Wonderland Switzerland Ag v. Evenflo Company, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG,
Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant
v.
EVENFLO COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant
______________________
2023-2043, 2023-2233, 2023-2326
______________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware in No. 1:20-cv-00727-JPM, Judge Jon
P. McCalla.
______________________
Decided: December 17, 2025
______________________
SHAMITA ETIENNE-CUMMINGS, Paul Hastings LLP,
Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-cross-appellant. Also
represented by ALAN BILLHARZ, JAMES P. GAGEN, DAVID M.
TENNANT.
AARON E. HANKEL, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, Kan-
sas City, MO, argued for defendant-appellant. Also repre-
sented by LAUREN ELIZABETH DOUVILLE.
______________________
Before MOORE, Chief Judge, PROST and REYNA, Circuit
Judges.
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 2
Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge MOORE.
Opinion concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part filed by
Circuit Judge REYNA.
MOORE, Chief Judge.
Evenflo Company, Inc. (Evenflo) appeals (1) a final
judgment from the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Delaware holding Evenflo infringed claim 1 of U.S.
Patent No. 7,625,043 and claims 1 and 5 of U.S. Patent
No. 8,141,951; and (2) a permanent injunction ordered by
the district court. Wonderland Switzerland AG (Wonder-
land) cross-appeals the district court’s denial of a new trial
on willful infringement. For the following reasons, we af-
firm-in-part, reverse-in-part, vacate-in-part, and remand
for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Wonderland owns the ’043 and ’951 patents, which are
directed to car seats for children. ’043 patent at 1:15–20;
’951 patent at 1:13–15. Claim 1 of each patent is repre-
sentative. Claim 1 of the ’043 patent reads:
1. A car seat for use in an automobile to transport
a child, comprising:
a seat assembly defining a generally horizontal
seat surface for supporting a child positioned
thereon, said seat assembly including a pair of re-
ceptables; and
a seat back having a locking mechanism for selec-
tively detachably connecting said seat back to said
seat assembly, said seat back including a rear sup-
port portion oriented in generally upright position
when attached to said seat assembly, said seat
back having a pair of attachment arms projecting
generally, perpendicularly outwardly relative to
said rear support portion for engagement with said
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 3
seat assembly so as to be received within corre-
sponding said receptacles.
’043 patent at 10:47–60 (emphases added).
Claim 1 of the ’951 patent reads:
1. A child safety seat comprising: a seat body;
an engaging board connected to the seat body, a
tooth-shaped structure being formed on the engag-
ing board;
a backrest movably disposed on the engaging board;
and
an engaging mechanism disposed between the en-
gaging board and the backrest, the engaging mech-
anism comprising:
an engaging member pivotally connected to the
backrest for engaging with the tooth-shaped struc-
ture; and
a driving device movably connected to the backrest,
the driving device comprising:
a connecting member pivotally connected to a first
end of the engaging member; and
a pulling member connected to the connecting mem-
ber, for driving the first end of the engaging mem-
ber to rotate relative to the backrest when the
driving device moves to a releasing position . . . .
’951 patent at 6:46–7:8 (emphases added).
Wonderland sued Evenflo, alleging five of Evenflo’s
convertible car seat models—divided into the “4-in-1 seats”
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 4
and the “3-in-1 seats” (collectively, accused products1)—in-
fringe various claims of the ’043 and ’951 patents.
J.A. 183–279; J.A. 1–3. At trial, the jury rendered a verdict
finding (1) Evenflo’s 3-in-1 and 4-in-1 seats infringe claim 1
of the ’043 patent under the doctrine of equivalents (DOE),
(2) Evenflo’s infringement of the ’043 patent was not will-
ful, (3) the 4-in-1 seats infringe claims 1 and 5 of the ’951
patent (literally and under DOE), and (4) the 3-in-1 seats
infringe claim 1 of the ’951 patent (literally and under
DOE). J.A. 107–12. After trial, the district court granted
Wonderland’s motion for permanent injunctive relief and
denied the parties’ cross-motions for judgment as a matter
of law (JMOL) and for a new trial. J.A. 1–19; J.A. 44–65.
Although Wonderland moved for permanent injunction
with respect to the ’043 patent only, the district court per-
manently enjoined activities relating to both asserted pa-
tents. J.A. 19. We ordered a stay pending appeal of the
injunction only as it relates to the ’951 patent. Stay Order,
Dkt. No. 21. Evenflo appeals the district court’s final judg-
ment and permanent injunction order. Wonderland cross-
appeals the court’s denial of a new trial on willful infringe-
ment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292
(c)(1)–(2) and 1295(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
I. Evenflo’s Appeal
Evenflo raises several issues on appeal. Regarding the
’043 patent, Evenflo argues (1) no reasonable jury could
find the seat back of Evenflo’s 4-in-1 seats have a “locking
mechanism for selectively detachably connecting” the seat
back to the seat assembly, (2) the district court erred by
failing to resolve a claim construction dispute over the “pair
1 The 4-in-1 seats include Evenflo’s EveryFit and
EveryKid models. The 3-in-1 seats include Evenflo’s Safe-
Max, Evolve, and Transitions models. J.A. 1–3.
