewing evidentiary ruling at
summary judgment for abuse of discretion). We disagree. First,
Geter fails to persuade us that Torrence’s alleged time off even
matters. Torrence was an operations team lead and Geter’s super-
visor; he was not an APM. So, his alleged absences imply nothing
about the essential duties of APMs.
Second, even if Torrence’s absences were relevant, the dis-
trict court also did not abuse its considerable discretion in exclud-
ing Geter’s hearsay testimony based on the unproduced calendar.
Geter argues that the calendar would be admissible as a business
record at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). We are not persuaded.
Because the calendar is not in the record, we cannot speculate that
the calendar will turn up before trial. Further, we cannot speculate
that the unproduced calendar will fall within the business records
exception. Cf. Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1294 (11th
Cir. 2012) (“The possibility that unknown witnesses will emerge to
provide testimony on this point is insufficient to establish that the
hearsay statement could be reduced to admissible evidence at
trial.”). Indeed, “admissibility under the business records exception
boils down to reliability, ‘and a trial judge has broad discretion to
determine the admissibility of such evidence.’” United States v. Ah-
med, 73 F.4th 1363, 1382–83 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States
v. Joseph, 978 F.3d 1251, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020)). Thus, based on the
record before us, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
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30 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
its discretion in determining that Geter’s testimony about the cal-
endar was inadmissible hearsay.
Therefore, viewed as a whole, the record establishes that
full-time work was an essential function of Geter’s job. Schneider
determined that a full-time schedule was an essential aspect of the
third-shift APM position. Schneider’s judgment is entitled to sub-
stantial weight regardless of other evidence. But on the record be-
fore us, the other relevant factors—the consequences of Geter’s
part-time schedule, the experiences of other Schneider employees
in similar positions, and the limited number of employees available
to cover Geter’s missed shifts—also uniformly weigh in Schneider’s
favor.7 Geter, by contrast, has not pointed to record evidence suf-
ficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact. We thus hold
that, based on the record evidence, the district court did not err in
concluding that full-time work was an essential function of Geter’s
job. See Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621, 626 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding
unreasonable a requested part-time accommodation, where the
employer had no part-time jobs at the time the employee requested
7 We do not consider several of the factors mentioned by our precedents be-
cause they are unhelpful in the context of this record. For example, we have
no need to analyze “the amount of time spent on the job performing the func-
tion” because doing so would be circular: the function we are considering is
how much time Geter needed to be working. See D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1230
(quoting Davis, 205 F.3d at 1305). We also need not consider the terms of any
collective bargaining agreements and the work experience of past incumbents
in Geter’s job because the record contains no evidence of either. See id.
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 31
the position, and where the employer would have had to create a
part-time position to provide the requested accommodation).
To be clear, our holding should not be read to lessen the
need for or the possibility of allowing part-time work arrangements
as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Indeed, part-time
work could well be a reasonable accommodation in some circum-
stances, particularly where the employer has part-time jobs readily
available. Id. Congress specifically provided that “‘reasonable ac-
commodation[s]’ may include . . . part-time or modified work
schedules.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); see also 38 C.F.R.
§ 18.412(b)(2). But whether an accommodation is reasonable is an-
alytically separate from the threshold question of whether an em-
ployee is a qualified individual. An employee is “qualified” under
the ADA only if she “could perform the essential functions of the
job in question with or without reasonable accommodations.” Lucas,
257 F.3d at 1255 (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). “In
other words, the ADA does not require [the employer] to eliminate
an essential function of [the plaintiff’s] job.” D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at
1229 (alterations in original) (quoting Davis, 205 F.3d at 1305). And
under our precedents, whether a function such as full-time work is
essential is a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on the circum-
stances of the case. See, e.g., Davis, 205 F.3d at 1305.
Other courts have adopted this approach. For instance, in
Hostettler v. College of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 2018), the Sixth
Circuit considered whether full-time work was an essential func-
tion of an employee’s job. See id. at 855–56. Although the court,
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32 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
viewing the specific record before it, concluded that full-time work
was not essential and reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, it recognized that the essential-function “analysis does
not lend itself to categorical rules—‘it is highly fact specific.’” Id. at
854 (quoting Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div.,
883 F.3d 595, 605 (6th Cir. 2018)); The court also explained that
“‘[r]egular, in-person attendance is an essential function’ of most,”
but not all, jobs, and “courts must perform a fact-intensive analy-
sis” in determining if it is. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting EEOC
v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 762–63 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc)); see
also Browning v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1043, 1048–49 (8th
Cir. 1999) (explaining that an employee was not a qualified individ-
ual because she could not work her full-time job at the time of his
termination).
