Moshe A. Perry v. United States Patent and Trademark Office

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
MOSHE A. PERRY,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE,
Defendant-Appellee
JOHN A. SQUIRES, UNDER SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, WENDY
GARBER, DIRECTOR PATENT TECHNOLOGY
CENTER, DARNELL JAYNE, DIRECTOR, DALE
SHAW, DEPUTY DIRECTOR STAKEHOLDER
OUTREACH AND PATENTS OMBUDSMAN
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, KRISTINE CLARETTE MATTER,
EXAMINER, KATHERINE MATECKI, GROUP
DIRECTOR, TECHNOLOGY CENTER, LAURA
MARTIN, EXAMINER, SHIRENE WILLIS
BRANTLEY, ATTORNEY ADVISOR AT THE USPTO
PETITION DEPARTMENT, CHARLES STEVEN
BRANTLEY, ATTORNEY ADVISOR AT THE USPTO
PETITION DEPARTMENT, DOES 1 THROUGH 10
KNOWN AND UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS,
Defendants
______________________
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PERRY v. PTO 2
2023-1812
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia in No. 1:22-cv-01126-LMB-
JFA, Judge Leonie M. Brinkema.
______________________
Decided: November 24, 2025
______________________
M OSHE A. PERRY , Chatsworth, CA, pro se.
M AUREEN D ONOVAN Q UELER, Office of the Solicitor,
United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria,
VA, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by M ICHAEL
S. FORMAN.
______________________
PER CURIAM.
Moshe Avram Perry appeals from the order of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia dismissing his complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). This is the third suit filed by Mr. Perry
asserting that he is entitled to relief for actions taken by
the United States Patent and Trademark Office and the
third appeal to this court. Because we discern no abuse of
discretion in the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Perry’s
complaint or in the judge’s decision to not recuse herself,
we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In January 2019, Mr. Perry, proceeding pro se, filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California against the USPTO and various
agency officials alleging misconduct in the handling of his
patent applications. In February 2019, the district court
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PERRY v. PTO 3
denied his in forma pauperis (IFP) motion and dismissed
the complaint as frivolous. Mr. Perry did not appeal that
ruling. However, Mr. Perry subsequently filed a complaint
raising similar allegations before the United States Court
of Federal Claims in November 2019. The Court of Federal
Claims also dismissed his claims. Mr. Perry appealed that
decision to this court, and we affirmed. Perry v. United
States, 149 Fed. Cl. 1 (2020), aff’d, No. 2020-2084,
2021 WL 2935075 (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2021).
Mr. Perry then returned to the Central District of Cal-
ifornia in December 2021, seeking to reopen his case. In
January 2022, the district court ordered that Mr. Perry’s
motion be rejected for filing and returned to him, noting
that his case had previously been dismissed, his IFP mo-
tion was previously denied, and no filings may be accepted
from him without an approved IFP application. In March
2022, Mr. Perry filed another IFP motion, and the district
court again ordered that the document be rejected for filing
and returned, noting that his IFP motion was previously
denied and the case was closed. Mr. Perry appealed those
orders to this court, and we dismissed due to lack of juris-
diction for untimeliness and because Mr. Perry’s appeal
was frivolous. Perry v. United States Pat. & Trademark
Off., No. 2022-1720, 2022 WL 3209323 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 9,
2022).
In October 2022, Mr. Perry filed another complaint
against the USPTO and various officials alleging miscon-
duct in the handling of his patent applications but this time
before the Eastern District of Virginia. Mr. Perry also filed
an IFP motion concurrent with his complaint. The district
court issued an order denying Mr. Perry’s IFP motion and
dismissing the complaint with prejudice as frivolous under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and duplicative of the previously
dismissed complaints.
After filing his notice of appeal to this court, Mr. Perry
filed a complaint of judicial misconduct against the district
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PERRY v. PTO 4
court judge with the Judicial Council of the Fourth Circuit.
