Reginald Andrew Paulk, Sr. v. L. Benson, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11635
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
REGINALD ANDREW PAULK, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
L. BENSON,
D/S ID#13736, Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office,
ZACHARY O’NEIL,
Assistant State Attorney, 15th Judicial Circuit Palm Beach,
NICHOLAS KALEEO,
Assistant State Attorney, 15th Judicial Circuit Palm Beach,
DANIEL O’HEARON,
in individual capacity,
BRIAN LEOFFLER,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11635
in individual capacity, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 9:22-cv-80126-RAR
____________________
Before WILSON, BRANCH , and L UCK , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Reginald Paulk, through counsel, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his pro se amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint under
the screening provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. On appeal, he argues that the district
court erred in concluding that he failed to state a claim for wrongful
arrest and that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing
his amended complaint without first giving him another
opportunity to amend. After review, we affirm.
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I . Background
In January 2022, Paulk filed a pro se civil complaint against
various defendants under § 1983 alleging a variety of claims.1 Upon
review, the district court concluded the complaint constituted an
impermissible shotgun pleading and explained that because Paulk
was pro se he was entitled to an opportunity to amend the
complaint. The district court explained that the amended
complaint must comply with both the local rules and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, including that the complaint should
include a short and plain statement of each claim and should
separate out each cause of action or claim for relief. Thereafter,
Paulk filed his pro se amended complaint.
As relevant to this appeal,2 Paulk’s complaint alleged that
two individuals, Daniel O’Hearon and Brian Leoffler, had stolen
Paulk’s personal property and boating equipment from Paulk’s
boat, which was docked in a boat harbor in Florida. On August 24,
2019, when Paulk and his family were at the boat harbor, they
observed the stolen items on Leoffler’s boat “in plain view,” and a
physical confrontation ensued between Paulk and the two men.
Paulk successfully retrieved his property. According to Paulk,
O’Hearon and Leoffler left the marina but then returned two more
1 At the time Paulk filed the complaint, he was incarcerated on charges
unrelated to this case.
2 Paulk asserted various claims against numerous defendants. However, he
appeals only the dismissal of the wrongful arrest claim. Therefore, this
opinion omits discussion of allegations and defendants unrelated to that claim.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11635
times and tried to confront Paulk again. Paulk and his family then
left the marina. That same day, however, O’Hearon and Leoffler
called the police and, according to Paulk, falsely reported that
Paulk had assaulted them while armed. Specifically, O’Hearon
reported that Paulk “threatened him with a hand gun [sic]” while
Leoffler reported that Paulk threatened him “with a 6-foot long
pitchfork.”
Based on the allegedly false allegations, police arrested Paulk
the next day when he and his family were preparing to board their
boat. The state charged Paulk with three counts of aggravated
assault (later reduced to simple assault) and one count of criminal
mischief; a trial ensued and a jury found him not guilty on all
counts.3 According to Paulk’s amended complaint, the arresting
officer, Deputy Benson, failed to adequately investigate the case,
arrested him without explanation, and without taking his
statement, and acted with a racially discriminatory motive in
arresting him.4
Prior to any appearance by the defendants, the district court
dismissed the complaint sua sponte under the screening provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In relevant part, the district court concluded
that the substance of Paulk’s claims against Deputy Benson
3 The district court took judicial notice of the state court records.
4 Paulk is black and O’Hearon and Leoffler are white. Paulk did not allege
Deputy Benson’s race.
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22-11635 Opinion of the Court 5
constituted a wrongful arrest claim.5 However, the district court
then concluded that Paulk failed to state a claim on which relief
could be granted because Deputy Benson was entitled to qualified
immunity as she had arguable probable cause to arrest Paulk based
on O’Hearon’s and Leoffler’s statements. The district court
explained that, even if Paulk was correct that O’Hearon and
Leoffler had lied to the police, that fact was irrelevant to the
probable cause analysis because there was no suggestion that
Deputy Benson knew that their statements were false.
Accordingly, because Deputy Benson had arguable probable cause,
the district court concluded that she was entitled to qualified
immunity and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
Paulk timely appealed to this Court, and he moved for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel in this
Court. A judge of this Court granted Paulk leave to proceed and
appointed counsel to represent him on appeal.
