Jermaine Harmon v. Fletcher Sams, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-14221
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
JERMAINE ALFONSO HARMON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FLETCHER SAMS,
Chief Superior Court Judge, in individual capacity and
official capacity,
STEPHEN DOUGLASS OTT,
Juvenile Court Judge, in individual capacity and
official capacity,
LLOYD WALKER,
Guardian Ad Litem, in individual capacity and
official capacity,
HOLLY LINE,
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-14221
Director of Fayette County DFCS, in individual capacity and
official capacity,
JILLIAN MOORE,
Supervisor, in her individual capacity and
official capacity, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 3:23-cv-00155-TCB
____________________
Before R OSENBAUM , BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case brought by Jermain Harmon,
a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Harmon alleges that various
state actors violated his constitutional rights throughout his
conviction process and the subsequent placement of his children in
foster care. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to
state a claim and improper joinder. Because we cannot grant
Harmon’s requested relief, we affirm.
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23-14221 Opinion of the Court 3
I. Background
In August 2023, Harmon, proceeding pro se, filed an
amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Harmon alleged that
various state actors—Fayette County Superior Court Judge
Fletcher Sams, Juvenile Court Judge Steven Douglas Ott, Guardian
Ad Litem Lloyd Walker, Director of Fayette County Division of
Family and Children Services (“DFCS”) Holly Line, DFCS
Supervisor Jillian Moore, and Social Worker Charell Nesbitt—
violated his constitutional rights throughout his conviction process
and the subsequent placement of his children in foster care.
Specifically, Harmon alleges that Judge Sams (1) denied
Harmon the right to be heard during his pretrial proceedings; (2)
had Harmon “removed from the court without addressing the
merits of [Harmon’s] consti[tut]ional claims”; (3) ignored his claims
“before jury commencement”; (4) attempted to “procure
jurisdiction through means of fraud by conducting a[n] on the spot
arraignment”; (5) “enter[ed] a fraudulent plea”; (6) illegally
empaneled a jury; and (7) “forced him into trial in a court that
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.” As to the other five
defendants—Judge Ott, Guardian Ad Litem Walker, Director Line,
Supervisor Moore, and Social Worker Nesbitt—Harmon alleged
that they aided and abetted Judge Sams and “authorized, initiated,
or enforced the placement of his minor children into” foster care.
Harmon alleges that, because of his “unlawful prosecution
and incarceration,” his children were “kidnapped and placed in
foster care,” and Harmon “suffered mental abuse, psychological
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-14221
abuse, trauma, fear, anxiety, insomnia, decreased appetite,
depression, destruction of [his] family and marriage,” loss of his
income and home, and slander of his character. As to relief,
Harmon requested that (1) the state court judgment be voided1 or
vacated with prejudice, (2) further prosecution be barred, and (3)
he receive “reimbursements for all legal fees and all [monetary] and
punitive damages accrued as a result of this unlawful act[.]”
The magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) recommending that (1) Harmon’s complaint be dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim and improper joinder,
and (2) his motion to void his state court judgment be denied. The
magistrate judge separated his analysis by defendant—first
analyzing the claims against Judge Sams, and then analyzing the
claims against the other five defendants.
The magistrate judge stated that Judge Sams was “entitled
to absolute immunity from [Harmon’s] claim for money
damages.” Then, citing to Heck v. Humphrey,2 the magistrate judge
said that Harmon could not “obtain any relief based on his
allegedly unlawful conviction” because his conviction had not been
reversed or otherwise questioned. Finally, citing to Preisser v.
1 In addition to requesting the state court judgment be voided in his amended
complaint, Harmon also filed a separate motion “for an order voiding the
judgment entered against him” in the state court case because the court
“lacked and continues to lack subject matter jurisdiction over” his case. The
district court denied this motion.
2 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994).
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23-14221 Opinion of the Court 5
Rodriguez,3 the magistrate judge said that it could not “declare
[Harmon’s] state court criminal conviction void because such relief
is available only in a federal habeas corpus action.”
As to the remaining five defendants, the magistrate judge
stated that they could not be joined to the lawsuit because
Harmon’s claims against them were “not sufficiently related to his
challenge to his state court criminal conviction.”
The district court adopted the R&R, dismissing Harmon’s
claims and denying Harmon’s motion to void his state court
criminal judgment. As to the claims against Judge Sams, the district
court held that the Rooker-Feldman4 doctrine prevented the court
from voiding Harmon’s state court judgment. And the district
court held that Judge Sams had absolute immunity from Harmon’s
claim for money damages. Finally, the district court held that
Harmon’s request for equitable relief—vacating his criminal
conviction and preventing the state from prosecuting him again—
was unavailable under § 1983.
The district court also dismissed the claims against the
remaining five defendants. It held (1) that those claims failed
because it could not find that the state court criminal judgment was
defective, (2) that Harmon’s claims against these other defendants
failed to state viable claims for relief, and (3) that Harmon failed to
3 Preisser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).
4 Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983).
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-14221
show how his children’s placement in foster care violated his rights
when both he and his wife were in prison.5
Harmon appealed.