The Judicial Council dismissed Mr. Perry’s complaint,
finding that Mr. Perry offered no evidence that the district
court judge had any involvement in any perceived delay in
the docketing and processing of his notice of appeal or en-
gaged in thievery, malice, or discrimination.
Mr. Perry appeals the district court’s order dismissing
his complaint to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
D ISCUSSION
Based on our reading of Mr. Perry’s briefs, the issues
properly before us are Mr. Perry’s challenges to the district
court’s dismissal of his complaint as frivolous and the dis-
trict court judge’s decision in not recusing herself. We ad-
dress each in turn.
Because questions regarding the dismissal of a com-
plaint as frivolous and judicial recusal are not within our
exclusive jurisdiction, we are guided by the law of the re-
gional circuit, here the Fourth Circuit. See C&F Packing
Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see
also Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. FrankSu Enter. Corp.,
78 F.3d 550, 556 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The Fourth Circuit
“appl[ies] an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing
a district court’s decision to dismiss an [IFP] complaint un-
der [28 U.S.C.] § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).” Nagy v. FMC Butner,
376 F.3d 252, 254 (4th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The
Fourth Circuit also ordinarily reviews a district court
judge’s recusal decision for abuse of discretion, United
States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 283 (4th Cir. 1998), or
for plain error where the recusal argument was not pre-
served. See United States v. Richardson, 796 F. App’x 795,
798 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Flame S.A. v. Freight Bulk Pte.
Ltd., 807 F.3d 572, 592 (4th Cir. 2015)).
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I
Mindful of the danger of encouraging suits that filing
fees might otherwise have deterred, “Congress authorized
district courts to dismiss [IFP] suits ‘if satisfied that the
action is frivolous or malicious.’” Nagy, 376 F.3d at 255 (ci-
tation omitted). “This authority was interpreted to confer
broad discretion on the district courts to police [IFP] fil-
ings.” Id. (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992)); see also Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1316
(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). “To this end, the statute accords
judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on
an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unu-
sual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual alle-
gations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions
are clearly baseless,” “fantastic or delusional,” or “fanciful.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28, 325 (1989).
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dis-
missing Mr. Perry’s complaint as frivolous because his
claims lack an arguable basis in law or fact.
The district court determined that dismissal of
Mr. Perry’s complaint as frivolous was warranted for three
reasons. Appx 18–20.1 First, the district court found that
Mr. Perry’s allegations of deception, discrimination, har-
assment, theft, fraud, email hacking, and conspiracy be-
tween private companies and the patent office “are so
fantastical and wholly incredible that they lack any merit.”
Appx 18–19. We agree. Mr. Perry’s allegations are conclu-
sory and unsupported and, as the district court noted, “the
claims plaintiff is asserting in [the district] court are very
similar to the previously filed and dismissed claims.”
Appx 20; see Perry, 149 Fed. Cl. at 14–36, aff’d, 2021 WL
1 We refer to the appendix filed with Mr. Perry’s in-
formal opening brief as “Appx” throughout this opinion.
See ECF No. 51.
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PERRY v. PTO 6
2935075, at *1–5 (finding that Mr. Perry’s complaint con-
tains no allegations sufficient to support his contract, tak-
ings, illegal exaction, email hacking, and conspiracy
claims). Given the lack of evidentiary support for
Mr. Perry’s implausible and previously-dismissed claims,
we determine that the district court reasonably exercised
its discretion in dismissing these claims as frivolous.
Second, the district court found that Mr. Perry’s com-
plaint sought “irrational and meritless forms of relief,” in-
cluding $150,000,000 in compensatory damages, a stay of
all USPTO actions, a criminal referral, and a referral for a
civil investigation of racketeering. Appx 19; see also
Appx 174–76, 137, 140, 245. Setting aside that damages
have not been established, Mr. Perry’s inflated request for
compensatory damages for publishing one of his patent ap-
plications does “nothing to strengthen the seriousness of
[his] claim.” Nagy, 376 F.3d at 258. Nor do his requests
for irrational relief, such as “a stay of all USPTO actions
pending resolution of this case.” Appx 176 (capitalization
normalized). Thus, the relief sought by Mr. Perry further
justifies the district court’s dismissal.