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 5
of receptacles,” and (3) the district court erred by failing to
construe “attachment arms . . . for engagement.” ’043 pa-
tent at 10:47–60. As for the ’951 patent, Evenflo argues (1)
the district court incorrectly construed “connected to” and
(2) no reasonable jury could find the accused products have
“a backrest movably disposed on the engaging board.” ’951
patent at 6:46–7:8. Finally, Evenflo argues the district
court abused its discretion in granting injunctive relief
with respect to both the ’043 and ’951 patents. We address
each issue in turn.
A. ’043 Patent: “a seat back having a locking mechanism
for selectively detachably connecting said seat back to
said seat assembly”
Evenflo argues the seat backs of its accused 4-in-1 seats
do not include a “locking mechanism for selectively detach-
ably connecting” the seat back to the seat assembly as re-
cited in claim 1 of the ’043 patent, and no reasonable jury
could have found otherwise. We agree.
We review a jury’s infringement findings, both literal
and under the doctrine of equivalents, for substantial evi-
dence. Osseo Imaging, LLC v. Planmeca USA Inc., 116
F.4th 1335, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2024). “A factual finding is
supported by substantial evidence if a reasonable jury
could have found in favor of the prevailing party in light of
the evidence presented at trial.” Id. (quoting Amgen Inc.
v. Hospira, Inc., 944 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2019)).
The jury found Evenflo’s 4-in-1 seats infringed claim 1
of the ’043 patent under DOE. J.A. 108. Claim 1, however,
requires “a seat back having a locking mechanism for se-
lectively detachably connecting said seat back to [a] seat
assembly.” ’043 patent at 10:52–54. There is no substantial
evidence the 4-in-1 seats include any such feature. The
seat backs of the 4-in-1 seats simply include a stationary
metal bar (referred to as a “lock rod”) while all the compo-
nents for selectively attaching and detaching to the lock
rod—including a handle and spring-loaded hooks—are
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 6
located on the seat assembly. Evenflo Br. 12–13, 45; Won-
derland Br. 44. Because claim 1 plainly requires the seat
back to include the components for selective detachability,
no reasonable jury could find the accused 4-in-1 seats liter-
ally meet this limitation.
Wonderland argues there is still substantial evidence
to find infringement under DOE because its expert,
Dr. Cameron, explained to the jury there were “no substan-
tial differences” in having the spring-loaded hooks on the
seat back or seat assembly because it is still the “overall
same mechanism.” Wonderland Br. 44 (citing J.A. 6583–
85). The locking mechanism limitation requires the selec-
tive detachability components to be on the seat back rather
than the seat assembly. It is thus insufficient, under DOE,
to argue the “overall . . . mechanism” is the same or that a
different claim element (i.e., the seat assembly) contains
the locking mechanism for selectively detachably connect-
ing. “[DOE] must be applied to individual elements of the
claim, not to the invention as a whole.” Warner-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) (em-
phasis added). We conclude there can be no equivalence as
a matter of law with Evenflo’s 4-in-1 seats, which do not
include any elements on the seat back for selectively de-
tachably connecting the seat back to the seat assembly. Ac-
cordingly, substantial evidence does not support the jury’s
finding that the 4-in-1 seats infringe claim 1 of the ’043 pa-
tent under DOE.
B. ’043 Patent: “pair of receptacles”
Evenflo further argues the district court erred by fail-
ing to resolve a claim construction dispute over the “pair of
receptacles” recited in claim 1 of the ’043 patent. We do not
agree.
We review a district court’s claim construction based
on intrinsic evidence de novo and review any findings of
fact regarding extrinsic evidence for clear error. Speed-
Track, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 998 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 7
2021). “When the parties raise an actual dispute regarding
the proper scope of [the] claims, the court, not the jury,
must resolve that dispute.” O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond
Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
During claim construction, Evenflo proposed constru-
ing the term “receptacle” as “a bounded space to receive
and contain,” while Wonderland proposed “a space defined
by one or more surfaces sized to receive attachment arms.”
J.A. 311. The district court considered both proposals and,
with the parties’ agreement, construed receptacle as “a
three[-]dimensional space sized to receive an attachment
arm.” J.A. 311 (parties’ proposed constructions); J.A. 490
(claim construction order); J.A. 496–510 (Markman hear-
ing). At summary judgment, the parties then disputed
what it means for a space to be “sized” to receive an arm,
but the district court determined Evenflo was judicially es-
topped from arguing each receptacle must be defined by a
bounded space because Evenflo abandoned this argument
when it accepted the court’s construction. J.A. 3862–64.
On appeal, Evenflo argues judicial estoppel does not
apply because its proposed construction of receptacle was
consistent with the court’s construction, and all parties
agreed a receptacle is a bounded space. Evenflo Br. 29–30
(citing J.A. 509 at 19:18–21; J.A. 500 at 10:11–18; J.A. 510
at 20:18–19). According to Evenflo, if the jury were
properly instructed that a receptacle is a bounded space,
they could not have found the accused products infringe be-
cause the accused products’ single continuous cavity is not
the same as a “pair of receptacles” each “sized” to receive
an attachment arm. Evenflo Br. 30–33.
