Angela W. DeBose v. USA, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13380
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ANGELA W. DEBOSE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
RONALD FICARROTTA,
Chief Judge, in official capacity,
ELIZABETH GADDY RICE,
GREGORY P. HOLDER, et al.,
Individually and Official Capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13380
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-02127-SDM-AAS
____________________
Before WILSON , L UCK , and BLACK , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Angela Debose, a licensed attorney proceeding pro se,1 ap-
peals the district court’s dismissal of her second amended com-
plaint. Debose asserts the court abused its discretion when it im-
posed a limited injunction enjoining her from filing further lawsuits
about her employment at the University of South Florida (USF)
without the signature of an attorney barred in Florida or the Mid-
dle District of Florida. Debose also contends the court erred in
granting the Appellees’ motion to dismiss based on res judicata. Af-
ter review,2 we affirm the district court.
1 Although pro se pleadings are normally liberally construed, Tannenbaum v.
United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), that rule does not apply to
a licensed attorney, see Olivares v. Martin, 555 F.2d 1192, 1194 n.1 (5th Cir.
1977).
2 We review an injunction against litigants who abuse the court system for an
abuse of discretion. Harrelson v. United States, 613 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980).
“The exercise of the court’s inherent powers is reviewed for abuse of discre-
tion.” Pedraza v. United Guar. Corp., 313 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 2002). “Be-
cause res judicata determinations are pure questions of law, we review them de
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22-13380 Opinion of the Court 3
I. DISCUSSION
A. Limited Injunction
Federal courts have the power to manage their own dockets.
Smith v. Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., 750 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir.
2014). That power “includes broad discretion in deciding how best
to manage the cases before them.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court has stated a litigant’s constitutional right of
access may be counterbalanced by the traditional right of courts to
manage their dockets and limit abusive filings. In re McDonald, 489
U.S. 180, 184 (1989). District courts possess the power to issue pre-
filing injunctions “to protect against abusive and vexatious litiga-
tion.” Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1993).
We have explained a court has “a responsibility to prevent single
litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery
needed by others” and a litigant “can be severely restricted as to
what he may file and how he must behave in his applications for
judicial relief ” as long as he is not “completely foreclosed from any
access to the court.” Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th
Cir. 1986) (en banc) (emphasis in original).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting a
limited injunction against Debose from filing further lawsuits
about her employment at USF without the signature of a lawyer
barred in Florida or the Middle District of Florida. The court found
novo.” Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11th Cir.
2004).
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Debose had brought a multitude of prior claims in both federal and
state court regarding the same issues and same Appellees. See Mar-
tin-Trigona, 986 F.2d at 1387. While Debose argues the injunction
violated her rights, the injunction did not completely foreclose her
from filing any new claims because it allows her to file claims re-
garding her employment at USF as long as an attorney signs off on
the filing. See Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074. The court also did not abuse
its discretion by using its inherent authority to issue this injunction
as it is allowed to control its own dockets. See Smith, 750 F.3d at
1262.
B. Res Judicata
Res judicata bars the parties to a prior action from relitigating
the same causes of action that were, or could have been, raised in
that prior action, if that action resulted in a final judgment on the
merits. In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir.
2001). Res judicata “generally applies not only to issues that were
litigated, but also to those that should have been but were not.”
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McCoy Restaurants, Inc., 708 F.2d 582, 586 (11th
Cir. 1983). The bar applies where four factors are shown: (1) the
prior decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction,
(2) there was a final judgment on the merits, (3) both cases involve
the same parties or their privies, and (4) both cases involve the same
causes of action. In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d at 1296.
As to the third factor, we have explained “privity” comprises
several different types of relationships and generally applies “when
a person, although not a party, has his interests adequately
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22-13380 Opinion of the Court 5
represented by someone with the same interests who is a party.”
E.E.O.C. v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004).
As to the fourth factor, “[i]n general, cases involve the same cause
of action for purposes of res judicata if the present case arises out
of the same nucleus of operative fact, or is based upon the same
factual predicate, as a former action.” Israel Disc. Bank Ltd. v. Entin,
951 F.2d 311, 315 (11th Cir. 1992) (quotation marks omitted). “In
determining whether the causes of action are the same, a court
must compare the substance of the actions, not their form.” In re
Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d at 1297 (quotation marks omitted).
“The test for a common nucleus of operative fact is whether the
same facts are involved in both cases, so that the present claim
could have been effectively litigated with the prior one.” Lobo v.
Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 704 F.3d 882, 893 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation
marks omitted).
The court did not err when it granted the USF Board of
Trustees and its members, Greenberg Traurig, P.A., and Richard
McCrea’s motion to dismiss based on res judicata. Debose’s prior
state and federal cases had final judgments on the merits. See In re
Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d at 1296. The previous state court and
federal court cases involved the same parties or their privies. See
Penco Aeroplex, 383 F.3d at 1286. In Debose’s previous complaints,
she sued the USF Board of Trustees and its members, Greenberg
Traurig, and McCrea. All of Debose’s cases arose out of the same
nucleus of operative facts as the current case because all of
Debose’s claims concern or stem from her employment and firing
from USF. See Israel Disc. Bank Ltd., 951 F.2d at 315. Therefore, the
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district court did not err when it found res judicata barred all of
Debose’s claims against the USF Board of Trustees and its mem-
bers, Greenberg Traurig, and McCrea.
II. CONCLUSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it
granted a limited injunction against Debose from filing further law-
suits about her employment at USF without the signature of a law-
yer barred in Florida or the Middle District of Florida. The district
court also did not err when it granted the USF Board of Trustees
and its members, Greenberg Traurig, and McCrea’s motion to dis-
miss based on res judicata. Accordingly, we affirm.3
AFFIRMED.
3 Debose did not raise the issue of whether the court erred in granting the
United States and Thirteenth Circuit’s motion to dismiss for absolute immun-
ity on appeal and thus abandoned that argument. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Flo-
ridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating “[w]hen an appellant
fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds on which the district
court based its judgment, [s]he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of
that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed”). Debose
did not discuss the court’s ruling granting judicial and sovereign immunity in
her initial brief, only discussing it in her reply brief, and has also abandoned
that argument. See id. at 682-83 (explaining an appellant also abandons a claim
when, among other things, she raises it for the first time in her reply brief).
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