22-13450•Linda Ifeoma Amaechi v. GEICO
22-13450Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit21 de fev. de 2024
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13450
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
LINDA IFEOMA AMAECHI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GEICO,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 5:20-cv-00442-TES
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13450
Before L AGOA , BRASHER , and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Linda Ifeoma Amaechi, proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s order dismissing, with prejudice, her recast
complaint that alleged several claims under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Amaechi
alleged that her former employer, Geico, discriminated against her
based on race, gender, sex, national origin, and religion. She also
alleged that Geico retaliated against her for filing an internal
complaint. After she repeatedly failed to follow the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and court orders throughout the discovery
process, the district court dismissed her complaint for failure to
prosecute. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2021, following a series of events not relevant to the
present appeal, Amaechi filed a recast complaint, the operative
pleading, against Geico. Amaechi alleged that Geico failed to
promote her and maintained unequal terms and conditions for her
employment compared to her peers. She also alleged that she
suffered retaliation because Geico became hostile towards her after
she complained to the company that she was being discriminated
against.
Specifically, Amaechi alleged the following claims under
Title VII: race discrimination because Geico failed to promote her,
but promoted her peers of a different race (Count 1); gender and
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22-13450 Opinion of the Court 3
sex discrimination because Geico showed favoritism of peers of the
opposite sex and promoted those peers (Count 2); religious
discrimination because Geico promoted peers that did not share
the same religious sentiment or mode of dress as her (Count 3);
national origin discrimination because Geico used her national
origin to her detriment and failed to address harassing behavior
that she experienced (Count 4); and, finally, retaliation, as Geico
neither protected nor mitigated the harassment that she suffered
after she complained of discriminatory practices (Count 5). She
sought the following damages: loss of income; loss of vesting in
her 401(k)/Vanguard account; loss of affordable health insurance
totaling $298,000; $1,600,000 due to emotional harm, stress, mental
anguish, and inconvenience; and punitive damages totaling
$3,600,000 for Geico’s gross neglect and Title VII violations.
Geico first moved to dismiss Amaechi’s recast complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Geico
asserted that any time-barred claims should be dismissed.1 It
identified Count 2 for gender and sex discrimination, Count 5 for
retaliation, and any claims occurring before November 7, 2018, as
time-barred. Amaechi then moved to strike Geico’s motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(f ), arguing that Geico presented an
insufficient defense.
1 On appeal, Amaechi does not challenge any of the time-barred claims.
Therefore, any challenge to those claims is abandoned. Sapuppo v. Allstate
Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680–81 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that an
appellant abandons any claims that she fails to properly raise on appeal).
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13450
The district court granted in part and denied in part Geico’s
motion to dismiss and construed Amaechi’s motion to strike as a
response, thereby denying her motion to strike. The district court
found that, because Amaechi filed her U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission charge on May 6, 2019, any
discriminatory actions that occurred before November 7, 2018,
were time-barred. The district court thus dismissed all claims that
arose from Geico’s alleged discrimination prior to November 7,
2018, and allowed her to proceed with all claims after that date,
including her retaliation claim in 2019. Geico then answered,
denied liability, and asserted various defenses.
The district court entered a scheduling order. The parties
conducted a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f ) conference on
August 16, 2021. On December 28, 2021, the district court held a
telephone conference because of Amaechi’s failure to provide
discovery documents, but she did not appear at the conference.
Amaechi acknowledges that she was informed of the conference
but claims that she failed to appear because she never received call-
in instructions. The next day, the district court issued an order and
reminded Amaechi of her duty to prosecute her case. It ordered
Amaechi to immediately provide Geico with the documents at
issue and, to ensure compliance, noted that Geico may move to
compel discovery. The district court stated that if Amaechi’s failure
to comply continued, she risked having her case dismissed pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
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22-13450 Opinion of the Court 5
Geico then moved to compel, attaching to its motion its
discovery requests, Amaechi’s responses, and other
correspondence between the parties. It noted that it had served
Amaechi with interrogatories and requests for production on
September 13, 2021, but when overdue responses were not received
by October 20, 2021, it sent a letter requesting such responses.