We see no error by the district court. The court re-
solved the claim construction dispute by adopting a con-
struction that did not include Evenflo’s proposed “bounded”
language, and the parties stipulated to this construction.
J.A. 311; J.A. 490; J.A. 496–510. Wonderland never con-
ceded a receptacle is necessarily a bounded space, as
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 8
Evenflo claims. Wonderland simply acknowledged during
the Markman hearing that one embodiment of the ’043 pa-
tent showed a “bounded space” and that a space within a
seat assembly needs to be “three-dimensional.” J.A. 500 at
10:11–18; J.A. 509 at 19:18–21; see also Wonderland
Br. 21. The district court did not err by adopting a claim
construction agreed upon by the parties and leaving the
factual question of infringement to the jury.
Having identified no error in the district court’s claim
construction, we also hold the jury’s infringement finding
was supported by substantial evidence. For example, there
was ample evidence from Dr. Cameron and Evenflo’s engi-
neers that there is not just one featureless cavity in the ac-
cused products, but lips and walls that define the pair of
receptacles. See J.A. 5750–51; J.A. 5864–69; J.A. 5880–82;
J.A. 6076–81; J.A. 6119–24; J.A. 6262–68; J.A. 6492–93;
J.A. 6579–81; J.A. 7357–59; J.A. 7527–28; J.A. 7545. Ac-
cordingly, we see no reason to disturb the jury’s finding
that the accused products include a pair of receptacles.
C. ’043 Patent: “attachment arms . . . for engagement”
Evenflo next argues the district court erred by failing
to construe “attachment arms . . . for engagement” as re-
cited in claim 1 of the ’043 patent. We do not agree.
Although “[a] determination that a claim term . . . has
the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ may be inadequate . . .
when reliance on a term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning does not re-
solve the parties’ dispute,” O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361, that
is not the case here. The district court’s adoption of a plain
and ordinary meaning construction of engagement fully re-
solved the parties’ dispute. J.A. 533; J.A. 3866.
During claim construction, Evenflo argued engage-
ment meant “to interlock with or fit into and move together
with.” J.A. 310. The district court, however, adopted the
plain and ordinary meaning of engagement, noting Even-
flo’s proposed construction was too narrow. J.A. 533. At
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 9
summary judgment, the district court again considered
Evenflo’s proposal that “attachment arms . . . for engage-
ment” means “attachment arms . . . for interlocking with or
otherwise attaching to,” and rejected this as “overly limit-
ing and inconsistent with [engagement’s] usage in the ’043
patent.” J.A. 3864–68. It is clear from this record the dis-
trict court considered and resolved the dispute over
whether claim 1’s attachment arms must interlock with or
attach to the seat assembly.
We see no error in the district court’s conclusion that
the plain and ordinary meaning of engagement is broader
than Evenflo’s proposed construction. The ’043 patent’s
distinct use of terms such as “locking” in the written de-
scription suggests engagement means something different.
’043 patent at 9:46–53. Moreover, dependent claim 5 re-
cites a “locking mechanism” and “latching apparatus” to
“secure” the attachment arm to the seat assembly. Id.
at 11:11–13. Because claim 1 already requires “attach-
ment arms . . . for engagement with [the] seat assembly,”
the further use of locking and latching components to se-
cure the attachment arm to the seat assembly demon-
strates engagement is broader than “interlocking with or
otherwise attaching to.” Id. at 10:56–59, 11:11–13.
Substantial evidence supports the jury’s infringement
finding under the correct construction of engagement. For
example, Dr. Cameron’s testimony about how the accused
products’ attachment arms (1) literally infringe by provid-
ing structural integrity for engagement and (2) infringe un-
der DOE was substantial evidence supporting the jury’s
verdict. J.A. 6104–12; J.A. 6154–58; J.A. 6585–87. Ac-
cordingly, we see no reason to disturb the jury’s finding
that the accused products include “attachment arms . . . for
engagement.”
D. ’951 Patent: “connected to”
Turning to the ’951 patent, Evenflo argues the district
court incorrectly construed “connected to” in claim 1 as
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 10
referring “not only to separate pieces that are later con-
nected, but also to different parts or features that are dis-
crete yet formed out of a continuous base material.”
Evenflo Br. 49 (quoting J.A. 88). Evenflo argues that if
“connected to” were properly construed to require the pull-
ing member and connecting member of claim 1 to be phys-
ically distinct components, no reasonable jury could have
found the accused products infringe because both alleged
elements are made of a single piece of plastic in the accused
products. Id. at 54–55. We do not agree.
