Dwight Smith, et al v. AMH 2014-1 Borrower, LLC, et al

23-13273Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit4 de abr. de 2024

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-13273
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
DWIGHT SMITH,
CATHERINE SMITH,
BRYANT SMITH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
AMH 2014-1 BORROWER, LLC,
AMERICAN HOMES 4 RENT SFR, LLC,
AMERICAN HOMES 4 RENT, L.P.,
AH4R MANAGEMENT - GA, LLC,
DAVID SINGELYN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
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DOES 1-25, INCLUSIVE, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00805-SEG
____________________
Before J ILL PRYOR , BRANCH, and G RANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Dwight Smith, proceeding pro se along with his wife and
daughter, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his discrimination
and retaliation claims under the Fair Housing Act for failure to state
a claim. He argues on appeal that the district court erred because
AMH 2014-1 failed to provide accommodations after being given
notice of his disability, and because it unlawfully retaliated against
him after he requested accommodations. He also appeals the
court’s denial of his motion for leave to file a third amended
complaint, which the court found would be futile. Because the
district court did not err in either of these respects, we affirm.
I.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Am. Dental
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23-13273 Opinion of the Court 3
Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). To survive
this motion, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir.
2011) (quotation omitted). This analysis generally has two steps.
First, we must “eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are
merely legal conclusions,” and then, “where there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Am.
Dental Ass’n, 605 F.3d at 1290 (quotation omitted). Pro se
pleadings, however, “are held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
Cir. 1998). Even so, a pro se litigant is “subject to the relevant law
and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).
We also review the denial of leave to amend by reason of
futility de novo because “futility is a legal conclusion that the
amended complaint would necessarily fail.” L.S. ex rel. Hernandez
v. Peterson, 982 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 2020). A party may freely
amend their complaint once within 21 days, but after that the party
must seek either the consent of the opposing party or the court’s
leave to amend. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The court should permit
amendment “when justice so requires.” Id. A district court need
not grant leave, however, when “a more carefully drafted
complaint could not state a claim”—in other words, when
amendment would be futile. Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty Bd. of Educ.,
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885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted); see also
Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004).
II.
We begin, as Smith did, with his claim that AMH
discriminated against him because of his disability by failing to
provide a reasonable accommodation. The Fair Housing Act
provides that it is unlawful to refuse to rent or otherwise
discriminate against any person in the “terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,” including by refusing to
“make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or
services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford
such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42
U.S.C. § 3604(b), (f)(3)(B). To state a failure-to-accommodate
claim, a plaintiff must show four elements: “(1) he is disabled
within the meaning of the FHA, (2) he requested a reasonable
accommodation, (3) the requested accommodation was necessary
to afford him an opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling, and (4)
the defendants refused to make the accommodation.” Bhogaita v.
Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, 765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014).
Smith’s discrimination claim fails because he did not plead
sufficient facts to show that he is disabled within the meaning of
the Fair Housing Act, and even if he did, his requested
accommodation was not reasonable. Under the Fair Housing Act,
a person is disabled if he has or is regarded as having “a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person’s major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). “Major life
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23-13273 Opinion of the Court 5
activities,” in turn, “means functions such as caring for one’s self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning and working.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(b). All
Smith has alleged, however, is that he has Crohn’s disease, which
in September of 2021 required him to be hospitalized for three days
and to receive a blood transfusion. But he did not allege any further
facts about his health or how his Crohn’s disease affects his major
life activities. This, by itself, is insufficient to allege that Smith met
the statutory definition of disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); 24
C.F.R. § 100.201(b).
Even if Smith could allege a disability, he has not met his
burden of showing that the proposed accommodation is facially
reasonable. Schaw v. Habitat for Human. of Citrus Cnty, Inc., 938 F.3d
1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2019). Smith alleges that he asked for “more
time to move” due to his disability, and that this was a “Reasonable
Accommodation Disability Request.” But calling his request
reasonable does not make it so. Judging the reasonableness of an
accommodation request requires us to consider “whether the
requested accommodation is both efficacious and proportional to
the costs to implement it.” Schaw, 938 F.3d at 1265 (quotations
omitted). An accommodation is unreasonable if it would require
“a fundamental alteration in the nature of a program” or if it would
impose “undue financial and administrative burdens.” Id.
(quotation omitted). Put differently, “the difference between an
accommodation that is required and a transformation that is not is
the difference between saddling a camel and removing its hump.”
Id. (quotation omitted and alteration adopted). Smith asks AMH
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to remove the hump. In fact, his requested accommodation is not
really an accommodation at all. He is not asking for a modification
in his dwelling that would ameliorate the effects of his handicap—
he is asking for AMH to cease or substantially delay his eviction.
This requested accommodation in no way addresses the needs
created by his alleged disability—Crohn’s disease. Schwarz v. City
of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1226 (11th Cir. 2008). Instead, it
goes beyond those needs to place him in a better position than a
non-disabled resident under the same circumstances, which is an
improper interpretation of the Fair Housing Act. Id.
Smith’s claim that he was retaliated against in violation of
the Fair Housing Act also fails. The Fair Housing Act makes it
“unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any
person in the exercise or enjoyment of” any right granted or
protected by the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3617. The district court found
that Smith’s retaliation claim suffered from fundamental timing
issues—any allegedly retaliatory action occurred before Smith’s
allegedly protected activities. We agree. According to Smith’s
own pleading, AMH first notified Smith that he had broken the
terms of the lease and needed to vacate the premises on March 4,
2021. Then, on March 5, 2021, Smith notified AMH that he had
just had surgery and would need time to vacate. AMH sent move-
out notices again on March 9, March 10, March 15, and March 19.
It was not until March 20 that Smith sent his accommodation
request to delay his eviction. Even assuming that this was
protected activity, it came after AMH had already tried to remove
Smith multiple times for an independent violation of the terms of
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Smith’s lease. Because Smith has not alleged facts sufficient to
support a claim that AMH retaliated against Smith, the district
court did not err when it dismissed this claim.
Finally, the district court did not err in denying Smith’s
motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. Smith had
already amended his complaint twice, and had received specific
instructions about how to resolve the deficiencies in his prior
pleadings. His latest round of proposed revisions would not cure
the fundamental problems with his Fair Housing Act claims,
discussed above. Accordingly, the district court was correct to
deny Smith’s motion for leave to amend based on futility.1
Because the district court did not err in dismissing Smith’s
second amended complaint for failing to state a claim, nor in
denying his motion to amend his complaint a third time, the
judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
1 Smith also moved to add a supplemental addendum to his appellate brief.
This proposal consists of a table of contents and jurisdictional statement, but
does not include any substantive changes to his legal arguments on appeal.
Though it does not change the outcome of his appeal, this motion is
GRANTED.
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