Escapex Ip, LLC v. Google LLC

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
ESCAPEX IP, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
GOOGLE LLC,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2024-1201
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California in No. 3:22-cv-08711-VC,
Judge Vince Chhabria.
______________________
Decided: November 25, 2025
______________________
WILLIAM P ETERSON R AMEY , III, Ramey LLP, Houston,
TX, argued for plaintiff-appellant.
J ONATHAN I RVIN T IETZ, Perkins Coie LLP, Washington,
DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
D AN L. BAGATELL , Hanover, NH.
______________________
Before T ARANTO, STOLL , and STARK, Circuit Judges.
S TARK, Circuit Judge.
Case: 24-1201 Document: 43 Page: 1 Filed: 11/25/2025

-- 1 of 14 --

ESCAPEX IP, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 2
EscapeX IP, LLC (“EscapeX”) appeals an award to
Google LLC (“Google”) of attorneys’ fees as well as the de-
nial of EscapeX’s motion to amend a judgment. We affirm.
I
EscapeX sued Google in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas, asserting that
Google’s YouTube Music product infringed U.S. Patent No.
9,009,113 (“System and Method for Generating Artist-
Specified Dynamic Albums”) (the “’113 patent”). Google in-
itially responded to the suit by sending a letter to EscapeX,
stating, among other things, that EscapeX could not have
conducted an adequate pre-suit investigation, since the
features accused of infringing the ’113 patent were not pre-
sent in the accused YouTube Music product. EscapeX then
filed an amended complaint in which it changed the ac-
cused product to YouTube Video with Auto-Add. Google
responded in several subsequent letters, stating that inter-
net searches would have revealed that this accused product
existed before the priority date of the ’113 patent – mean-
ing that if it infringed the ’113 patent then it also antici-
pated and invalidated it. EscapeX did not to respond to
Google’s request that EscapeX voluntarily dismiss the law-
suit.
In other correspondence, Google informed EscapeX
that Google planned to file a motion to transfer the action
to the Northern District of California and again requested
confirmation that EscapeX would dismiss the case. Again
EscapeX did not respond. Google then filed its transfer mo-
tion and supporting brief. When EscapeX failed to file a
response, Google notified the court, which then noted Es-
capeX’s “troublesome” and “repeated failure to file in a
timely manner.” J.A. 134-36. The court also granted
Google’s motion and transferred the case.
Shortly thereafter, in a separate case in which EscapeX
was asserting the same ’113 patent, a judge in the South-
ern District of New York found all claims of the ’113 patent
Case: 24-1201 Document: 43 Page: 2 Filed: 11/25/2025

-- 2 of 14 --

ESCAPEX IP, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 3
to be directed to subject matter not eligible for a patent un-
der 35 U.S.C. § 101. See EscapeX IP LLC v. Block, Inc., 652
F. Supp. 3d 396, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). EscapeX did not ap-
peal this ruling. After Google again asked EscapeX to dis-
miss its suit, EscapeX filed what purported to be a “joint
stipulation of dismissal,” which represented that the par-
ties “jointly stipulate to the dismissal of this action” and
“further jointly stipulate and agree that each party shall
bear its own costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees.” J.A. 137-
38. EscapeX’s attorney attested in the stipulation that
“concurrence in the filing of this document has been ob-
tained from [Google’s] counsel.” J.A. 139. In fact, however,
as EscapeX later acknowledged, EscapeX had not shared
the stipulation with Google before its filing, had not ob-
tained Google’s consent to file it, and mistakenly repre-
sented to the court that Google had agreed to bear its own
attorneys’ fees. See J.A. 438 ¶¶ 5-6. Google demanded that
EscapeX “immediately withdraw this stipulation[] and no-
tify the Court that it was filed without Google’s permis-
sion.” J.A. 267. EscapeX withdrew the stipulation of
dismissal that same day. J.A. 141-42. Several days later,
with Google’s consent, EscapeX filed a second “joint stipu-
lation of dismissal,” which made no representation that the
parties had agreed to bear their own fees. J.A. 143-44.
Google then moved for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285, arguing EscapeX had advanced frivolous claims and
unreasonably prolonged the litigation. EscapeX did not
contest the facts alleged by Google; rather, EscapeX argued
that Google was not a prevailing party1 and that the case
was not exceptional. Following oral argument, the district
court granted Google’s motion and ordered EscapeX to pay
$191,302.18 to Google for attorneys’ fees and costs it had
incurred in the course of this case.
1 EscapeX no longer challenges the district court’s
determination that Google was the prevailing party.
Case: 24-1201 Document: 43 Page: 3 Filed: 11/25/2025