Evenflo incorrectly asserts that controlling precedent
confirms components “connected to” one another are pre-
sumed to be physically distinct. Id. at 48–55. For example,
Evenflo cites cases such as Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco
Healthcare Grp., LP, 616 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2010) to ar-
gue “there is a presumption that two distinct and separate
structures are required for a finding of infringement” when
the claims specify two components are “connected to” each
other. Evenflo Br. 52 (citing Becton, 616 F.3d at 1254–56);
see also id. at 51 (citing Gaus v. Conair Corp., 363 F.3d
1284, 1288 (Fed. Circ. 2004); Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lock-
former Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1404–05 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). These
cases, however, describe no such presumption. Becton did
not address whether two structural elements can be con-
sidered connected to each other when they are distinct yet
formed on the same underlying structure. 616 F.3d at
1254–56. Becton simply concluded two distinct claim ele-
ments connected to each other could not both refer to the
entirety of a single structure because this would make them
“one and the same.” Id.; see also Engel Indus., 96 F.3d at
1404–05 (concluding a “second portion” and “return por-
tion” cannot be “one and the same” when the patent de-
scribes them as separate elements). Evenflo’s view is
further contradicted by Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011), where we
expressly declined “to exclude from the scope of the claims
[two components] that form distinct portions of a single
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 11
structure” where the two components “serve different pur-
poses” and “cover distinct structural portions of an integral
structure.” 653 F.3d at 1304. We thus reject the notion
that our precedent establishes a presumption or per se rule
that controls the construction of “connected to.”
We focus our analysis on the intrinsic evidence, which
is “[t]ypically . . . the most important consideration in a
claim construction analysis,” and conclude it supports the
district court’s construction. Medytox, Inc. v. Galderma
S.A., 71 F.4th 990, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Although the spec-
ification describes embodiments in which the pulling and
connecting members are distinct components, the claim
language does not recite a specific process or way of con-
necting them. See ’951 patent at 3:18–20, 4:46–49, Fig. 2,
6:46–7:8 (claim 1). Moreover, the specification uses “con-
nected to” broadly to encompass the connection of distinct
portions of a backrest that are integrally formed. Id. at
2:46–48 (“headrest portion 15 is connected to a body portion
17 closely and formed integrally and movable synchro-
nously with the body portion 17”). Because “claim terms
are normally used consistently throughout the patent,” we
find this to be strong evidence that “connected to” in claim
1 encompasses connections between two distinct portions
(i.e., a pulling member and a connecting member) of a sin-
gle integrally formed plastic component. Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005). We also see no
contradiction with the prosecution history, which is devoid
of any indication that the addition to claim 1 of the “pulling
member connected to the connecting member” language
was intended to require physically separate and distinct
components. J.A. 1002–03; J.A. 1005–08.
Under the district court’s correct construction, there
was substantial evidence in the form of Dr. Cameron’s tes-
timony to find infringement. See, e.g., J.A. 6190–97;
J.A. 6215–20; J.A. 6576–79. We see no error in the court’s
construction of “connected to” and hold substantial evi-
dence supports the jury’s finding that the accused products
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 12
meet the “pulling member connected to the connecting
member” limitation of claim 1.
E. ’951 Patent: “backrest”
Evenflo next argues we should reverse the jury’s in-
fringement findings for the ’951 patent (both literal and un-
der DOE) because a reasonable jury could not have found
the accused products have “a backrest movably disposed on
the engaging board” as recited in claim 1. We do not agree.
According to Evenflo, its car seats only include a mov-
able headrest, not a movable backrest. Id. at 56 (citing
J.A. 7457–58; J.A. 7459–60; J.A. 7634–35; J.A. 7636–38).
Further, Evenflo argues the trial evidence showed the
headrests in the 3-in-1 seats never support a child’s back,
and the headrests in the 4-in-1 seats include, at best, a
small plastic flap on the lower portion of the headrest that
would sit at a child’s shoulders with proper installation. Id.
at 56–57 (citing J.A. 7490–7524; J.A. 7634–35;
J.A. 7636–38; J.A. 7639–40; J.A. 5932 at 842:16–24;
J.A. 5934–35 at 844:20–845:1; J.A. 5846–47 at
756:18–757:24). Evenflo’s argument fails, however, be-
cause substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that
the claimed “backrest” is met by the headrests of the ac-
cused products. For example, the ’951 patent describes a
backrest as a structure that “a child can lie on or lean
against” and discloses an embodiment including a “head-
rest portion.” ’951 patent at 2:45–51, Fig. 1. Thus, a jury
could reasonably find the term “backrest,” as used in
claim 1, was met by the headrests of Evenflo’s accused
products because a child could lean back against them. The
jury heard testimony from Dr. Cameron on this point.
J.A. 6176–77 (“[W]hat Evenflo calls the headrest . . . that’s
the backrest.”); see also J.A. 6204–05. And as Dr. Cameron
explained to the jury, it is the ’951 patent’s use of the term
“backrest” that controls, not Evenflo’s preferred terminol-
ogy for its own products. J.A. A6172–74; see also Phillips,
415 F.3d at 1315 (“The words of patent claims have the
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 13
meaning and scope with which they are used in the speci-
fication and the prosecution history.”) (quoting Kinik Co. v.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
This is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury
could find infringement and supports the jury’s finding
that the accused products meet the “backrest” limitation of
claim 1.
F. Injunctive Relief
Evenflo argues the district court abused its discretion
in permanently enjoining activities relating to both the
’951 and ’043 patents. We agree on both counts.
