Mark Knox v. Johnny Hardwick

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-12493
Non-Argument Calendar
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MARK KNOX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOHNNY HARDWICK,
Judge, Ala. 15th Circuit Court,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-00075-WKW-JTA
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12493
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Before J ORDAN, L AGOA, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Mark Knox, proceeding pro se, appeals following the district
court’s dismissal of his complaint against Johnny Hardwick, a
Montgomery County, Alabama, Circuit Court Judge. In the com-
plaint, Knox alleged that Judge Hardwick had violated his civil
rights in state court when the judge purportedly would not let him
speak and directed a bailiff to detain him during proceedings in-
volving medical malpractice claims Knox had brought against a
hospital. The district court dismissed Knox’s federal complaint on
two grounds: (1) it was barred by the Rooker-Feldman1 doctrine; and
(2) Judge Hardwick was entitled to judicial immunity. On appeal,
Knox argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint
as barred by judicial immunity. After thorough review, we affirm.
We review de novo whether an official is entitled to judicial
immunity. Smith v. Shook, 237 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court shall dismiss
an action by a litigant proceeding in forma pauperis if it is frivolous
or malicious or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii).
1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is named for Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983).
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23-12493 Opinion of the Court 3
We liberally construe the pleadings of pro se litigants, but we
will not “serve as de facto counsel” or “rewrite an otherwise defi-
cient pleading.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–
69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). An appellant abandons
any argument not briefed on appeal, made in passing, or raised
briefly without supporting arguments or authority. Access Now,
Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004); Sapuppo
v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). To
obtain reversal of a district court judgment that is based on multi-
ple, independent grounds, an appellant must convince us that
every stated ground for the judgment against him is incorrect.
Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.
Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from dam-
ages for their acts taken while acting in their judicial capacity unless
they acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Bolin v. Story,
225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted). Thus, a
judge enjoys immunity for judicial acts even if he made a mistake,
acted maliciously, or exceeded his authority. McCullough v. Finley,
907 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting that even “a judicial
officer who was allegedly motivated to further a conspiracy enjoys
absolute judicial immunity”). Further, a judge acts in “clear ab-
sence of all jurisdiction” only if he lacked subject-matter jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 1332 (quotations omitted).
In this appeal, Knox argues that the district court erred in
dismissing his complaint as barred by judicial immunity. Notably,
however, the district court dismissed Knox’s complaint on two
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-12493
independent grounds – one was that Judge Hardwick was entitled
to judicial immunity, and the other was that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine barred his claims, since the appropriate course for Knox’s
challenge to Judge Hardwick’s rulings or conduct in the state court
litigation should have been to seek relief by pursuing an appeal in
that case to the appropriate state court. But Knox failed to chal-
lenge the district court’s conclusion that his complaint was barred
by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, so he has not challenged every
stated ground for the judgment against him. As a result, he has
abandoned his claim on appeal and the judgment is due to be af-
firmed on this basis. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.
But, in any event, even if we were to address the argument
Knox raises on appeal -- concerning judicial immunity -- we are un-
persuaded. The district court did not err in dismissing Knox’s com-
plaint as barred by judicial immunity because, assuming the allega-
tions in the complaint to be true, Judge Hardwick would have been
acting within his judicial capacity when he ordered the bailiff to
detain Knox during proceedings in the judge’s courtroom. Bolin,
225 F.3d at 1239. Indeed, under Alabama law, “[e]very court” has
the “power . . . [t]o preserve and enforce order in its immediate
presence . . . as is necessary to prevent interruption, disturbance or
hindrance to its proceedings” and “[t]o control, in furtherance of
justice, the conduct of its officers and all other persons connected
with a judicial proceeding before it[.]” Ala. Code § 12-1-7(1),(4).
Thus, even if Judge Hardwick had acted maliciously or exceeded
his judicial authority when he was attempting to maintain court-
room decorum during Knox’s case, he was entitled to judicial
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23-12493 Opinion of the Court 5
immunity, so long as he was not acting in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction. McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1331; Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239.
Knox has made no allegation to this effect. Accordingly, we also
affirm the district court’s dismissal of Knox’s complaint on judicial
immunity grounds.
AFFIRMED.
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