-- 3 of 14 --

ESCAPEX IP, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 4
EscapeX subsequently moved, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), to amend the judgment,
“based on newly discovered evidence” EscapeX asserted
had been unavailable at the time of the district court’s or-
der granting attorneys’ fees. J.A. 505. The “new evidence”
consisted of two short declarations: one from EscapeX’s
president and the other from an engineer who had per-
formed EscapeX’s pre-suit investigation and prepared the
claim charts that were attached to its amended complaint.
J.A. 505-16. These declarations, according to EscapeX,
showed that “meticulous steps were undertaken” prior to
filing suit. J.A. 505.
Google sought to meet and confer with EscapeX before
going to the expense of briefing its response to EscapeX’s
Rule 59(e) motion, which Google viewed as frivolous and
had asked EscapeX to withdraw. Despite several follow-
ups, EscapeX did not respond until weeks later, by which
time Google had already had to file its response to the mo-
tion. J.A. 571-72. In that response, Google argued that the
declarations violated a court order (that had rejected Es-
capeX’s request for leave to file a declaration in opposition
to Google’s motion for attorneys’ fees) and, in any event,
they did not comprise “newly discovered evidence.” J.A.
526-33. The district court agreed. Finding that EscapeX
“wholly failed to meet the Rule 59(e) standard for amend-
ing a judgment,” it denied the motion. J.A. 3.
Google then moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 35 U.S.C.
§ 285, and the court’s inherent powers to recover the fees
and costs it incurred in opposing EscapeX’s Rule 59(e) mo-
tion. Google argued that EscapeX’s motion was frivolous
and increased litigation costs, and further that EscapeX’s
counsel had acted recklessly or in bad faith. In opposition,
EscapeX suggested that the basis for its motion had been
to eliminate the “manifest injustice” of the court’s attor-
neys’ fees award. At a hearing on Google’s motion, the dis-
trict court made clear that it believed EscapeX’s Rule 59(e)
motion had been frivolous. It granted Google’s motion,
Case: 24-1201 Document: 43 Page: 4 Filed: 11/25/2025

-- 4 of 14 --

ESCAPEX IP, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 5
awarding an additional $63,525.30 in attorneys’ fees and
costs, and held that EscapeX and its attorneys were jointly
and severally liable for this amount.
EscapeX timely appealed. The district court had juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, and we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
II
“Federal Circuit precedent applies to a district court’s
decision to award fees pursuant to § 285.” Realtime Adap-
tive Streaming LLC v. Netflix, Inc., 41 F.4th 1372, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2022); see also Blackbird Tech LLC v. Health in
Motion LLC, 944 F.3d 910, 914 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“We apply
Federal Circuit caselaw to the § 285 analysis, as it is
unique to patent law.”) (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted). “We review § 1927 motions under the
law of the regional circuit,” here the Ninth Circuit. United
Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective Inc., 66 F.4th
1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2023). “We also review a district
court’s denial of a Rule 59(e) motion to amend a judgment
. . . under the regional circuit’s law.” CODA Dev. S.R.O. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 916 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2019).
We “review all aspects of a district court’s § 285 deter-
mination for abuse of discretion.” Highmark Inc. v. Allcare
Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 561 (2014). The
Ninth Circuit reviews decisions on motions to amend a
judgment under Rule 59(e) and sanctions under § 1927 for
abuse of discretion. See Kaufmann v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th
843, 847 (9th Cir. 2022) (relating to Rule 59(e)); Trulis v.
Barton, 107 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 1995) (relating to 28
U.S.C. § 1927). “[A]n abuse of discretion may be found
when the decision rests on an erroneous interpretation of
the law or on clearly erroneous factual underpinnings, or
absent such errors, when the court’s decision represents an
unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” In-
tirtool, Ltd. v. Texar Corp., 369 F.3d 1289, 1294 (Fed. Cir.
Case: 24-1201 Document: 43 Page: 5 Filed: 11/25/2025