1. ’951 patent
Regarding the ’951 patent, we conclude the district
court abused its discretion in granting a permanent injunc-
tion because Wonderland expressly declined to request
such relief. J.A. 7138 (Wonderland’s attorney stating
“[w]e’re not seeking injunction with respect to Evenflo’s in-
fringement of the ’951 patent.”). Injunction is “a drastic
and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as
a matter of course.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,
561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010). Thus, it is an abuse of discretion
to grant such an extraordinary remedy when a party did
not request it. Wonderland argues the grant of a perma-
nent injunction as to the ’951 patent is at most harmless
error because it has the same “practical effects” as the in-
junction for the ’043 patent. Wonderland Br. 60. We do not
agree for two distinct reasons: (1) the injunction could af-
fect Evenflo’s release of other products, which may not nec-
essarily infringe the ’043 patent, and (2) we conclude the
district court also abused its discretion in granting injunc-
tive relief with respect to the ’043 patent, as explained be-
low. We temporarily stayed the injunction as to the ’951
patent pending appeal, and having now considered the par-
ties’ arguments, we reverse the district court’s grant of a
permanent injunction.
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 14
2. ’043 patent
Regarding the ’043 patent, we conclude the district
court abused its discretion in granting a permanent injunc-
tion because it relied solely on speculative and conclusory
evidence that Wonderland suffered, and would continue to
suffer, irreparable harm or injury that could not be com-
pensated with monetary damages. To justify the extraor-
dinary remedy of injunctive relief, a plaintiff “must
demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary dam-
ages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted;
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
735 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)). With re-
spect to irreparable harm, it is insufficient for the plaintiff
to raise “[t]he mere possibility or speculation of harm.”
Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Thales DIS AIS USA LLC, 39
F.4th 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Instead, the “party seek-
ing a preliminary injunction must establish that it is likely
to suffer irreparable harm without an injunction.” Id. (cit-
ing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22
(2008)).
Here, the district court did not point to any non-specu-
lative or non-conclusory evidence establishing Wonder-
land’s business partner, Graco Children’s Products Inc.
(Graco),2 lost sales or market share of car seat products to
Evenflo as opposed to the large number of other competi-
tors in the market. J.A. 8–10 (citing J.A. 5885–91,
J.A. 5727–28, J.A. 5996); see also J.A. 7910–24 (showing
market data for several competitor brands). Meanwhile,
2 Wonderland is Graco’s exclusive supplier of car
seats. J.A. 9.
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 15
for non-car seat products, the district court improperly re-
lied on speculative and conclusory testimony from Wonder-
land’s managing director, Renee Wang, that a lost car seat
sale “naturally leads” to the loss of market share across
other products. J.A. 9 (citing J.A. 5673–75); see also
J.A. 12. This testimony was concededly based on
“no[thing] more than [the notion that] the parents will buy
other products under the same brand name.” J.A. 5674 at
584:20–21. Without providing any evidence of such con-
sumer behavior, Ms. Wang merely speculated that after
buying a car seat, a parent “may” also choose to buy other
products under the same brand. J.A. 5675 at 585:4–12.
Such speculative testimony is not sufficient to establish ir-
reparable harm. Koninklijke Philips, 39 F.4th at 1380.
With respect to reputational loss, the district court
cited no record evidence to support its findings that “[t]he
similarity between Graco’s products and Evenflo’s Accused
Products has caused Graco’s products to lose some of their
‘distinctiveness and market allure’ and has also harmed
Graco’s reputation as an innovator in the marketplace.”
J.A. 10. Nor did the district court cite any evidence to sup-
port its finding that such reputational factors “cause Won-
derland irreparable harm because of Graco and
Wonderland’s close working relationship and exclusive
supplier arrangement.” Id.; see also J.A. 13. Similarly, the
district court failed to identify any evidence from the trial
record supporting its assertions that “an average cus-
tomer . . . [would] assume that Graco’s products do not con-
tain unique or innovative technologies,” that such
reputational harm would flow to Wonderland, or that Won-
derland would suffer reputational harm because it “may be
seen as failing to enforce its intellectual property rights.”
J.A. 13.
Wonderland argues the trial record supports the dis-
trict court’s grant of a permanent injunction by citing to
Wonderland’s motion for injunctive relief, in which it ar-
gued “Evenflo’s infringement has resulted in product
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 16
confusion among consumers, and . . . has raised concerns
about quality control of the infringing technology.” Evenflo
Br. 62 (citing J.A. 4974). The underlying cited testimony
of Ms. Wang, however, simply states that “[i]f Evenflo’s car
seat with [a] similar function has a problem . . . then [the]
consumer might think that’s a technology problem.”
J.A. 4974. This kind of speculative testimony is not suffi-
cient to establish irreparable reputational harm to Graco
and certainly fails to show how such reputational harm
flows to Wonderland. Accordingly, based on the record be-
fore us and the reasoning provided by the district court, we
reverse the district court’s grant of a permanent injunction
as to the ’043 patent.
II. Wonderland’s Cross-Appeal
In its cross-appeal, Wonderland argues the district
court abused its discretion by denying Wonderland a new
trial on willful infringement as to the ’043 patent after er-
roneously excluding trial evidence of Evenflo’s subjective
intent to infringe. Wonderland Br. 66–75. Specifically,
Wonderland challenges the court’s exclusion, under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 403, of an email chain in which an
employee of Evenflo’s affiliated corporation, Goodbaby
Child Products Co., Ltd. (Goodbaby),3 notified Evenflo em-
ployees that one of the accused products might fall within
the scope of claim 1 of the ’043 patent and asked how to
“avoid the claims of the patent.” Id.; see also J.A. 3785–
38054; J.A. 4006–08. We agree the district court abused its
3 Goodbaby and Evenflo share the same parent cor-
poration. Evenflo Resp. & Reply Br. at 40; Wonderland Re-
ply Br. at 6.
