Odilance Silien v. Waste Management, Inc. of Florida

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-14091
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ODILANCE SILIEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. OF FLORIDA,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 9:22-cv-81531-WPD
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-14091
Before R OSENBAUM , J ILL PRYOR , and B RANCH , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Odilance Silien appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
amended complaint against his former employer, Waste Manage-
ment, Inc. of Florida, asserting race discrimination and retaliation
claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court concluded
that it was apparent from the face of the amended complaint that
Silien’s claims were time-barred. After careful review, we affirm.
I.
Silien, a Black man of Haitian national origin, worked as a
truck driver for Waste Management for nearly 30 years. In March
2018, Waste Management terminated his employment.
Nearly three years later—in February 2021—Silien sued
Waste Management in Florida state court. He alleged that his su-
pervisor “regularly berate[d]” him and treated him less favorably
than White employees. Doc. 1-2 at 6.1 In the complaint, Silien as-
serted a single claim for race discrimination arising under the Flor-
ida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”). See Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). He al-
leged that he had filed a charge of discrimination with an adminis-
trative agency before filing suit. According to the complaint, “[o]n
or about April 17, 2019,” Silien “filed a timely charge of employ-
ment discrimination with the” Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”). Id. The complaint also alleged that “[a]ll
1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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22-14091 Opinion of the Court 3
conditions precedent for the filing of this action before this Court
[have] been previously met, including the exhaustion of all perti-
nent administrative procedures and remedies.” Id.
Waste Management moved to dismiss the complaint. It ar-
gued that the allegations in the complaint showed that Silien was
terminated in March 2018 and filed a charge of discrimination with
the EEOC in April 2019. Because Silien failed to file an administra-
tive charge of discrimination within one year of his termination,
Waste Management said, his FCRA claim was time-barred. See
Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 894
(Fla. 2002) (explaining that “[a]s a prerequisite to bringing a civil
action based upon an alleged violation of the FCRA,” a plaintiff
must file an administrative complaint “within 365 days of the al-
leged violation”).
For more than a year, Silien filed nothing in response to
Waste Management’s motion to dismiss. In September 2022, the
state court entered an order setting the case for a status conference.
A few days later, Silien filed an amended complaint.
In the amended complaint, Silien repeated many of the same
allegations about his supervisor “berat[ing]” him and treating him
less favorably than employees of other races. Doc. 1-2 at 27. But
rather than asserting a race discrimination claim under FCRA, the
amended complaint asserted claims for race discrimination and re-
taliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The amended complaint included
no allegation about when Silien filed a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-14091
After Silien filed the amended complaint, Waste Manage-
ment removed the case to federal court. It then moved to dismiss
the amended complaint, again arguing that Silien’s claims were un-
timely. It explained that a four-year limitations period applied to §
1981 claims. Because Silien was terminated in March 2018, the lim-
itations period for his § 1981 claims expired in March 2022. But he
did not bring the § 1981 claims until September 2022.
Silien opposed the motion to dismiss. He argued that his
§ 1981 claims were not time-barred because they related back to
the original complaint, which was filed in February 2021, within
the four-year limitations period.
Waste Management argued that the relation-back doctrine
did not apply. It acknowledged that an amended pleading could be
timely under the relation-back doctrine when the amendment was
made to a “timely filed claim that involved the same facts and cir-
cumstances.” Doc. 14 at 3 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). But because Silien waited more than one year after
his termination to file his charge of discrimination with the EEOC,
Waste Management argued, the original complaint was time-
barred and thus the relation-back doctrine did not apply.
The district court granted Waste Management’s motion to
dismiss. The court concluded that it was apparent from the face of
the amended complaint that the § 1981 claims were untimely be-
cause Silien filed them in September 2022, more than four years
after he was terminated. Although the original complaint was filed
within four years of Silien’s termination, the court determined that
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22-14091 Opinion of the Court 5
the relation-back doctrine did not apply. It explained that the orig-
inal complaint was itself untimely because the face of that pleading
showed that Silien did not file his charge of discrimination with the
EEOC until April 2019—more than a year after he was terminated.2
This is Silien’s appeal.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal based on the
statute of limitations. Karantsalis v. City of Miami Springs, 17 F.4th
1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2021). We also review de novo a district court’s
determination about whether an amended complaint related back
to the date of the original complaint. Mungin v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
Corr., 89 F.4th 1308, 1321 (11th Cir. 2024).
A “dismissal for failure to state a claim on statute of limita-
tions grounds is appropriate only if it is apparent from the face of
the complaint that the claim is time-barred.” Karantsalis, 17 F.4th
at 1319–20 (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a dis-
missal, we accept “well-pleaded factual allegations as true and con-
stru[e] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Einhorn v.