-- 5 of 14 --

ESCAPEX IP, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 6
2004); see also Realtime Adaptive Streaming, 41 F.4th at
1378.
We reject EscapeX’s suggestion that the degree of def-
erence given to a district court is somehow related to the
amount of time the district court presided over a case.2
See, e.g., Open. Br. at 10 (“While this Court reviews for
abuse of discretion, in part because of a district court’s fa-
miliarity with the case, when that familiarity is not present
or less, such as in this case, the deference to the District
Court should likewise be less.”); see also id. at 7-8 (“[T]he
District Court abused its discretion in finding the case
2 EscapeX cites Thermolife Int’l LLC v. GNC Corp.,
922 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2019), in support of this du-
bious proposition. See Open. Br. at 18-19, 29-30. There,
we affirmed an award of fees under § 285 that was prem-
ised on the district court’s “conclusion that plaintiffs were
unjustified in alleging infringement in the first place, hav-
ing failed to do an adequate pre-filing investigation.” 922
F.3d at 1350. We specifically held there was no “abuse of
discretion in the district court’s resting its exceptional-case
determination on an examination of an issue – infringe-
ment, and specifically the basis for alleging infringement –
that was neither fully adjudicated nor even fully litigated
before the judgment on the merits.” Id. at 1356-57; see also
Lumen View Tech. LLC v. Findthebest.com, Inc., 811 F.3d
479, 483 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (no abuse of discretion in finding
case exceptional under § 285 even where non-infringement
had not been adjudicated before the asserted claims were
invalidated). While we added that “more process may well
be needed on a fees motion when the issue presented as a
basis for fees has not previously been litigated,” 922 F.3d
at 1357, we neither held nor even suggested that the
amount of time or effort a district court expends on a case
impacts the degree of deference we accord its judgments.
Case: 24-1201 Document: 43 Page: 6 Filed: 11/25/2025

-- 6 of 14 --

ESCAPEX IP, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 7
exceptional and awarding fees . . . [because it] issued its
Order after it had been on the case for only two months and
without deciding any other motion in the case.”); id. at 40
(arguing that “the length of time the case was pending be-
fore the [District] Court” warrants reversal). Our standard
of review is unaffected by the fairly short time the district
court had the case. To hold otherwise would perversely
suggest that a party could act in an otherwise sanctionable
manner for a brief time and suffer no consequences, or, al-
ternatively, act in a sanctionable manner and then agree
to a transfer and thereby purge itself of any responsibility
for its bad acts. We decline to incentivize such tactics.
III
EscapeX argues that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in finding this case exceptional and granting attor-
neys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. In particular, EscapeX
contends that the district court failed to appreciate that Es-
capeX had performed an adequate pre-suit investigation
and pressed only non-frivolous claims; it further alleges the
court improperly considered EscapeX’s lack of engagement
with Google regarding transfer and dismissal. EscapeX
also contends that the district court erred in denying its
Rule 59(e) motion and in granting Google’s subsequent mo-
tion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. EscapeX’s arguments
lack merit.
A
A district court may, in an exercise of its discretion,
award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in an excep-
tional case. See 35 U.S.C. § 285. The burden is on the mov-
ing party to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the case “stands out from others,” “considering the totality
of the circumstances,” including the strength of the parties’
litigating positions and their conduct in the litigation. Oc-
tane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S.
545, 554 (2014). This “generous standard” recognizes “‘the
need in particular circumstances to advance considerations
Case: 24-1201 Document: 43 Page: 7 Filed: 11/25/2025