II. Discussion
Paulk argues that the district court (1) erred in dismissing his
wrongful arrest claim for failure to state a claim, and (2) abused its
5 The district court also concluded that Paulk asserted an equal protection
claim against Deputy Benson based on his allegations that Deputy Benson
acted with a racially discriminatory motive. The district court denied the
equal protection claim because Paulk “fail[ed] to allege that he was treated
differently from any other ‘similarly situated’ person and instead improperly
relie[d] upon ‘conclusory allegations or assertions of personal belief of
disparate treatment or discriminatory intent.’” Paulk does not challenge the
denial of this claim on appeal.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11635
discretion in dismissing the amended complaint without first
granting him another opportunity to amend on account of his pro
se status.
Before addressing the merits of Paulk’s claims, it is necessary
to review the governing principles in this case. Under the PLRA,
the district court is required to screen any “civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). “On review, the court shall
identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion
of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. . . .” Id.
§ 1915A(b). In conducting this review, the court must accept the
allegations in the complaint as true and “construe them in the light
most favorable to [the plaintiff].” Danglar v. Dep’t of Corr., 50 F.4th
54, 55 n.1 (11th Cir. 2022). “If the complaint contains a claim that
is facially subject to an affirmative defense, that claim may be
dismissed” for failure to state a claim. LeFrere v. Quezada, 582 F.3d
1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009). The same standards that apply to a
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) apply to
dismissals under § 1915A. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276,
1278–79 (11th Cir. 2001). “A district court’s decision to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A is reviewed de
novo[.]” Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006).
With these principles in mind, we turn to Paulk’s claims.
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A. Whether the district court erred in dismissing Paulk’s
wrongful arrest claim
Paulk argues that the district court erred in concluding that
his wrongful arrest allegations were insufficient to state a claim
against Deputy Benson. He maintains that under Kingsland v. City
of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004), a wrongful arrest claim
under the Fourth Amendment and § 1983 exists where, as here, an
officer conducts an investigation in a biased fashion or ignores
exculpatory information offered to her.
“An arrest without a warrant and lacking probable cause
violates the Constitution and can underpin a § 1983 claim . . . .” See
Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010);
see also Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 (11th Cir. 1990)
(“Under the Fourth Amendment, . . . persons have the right not to
be arrested without probable cause.”). The existence of actual
probable cause, or arguable probable cause, however, “at the time
of arrest is an absolute bar to a subsequent constitutional challenge
to the arrest.” Gates v. Khokar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1297–98 (11th Cir.
2018) (quotation omitted). “Whether an officer has probable or
arguable probable cause . . . depends on the elements of the alleged
crime and the operative fact pattern.” Id. at 1298 (quotation
omitted).
“To determine whether an officer had probable cause for an
arrest, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then
decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint
of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11635
cause.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56–57 (2018)
(quotations omitted); see also Carter, 821 F.3d at 1319 (“We assess
probable cased based on the totality of the circumstances.”
(quotations omitted)). Of course, “[b]ecause probable cause deals
with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances,
it is a fluid concept that is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to
a neat set of legal rules.” Gill as Next Friend of K.C.R. v. Judd, 941
F.3d 504, 516 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted)). Indeed, it
“requires only a probability or a substantial chance of criminal
activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Wesby, 583 U.S.
at 57 (quotations omitted). Far from an exacting standard,
probable cause is “not a high bar.” Id.; see also Paez v. Mulvey, 915
F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining that probable cause
“does not require anything close to conclusive proof or proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime was in fact committed, or
even a finding made by a preponderance of the evidence”).
Arguable probable cause exists when a reasonable officer “in
the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the
defendant could have believed that probable cause existed to
arrest.” Gates, 884 F.3d at 1298 (alteration adopted) (quotation
omitted). “The concept of arguable probable cause therefore
allows for the possibility that an officer might reasonably but
mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present.” Id.
(quotations omitted). “In determining whether arguable probable
cause exists, [w]e apply an objective standard, asking whether the
officer’s actions [were] objectively reasonable . . . regardless of the
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22-11635 Opinion of the Court 9
officer’s underlying intent or motivation.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d
1188, 1195 (11th Cir. 2002).
