Kevin P. Golden v. Douglas A. Collins, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
KEVIN P. GOLDEN,
Claimant-Appellant
v.
DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent-Appellee
______________________
2023-2070
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in No. 21-2606, Judge Joseph L. Toth.
______________________
Decided: December 12, 2025
______________________
RYAN VALENTINE MC D ONNELL , Finnegan, Henderson,
Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Washington, DC, ar-
gued for claimant-appellant. Also represented by CHARLES
COLLINS -CHASE, ELIZABETH D. F ERRILL , T HOMAS ERIC
SULLIVAN.
EVAN WISSER, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Di-
vision, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represented by
CLAUDIA BURKE, G EOFFREY M. L ONG, P ATRICIA M.
MCCARTHY , YAAKOV ROTH ; Y. K EN L EE, ANDREW J.
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GOLDEN v. COLLINS 2
STEINBERG, Office of General Counsel, United States De-
partment of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
______________________
Before L OURIE, D YK, and CUNNINGHAM , Circuit Judges.
CUNNINGHAM , Circuit Judge.
Kevin P. Golden appeals a decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”),
which denied service connection for bilateral hearing loss
and concluded that the Board of Veterans’ Appeals
(“Board”) did not err by omitting discussion of a secondary
service connection theory. Golden v. McDonough, No. 21-
2606, 2022 WL 17335575 at *1 (Vet. App. Nov. 30, 2022)
(“Decision”). For the reasons below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Kevin P. Golden served in the Navy as a flight deck
signalman from March 1984 to January 1988. Decision
at *1; J.A. 1006; J.A. 3055. In 2009, Mr. Golden filed a
claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) seek-
ing service connection for bilateral hearing loss and tinni-
tus, which was denied by the regional office (“RO”) in 2010.
Decision at *1; J.A. 2935–37; J.A. 2870–72. After
Mr. Golden filed a notice of disagreement, the VA com-
pleted a medical examination of him in 2011. See Decision
at *1; J.A. 2783–84; J.A. 2748–59; J.A. 2765–66. The ex-
aminer found that Mr. Golden’s bilateral hearing loss was
less likely than not caused by an in-service event or injury
because his “[h]earing was found to be within normal limits
bilaterally. . . at both the military enlistment and military
separation exams.” Decision at *1; J.A. 2755. With respect
to tinnitus, the examiner noted that Mr. Golden first re-
ported experiencing tinnitus during military service after
exposure to loud noises. J.A. 2757. The examiner con-
cluded that his tinnitus “is at least as likely as not (50%
probability or greater) a symptom associated with the hear-
ing loss, as tinnitus is known to be a symptom associated
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GOLDEN v. COLLINS 3
with hearing loss.” J.A. 2758; see Decision at *1. The re-
port did not address whether Mr. Golden’s tinnitus was
service connected. J.A. 2748–59; Decision at *1.
In 2012, based on this examination report, the RO de-
nied Mr. Golden service connection for his hearing loss and
for his tinnitus. Decision at *1; J.A. 2661–82. In 2017, the
Board concluded that Mr. Golden was entitled to service
connection for his tinnitus and remanded his claim of ser-
vice connection for bilateral hearing loss. Decision at *1;
J.A. 2525–32. The Board indicated that although the 2011
examination report associated Mr. Golden’s tinnitus with
his hearing loss, it did not address Mr. Golden’s reports
that he first began to experience tinnitus during active ser-
vice and did not provide a medical opinion regarding
whether the tinnitus was related to service. Decision at *1;
J.A. 2528. The Board explained that Mr. Golden’s position
as a signalman has been identified as a “military occupa-
tional specialty (MOS) with a moderate exposure to noise”
and that Mr. Golden was “competent and credible to iden-
tify the presence of tinnitus since his period of active ser-
vice.” J.A. 2528–29; see Decision at *1. Therefore, the
Board concluded that the evidence was “in relative equi-
poise” as to whether the tinnitus had started during
Mr. Golden’s service and “resolve[d] the benefit of the
doubt” in his favor. J.A. 2529; see Decision at *1. With re-
spect to his hearing loss, the Board noted that the examiner
had failed to address evidence suggesting that Mr. Golden
experienced some degree of hearing loss during service and
remanded for a VA addendum opinion. Decision at *1;
J.A. 2530.