Axogen, Inc., 42 F.4th 1218, 1222 (11th Cir. 2022); see Karantsalis,
2 In its motion to dismiss the amended complaint, Waste Management also
argued that Silien failed to state a claim under § 1981 for race discrimination
or retaliation. The district court agreed and concluded, in the alternative, that
the amended complaint was due to be dismissed because Silien failed to state
a claim for relief. Because we affirm the dismissal on statute of limitations
grounds, we do not address whether the amended complaint stated a claim
under § 1981 for race discrimination or retaliation.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-14091
17 F.4th at 1319. But “conclusory allegations . . . will not prevent
dismissal.” Einhorn, 42 F.4th at 1222 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
III.
The central issue in this appeal is whether it was apparent
from the face of the amended complaint that Silien’s § 1981 dis-
crimination and retaliation claims were time-barred. Section 1981
“prohibits intentional race discrimination in the making and en-
forcement of . . . employment contracts.” Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th
1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
parties agree that a four-year limitations period applies to § 1981
claims. It is clear from the face of the amended complaint that Silien
raised the § 1981 claims more than four years after his termination,
so the claims were untimely.
Silien nevertheless argues that these claims were timely un-
der the relation-back doctrine. “Relation back is a legal fiction em-
ployed to salvage claims that would otherwise be unjustly barred
by a limitations provision.” Caron v. NCL (Bah.), Ltd., 910 F.3d 1359,
1368 (11th Cir. 2018). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) pro-
vides that an amendment to a pleading “relates back” to the date of
the original pleading when “the amendment asserts a claim or de-
fense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
out . . . in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).
But an amended pleading relates back only when the origi-
nal pleading itself was timely filed. See Bryant v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
967 F.2d 501, 504 (11th Cir. 1992). In Bryant, an employee of the
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22-14091 Opinion of the Court 7
United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) complained of
racial discrimination and retaliation to the EEOC. Id. at 502. After
the EEOC denied the employee relief, she had 30 days to bring Ti-
tle VII claims against the head of the USDA. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16(c) (amended 1991)). But the employee, who was pro-
ceeding pro se, did not file her complaint until more than a year
after the EEOC’s decision. Id. at 503. The district court dismissed
the complaint because the employee had failed to sue the proper
defendant when she had named the USDA, not its head, as the de-
fendant. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)).
On appeal, the employee asked for an opportunity to file an
amended complaint that named the proper defendant. Id. She as-
serted that this amended complaint would be timely because it
would relate back to her original complaint. Id. We rejected this
argument, explaining that because the original complaint was not
timely filed, an amended complaint naming the proper defendant
would not relate back. Id. at 504–05; see also Hargett v. Valley Fed.
Sav. Bank, 60 F.3d 754, 762 (11th Cir. 1995) (concluding that a retal-
iation claim raised for the first time in an amended complaint did
not relate back to an age discrimination claim in the original com-
plaint because the discrimination claim was “not timely filed”).
Here, the relation-back doctrine does not apply. The FCRA
requires a plaintiff to file an administrative charge of discrimination
within one year of the complained-of employment decision. See
Fla. Stat. § 760.11(1). It is apparent from the face of the original
complaint that Silien failed to file his EEOC charge during this one-
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-14091
year period. Because Silien’s original complaint was time-barred,
he could not rely on the relation-back doctrine.
For the first time on appeal, Silien argues that we should ig-
nore the original complaint’s allegation that he filed his charge of
discrimination with the EEOC in April 2019 because the allegation
was incorrect. He now says that he actually filed the charge in June
2018—within one year of his termination. In effect, Silien seeks to
amend his original complaint on appeal to correct the allegation
about when he filed a charge with the EEOC. But a “plaintiff can-
not amend [his] complaint on appeal.” Durango-Ga. Paper Co. v.
H.G. Estate, LLC, 739 F.3d 1263, 1272 n.23 (11th Cir. 2014).3
Because the district court correctly concluded that Silien’s
§ 1981 claims were time-barred, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
3 Silien argues that we should not consider the allegation in his original com-
plaint that he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC in April 2019 for
another reason as well: because he also alleged in that pleading that he satisfied
“[a]ll conditions precedent for the filing of this action.” Doc. 1-2 at 6. But we
need not accept this conclusory allegation when the complaint included more
specific allegations, which showed that he failed to timely file an administra-
tive charge of discrimination. See Einhorn, 42 F.4th at 1222 (explaining that
“conclusory allegations . . . will not prevent dismissal” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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