Geico explained that Amaechi twice asked for additional time to
provide responses, which it granted, but after receiving no response
upon a good-faith effort, it sought the court’s intervention on
December 16, 2021. It noted that Amaechi replied on December
19, 2021, and informed the court that she would send the response
the best way she knew how. Geico spoke with Amaechi by
telephone, and she confirmed that she would send complete
written discovery responses, initial disclosures, and responsive
documents by December 24, 2021. It then contended that Amaechi
sent her initial disclosures on December 26, 2021, but they were
incomplete. It also noted that Amaechi failed to appear at the
telephone conference on December 28, 2021. It argued that it was
unable to complete its discovery until Amaechi provided complete
responses to discovery requests and initial disclosures.
The district court granted Geico’s motion to compel. In its
order, the court noted that, although Amaechi did not receive call-
in instructions for the telephone conference, the court ordered her
to provide the documents at issue, notified Geico it could move to
compel, and warned Amaechi that she ran the risk of having her
case dismissed if she failed to comply with its orders or prosecute
her case. The district court then noted that Amaechi had not
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13450
provided any explanation as to why it should not compel discovery.
It again reminded her that failure to comply could result in
dismissal of her case.
Thereafter, Geico moved to dismiss for lack of prosecution
with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)
and to stay discovery. It argued that Amaechi failed to properly
prosecute her case by failing (1) to respond to written discovery, (2)
to comply with orders from the court, and (3) to attend her
properly noticed deposition. Geico noted that the pattern of
deficient responses continued, and the district court again warned
Amaechi that her conduct ran the risk of dismissal. Amaechi then
responded to Geico’s motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution.
She argued that she had extenuating circumstances due to her
health that made her unable to respond, that she never received
adequate call-in instructions for the December 28, 2021, telephone
conference, and that she was unable to attend the initial deposition
because the location was over 100 miles away from her.
The district court granted Geico’s motion and dismissed
Amaechi’s recast complaint. The district court described the
procedural history of Amaechi’s case and noted that it had a
“difficult discovery period” and that the case “derailed early, []
despite the Court’s lenience, patience, and direction [as Amaechi]
stubbornly continued to operate outside the procedural tracks.”
The district court explained that she missed deadlines, disregarded
discovery rules, ignored court directives, concealed documents,
and gave intentionally vague responses to easy questions. It noted
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22-13450 Opinion of the Court 7
that she filed initial disclosures nearly four months late and ignored
Geico’s valid discovery requests, which caused the court to order
Amaechi to comply with discovery rules. It stated that Amaechi
did not respond to the court’s order until after the deadline. It also
stated that she was noticed for her deposition and failed to appear
or inform Geico that she would not be able to attend. The district
court explained that it again had warned Amaechi to comply with
discovery requests and informed her that, if she did not, she ran the
risk of having her case dismissed. It noted that, despite Amaechi
complying with its order, her responses were incomplete and
convoluted. The district court described how Amaechi’s discovery
responses were insufficient and highlighted that she provided
“non-answers,” admitted to withholding relevant documents and
audio recordings, and refused to disclose the names of her treating
physicians and relevant people with whom she worked. The
district court emphasized that Amaechi “objected” to each of
Geico’s requests for production and did not timely provide “a single
document or piece of evidence before it came time for the [c]ourt
to rule on the merits of her case.” The court also pointed out that
Amaechi violated numerous local rules.
Further, the district court noted that, despite Amaechi’s
status as a pro se litigant, she did not have a license to ignore the
court’s rules and orders. It also noted that Amaechi had been
warned at least three times that failure to prosecute her case would
result in dismissal. The district court emphasized that it had
ordered compliance, set conferences, and given extensions, and,
thus, was left with a firm conviction that no other sanction would
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13450
suffice. Accordingly, it granted Geico’s motion and dismissed
Amaechi’s recast complaint. Amaechi filed a timely notice of
appeal for this order.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) dismissal
for abuse of discretion. Gratton v. Great Am. Commc’ns, 178 F.3d
1373, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). A discretionary decision means the
district court has a “range of choice, and that its decision will not
be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not
influenced by any mistake of law.” Guideone Elite Ins. Co. v. Old
Cutler Presbyterian Church, Inc., 420 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Ameritas Variable Life Ins. Co. v. Roach, 411 F.3d 1328, 1330
(11th Cir. 2005)). Although we construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings
liberally, they are not relieved from following procedural rules.
Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
As an initial matter, Amaechi arguably fails to challenge the
grounds relied upon by the district court in its dismissal order. On
appeal, issues that are not briefed are deemed to be abandoned.
Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.
2004). An appellant fails to adequately brief a claim when it has not
been plainly and prominently raised. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian
Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). We have long held that
an appellant abandons a claim when it is raised “in a perfunctory
manner without supporting arguments and authority. Id. Further,
when a district court order is based on multiple, independent
grounds, an appellant must demonstrate that “every stated ground
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22-13450 Opinion of the Court 9
for the judgment against h[er] is incorrect.” Id. at 680. The district
court’s order was based on Amaechi’s failure to prosecute her case
via her disregard of the court’s orders and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and her failure to respond to discovery, despite
numerous warnings that such failure would result in dismissal. On
appeal, Amaechi was required to properly challenge these grounds
to avoid abandonment but failed to do so. Id. at 681. She does not
raise any argument or cite to any authority to explain her lack of
compliance with the district court’s orders, nor address the fact that
the court repeatedly warned that her failure to prosecute would
result in dismissal. Instead, she makes mere conclusory assertions
that dismissal was unfair. See id. at 682. Given all of this, we could
deem her challenge to the district court’s dismissal to be
abandoned and affirm on this basis alone.
But even if we assume that Amaechi implicitly preserved
challenges in the preceding respect, the district court did not abuse
its discretion by dismissing her recast complaint under Rule 41(b).
Rule 41(b) provides that, “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to
comply with [the Rules of Civil Procedure] or a court order, a
defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.”
A district court may dismiss a case for failure to comply with court
rules “under the authority of either Rule 41(b) or the court’s
inherent power to manage its docket.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty.
Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 n.10 (11th Cir. 2015). To dismiss
with prejudice under Rule 41(b), the court must find that “(1) a
party engage[d] in a clear pattern of delay or willful contempt
(contumacious conduct); and (2) the district court specifically finds
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that lesser sanctions would not suffice.” Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v.
M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337–38 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting
World Thrust Films, Inc. v. Int’l Fam. Entm’t, Inc., 41 F.3d 1454, 1456
(11th Cir. 1995)). Although dismissal with prejudice is a drastic
remedy, we have stated that “dismissal upon disregard of an order,
especially where the litigant has been forewarned, generally is not
an abuse of discretion.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th
Cir. 1989).
Here, Amaechi repeatedly failed to follow the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and court orders throughout the discovery
process. See Gratton, 178 F.3d at 1374; Betty K Agencies, 432 F.3d at
1337. Particularly, she submitted written discovery requests late
and failed to produce requested documents, despite her promises
to do so and Geico’s multiple requests. She also failed to appear at
her initial deposition, despite receiving notice, and did not
communicate her absence to Geico or to the court. Further, the
court warned her at least three times that her continued failure to
comply and diligently prosecute her case could result in dismissal.
Moon, 863 F.2d at 837. Her consistent disregard for the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the district court’s orders shows a
clear pattern of willful contempt. Betty K Agencies, 432 F.3d at 1337–
38. And the district court’s explicit finding that lesser sanctions
would not suffice is amply supported by the record as summarized
above. See id. at 1338.
Therefore, even if Amaechi had properly raised her
challenge to the district court’s dismissal, we conclude that the
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22-13450 Opinion of the Court 11
district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing her recast
complaint under Rule 41(b). Indeed, Amaechi repeatedly failed to
follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and court orders
throughout the discovery process of her case. Accordingly, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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