After further rounds of examinations and medical opin-
ions, the Board denied service connection for bilateral hear-
ing loss in 2021. See Decision at *1–2; J.A. 1147–48;
J.A. 1430–37; J.A. 1449–54; J.A. 1632; J.A. 2316;
J.A. 1005–11. Of relevance to this appeal, the Board’s 2021
decision did not include any discussion of a connection
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GOLDEN v. COLLINS 4
between Mr. Golden’s tinnitus and his bilateral hearing
loss. See generally J.A. 1005–11.
Mr. Golden appealed to the Veterans Court. Before the
Veterans Court, Mr. Golden argued that (1) the Board
erred in its assessment of the nexus requirement for direct
service connection of hearing loss, and (2) the Board failed
to address a secondary service connection claim for hearing
loss. Decision at *2. In November 2022, the Veterans
Court affirmed the Board’s judgment, finding no clear error
in the Board’s denial of direct service connection for hear-
ing loss and concluding that Mr. Golden’s secondary ser-
vice connection theory was not reasonably raised by the
record. Id. at *2–3.1
Mr. Golden timely appeals. We have jurisdiction under
38 U.S.C. § 7292.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We “have exclusive jurisdiction to review and decide
any challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or
any interpretation thereof brought under this section, and
to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the
extent presented and necessary to a decision.” 38 U.S.C.
§ 7292(c); Middleton v. Shinseki, 727 F.3d 1172, 1175
(Fed. Cir. 2013). We review legal determinations of the
Veterans Court, including its interpretation of a regula-
tion, de novo. Williams v. Collins, 131 F.4th 1325, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2025).
1 The single judge’s decision remained the decision
of the court, see J.A. 3–4, and Mr. Golden’s motion for re-
view by the full Veterans Court was denied. Golden
v. McDonough, No. 21-2606, 2023 WL 2967389, at *1
(Vet. App. Apr. 17, 2023).
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GOLDEN v. COLLINS 5
III. D ISCUSSION
On appeal, Mr. Golden challenges the Veterans Court’s
determination that the Board did not err by omitting dis-
cussion of a secondary service connection theory. See, e.g.,
Appellant’s Br. 29 & 29 n.6. Mr. Golden argues that the
Veterans Court erred in finding that secondary service con-
nection for bilateral hearing loss was not reasonably raised
by Mr. Golden or the record. Id. at 20–33. Mr. Golden also
argues that the Veterans Court engaged in impermissible
fact-finding in reaching this conclusion. Id. at 33–35. We
address each argument in turn.
A.
Mr. Golden argues that the Veterans Court relied on
an incorrect interpretation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a), the reg-
ulation governing secondary service connection, in conclud-
ing that a secondary service connection theory was not
reasonably raised by the record. Appellant’s Br. 22–33.
This provision states:
Except as provided in § 3.300(c), disability which is
proximately due to or the result of a service-con-
nected disease or injury shall be service connected.
When service connection is thus established for a
secondary condition, the secondary condition shall
be considered a part of the original condition.
38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a); see also 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131
(providing the statutory authority for this regulation).
The core of the parties’ dispute is whether a veteran
seeking entitlement for secondary service connection must
show a causal link between the secondary condition and an
in-service disease or injury as opposed to the original con-
dition for which the veteran was granted a direct service
connection. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 5 (“The Veterans
Court therefore should have considered whether the record
had reasonably raised whether Mr. Golden’s hearing loss
was caused by his in-service injury of acoustic trauma.”);
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GOLDEN v. COLLINS 6
Appellee’s Br. 9 (“Proper interpretation of [38 C.F.R.
§ 3.310(a)] compels the conclusion that a secondary condi-
tion must ‘arise after, and as a result of, the original disa-
bility.’” (cleaned up and citation omitted)). We therefore
turn to addressing the question of what causal relationship
must be established to demonstrate that the “disabil-
ity . . . is proximately due to or the result of a service-con-
nected disease or injury.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a).
“[W]e begin with ‘the regulatory language itself to de-
termine its plain meaning.’” Frazier v. McDonough,
66 F.4th 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Goodman
v. Shulkin, 870 F.3d 1383, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). “When
interpreting a regulation, we start by exhausting all tradi-
tional tools of interpretation to determine whether the
plain meaning of the regulation can be discerned or
whether it is truly ambiguous.” Cranford v. McDonough,
55 F.4th 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing Kisor v. Wilkie,
588 U.S. 558, 575 (2019)). “If the regulatory language is
clear and unambiguous, the inquiry ends with the plain
meaning.” Goodman, 870 F.3d at 1386.
