Reginald Grimes, Sr. v. FPC Pensacola Warden

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11131
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
REGINALD EUGENE GRIMES, SR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
FPC PENSACOLA WARDEN,
Respondent-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cv-09927-LC-MAL
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11131
Before J ORDAN, NEWSOM , and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Reginald Grimes, Sr., a pro se federal prisoner, appeals the
order of the District Court granting the warden’s motion to dismiss
his pro se petition for habeas relief, filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
The warden, in turn, moves for summary affirmance and to stay
the briefing schedule.
Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of
the essence, such as “situations where important public policy is-
sues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,”
where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter
of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the out-
come of the case, or where . . . the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke
Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).1 A motion
for summary affirmance postpones the due date for the filing of any
remaining brief until we rule on the motion. 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c).
When reviewing the denial of a habeas petition, we review
questions of law de novo. Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1266
(11th Cir. 2000). The availability of habeas relief under § 2241 is
also reviewed de novo. Cook v. Wiley, 208 F.3d 1314, 1316–17 (11th
Cir. 2000). We review de novo “questions of law concerning
1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former
Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981.
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23-11131 Opinion of the Court 3
subject matter jurisdiction, including whether a prisoner may, in a
particular circumstance, bring a § 2241 petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under the saving clause of [28 U.S.C.] § 2255(e).” Amodeo v.
FCC Coleman - Low Warden, 984 F.3d 992, 996 (11th Cir. 2021), cert.
denied, 142 S. Ct. 836 (2022). Whether the saving clause of § 2255(e)
applies is a threshold jurisdictional issue. Brown v. Warden, FCC
Coleman-Low, 817 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2016).
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally con-
strued.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.
1998). Courts are obligated to “look behind the label” of pro se in-
mate filings to determine whether they are cognizable under “a dif-
ferent remedial statutory framework.” United States v. Jordan, 915
F.2d 622, 624–25 (11th Cir. 1990).
The primary method of collateral attack on a federal sen-
tence is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id. at 629; McCarthan v. Dir.
of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, 851 F.3d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir. 2017) (en
banc). A § 2255 motion must be filed in the “court which imposed
the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Challenges to the execution of
a sentence or the continuation of an initially valid sentence, rather
than to the sentence’s validity, may be brought through a petition
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241. McCarthan, 851 F.3d
at 1089. A § 2241 petition must be filed in the “district wherein the
restraint complained of is had.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a).
A federal prisoner may only file one § 2255 motion. Osbourne
v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 1261, 1264 (11th Cir. 2020). If
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11131
that motion is denied in a “judgment on the merits,” he must ob-
tain leave from this Court before filing a second or successive mo-
tion. Id. A petitioner who has filed a previous § 2255 motion may
not circumvent the restriction on successive § 2255 motions simply
by petitioning under § 2241. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1092.
Generally, a “federal prisoner seeking to challenge the legal-
ity of his conviction or sentence has two bites at the apple: one on
direct appeal, and one via a § 2255 motion.” Williams v. Warden,
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 713 F.3d 1332, 1339 (11th Cir. 2013), overruled
on other grounds by McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1096. A third means of
collateral attack to the conviction may be available under § 2241 if
the federal prisoner can satisfy the saving clause in § 2255(e).
McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1081. The saving clause of § 2255 permits a
federal prisoner to file a § 2241 habeas petition if the remedy pro-
vided under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality
of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). The petitioner bears the
burden of establishing that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective.
McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1081. If the petitioner’s motion attacked his
sentence based on a claim that could have been brought in a § 2255
motion, the § 2255 remedial vehicle was adequate and effective to
test his claim, even if circuit precedent or a procedural bar would
have foreclosed it. Id. at 1086, 1089-90, 1099; see also Jones v. Hen-
drix, 143 S. Ct. 1857, 1870 (2023) (“[T]he saving clause is concerned
with the adequacy or effectiveness of the remedial vehicle . . . not
any court’s asserted errors of law.”).
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23-11131 Opinion of the Court 5
Summary affirmance is warranted here because it is clear as
a matter of law that the District Court correctly dismissed Grimes’s
§ 2241 petition as an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 mo-
tion. Grimes contended that facts from the presentence investiga-
tion report were incorrect and that, if the facts had been corrected,
the jury’s verdict could have changed to “not guilty” or the out-
come of his incarceration could have been different. Grimes’s
claim that he was “actually and factually innocent” and his support-
ing claims about the District Court’s compliance with Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 32 at sentencing were attacks on the validity
of his convictions and sentences, which are properly brought in a §
2255 motion, not a § 2241 petition. See McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1081.
Next, Grimes did not meet his burden of showing that he
could seek § 2241 relief under the saving clause in § 2255(e). See id.
Grimes’s claims attacked his convictions and sentences on grounds
that could have been, and were, brought in a § 2255 motion. Thus,
Grimes could not bring his § 2241 petition under § 2255(e)’s saving
clause because § 2255 provided an adequate and effective remedial
vehicle to test his claim, even if a procedural bar such as rules on
successive § 2255 motions would foreclose it. See id. at 1086,
1089-90, 1099.
Finally, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider
Grimes’s filing because he had a prior § 2255 motion denied with
prejudice and did not receive leave from this Court to file a succes-
sive § 2255 motion. See Osbourne, 968 F.3d at 1264; 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(h). Further, as a § 2255 motion, Grimes should have filed it
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-11131
in the district court where he was sentenced, not in the district
where he is confined. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
Accordingly, because the warden’s position is clearly correct
as a matter of law, we GRANT the warden’s motion for summary
affirmance and DENY as moot the motion to stay the briefing
schedule. See Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162.
AFFIRMED.2
2 Grimes’s motion to supplement the record on appeal, construed from his
response to the warden’s motion for summary affirmance, is DENIED.
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