We agree that determining what job functions are essential
is a fact-specific endeavor. Terrell, 132 F.3d at 626 (“Whether an
accommodation is reasonable depends on specific circum-
stances.”). So while we reach a different result than the Sixth Cir-
cuit in Hostettler in assessing the distinct record before us, we also
recognize that, in other contexts, there will be cases in which an
employee points to evidence that would permit a reasonable fact-
finder to determine that full-time work is not an essential function
of the particular job at issue.
2. In-Person Work
Geter also contends that in-person work was not an essential
function of her job. We turn first to Schneider’s judgment
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 33
regarding the APM job. Although Geter argues that Schneider did
not consider in-person work essential, the record shows otherwise.
The APM job description listed “regular and consistent attendance
and timeliness” as essential. Torrence attested that in-person work
was essential to Geter’s job. And Geter herself testified that Schnei-
der’s wanted its APMs in the office because Atlanta-based drivers
appreciated when APMs were physically present. In short, there is
no real dispute that Schneider considered in-person work essential
to Geter’s job. And again, Schneider’s judgment is entitled to sub-
stantial weight. See Holly. 492 F.3d at 1247.
Next, we address “the current work experience of incum-
bents in similar jobs.” D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1230 (quoting Davis,
205 F.3d at 1305). Geter argues that the work experiences of other
APMs support her position that in-person work was not essential.
The best comparator for Geter is Williams, another third-shift
APM who Torrence sometimes permitted to work remotely dur-
ing the later stage of her pregnancy in early 2019.8 Williams’s
vague testimony about this temporary arrangement lends minimal
support to Geter’s argument, but ultimately, it does not move the
needle. The record contains no details about how often Schneider
permitted Williams to work remotely or how the company man-
aged when Williams was scheduled to work alone. Schneider also
knew that Williams would soon take FMLA-covered maternity
leave and, as a result, was hiring a temporary employee to cover
8 Although Kitchens also worked remotely at times while her mother was sick,
Kitchens was a first shift APM who, unlike Geter, never had to work alone.
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34 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
for Williams. Geter, by contrast, continually requested accommo-
dations with no definite end dates and specifically requested that
she be allowed to work both remotely and alone.
The next factor is “the consequences of not requiring” Geter
to work at the office. D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1230 (quoting Davis, 205
F.3d at 1305). Geter’s own deposition testimony shows why this
factor weighs heavily in Schneider’s favor. Geter testified that if
Schneider approved her to work from home every time she was
scheduled to work alone—as she requested in April 2019—she
would have still needed someone in the Fairburn office to assist
with unanticipated driver issues, retrieving keys, and finding
trucks. Geter’s admission that someone needed to be in the office
when she was scheduled to work alone hurts her argument that in-
person work was not essential. Schneider was “not required by the
ADA to reallocate job duties in order to change the essential func-
tions of [Geter’s] job.” Holbrook, 112 F.3d at 1528 (quoting Milton
v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1124 (10th Cir. 1995)).
Geter resists this conclusion by arguing that the Fairburn of-
fice’s operations after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic prove
that being in the office to retrieve keys for drivers and help them
find trucks was not necessary. This argument lacks merit. The
bare feasibility of temporarily suspending a function in response to
the COVID-19 pandemic does not demonstrate that the function
was not essential. The only way Schneider could allow Geter to
work remotely when she was scheduled to work alone was to keep
the office unlocked during her shift to allow drivers to obtain keys.
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 35
And although the company left the office unlocked for a short time
at the beginning of the pandemic, it has required locking the office
ever since its return to in-person work. Accepting Geter’s argu-
ment that Schneider should have permitted her to work remotely
and alone would require Schneider to (1) jeopardize company
property by leaving its office unlocked and unattended all night or
(2) assign someone to be physically present in the office, thus
demonstrating the necessity of physical presence. Because Geter’s
argument that Schneider should return to its pandemic-era policies
collapses into an argument that Schneider should effectively excuse
Geter from performing a fundamental function of her job, we re-
ject it.
