Charles Cornelius v. Rollins Ranches, LLC

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12862
____________________
CHARLES CORNELIUS,
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant
Appellee-Cross Appellant,
versus
ROLLINS RANCHES, LLC,
a foreign limited liability company,
Defendant-Counter Claimant
Appellant-Cross Appellee.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-14464-KAM
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12862
Before J ORDAN, BRASHER , and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This appeal requires us to decide whether, among other
things, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Charles
Cornelius, who brought an action under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (“FLSA”) against Rollins Ranches, LLC, for unpaid overtime
wages, qualified as an “employee” within the meaning of the FLSA,
29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
Rollins, who considered Cornelius to be an independent
contractor, filed a counterclaim for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. After a four-day trial, a jury returned
a verdict in Cornelius’s favor on the FLSA claim and in Rollins’s
favor on the counterclaim. The parties appeal the jury’s verdict
and the district court’s final judgment. After a thorough review of
the record and the parties’ briefs, and with the benefit of oral argu-
ment, we affirm.1
1 We address only the issues that we believe merit discussion. As to the other
issues Rollins raises in its appeal—an in pari delicto defense, a remittitur argu-
ment, and an argument for a new trial based on the district court’s denial of
its motion to amend the answer, defenses and counterclaim—we summarily
affirm the district court’s rulings.
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22-12862 Opinion of the Court 3
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL
HISTORY2
From 2017 to 2020, Cornelius worked as a carpenter for Rol-
lins. Although Rollins advertised the position as providing em-
ployee status, it required Cornelius to sign an independent contrac-
tor acknowledgment form. Rollins paid him an hourly rate for 40
hours of work each week, and it never paid him overtime wages
for the weeks that he worked more than 40 hours.
Although Rollins classified Cornelius as an independent con-
tractor for wage purposes, it exercised significant control over his
work. It required him to record his daily work hours and tasks on
the same time sheet that its employees used to record their daily
work hours. It dictated the time he was to report to work each day
and would assign him a list of tasks to perform throughout the day.
It also provided him with many of the tools that he needed to per-
form his daily tasks. After Cornelius performed his daily tasks, his
supervisor would review his work before approving his time sheet.
Additionally, although Rollins employed Cornelius as a carpenter,
it routinely assigned him non-carpentry tasks to perform, including
housekeeping, car repairs, plumbing installation, and electrical
work. Sometimes, Rollins assigned him a heavy workload that
caused him to work over 40 hours a week, and Cornelius was not
allowed to hire his own assistant or another co-worker. Therefore,
2 As we write for the parties, we set out only the facts and procedural history
that are necessary to explain our decision.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12862
Cornelius enjoyed very little flexibility in how he performed his
work.
For the three years that Cornelius worked at Rollins, he re-
ceived 1099 tax forms, indicating that he was an independent con-
tractor. Further, he routinely claimed tax deductions as an inde-
pendent contractor: he reported his two vehicles’ mileage and re-
pair expenses and the costs of his personal tools as business expend-
itures and received tax benefits. During his employment, Rollins
offered Cornelius an opportunity to convert his independent con-
tractor status to employee status, but he declined because of the
significant tax advantages he enjoyed as an independent contractor.
After Rollins terminated Cornelius’s employment in 2020,
he filed the present FLSA action, alleging unpaid overtime wages.
Rollins filed a counterclaim alleging that Cornelius breached his in-
dependent contractor agreement by misrepresenting his work
hours on his time sheets. The case went to trial, and the jury found
in both parties’ favor—it found that Cornelius was an employee
entitled to overtime wages he did not receive, and that Rollins was
entitled to damages on its counterclaim because Cornelius had
claimed and been paid for hours he had actually not worked. Fol-
lowing the jury’s verdict and the district court’s final judgment,
both parties moved for judgment as a matter of law on the adverse
jury verdicts pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), and
Cornelius moved for an award of liquidated damages. The district
court denied their post-trial motions, and the parties appealed.
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22-12862 Opinion of the Court 5
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of
law de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Abel
v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2000) (“A motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law will be denied only if reasonable and fair-
minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach
different conclusions.” (alteration omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). If an employer establishes that its violation of the
FLSA occurred in good faith, we review the district court’s denial
of a request for liquidated damages for an abuse of discretion. See
Dybach v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 942 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 1991) (ex-
plaining that we review the district court’s determination that an
employer acted in good faith de novo as to the application of the law
and for clear error as to the facts, but “[o]nce the employer has
demonstrated its good faith and reasonable belief, the district
court’s refusal to award liquidated damages is reviewed for [an]
abuse of discretion.” (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted)). We also review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s
denial of a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). MacPhee v. MiMedx Grp., Inc., 73
F.4th 1220, 1238 (11th Cir. 2023).