4 Although the full email chain at J.A. 3785–3805 is
marked as confidential, the parties agreed at oral argu-
ment to publicly discuss the email chain to the extent it
refers to commercially available, existing products such as
the Evenflo Evolve. Oral Arg. at 5:05–5:32.
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 17
discretion by excluding certain portions of the email chain
and reverse the district court’s denial of a new trial on will-
ful infringement.
We review the denial of a motion for a new trial under
the law of the regional circuit, here the Third Circuit. Fin-
jan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1202
(Fed. Cir. 2010). The Third Circuit reviews denial of a mo-
tion for a new trial for an “abuse of discretion, except where
a district court bases its denial of the motion on an appli-
cation of law, in which case an appellate court’s review is
plenary.” Id. The district court abuses its discretion when
its “decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact,
an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of
law to fact.” Robinson v. First State Cmty. Action Agency,
920 F.3d 182, 191 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation and
citation omitted).5 A court may grant a new trial for the
erroneous exclusion of evidence that affected “a substantial
right” of a party. Glass v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 34 F.3d
188, 191 (3d Cir. 1994). Erroneous exclusion of evidence is
harmless only “if it is highly probable that the error did not
affect the outcome of the case.” Id.
Here, the district court excluded the email chain under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because it determined the
probative value was substantially outweighed by a danger
of unfair prejudice and confusion. J.A. 4006–08; see also
FED. R. EVID. 403. This was an abuse of discretion because
the email chain included portions with high probative
5 While the dissent notes “a trial judge’s decision to
admit or exclude evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 403 may not
be reversed unless it is arbitrary and irrational,” Dissent
at 2–3 (citing Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 922 F.2d
184, 187 (3d Cir. 1990)), we conclude the multiple clear er-
rors identified below in the trial judge’s analysis resulted
in an arbitrary and irrational exclusion of evidence.
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 18
value for the issue of willfulness that far outweighs the lim-
ited concerns identified by the district court.
Willful infringement is “a measure of reasonable com-
mercial behavior in the context of the tort of patent in-
fringement.” Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd.,
78 F.3d 1575, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). “Knowledge of the as-
serted patent and evidence of infringement is necessary,
but not sufficient, for a finding of willfulness. Rather, will-
fulness requires deliberate or intentional infringement.”
Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc., 989 F.3d 964, 988
(Fed. Cir. 2021). It is therefore highly relevant whether an
infringer acted “despite a risk of infringement that was ‘ei-
ther known or so obvious that it should have been known
to the accused infringer.’” Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier
Recreational Prods. Inc., 876 F.3d 1350, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (quoting Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 579
U.S. 93, 97 (2016)).
The email chain at issue includes a message from an
employee of Evenflo’s affiliated corporation (Goodbaby) to
several individuals, at least some of whom are Evenflo em-
ployees, stating:
We have studied Graco Nautilus patent [the ’043
patent at issue in this appeal] and thought that the
function “Locking of booster seat lower section to
tubes” might fell under below patent as the scope
of below claim is quite broad. While we also find
the EVENFLO EVOLVE might also involve this
and could you pls advise HOW US avoid the claims
of the patent ingeniously? Thanks.
J.A. 3786. The email further includes a screenshot of
claim 1 of the ’043 patent. Id. A follow-up email from the
same individual then states:
Phil or someone else will help to send us the lawyer
letter about HOW US avoid the claims of Graco
Nautilus patent [the ’043 patent] ingeniously.
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 19
J.A. 3785.
The messages reproduced above are clearly probative
of willfulness, and they are not merely cumulative of Even-
flo’s stipulation to awareness of the ’043 patent. J.A. 57.
As noted previously, willfulness requires more than mere
“[k]nowledge of the asserted patent.” Bayer, 989 F.3d at
988. Here, the messages go beyond knowledge by demon-
strating Evenflo was aware one of its accused 3-in-1
seats—the Evenflo Evolve—was at risk of infringement
and that its affiliate sought advice from Evenflo on how to
“ingeniously” avoid the claims of the ’043 patent.
J.A. 3785–86. Moreover, to the extent the district court ex-
cluded the email chain because it is “unclear exactly which
portion” of the product might infringe, J.A. 4008, this was
clear error. The email chain, on its face, plainly makes
Evenflo aware that its affiliate, Goodbaby, had concerns
about the Evenflo Evolve’s “[l]ocking of [the] booster seat
lower section to tubes.” J.A. 3786.
