Thomas A. Guerriero v. Miami RRM

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-10337
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
THOMAS A. GUERRIERO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
MIAMI RRM,
Director,
Respondent-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cv-62252-BB
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10337
____________________
Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Thomas A. Guerriero, a federal prisoner in the custody of
Miami Residential Reentry Management (“Miami RRM”) proceed-
ing pro se, appeals the district court’s order denying his habeas cor-
pus petition. On appeal, he argues that the Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) improperly refused to apply all of his earned time credits
under the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”)1 to his sentence.
When reviewing the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, we review questions of law de novo and the district court’s
factual findings for clear error. Andrews v. Warden, 958 F.3d 1072,
1076 (11th Cir. 2020).
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241 permits district courts to grant habeas
relief for petitioners held “in custody in violation of the Constitu-
tion or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
Challenges to the execution of a federal prisoner’s sentence, such
as the deprivation of good time credits or parole determinations,
rather than his sentence’s validity may be brought through a peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241. McCarthan v. Dir.
of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1089, 1093 (11th Cir.
2017) (en banc).
1 Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
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24-10337 Opinion of the Court 3
The FSA, in relevant part, mandates that the BOP offer in-
centives to prisoners who complete certain recidivism reduction
programs and other productive activities while in custody. 18
U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4). Under the FSA, prisoners who have been de-
termined to have a low risk of recidivism are eligible to earn up to
15 days in FSA time credits for every 30 days of successful partici-
pation in such programs. Id. § 3632(d)(4)(A); see also 28 C.F.R.
§ 523.42(c). Section 3632(d)(4)(C) provides that the BOP can apply
these FSA time credits to either lengthen an eligible prisoner’s pre-
release custody, such as home confinement or half-way house
placement, or to advance transfer to supervised release. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3632(d)(4)(C). However, under § 3624(g)(3), “the Director of the
[BOP] may transfer [a] prisoner to begin any term of supervised
release at an earlier date, not to exceed 12 months, based on the appli-
cation of [FSA] time credits under section 3632.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(g)(3) (emphasis added); see also 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(d)(3)
(“The [BOP] may apply FSA Time Credits toward early transfer to
supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g) only when . . . [t]he
application of FSA Time Credits would result in transfer to super-
vised release no earlier than 12 months before the date that transfer .
. . would have otherwise occurred.”) (emphasis added). Further,
§ 3632(d)(4)(C) does not permit the BOP to apply a prisoner’s FSA
time credits to his period of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3632(d)(4)(C).
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-10337
Here, the district court correctly found that the BOP had al-
ready applied the maximum 12 months’ worth of earned time cred-
its allowed by the FSA to begin Guerriero’s term of supervised re-
lease. On appeal, Guerriero relies heavily on subsection (g)(10),
which states “[t]he time limits under subsections (b) and (c) shall
not apply to prerelease custody under this subsection.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(g)(10). Contrary to Guerriero’s assertions, that subsection
of the FSA is irrelevant to him, because subsections (b) and (c) of
the same are irrelevant to him. Subsection (b) governs good time
credit, and subsection (c) generally authorizes prerelease programs,
such as reentry. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624(b), (c). Guerriero is
not subject to either of those subsections, or their “time limits,” so
§ 3624(g)(10) is irrelevant in this case.
Further, Guerriero acknowledges that 365 days of FSA time
credits have already been applied towards his sentence. The FSA’s
plain language does not entitle him to claim more than that. 18
U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3).
Guerriero also asserts that any additional outstanding time
credits (over and above the 12 months which can be, and have al-
ready been, allowed to accelerate the beginning of Guerriero’s
term of supervised release) should be applied to reduce his three-
year term of supervised release. Guerriero relies upon the first sen-
tence of § 3632(d)(4)(C), which provides:
Time credits earned under this paragraph by prison-
ers who successfully participate in recidivism reduc-
tion programs or productive activities shall be applied
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24-10337 Opinion of the Court 5
toward time in prerelease custody or supervised re-
lease.