Third, the district court found that the duplicative na-
ture of Mr. Perry’s complaint in the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia in comparison to the claims previously dismissed by
other courts supported dismissal. Appx 19–20. It is well
within a district court’s authority to refuse to accept repet-
itive filings where a litigant continues to abuse “the judicial
process by filing meritless and repetitive actions.” Cromer
v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 817–18 (4th Cir.
2004); see also Cochran, 73 F.3d at 1316–17. Because mul-
tiple courts have expressed serious criticism of Mr. Perry’s
frivolous litigation habits,2 and Mr. Perry’s claims have
2 See In re Perry, No. CV 15-7155 FMO, 2017 WL
1276075, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2017) (“Because
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PERRY v. PTO 7
previously been dismissed as frivolous, we discern no abuse
of discretion in the district court’s determination.
Mr. Perry raises no cogent, non-frivolous argument as
to why the district court’s determination was incorrect, let
alone an abuse of discretion. Instead, Mr. Perry’s argu-
ments before this court consist mostly of assertions going
to the merits of his complaint: that the USPTO’s pro-
cessing, examination, rejection, and publication of his pa-
tent applications were improper and that the USPTO
hacked his email account. Beyond that, Mr. Perry con-
tends that he has standing and that the district court has
jurisdiction over his claims but dismissed his complaint
without ever hearing the merits or holding an evidentiary
hearing. But these arguments are irrelevant to the propri-
ety of the district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), where the court “is not bound, as it usu-
ally is when making a determination based solely on the
pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the plain-
tiff’s allegations.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. Instead, the dis-
trict court is entrusted with discretion to determine “when
the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the
wholly incredible.” Id. at 33. Without any non-frivolous
contention that the district court abused its discretion in
dismissing Mr. Perry’s complaint as frivolous, we find its
dismissal appropriate.
[Mr. ]Perry was found to be a vexatious litigant by the state
courts, he was required to post a bond before initiating any
state court action.”), aff’d, 734 F. App’x 533 (9th Cir. 2018),
cert. denied sub nom. Perry v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
589 U.S. 1107 (2019); In re Perry, No. ADV 10-01356-GM,
2013 WL 3369310, at *4 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. July 2, 2013),
aff’d, 586 F. App’x 283 (9th Cir. 2014); Perry, 149 Fed. Cl.
1, aff’d, 2021 WL 2935075; Perry, 2022 WL 3209323.
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II
Mr. Perry also appears to ask this court to find that the
district court judge erred by failing to recuse herself under
28 U.S.C. § 455. Ordinarily, we review a judge’s decision
not to recuse themselves for an abuse of discretion. DeTem-
ple, 162 F.3d at 283. But because Mr. Perry never moved
for the judge’s recusal in the district court, we review this
issue for plain error. Richardson, 796 F. App’x at 798.
“Under this standard of review, [Mr. Perry] must show that
an error occurred, that it was plain, and that it affected
[his] substantial rights.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, Mr. Perry does not identify any errors, much less
plain errors, that warrant recusal. Mr. Perry does not
point to any evidence of bias or prejudice or anything out-
side of judicial rulings and routine trial administration ef-
forts. “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute
valid basis for a bias or partiality recusal motion,” espe-
cially here, where Mr. Perry does not contend that the dis-
trict court judge relied on “knowledge acquired outside
such proceedings []or . . . displayed deep-seated and une-
quivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment im-
possible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56
(1994). We thus find no error in the district court judge’s
decision not to recuse herself.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Perry’s remaining arguments
and are unpersuaded.3 Accordingly, we affirm the dismis-
sal of Mr. Perry’s complaint by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
AFFIRMED
3 We also deny Mr. Perry’s motion to correct the Oc-
tober 7, 2025 order denying his renewed motion for oral ar-
gument. See ECF No. 107.
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COSTS
No costs.
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