As for the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion, we
conclude the district court abused its discretion by exclud-
ing the email chain rather than managing any existing risk
through limiting instructions or redaction. See 2 Wein-
stein’s Federal Evidence § 403.02 (2025) (“If there is doubt
about the existence of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues,
[etc.] . . . it is generally better practice to admit the evi-
dence, taking necessary precautions by way of contempora-
neous instructions to the jury followed by additional
admonitions in the charge[.]”); id. (“The court has the
power to admit part of a line of proof while excluding the
more prejudicial details.”). While we do not preclude a de-
termination that some portions of the lengthy email chain
should be excluded because they are difficult to decipher or
reference companies and products unrelated to this litiga-
tion, we see no such issues with the limited and highly pro-
bative portions relating to the Evenflo Evolve addressed by
the parties on appeal. See J.A. 3785–86.
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 20
To the extent the district court identified potential
privilege and hearsay concerns, J.A. 4008, this was also
clear error. The email chain’s mere reference to a “lawyer
letter” does not raise any privilege issues and could be eas-
ily redacted if needed. J.A. 3785. Further, the relevant
portions of the email chain are not hearsay because they
were not offered to show the truth of the matter asserted
(i.e., that the Evenflo Evolve infringes claim 1 of the ’043
patent) but to show that Evenflo was on notice of its in-
fringement risk. Accordingly, we conclude the district
court abused its discretion by excluding highly probative
willfulness evidence in the email chain based solely on non-
existent or otherwise manageable concerns.
Finally, excluding these portions of the email chain
was not harmless, as it impaired Wonderland’s substantial
rights to effectively prove its case of willfulness. Because
we cannot say it is highly probable that this exclusion did
not affect the case’s outcome, we reverse the district court’s
denial of a new trial and remand for a new trial on willful
infringement of the ’043 patent relating to the 3-in-1 seats
only (excluding the 4-in-1 seats that no reasonable jury
could find infringe, see § I.A, supra). On remand, the dis-
trict court should admit the most probative portions of the
email chain that (1) suggest the Evolve 3-in-1 seat might
fall within the scope of claim 1 of the ’043 patent and (2)
ask how to “avoid the claims of the patent.” J.A. 3785–86.
We otherwise leave it to the district court’s discretion to
determine how to minimize the risk of unfair prejudice and
confusion through redaction of the remainder of the email
chain, limiting instructions, or both.
CONCLUSION
We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
(1) reverse the district court’s judgment that Evenflo’s 4-in-
1 seats infringe the ’043 patent under DOE and thus vacate
the corresponding damages award; (2) reverse the district
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 21
court’s grant of a permanent injunction as to both the ’043
and ’951 patents; (3) reverse the denial of a new trial on
willful infringement for the ’043 patent; and (4) otherwise
affirm the district court’s judgment as it relates to the is-
sues raised on appeal. We remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART,
VACATED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED
COSTS
No costs.
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United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG,
Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant
v.
EVENFLO COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant
______________________
2023-2043, 2023-2233, 2023-2326
______________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware in No. 1:20-cv-00727-JPM, Judge Jon
P. McCalla.
______________________
REYNA, Circuit Judge, concurring-in-part and dissenting-
in-part.
I concur with the majority’s disposition of Evenflo’s ap-
peal. But I cannot join the majority’s determination on
Wonderland’s cross-appeal for a new trial on willful in-
fringement. Contrary to the majority’s decision, the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in excluding an email
chain, i.e., the “Dracula Email Chain.” Rather, the district
court’s balancing of considerations under Fed. R. Evid. 403
was careful and comprehensive.
I.
We review the denial of a motion for a new trial under
the law of the regional circuit, here the Third Circuit.
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 2
Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197,
1202 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The Third Circuit reviews a district
court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discre-
tion, a highly deferential standard. Bhaya v. Westinghouse
Elc. Corp., 922 F.2d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 1990). This is be-
cause, “the trial judge [ ] saw and heard the witnesses and
has the feel of the case which no appellate printed tran-
script can impart.” Id. (citation modified).
The Third Circuit applies “[p]articular deference” to
the district court’s new trial determination stemming from
a ruling under Fed. R. Evid. 403, which “itself [is] entrusted
to the [district] court’s discretion.” Id. (“If judicial self-re-
straint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of
a trial court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal[.]” (quot-
ing United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3rd Cir.
1978))). Under Fed. R. Evid. 403, a district court may ex-
clude evidence “if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
As the Third Circuit has explained,
Rule 403 is a balancing test, and like any balancing
test, the Rule 403 standard is inexact, requiring
sensitivity on the part of the trial court to the sub-
tleties of the particular situation, and considerable
deference on the part of the reviewing court to the
hands-on judgment of the trial judge.
United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 537 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citation modified); see also United States v. Scarfo, 41
F.4th 136, 178 n.35 (3d Cir. 2022) (“[S]uch discretion is con-
strued especially broadly in the context of Rule 403.”);
United States v. Heatherly, 985 F.3d 254, 266 (3d Cir. 2021)
(noting that “[d]istrict courts deserve broad deference in
applying Rule 403” for the “rule is written in discretionary
terms”). Thus, in the Third Circuit, “a trial judge’s decision
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 3
to admit or exclude evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 403 may
not be reversed unless it is ‘arbitrary and irrational.’”