-- 7 of 14 --

ESCAPEX IP, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 8
of compensation and deterrence.’” In re Rembrandt Techs.
LP Pat. Litig., 899 F.3d 1254, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quot-
ing Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 554 n.6).
Here, the district court’s finding that EscapeX failed to
conduct an adequate pre-suit investigation is well-sup-
ported in the record and, as part of the totality of circum-
stances found by the court, renders its determination to
award attorneys’ fees under Section 285 an appropriate ex-
ercise of discretion. See, e.g., Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow
AgroScience LLC, 851 F.3d 1302, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(“We cannot say that the district court erred in reasoning
that had [Appellant] conducted a more searching pre-suit
investigation – at least of its own easily-obtainable evi-
dence – it would have not filed suit. Nor did the district
court err in treating pre-suit diligence as a factor in the to-
tality-of-the-circumstance approach, as we have previously
approved of this consideration in § 285 determinations.”).
The district court found it was “obvious that EscapeX
conducted no serious pre-suit investigation and that this
case was frivolous from the start.” J.A. 1. In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted that EscapeX’s original and
first amended complaints “cobbled together features” from
different Google products and that EscapeX’s second
amended complaint accused a product feature that preex-
isted the ’113 patent. Id. The district court further found
that EscapeX was “on notice of the baselessness of its claim
early,” at least from letters it received from Google, and
then again when the Southern District of New York found
its ’113 patent ineligible under Section 101. J.A. 1-2. Nei-
ther the fact nor the substance of these communications is
in dispute. See, e.g., J.A. 194-202 (letter from Google to Es-
capeX asserting that complaint was “cobbled together,”
that “’113 patent is invalid,” and “EscapeX failed to conduct
an adequate pre-suit investigation”); J.A. 238-46 (second
letter from Google reiterating prior points and notifying
EscapeX that Google believed EscapeX “lacks a good faith
basis for maintaining this action,” which is “clearly
Case: 24-1201 Document: 43 Page: 8 Filed: 11/25/2025

-- 8 of 14 --

ESCAPEX IP, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 9
baseless” and a “nuisance,” and warning of potential appli-
cation for fees). From this record, the district court’s find-
ing that EscapeX did not conduct an adequate pre-suit
investigation, but instead filed frivolous claims, is not
clearly erroneous.
EscapeX insists that its infringement allegations were
not frivolous because Google’s accused “Auto Add” feature
did not include an “artist specific application” until after
the priority date of the ’113 patent. Open. Br. at 20. Ac-
cording to EscapeX, this also demonstrates that it con-
ducted an adequate pre-suit investigation. EscapeX failed
to raise this contention before the district court in opposing
the § 285 motion.3 Moreover, EscapeX’s claim charts make
no allegations about “artist specific application” as part of
its “Auto Add” allegations. J.A. 233-36. Thus, we discern
no clear error in the court’s finding that “[a] basic online
search would have revealed that [Google’s] accused ‘Auto
Add’ feature predated EscapeX’s patent.” J.A. 1.
EscapeX argues the district court improperly placed
weight in its analysis on correspondence between the par-
ties, and EscapeX’s general non-responsiveness to Google’s
efforts to meet and confer. “[W]e have stressed that one
consideration that can and often should be important to an
exceptional-case determination is whether the party
3 EscapeX points us to an argument it made in sup-
port of a proposed claim construction, see J.A. 427-29
(“Google argues, without support, that YouTube Music is
not an ‘Artist Specific Application’”), but there was no rea-
son for the district court to turn to claim construction
(which had not yet even been briefed) in evaluating Es-
capeX’s opposition to the attorneys’ fees motion. See gen-
erally SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d
1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[A] passing reference to an
issue will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.”)
(internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted).
Case: 24-1201 Document: 43 Page: 9 Filed: 11/25/2025