II. Standard of Review
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted using the same standards that govern Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) dismissals. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278
(11th Cir. 2001). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), despite any filing
fee that may have been paid, the court must dismiss a case at any
time if it determines that the action is frivolous or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). While pro se pleadings are liberally construed
and held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers,
they must still suggest some factual basis for a claim. Jones v. Fla.
Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015). And we can
affirm the district court’s judgment “on any basis supported by the
record,” whether or not the district court decided the case on that
basis. Club Madonna, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 924 F.3d 1370, 1378
(11th Cir. 2019).
5 After the magistrate judge filed its R&R, but before the district court’s order,
Harmon moved for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed in
dismissing Harmon’s amended complaint, the district court stated that
“Harmon ha[d] not established that he [was] entitled to summary judgment”
and denied his motion as moot.
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23-14221 Opinion of the Court 7
III. Discussion
On appeal, Harmon argues that exceptions to Heck and
absolute judicial immunity apply to his case, that he did not seek to
circumvent § 1983 by challenging his conviction, and that he did
not need to appeal the state court’s judgment or seek habeas corpus
relief.6
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, no person acting under color of state
law may deprive another of “any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. See
Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547, 1554 (11th Cir. 1985). A prisoner in
state custody, however, cannot use a § 1983 claim to challenge the
fact or duration of his confinement, and if the relief he seeks is a
determination that he is entitled to immediate release or faster
release from prison, then “his sole federal remedy is to seek a writ
of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499–500
(1973). Additionally, “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred . . .
no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief) . . . if
success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity
of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74
6 Even liberally construing Harmon’s brief, Harmon has abandoned his claims
against all defendants except Judge Sams. Harmon only mentions Judge Ott
once, and never mentions the other four of defendants by name; nor does he
address any of the reasons the district court dismissed his claims against any
defendant other than Judge Sams. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385
F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.2004) (“[T]he law is by now settled in this Circuit
that a legal claim or argument that has not been briefed before the court is
deemed abandoned and its merits will not be addressed.”).
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(2005) (emphasis omitted) (extending Heck, 512 U.S. 477 to cover
claims for equitable relief).
“Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from
damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial
capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”
Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks
omitted). Factors that determine whether actions were made in a
judicial capacity include whether: “(1) the act complained of
constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in
the judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved
a case pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose
immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.”
Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005). “This
immunity applies even when the judge’s acts are in error,
malicious, or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction,” so long as
they were not in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.7 Id.
7 An example illustrates the difference between acting in “clear absence of all
jurisdiction,” which would defeat absolute immunity, and acting in “excess of
jurisdiction,” which would not defeat absolute immunity. The Supreme
Court has stated:
if a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills and estates,
should try a criminal case, he would be acting in the clear
absence of jurisdiction and would not be immune from
liability for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal
court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he
would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would
be immune.
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23-14221 Opinion of the Court 9
Harmon’s claims fail because we cannot grant his requested
relief. Recall that Harmon requested that (1) the state court
judgment be voided or vacated with prejudice, (2) further
prosecution be barred, and (3) he receive “reimbursements for all
legal fees and all [monetary] and punitive damages accrued as a
result of this unlawful act[.]” We discuss each in turn.
First, as to Harmon’s request that his state court judgment
be voided or vacated, § 1983 is not the proper vehicle for such relief.
Instead, when “challenging the very fact” of his imprisonment and
requesting “immediate release,” Harmon’s “sole federal remedy is
a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500.
Second, Harmon’s request to bar further prosecution
against him runs into at least two problems. First, Harmon has
presented no evidence indicating that he is likely to be prosecuted
again, and we do not enjoin future prosecutions in state court
based on speculation that such prosecution might occur. See
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971) (“A federal lawsuit to stop
a prosecution in a state court is a serious matter. And persons
having no fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary
or speculative, are not to be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs in
such cases.”). And second, to obtain such an injunction, Harmon
must show, in part, “that he has prevailed in establishing the
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 n.7 (1978) (citing Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. 335, 352 (1871)).
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violation of the right asserted in his complaint.”8 Thomas v. Bryant,
614 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). To do so here would require
Harmon to prove that his state court conviction was
unconstitutional, which “would necessarily demonstrate the
invalidity of [his] confinement[.]” And if success on his claim
“would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of [his
confinement,” his “§ 1983 action is barred.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at
74–75.
Third, Harmon’s claim for money damages against Judge
Sams is barred by judicial immunity because Harmon’s allegations
all relate to Judge Sams’s actions taken in his judicial capacity. See
Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239; Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1070. As the district court
noted, “[p]residing over a criminal trial is clearly acting in a judicial
capacity[.]” And a superior court judge trying a criminal case does
not act in “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 357
n.7 (citing Bradley, 80 U.S. at 352).
Because we cannot grant Harmon’s requested relief, his
claims must be dismissed.
AFFIRMED.
8 Harmon would also need to show that “(2) there is no adequate remedy at
law for the violation of this right; (3) irreparable harm will result if the court
does not order injunctive relief; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be
adverse to the public interest.” Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1317. We do not discuss
these additional elements, because, as discussed, Harmon’s need to prove the
first element is sufficient to bar his claim.
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