Bhaya, 922 F.2d at 187 (emphasis added); see also
Langbord v. United States Dep’t of Treasury, 832 F.3d 170,
192 (3d Cir. 2016). Under the arbitrary and irrational
standard, “[a] district court’s decision . . . cannot be re-
versed merely because . . . members of a reviewing court[ ]
possess a different view concerning the probative value or
prejudicial effect of the challenged evidence.” United States
v. Universal Rehab. Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 665 (3d
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s Rule 403
ruling as neither arbitrary nor irrational when “the Dis-
trict Court’s balancing was careful and comprehensive”).
II.
Applying the Third Circuit’s deferential standard of re-
view, I would affirm the district court’s decision to deny
Wonderland a new trial on willful infringement. The dis-
trict court’s decision to exclude the Dracula Email Chain
under Fed. R. Evid. 403 was neither arbitrary nor irra-
tional but instead reflected a careful and comprehensive
balancing of the weight of the evidence’s probative value
against the risk of prejudice and jury confusion.
The district court articulated sound reasons for con-
cluding that the risks outweighed the probative value.
J.A. 4008. To be clear, the Dracula Email Chain had some
probative value as to willfulness. As the district court
acknowledged, the Dracula Email Chain may be probative
to show that Evenflo was on notice that its affiliate believed
one of Evenflo’s accused products, the Evenflo Evolve,
could fall within the scope of the ’043 patent. Id. But, the
district court determined that the Dracula Email Chain is
unfairly prejudicial to Evenflo and risks confusing the jury,
considerations which substantially outweigh its probative
value. Id. Specifically, as the district court explained,
“[p]resenting the email [chain] and teaching the jury about
Project Dracula while also making sure they do not confuse
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 4
it with the car seats that are at issue in the case would be
challenging, confusing, and likely prejudicial to Evenflo.”
Id. These are the very type of sound, analytical considera-
tions underlying a Fed. R. Evid. 403 determination in the
Third Circuit. See, e.g., Bhaya, 922 F.2d at 188–89 (affirm-
ing exclusion of out-of-court statements under Rule 403 be-
cause testimony risked confusion of the issues when the
testimony “invited the jurors to ponder” other legal claims
not asserted in the case).
The Dracula Email Chain consists of several emails.
J.A. 3785–3805. At issue are two emails, a February 14
email and February 17 email. J.A. 3785–86. The sender of
both emails is an employee of non-party Goodbaby Child
Products Co., Ltd. (“Goodbaby”).1 Id. The recipients in-
clude some employees of Evenflo. Id. The subject line of
these two emails is “Dracula Project: [] Booster Design
Feedback” and the emails focus on Goodbaby’s develop-
ment of the “Dracula” car seat, a product not accused in
this case and separate from Evenflo’s accused product. Id.
The Goodbaby employee asks “HOW US,” i.e., Goodbaby,
can “avoid the claims of the patent ingeniously,” as to the
Dracula car seat, i.e., the subject product of the email
chain. J.A. 3785–36. The only time the Goodbaby em-
ployee references Evenflo’s accused product is in passing,
noting that the product “might” involve a “function” of the
Dracula car seat. J.A. 3786. Thus, the Dracula Email
Chain’s reference to Evenflo’s product can only be under-
stood by reviewing the context of the email chain, which
involves Goodbaby’s development of the Dracula car seat.
As the district court concluded, “teaching the jury about
Project Dracula while also making sure they do not confuse
it with the car seats that are at issue in the case would be
1 Evenflo and Goodbaby share the same parent com-
pany. See Evenflo Opp. Br. at 40; Wonderland Reply Br. at
6.
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WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. 5
challenging, confusing, and likely prejudicial to Evenflo.”
J.A. 4008. The district court also concluded that redactions
and/or jury instructions to the Dracula Email Chain could
not sufficiently mitigate the potential for confusion and
prejudice. Id. The district court’s Rule 403 ruling is not
arbitrary nor irrational and should be affirmed.
The problem here is that the majority substitutes its
judgment for that of the district court. The majority con-
cludes that the Dracula Email Chain is “clearly probative.”
Maj. Op. 19. The task before us, however, is not to deter-
mine anew the probative value of the evidence but to deter-
mine whether the district court’s assessment of the
evidence was arbitrary or irrational. Here, the district
court determined that the Dracula Email Chain, which re-
flects non-party Goodbaby’s efforts concerning a non-ac-
cused product, was less than “clearly probative” as to
Evenflo’s intent to willfully infringe the ’043 patent.
J.A. 4008. The majority fails to explain why this determi-
nation was arbitrary or irrational.
The majority also concludes the district court should
have managed any existing risk of prejudice and confusion
through jury instructions or redactions. Maj. Op. 19–20.
The question, however, is not whether the district court
could have, as the majority contends, managed any preju-
dice or confusion via redactions and jury instructions, but
whether the district court’s decision regarding jury instruc-
tions was arbitrary or irrational. Here, the district court
considered the context of the Dracula Email Chain and con-
cluded that redactions or jury instructions could not miti-
gate risk of prejudice or confusion. J.A. 4008. The majority
fails to explain why this determination was arbitrary or ir-
rational. In sum, the majority substitutes its judgment for
the district court’s, contrary to Third Circuit law requiring
broad deference to a district court’s Fed. R. Evid. 403 rul-
ing. See, e.g., Universal Rehab. Servs., 205 F.3d at 665.
For these reasons, I dissent.
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