-- 9 of 14 --

ESCAPEX IP, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 10
seeking fees provided early, focused, and supported notice
of its belief that it was being subjected to exceptional liti-
gation behavior.” Thermolife, 922 F.3d at 1357 (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). Indeed, we have
previously found that “the parties’ communications” may
be a basis to “affirm the district court’s finding of excep-
tionality” when they show that “the lawsuit appears to
have been baseless.” Lumen View, 811 F.3d at 483.
Google’s exchanges with EscapeX, therefore, provide a data
point the district court was permitted to consider as part of
its evaluation of the totality of circumstances. J.A. 1-2
(“Google placed EscapeX on notice of the baselessness of its
claim early and often.”); Thermolife, 922 F.3d at 1358
(“[T]he presence of such notice, followed by continuation of
litigation, can be a factor in justifying an award of attor-
ney’s fees.”).
Finally, EscapeX suggests that the district court acted
to punish it for being a non-practicing entity. The record
reveals no evidence of such animus. The lone quotation Es-
capeX relies on as support for this proposition does not help
it. What the district court said was: “This was, in short, an
effort to force a modest settlement by pestering a tech giant
with a frivolous suit on the assumption that the tech giant
will prefer to capitulate than fight back.” J.A. 2. The dis-
trict court was not, in this statement or otherwise, placing
weight on the mere fact of the patent owner’s status as a
non-practicing entity. Instead, it was considering, as part
of its evaluation of the deterrent effect of an award of at-
torneys’ fees, the frivolousness of the patentee’s position
and evidence it was asserted for reasons other than a gen-
uine intent to proceed to adjudication. This is entirely
proper. See Lumen View, 811 F.3d at 482-83 (affirming fee
award where district court found “motivation for filing suit
was to extract a nuisance settlement from [the defendant],
and that [such a] ‘predatory strategy’ of baseless litigation
showed the need for deterrence”); see also SFA Sys., LLC v.
Newegg Inc., 793 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[A]
Case: 24-1201 Document: 43 Page: 10 Filed: 11/25/2025

-- 10 of 14 --

ESCAPEX IP, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 11
pattern of litigation abuses characterized by the repeated
filing of patent infringement actions for the sole purpose of
forcing settlements, with no intention of testing the merits
of one’s claims, is relevant to a district court’s exceptional
case determination under § 285.”).
Based on these findings, it was not an abuse of discre-
tion for the district court to determine this case is excep-
tional and to choose, therefore, to award attorneys’ fees to
Google as the prevailing party. See, e.g., Octane Fitness,
572 U.S. at 557 (explaining that assessing exceptionality
calls for “discretionary inquiry” that may include consider-
ation of “exceptionally meritless claims”).
B
EscapeX additionally challenges the district court’s de-
nial of its Rule 59(e) motion to amend the judgment, by
which it sought to reverse the § 285 award to Google. Spe-
cifically, EscapeX argues that the two declarations it at-
tached to its motion constituted “new evidence” because
they were “drafted in a way that the evidence was not evi-
dence that had been considered before” by the trial court.
Open. Br. at 10, 32. EscapeX further insists that in the
“highly unusual circumstances” of this case, where the dis-
trict court presided for only the short time after transfer,
Google was able to “manipulate” the record, which should
have caused the district court to permit EscapeX to supple-
ment. Open. Br. at 32-34.
EscapeX is wrong. The Ninth Circuit allows amend-
ment of a judgment under Rule 59(e) “if (1) the district
court is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) the
district court committed clear error or made an initial de-
cision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an inter-
vening change in controlling law.” Zimmerman v. City of
Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001). “A Rule 59(e)
motion may not be used to raise arguments or present evi-
dence for the first time when they could reasonably have
been raised earlier.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Mahogany
Case: 24-1201 Document: 43 Page: 11 Filed: 11/25/2025