We hold that 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a) requires that a vet-
eran seeking a grant of secondary service connection must
show a causal link between the secondary condition and an
underlying primary condition for which service connection
was granted. The regulation is directed towards a “disabil-
ity which is proximately due to or the result of a service-
connected disease or injury.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a) (empha-
sis added). The plain language of the provision provides
additional context that indicates that the “service-con-
nected disease or injury” refers to the underlying primary
condition. Notably, there would be little need for the regu-
lation to create a “secondary condition” and “original con-
dition” dichotomy if it did not require tracing the causal
relationship between the secondary condition and the in-
service disease or injury through an intervening condition.
See, e.g., Barry v. McDonough, 101 F.4th 1348, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2024) (“[T]he plain meaning that we seek to
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GOLDEN v. COLLINS 7
discern is the plain meaning of the whole statute or regu-
lation, not of isolated sentences.” (citation omitted)); Sulli-
van v. McDonald, 815 F.3d 786, 790 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e
attempt to give full effect to all words contained within that
statute or regulation, thereby rendering superfluous as lit-
tle of the statutory or regulatory language as possible.” (ci-
tation omitted)). The plain language of 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.310(a), read in the context of the entire regulation, in-
dicates that “service-connected disease or injury” refers to
the underlying primary condition.
Moreover, an interpretation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a) that
requires a direct causal link between the in-service injury
and the “secondary condition” would render secondary ser-
vice connection equivalent to direct service connection.2
See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303–.305. Mr. Golden attempts to dis-
tinguish direct service connection from secondary service
connection by arguing that a secondary service connection
theory allows a claimant to use the fact that one disability
is service connected “as evidence that [a] second [disability]
should also be service connected to that same in-service in-
jury.” Oral Arg. 10:40–11:16, https://www.cafc.uscourts.go
v/oral-arguments/23-2070_05082025.mp3. Mr. Golden ar-
gues that such an evidentiary connection exists here be-
cause the tinnitus and the hearing loss are “linked together
as the tinnitus is a symptom of the hearing loss.” Oral
Arg. 9:33–40. Mr. Golden, however, points to no regulatory
language or other authority supporting his proposed dis-
tinction. A court or tribunal examining a direct service
2 Notably, the Veterans Court did consider whether
there was a causal relationship between Mr. Golden’s
acoustic trauma and hearing loss in rejecting his direct ser-
vice connection theory. Decision at *2–3. Mr. Golden does
not challenge this determination. See Appellant’s Br. 29
n.6.
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GOLDEN v. COLLINS 8
connection theory for a condition—here, hearing loss—is
not precluded from relying on symptomology for another
condition—here, tinnitus—as relevant evidence in a direct
service connection inquiry. See, e.g., Jandreau v. Nichol-
son, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (recognizing “lay
testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a
later diagnosis by a medical professional” as competent ev-
idence to establish a diagnosis); Stinson v. McDonough,
92 F.4th 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (instructing the Board
to remand for further fact development, “including whether
[the appellant’s] in-service symptoms support a manifesta-
tion of [his disease] earlier than 2011”). Nor do we see a
reason why a symptom should be excluded from considera-
tion merely because it qualifies as a service-connected dis-
ability itself.
However, following established canons of construction
that instruct us “to give full effect to all words contained
within [a] statute or regulation, thereby rendering super-
fluous as little of the statutory or regulatory language as
possible,” we conclude the plain language of 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.310 requires demonstration of a causal link between a
secondary condition and an underlying service-connected
primary condition. Sullivan, 815 F.3d at 790 (citation
omitted). This interpretation is also consistent with how
this court and the Veterans Court have traditionally
treated secondary conditions and service connection. See,
e.g., Manzanares v. Shulkin, 863 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (describing, favorably, the Veterans Court’s holding
in Ross v. Peake, 21 Vet. App. 528 (2008), as amended
(Mar. 28, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Ross v. Shinseki,
309 F. App’x 394 (Fed. Cir. 2009), as noting that a second-
ary condition under § 3.310(a) is a “separate, additional
disability” that is different from “the underlying primary
condition”); MacPhee v. Nicholson, 459 F.3d 1323, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Under § 3.310, a condition that is proxi-
mately caused by a service-connected condition is consid-
ered a part of the original condition.”). For the reasons
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GOLDEN v. COLLINS 9
stated, we hold that a veteran must demonstrate a causal
relationship between a secondary condition and an under-
lying primary condition to succeed under a secondary ser-
vice connection theory.