Here, the gravamen of Paulk’s argument is that his
allegations established that Deputy Benson lacked even arguable
probable cause because she conducted an inadequate investigation
before arresting him. He maintains that she relied solely on the
allegedly false statements of O’Hearon and Leoffler and she acted
unreasonably under Kingsland in not obtaining Paulk’s side of the
story prior to arresting him. We disagree.
We recognized in Kingsland that “officers are not required to
perform error-free investigations or independently investigate
every proffered claim of innocence.” 382 F.3d at 1229 n.10. The
plaintiff in Kingsland, however, alleged that the officers not only
“turned a blind eye to immediately available exculpatory
information” but essentially fabricated evidence in an effort to
“exonerate” one of their fellow officers. Id. Specifically, the
evidence indicated that, upon responding to the scene of an auto
accident, Kingsland indicated that she was injured, but officers
ignored her; officers spoke to the other party involved in the
accident (who happened to be a fellow police officer), but no officer
took Kingsland’s statement or spoke to any witnesses on scene, yet
in the arrest report, officers stated that Kingsland had run a red light
and was at fault for the accident; officers claimed to smell a
marijuana odor coming from Kingsland’s vehicle, but never
searched the vehicle or called in a canine unit, despite Kingsland’s
assertions that she did not do drugs and no drugs were ever
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produced; officers administered field sobriety tests on Kingsland,
despite her continued protestations that she was injured, felt dizzy
and sick, and needed to go to the hospital; and when she failed the
field sobriety tests, officers arrested her and charged her with
driving under the influence of alcohol, but when the Breathalyzer
tests came back negative, another officer told the first officer to
charge Kingsland with driving under the influence of cannabis (but
a drug test later came back negative). Id. at 1223–27. Thus, we
concluded that summary judgment in favor of the officers was
inappropriate because “a reasonable jury could find that the
[officers’] investigation was deficient in that the officers consciously
and deliberately did not make an effort to uncover reasonably
discoverable, material information.” Id. at 1230.
We have cautioned that Kingsland did not “establish[] that
every failure by an officer to discover ‘easily discoverable facts’
violates the Fourth Amendment.” Washington v. Rivera, 939 F.3d
1239, 1248 (11th Cir. 2019). Rather, the significant point in
Kingsland was the jarring fact that a jury could have found that the
officers fabricated evidence against the plaintiff. Id.; see also Huebner
v. Bradshaw, 935 F.3d 1183, 1189–90 (11th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing
Kingsland and emphasizing that in Kingsland the arresting officers
not only failed to follow up and ignored exculpatory evidence but
affirmatively misrepresented their intentions and may well have
manufactured evidence to justify the arrest).
There are stark differences between this case and Kingsland.
Here, taking as true Paulk’s allegations that O’Hearon and Leoffler
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22-11635 Opinion of the Court 11
were lying, Paulk does not allege that Deputy Benson knew that
they were lying or that Deputy Benson fabricated evidence against
him. Rather, he merely faults Deputy Benson from arresting him
without first obtaining his side of the story. But we have never held
that in order to have probable cause, much less arguable probable
cause, an officer must first interview a defendant before
effectuating an arrest. To the contrary, it is entirely reasonable for
an officer to rely on the statements of the purported victims when
determining whether he has probable cause to arrest. See Lee, 284
F.3d at 1195 (“Arguable probable cause does not require an
arresting officer to prove every element of a crime or to obtain a
confession before making an arrest, which would negate the
concept of probable cause and transform arresting officers into
prosecutors.”). To be clear, “[p]olice officers are not expected to
be lawyers or prosecutors,” and they are not required to resolve
conflicting stories before effectuating an arrest. Huebner, 935 F.3d
at 1188 (explaining that an arresting officer is not “required to sift
through conflicting evidence or resolve issues of credibility” before
making an arrest).
