Sanbar Isle, LLC v. USA, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11643
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
SANBAR ISLE, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL
IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11643
D.C. Docket No. 0:22-cv-61231-AHS
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Before J ORDAN, G RANT, and L AGOA , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This case arises from a dispute over an easement. Sanbar
Isle, LLC asserts that it is a fee simple owner of 2.57 acres in
Florida’s Intracoastal Waterway. The United States argues in
response that it was granted an easement on the property by the
State of Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Trust Fund. Believing that easement to be invalid, Sanbar Isle
brought an action to quiet title under 28 U.S.C. § 2409a against the
United States and the Board.
The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court granted
the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion but did not consider the Rule
12(b)(6) motion. Sanbar Isle appeals.
We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions on a
Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Odyssey Marine Expl., Inc. v. Unidentified
Shipwrecked Vessel, 657 F.3d 1159, 1169 (11th Cir. 2011). Here, the
district court recognized that any action under § 2409a is “barred
unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which
it accrued,” and that this Court has formerly held that this
limitations period is jurisdictional. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g); F.E.B.
Corp. v. United States, 818 F.3d 681, 685 (11th Cir. 2016), abrogated
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23-11643 Opinion of the Court 3
by Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 156 & n.2, 165 (2023).
Finding that Sanbar Isle failed to file suit within the limitations
period, the district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
Two days after the district court’s Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal,
the Supreme Court held that § 2409a(g)’s time-bar provision is
nonjurisdictional. Wilkins, 598 U.S. at 165. This decision has
abrogated our precedent to the contrary. Because § 2409a(g) is
nonjurisdictional, the district court erred in dismissing Sanbar Isle’s
complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) for failure to meet the statute of
limitations.1 We thus REVERSE the district court’s order granting
the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, and REMAND for
further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision
in Wilkins.
1 The defendants acknowledge that § 2409a(g) is nonjurisdictional under
Wilkins but argue that we should still affirm because Sanbar Isle’s claim is time-
barred and thus subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). To be sure, we have
previously affirmed a district court’s dismissal despite concluding that part of
the basis for that dismissal was improperly considered under Rule 12(b)(1)
instead of Rule 12(b)(6). U.S. ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 809–
11, 816 (11th Cir. 2015). But Osheroff did not hold that motions to dismiss
improperly resolved under Rule 12(b)(1) must be reassessed by this Court
under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than remanded to the district court. And where, as
in this case, the parties agree that the district court improperly analyzed the
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), we think remand is appropriate.
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