Mr. Golden maintains that the Veterans Court con-
flated the terms “disability” and “disease or injury.” Con-
sequently, Mr. Golden argues that the Veterans Court
improperly focused the inquiry on whether Mr. Golden’s
hearing loss was “proximately due to or the result of” his
service-connected tinnitus rather than his in-service acous-
tic trauma. Appellant’s Br. 20–26, 30–33. Under a proper
interpretation of the regulation, Mr. Golden argues that he
reasonably raised a secondary service connection argu-
ment. Id. at 26–30. We disagree.
Mr. Golden’s focus on the difference between the regu-
lation’s use of “disability” and “disease or injury” is mis-
placed. The Veterans Court’s conclusion that Mr. Golden
failed to raise a secondary service connection theory was
not based on whether tinnitus qualified as a “disease or in-
jury” or as a “disability.”3 See Decision at *3. Instead, the
Veterans Court based its conclusion on the “proximately
due to or the result of” requirement in the regulation, rea-
soning that “[t]here is no argument alleging his service-
connected tinnitus caused or aggravated his hearing loss,
nor, for that matter, how the two are etiologically related.”
Id. (emphasis in original). In other words, the Veterans
Court’s analysis effectively treated the “disease or injury”
requirement as satisfied (to Mr. Golden’s benefit) and in-
stead concluded that Mr. Golden failed to allege another
3 The Secretary agrees that “disability” and “disease
or injury” have different meanings. Oral Arg. 18:02–18:59.
Because it does not affect the disposition of this appeal, we
do not address whether the Veterans Court’s usage of this
terminology was accurate. See Decision at *3.
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GOLDEN v. COLLINS 10
required element—causation. Therefore, Mr. Golden’s ar-
guments related to the meanings of “disability” and “dis-
ease or injury” are irrelevant to the issue at hand.
B.
Mr. Golden argues that the Veterans Court erred by
impermissibly making the following fact-findings in the
first instance: (1) in granting service connection for tinni-
tus, finding that the Board relied on Mr. Golden’s lay state-
ments rather than the 2011 exam, and (2) finding that the
2011 exam was the only exam linking his tinnitus and
hearing loss. Appellant’s Br. 33–35 (citing Decision at *3).
We disagree.
The Veterans Court did not engage in fact-finding by
observing that the Board had “granted service connection
for tinnitus based on Mr. Golden’s lay statements, not the
2011 exam.” Decision at *3. The statement at issue merely
represents the Veterans Court’s characterization of the
Board’s decision.4 The Veterans Court is not precluded
from “synthesizing,” “analyzing,” and “paraphrasing” the
Board’s decision, as these actions do not constitute inde-
pendent fact-finding. See, e.g., Chen v. Holder, 703 F.3d
17, 23 (1st Cir. 2012). Accordingly, we disagree with
Mr. Golden’s argument that the Veterans Court engaged in
impermissible fact-finding in explaining the Board’s ra-
tionale for granting service connection for tinnitus.
4 We do not think the Veterans Court’s understand-
ing of the Board’s reasoning is inaccurate. See J.A. 2528–
29 (noting that the 2011 examination report did not ad-
dress the etiology of Mr. Golden’s tinnitus and instead bas-
ing its conclusions largely on Mr. Golden’s own reports
regarding his tinnitus).
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GOLDEN v. COLLINS 11
The Veterans Court also did not err in concluding that,
after the 2011 exam, “no subsequent examiner linked the
veteran’s hearing loss to his service-connected tinnitus.”
Decision at *3. While the Board never explicitly made such
a finding, see generally J.A. 1005–11, the Veterans Court is
not limited to considering only the facts relied on by the
Board and the VA but must consult the full agency record.
Newhouse v. Nicholson, 497 F.3d 1298, 1302 (Fed. Cir.
2007). Here, the Veterans Court simply acknowledged that
the record reflected that the 2011 examiner was the only
examiner who linked Mr. Golden’s hearing loss and tinni-
tus. Decision at *3. Mr. Golden does not dispute this fact.
See Oral Arg. 8:54–9:16. Accordingly, the Veterans Court
permissibly recognized the lack of examination reports in
the record that connected Mr. Golden’s tinnitus to his hear-
ing loss. We conclude that the Veterans Court’s decision
does not rely on impermissible fact-findings.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Golden’s remaining argu-
ments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing rea-
sons, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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