Given the totality of the circumstances in this case viewed
in the light most favorable to Paulk, arguable probable cause
existed to arrest Paulk for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
Faced with O’Hearon and Leoffler’s statements, a reasonable
officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same
knowledge as Deputy Benson had reason to believe that Paulk was
involved in a confrontation with O’Hearon and Leoffler and that
he threatened them with a deadly weapon during the
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confrontation. Gates, 884 F.3d at 1298. Thus, a reasonable officer
possessing this information could have believed that probable
cause existed to arrest Paulk for aggravated assault under Florida
law.6 Id. Because the existence of arguable probable cause defeats
Paulk’s wrongful arrest claim, id., the district court did not err in
sua sponte dismissing the claim for failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted under § 1915A.
B. Whether the district court abused its discretion in
dismissing the amended complaint without giving Paulk
an additional opportunity to amend
Paulk argues that because he was pro se and he had
attempted to correct the deficiencies in his initial complaint by
filing the amended complaint, the district court should have
afforded him an additional opportunity to amend the complaint
before dismissing it. He maintains that had he received the
6 In Florida, an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon has four elements:
(1) the defendant intentionally and unlawfully threatened,
either by word or act, to do violence to the victim, (2) at the
time, the defendant appeared to have the ability to carry out
the threat, (3) the act of the defendant created in the mind of
the victim a well-founded fear that violence was about to take
place, and (4) the assault was with a deadly weapon.
Howard v. State, 245 So. 3d 962, 963 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018); accord Fla. Stat.
§ 784.021(1)(a) (defining aggravated assault as simple assault with a deadly
weapon without the intent to kill). “A deadly weapon is defined as an
instrument that will likely cause death or great bodily harm when used in the
ordinary and usual manner contemplated by its design.” Brown v. State, 86 So.
3d 569, 571 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).
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22-11635 Opinion of the Court 13
opportunity to amend, it is possible that he could have included
additional allegations that would have supported the existence of a
wrongful arrest claim against Deputy Benson, such as “what
Deputy Benson knew before the arrest, the lack of any interaction
with him prior to arrest, the existence and reactions of other
eyewitnesses present at the public place of the supposed assault,
and the availability of still other witnesses at the scene of his arrest
who might have provided details about the supposed assault.”
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
construed.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)
(quotations omitted). Generally, where a more carefully drafted
complaint might state a claim, the district court abuses its
discretion if it does not provide a pro se plaintiff at least one
opportunity to amend before the court dismisses with prejudice.
See Woldeab v. DeKalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291–92
(11th Cir. 2018); see also Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir.
1991) (same), overruled in part by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am.
Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 543 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc). This rule
applies even when the plaintiff does not seek leave to amend the
complaint in the district court. Bank, 92 F.2d at 1112. A district
court need not grant leave to amend however, if the plaintiff clearly
indicates that he does not want to amend or if amendment would
be futile because a more carefully crafted complaint would still not
be able to state a claim. See Woldeab, 885 F.3d at 1291.
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Here, as required, the district court afforded Paulk one
opportunity to amend his complaint. Once Paulk filed his
amended complaint, nothing compelled the district court to
continue to offer Paulk opportunities to further amend his
complaint. See Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1358–59
(11th Cir. 2018) (explaining that where the plaintiff is provided fair
notice of the specific defects in his complaint and a meaningful
chance to fix it but fails to correct the defects, the district court does
not abuse its discretion by subsequently dismissing with prejudice
on shotgun pleading grounds). Paulk’s speculative assertion on
appeal that, if given a second opportunity to amend, he “may” have
been able to include additional allegations related to the wrongful
arrest claim does not establish that the district court abused its
discretion in dismissing the complaint without affording him a
second opportunity to amend. Moreover, it is clear that any
further amendment would have been futile. Even assuming that
Paulk included additional allegations about eyewitnesses to the
confrontation and Deputy Benson’s lack of interaction with Paulk
prior to his arrest, as discussed above, Deputy Benson was not
required to sift through the evidence or resolve conflicting
accounts of the incident before arresting Paulk. See Huebner, 935
F.3d at 1188; Lee, 284 F.3d at 1195. Rather, arguable probable cause
existed to arrest Paulk based on the statements of O’Hearon and
Leoffler.
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III. Conclusion
For the above reasons, we affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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