18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C)(first sentence). It is not clear from that
sentence, read in isolation, whether the time credits are to be used
to reduce incarceration time so as to accelerate the beginning of
prerelease custody or supervised release, on the one hand, or, on
the other hand, are to be used to reduce the actual time imposed
by the original sentence of supervised release (in Guerriero’s case
his three-year supervised release sentence). However, the next sen-
tence of § 3632(d)(4)(C) points to the former as the meaning of
Congress. It instructs the Bureau of Prisons how to implement the
application of the time credits provided for in the first sentence.
That second sentence provides:
The Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall transfer
eligible prisoners, as determined under section
3624(g), into prerelease custody or supervised release.
Id. (second sentence). In other words, the second sentence clearly
indicates that Congress meant that the time credits are to be used
to reduce incarceration time so as to accelerate the beginning of
prerelease custody or supervised release, or, as the second sentence
of § 3632(d)(4)(C) says: “transfer eligible prisoners . . . into prelease
custody or supervised release.” This meaning is also suggested by
the title of § 3632(d)(4)(C): “Application of time credits toward pre-
release custody or supervised release.” 2 The “[u]se of the word
2 Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 120–21 (2023)(“This Court has long con-
sidered that the title of a statute and the heading of a section are tools available
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-10337
‘toward’ means that credits can be applied to bring ‘time in prere-
lease custody or supervised release’ closer to occurring because
credits applied ‘toward’ something generally means to bring that
something closer to happening.” United States v. Calabrese, 2023
WL 1969753, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2023)(quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“defining ‘toward,’ in relevant part, as
‘in the direction of; on a course or line leading to (some place or
something)’”)). This meaning is also indicated by § 3624(g), the
provision to which the second sentence of § 3632(d)(4)(C) looked
with respect to the implementation of the time credits. Section §
3624(g)(3) provides:
Supervised release.--If the sentencing court included
as a part of the prisoner's sentence a requirement that
the prisoner be placed on a term of supervised release
after imprisonment pursuant to section 3583, the Di-
rector of the Bureau of Prisons may transfer the pris-
oner to begin any such term of supervised release at
an earlier date, not to exceed 12 months, based on the
application of time credits under section 3632.
18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3). Thus, considering the entirety of the rele-
vant statutory language, we conclude that Congress intended the
for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute.”)(internal quota-
tions and citations omitted).
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24-10337 Opinion of the Court 7
time credits to be used to reduce incarceration time so as to accel-
erate the beginning of prerelease custody or supervised release.
As is apparent from the overall statutory language, the obvi-
ous purpose of Congress—in providing for these time credits—was
to provide an incentive for prisoners to attend the recidivism re-
duction programs Congress was devising, and the obvious incen-
tive was that the time credits would reduce a prisoner’s incarcera-
tion time—not that the credits would reduce the post-incarceration
supervised release. The regulations also reflect this obvious con-
gressional purpose. See 28 C.F.R. § 523.44 (“Application of FSA
Time Credits”). Section 523.44(b) provides, in relevant part:
[T]he Bureau may apply FSA Time Credits toward
prerelease custody or early transfer to supervised re-
lease under 18 U.S.C. 3624(g) only if an eligible in-
mate has:
(1) Earned FSA Time Credits in an amount that is
equal to the remainder of the inmate’s imposed
term of imprisonment;
Id. § 523.44(b) (emphasis added).
For the reasons set out above, we readily conclude that §
3632(d)(4)(C) means that the FSA time credits are to be used to re-
duce incarceration time so as to accelerate the beginning of the su-
pervised release time that was imposed at sentencing on the pris-
oner. Accordingly, we reject Guerriero’s attempt to have his excess
time credits applied to reduce his three-year supervised release
term. Every case to address this issue has agreed with the
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-10337
interpretation set out above, save only one: Dyer v. Fulgam, 2022
WL 1598249, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. May 20, 2022), appeal dismissed as
moot, Dyer v. Fulgam, No. 22-5608 (6th Cir. June 6, 2023). See, e.g.,
Singleton v. Neely, 2023 WL 9550049 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 21, 2023), re-
port and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 476949 (N.D. Ala.
Feb. 7, 2024); Williams v. Fitch, 2024 WL 737803 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 31,
2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 734477 (M.D.
Ala. Feb. 22, 2024); Alexander v. Joseph, 2023 WL 6798866 (N.D. Fla.
Sept. 12, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 6794979
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2023); Harrison v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2022 WL
17093441 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2022)).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is
AFFIRMED.
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