Geter again stresses Schneider’s FWA and remote-work pol-
icies. But those policies neither create a genuine dispute or mate-
rial fact nor contravene the more specific evidence that APMs did
not work remotely under them for any sustained period. Kitchens,
to be sure, might have worked remotely some days during the
four-month period that her mother was in the hospital, but Kitch-
ens was approved for FMLA leave and the arrangement was tem-
porary. Kitchens also worked a different, more heavily staffed shift
and, unlike Geter, never worked alone. Kitchens’s temporary ar-
rangement thus indicates little about the essential functions of
Geter’s role.
Last, Geter points to Schneider’s 2020 relocation of APMs to
Green Bay and reallocation of responsibilities among its positions
after it terminated her employment. But Schneider’s pandemic-era
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36 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
changes only confirm that in-person work was essential for APMs
like Geter when she worked there. See, e.g., Browning, 178 F.3d at
1048–49 (framing the relevant question as whether the employee
“was . . . a qualified individual at the time of her termination”); Ter-
rell, 132 F.3d at 626 (focusing on “when Plaintiff demanded such a
position”). When Schneider relocated APMs, it had to reassign the
essential, in-person aspects of the APM job to SOSs in Fairburn.
Geter cannot rebut evidence that in-person work was an essential
function of her job by arguing that Schneider should have simply
eliminated the function. See Holbrook, 112 F.3d at 1528.
For these reasons, in-person work was essential to Geter’s
job. The experiences of other APMs, like Williams, provide at best
only minimal support for Geter’s argument. But every other per-
tinent factor—Schneider’s judgment and the consequences of per-
mitting Geter to work remotely any time she worked alone—
strongly supports Schneider’s view that in-person work was essen-
tial to Geter’s job. After all, Geter, at her deposition, admitted that
key aspects of her job required her physical presence in the office.
Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that
full-time and in-person work were essential functions of Geter’s
job. The district court properly granted summary judgment to
Schneider on Geter’s failure-to-accommodate claim.
B. Discrimination Claim
Geter also maintains that the district court improperly
granted summary judgment to Schneider on her ADA discrimina-
tion claim. We apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 37
framework when evaluating ADA discrimination claims. See Holly,
492 F.3d at 1255. “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination
under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is disabled; (2) he is a
qualified individual; and (3) he was subjected to unlawful discrimi-
nation because of his disability.” Id. at 1255–56. For the reasons
discussed in Geter’s failure-to-accommodate claim, we conclude
that Geter’s ADA discrimination claim fails because she is not a
qualified individual. We thus conclude that the district court
properly granted summary judgment to Schneider on Geter’s ADA
discrimination claim.
C. Retaliation Claim
The ADA also provides that “[n]o person shall discriminate
against any individual because such individual . . . made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
We assess ADA retaliation claims under the McDonnell Douglas bur-
den-shifting framework. See Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire
Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1997). “To establish a
prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) statutorily
protected expression; (2) adverse employment action; and (3) a
causal link between the protected expression and the adverse ac-
tion.” Id. Once that initial showing is made, the burden shifts to
the employer to “come forward with legitimate non-discrimina-
tory reasons for its actions that negate the inference of retaliation.”
Id. If the employer does so, the plaintiff “must then demonstrate
that [she] will be able to establish at trial that the employer’s
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38 Opinion of the Court 22-11285
proffered non-discriminatory reasons are a pretextual ruse de-
signed to mask retaliation.” Id.
The district court determined that Geter made a prima facie
case of retaliation, and that Schneider articulated a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for terminating Geter—that Geter could not
perform her job’s essential functions. Neither party challenges
these conclusions. So we will assume without deciding that the
district court was correct to proceed to the third question posed by
the McDonnell Douglas framework: whether Geter can establish that
Schneider’s proffered reasons for her termination were pretextual.
She cannot. Geter’s only argument for pretext is that she
was “capable of performing the essential functions of her job with
her requested reasonable accommodations,” and thus “any reason
for terminating her employment rather than allowing her the ben-
efit of reasonable accommodations is pretext for discrimination
and retaliation.” So again, Geter links her retaliation claim to her
failure-to-accommodate claim: she can succeed only by establish-
ing that full-time work and in-person work were not essential func-
tions and that Schneider failed to reasonably accommodate her.
But for the reasons we have discussed, there are no genuine dis-
putes of material fact that Geter could not perform the essential
functions of her job. Accordingly, we conclude that the district
court correctly entered judgment against her on her retaliation
claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
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22-11285 Opinion of the Court 39
For the reasons discussed, we affirm the district court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of Schneider.
AFFIRMED.
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