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if “a reasonable
jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for
the” non-moving party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). “Only the sufficiency
of the evidence matters; what the jury actually found is irrelevant.”
Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 688 F.3d 713, 724 (11th Cir.
2012). We will not disturb a jury’s verdict unless “there is no legally
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12862
sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find” for the
party on that issue. Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc.,
267 F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Rollins argues that the district court erred in
denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law. In its view,
there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that
Cornelius was as an employee within the meaning of the FLSA be-
cause (1) he signed the independent contractor acknowledgment
form; (2) he represented that he was an independent contractor in
his tax filings; and (3) he declined Rollins’s offer to convert him to
employee status.
Cornelius, on the other hand, asserts that he was entitled to
overtime compensation damages because the evidence demon-
strated that he qualified as an employee under the FLSA, and not
as an independent contractor. Cornelius also argues that the dis-
trict court erred in denying his motion for liquidated damages be-
cause Rollins failed to establish its good faith.
The FLSA ensures a minimum subsistence wage for all “em-
ployees”—defined under the statute as “any individual employed
by an employer.” Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 205 (11th
Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
203(e)(1)). Under the FLSA, an employer includes any individual
who directly or indirectly acts “in the interest of an employer in
relation to an employee.” McKay v. Miami-Dade County, 36 F.4th
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22-12862 Opinion of the Court 7
1128, 1132 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)). Because
the purpose of the FLSA is to protect workers from substandard
wages, Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739
(1981), it requires an award of liquidated damages when an em-
ployer fails to pay an employee sufficient wages, Joiner v. City of Ma-
con, 814 F.2d 1537, 1538 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
216(b)). The employer, however, can avoid an award of liquidated
damages if its violation “was ‘both in good faith and predicated
upon such reasonable grounds that it would be unfair to impose
upon [the employer] more than a compensatory verdict.’” Joiner,
814 F.2d at 1539 (quoting Reeves v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 616 F.2d
1342, 1352–53 (5th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by McLaugh-
lin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1988)).
The FLSA mandates that courts award a prevailing FLSA
employee liquidated damages unless “the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to” the
FLSA violation “was in good faith and that [it] had reasonable
grounds for believing that [its] act or omission was not a violation
of the [FLSA].” 29 U.S.C. § 260. To establish a good faith defense
against liquidated damages, an employer must show that (1) “it had
an honest intention to ascertain what the [FLSA] requires and to
act in accordance with it[,]” and (2) it “had reasonable grounds for
believing its conduct comported with the” FLSA. Dybach, 942 F.2d
at 1566–67 (alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks and ci-
tation omitted).
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12862
As to the issue of Cornelius’s employee status, we conclude
that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict on
the FLSA claim. Cornelius testified that the advertisement for the
job offered insurance, a 401k plan, and paid vacation days—offer-
ings generally made available to employees. There was also testi-
mony at trial that Cornelius’s supervisor set his work schedule, re-
viewed his timesheets, reviewed his work, and relayed assignments
daily. Accordingly, it was reasonable for the jury to find that the
relationship between Cornelius and Rollins followed the “usual
path” of an employer-employee relationship as defined in the
FLSA. See Scantland v. Jeffrey Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th
Cir. 2012) (explaining that where “the work done, in essence, fol-
lows the usual path of an employee[,]” “putting on an independent
contractor label does not take the worker from the protection of
the [FLSA]” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rutherford
Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947))).
We also conclude that sufficient evidence supported the
jury’s verdict in favor of Rollins on the counterclaim because Cor-
nelius misrepresented his work hours by claiming time he did not
work on his time sheets. See Lipphardt, 267 F.3d at 1186 (“We will
not second-guess the jury or substitute our judgment for its judg-
ment if its verdict is supported by sufficient evidence.” (alteration
omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also
Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Un-
der Florida law, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is a part of every contract.” (citing County of Brevard v. Miorelli Eng’g,
Inc., 703 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 1997))).
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22-12862 Opinion of the Court 9
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
ing Cornelius’s request for an award of liquidated damages because
Rollins satisfied its burden of proof as to its good faith defense. The
district court properly found that Rollins relied on the independent
contractor acknowledgment form that Cornelius signed, his tax
records, and the advice of legal counsel in treating him as an inde-
pendent contractor.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
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