-- 11 of 14 --

ESCAPEX IP, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 12
Meadows Ave. Tr., 979 F.3d 1209, 1218 (9th Cir. 2020) (in-
ternal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
We agree with the district court that EscapeX “wholly
failed to meet the Rule 59(e) standard for amending a judg-
ment.” J.A. 3. The declarations from EscapeX’s CEO and
one of its engineers were not “newly discovered evidence,”
as these witnesses were always within the control of Es-
capeX and their knowledge – including as to EscapeX’s pre-
suit investigation – was always available to EscapeX.
These declarations reasonably could have been prepared
and offered to the court much earlier.
EscapeX argues that it also invoked the “manifestly
unjust” basis for amendment of judgment, but it cannot
show us where it did so. Oral Arg. at 14:24-34.4 Nor have
we been able to find any such invocation of this grounds for
relief under Rule 59(e). Thus, the argument is forfeited.
See SEKRI, Inc. v. United States, 34 F.4th 1063, 1071 n.9
(Fed. Cir. 2022). In any event, we see nothing “manifestly
unjust” in the district court’s grant of Google’s Section 285
motion, for all the reasons we have already explained. It
follows, then, that there is no manifest injustice in the dis-
trict court’s denial of EscapeX’s Rule 59(e) motion.
C
Finally, EscapeX argues the district court abused its
discretion by granting Google’s motion for additional attor-
neys’ fees after the court denied EscapeX’s Rule 59(e) mo-
tion, and imposing sanctions on EscapeX’s attorneys,
pursuant to Section 1927. EscapeX contends its attorneys
“should not be sanctioned for failing to abandon [their]
4 The oral argument recording is available at:
https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/24-
1201_06042025.mp3.
Case: 24-1201 Document: 43 Page: 12 Filed: 11/25/2025

-- 12 of 14 --

ESCAPEX IP, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 13
client’s case at the drop of a motion.” Open. Br. at 35.
Again, EscapeX’s positions lack merit.
Title 28 United States Code § 1927 further authorizes
a district court to hold an attorney liable “to satisfy person-
ally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reason-
ably incurred” when that attorney “so multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.”
“Personal sanctions under section 1927 against an attorney
are appropriate for conduct that viewed objectively, mani-
fests either intentional or reckless disregard of the attor-
ney’s duties to the court.” Julien v. Zeringue, 864 F.2d
1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
EscapeX’s appeal of the § 1927 determination is prem-
ised on its view that the district court expected counsel to
abandon their client based simply on Google’s contentions.
There is no indication the district court believed this, much
less that it granted Google’s motion on this basis. Instead,
the district court explained it was granting Google addi-
tional attorneys’ fees after its first award, and making Es-
capeX’s attorneys jointly and severally liable for this
additional amount, because “the attorneys for EscapeX
acted recklessly by filing a frivolous Rule 59(e) motion that
unreasonably multiplied the proceedings of this case.” J.A.
4-5 (“EscapeX’s attorneys’ refusal to withdraw or amend
their motion when informed by Google’s counsel of its nu-
merous problems, at a minimum, constitutes reckless-
ness.”). An attorney’s obligation to zealously advocate for
a client is not a license to ignore other duties, such as con-
ducting an adequate pre-suit investigation and refraining
from filing frivolous motions. See generally In re Personal-
Web Techs., 85 F.4th 1148, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[Z]ealous
representation is tempered by the obligation of counsel to
assist the court by fully and fairly presenting legal issues
relevant to the facts of the case. Exceptionality cannot hide
behind a claim of zealous representation.”) (internal cita-
tion omitted).
Case: 24-1201 Document: 43 Page: 13 Filed: 11/25/2025

-- 13 of 14 --

ESCAPEX IP, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 14
EscapeX’s Rule 59(e) motion was frivolous because it
was “baseless and made without reasonable and competent
inquiry” and contained “legal or factual contentions so
weak as to constitute objective evidence of improper pur-
pose.” In re Girardi, 611 F.3d 1027, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010).
Counsel here could have avoided sanction by simply not fil-
ing such a motion, which would not by any means have con-
stituted abandonment of their client.
Hence, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
granting Google’s § 1927 motion.
IV
For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court’s or-
ders awarding Google LLC attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and denying EscapeX’s motion
to amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 59(e).
AFFIRMED
COSTS
Costs awarded to Google.
Case: 24-1201 Document: 43 Page: 14 Filed: 11/25/2025

-- 14 of 14 --