Robert M. Laird v. Douglas A. Collins, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
ROBERT M. LAIRD,
Claimant-Appellant
v.
DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent-Appellee
______________________
2024-1263
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in No. 22-5199, Judge Joseph L. Toth.
______________________
Decided: December 17, 2025
______________________
CLARE MALINOWSKI, Veterans Legal Advocacy Group,
Arlington, VA, argued for claimant-appellant. Also repre-
sented by HAROLD HAMILTON HOFFMAN, III, MEGAN
EILEEN HOFFMAN, LEA SUAREZ.
TANYA KOENIG, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represent-
ed by ERIC P. BRUSKIN, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, YAAKOV
ROTH; CHRISTOPHER O. ADELOYE, DEREK SCADDEN, Office
Case: 24-1263 Document: 43 Page: 1 Filed: 12/17/2025

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LAIRD v. COLLINS 2
of General Counsel, United States Department of Veter-
ans Affairs, Washington, DC.
______________________
Before LOURIE, SCHALL, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
STOLL, Circuit Judge.
Robert M. Laird appeals the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirming the
Board of Veterans Appeals’ denial of an earlier effective
date for Mr. Laird’s service-connected disability. Because
Mr. Laird’s appeal presents no arguments within our
jurisdiction, we dismiss.
In 2010, Mr. Laird, a Marine Corps veteran, filed a
claim for service connection for post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). In June 2011, Mr. Laird received a
medical exam from the VA, and the medical examiner
diagnosed Mr. Laird with depression but not with PTSD.
In a November 2011 decision, the agency of original
jurisdiction granted service connection for major depres-
sive disorder (MDD), assigning a 10% rating to
Mr. Laird’s claim. On October 12, 2012, Mr. Laird—who,
at the time, was representing himself before the VA—
submitted a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) requesting an
increased rating for PTSD. However, Mr. Laird used the
wrong form to submit the NOD, and the Board subse-
quently interpreted Mr. Laird’s October 12, 2012 submis-
sion not as a NOD but rather as a new claim for an
increased rating for MDD.
Because the Board interpreted Mr. Laird’s submission
as a new claim for an increased rating for MDD, it evalu-
ated it as such, “review[ing] evidence from the date of
claim and during the one year ‘look back period’ preceding
the submission of the claim.” J.A. 17 (citing 38 U.S.C.
§ 5110(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2); Gaston v. Shinseki,
605 F.3d 979, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Accordingly, the
Board “considered the lay and medical evidence in the one
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LAIRD v. COLLINS 3
year prior to the date of receipt of the October 12, 2012
increased rating claim.” Id. On August 2, 2022, the
Board issued its decision.
Mr. Laird appealed the Board’s decision to the Veter-
ans Court. He argued that “[u]nder an appropriately
liberal reading, [his] pro se submission could be construed
as a disagreement with the denial of a higher rating for
MDD.” J.A. 47–48. The Veterans Court agreed, holding
Mr. Laird’s October 12, 2012 submission “was a valid
NOD and that the Board erred in determining otherwise.”
J.A. 2. But the Veterans Court also concluded that the
Board’s error was harmless, since the Board “left intact
the currently assigned effective date of October 12, 2012,”
and Mr. Laird “d[id] not attempt to challenge the Board’s
finding as to the date entitlement arose.” J.A. 3.
Mr. Laird subsequently moved the Veterans Court for
reconsideration. He argued that, in finding the Board’s
error was harmless, the Veterans Court “overlooked that
the Board’s finding of fact regarding the increase . . .
treat[ed] the claim as an increased rating claim.” J.A. 28.
Therefore, “the Board did not evaluate whether an in-
creased rating was warranted based on the entire record-
ed history of the claim but limited its analysis to that
within one year of the October 2012 supplemental claim.”
Id. The Veterans Court denied Mr. Laird’s motion, noting
Mr. Laird relied “entirely on legal arguments not present-
ed in his initial brief.” J.A. 27. The Veterans Court
entered judgment, and Mr. Laird filed the instant appeal.
After review, we determine we lack jurisdiction to
consider the Veterans Court’s decision. Our jurisdiction
to review decisions of the Veterans Court is limited.
Wanless v. Shinseki, 618 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
We have jurisdiction to review and decide “all relevant
questions of law, including interpreting constitutional and
statutory provisions.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). But we lack
jurisdiction to review “(A) a challenge to a factual deter-
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LAIRD v. COLLINS 4
mination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as
applied to the facts of a particular case.” Id. § 7292(d)(2).
Mr. Laird contends that the Board’s mischaracteriza-
tion of the NOD led it to apply the one-year look-back
period for its evidentiary review and, as a result, to “pre-
clude[] [Mr. Laird’s] June 2011 PTSD exam from review.”
Appellant’s Br. 17. Mr. Laird further claims that the
Veterans Court’s adoption of the Board’s review “perpetu-
ated the ill effects of the Board’s error.” Appellant’s
Br. 18. Mr. Laird’s arguments, ultimately, are challenges
to the Veterans Court’s determination that the Board’s
error was harmless. See J.A. 3 (“[I]t is fair to conclude
that Mr. Laird’s submission is a[] NOD, and the Board
erred in determining otherwise. However, any Board
error in this regard is harmless.”). And a challenge to
such a holding is a challenge to the Veterans Court’s
“application of law to fact and therefore falls outside this
court’s jurisdiction.” Pitts v. Shinseki, 700 F.3d 1279,
1286 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
We also note that Mr. Laird’s argument regarding the
effect of the Board’s error is not preserved because
Mr. Laird did not present that argument to the Veterans
Court until he moved for reconsideration. See J.A. 26.
“[A]n argument made for the first time in a motion for
reconsideration comes too late, and is ordinarily deemed
waived and not preserved for appeal.” Bluebonnet Sav.
Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 466 F.3d 1349, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Mr. Laird’s ap-
peal for lack of jurisdiction.
DISMISSED
COSTS
No costs.
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