Tesla, Inc. v. Charge Fusion Technologies, LLC

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
TESLA, INC.,
Appellant
v.
CHARGE FUSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
Appellee
______________________
2024-2015
______________________
Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2023-
00063.
______________________
Decided: March 31, 2026
______________________
K RISTA MARIE CARTER , Tesla, Inc., Palo Alto, CA, ar-
gued for appellant. Also represented by P AUL I SAAC
MARGULIES , Washington, DC; D AVID A. CAINE, Arnold &
Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Palo Alto, CA.
BRADLEY D. L IDDLE, Cozen O'Connor, Dallas, TX, ar-
gued for appellee. Also represented by MICHAEL CLAYTON
P OMEROY ; F REDERICK A. T ECCE , Altima Advisors/Attor-
neys, LLC, Philadelphia, PA.
______________________
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TESLA, INC. v. CHARGE FUSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 2
Before D YK, REYNA, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
REYNA, Circuit Judge.
Tesla, Inc. appeals from a final written decision of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial
and Appeal Board, which found that Tesla failed to prove
that the challenged claims of U.S. Patent No. 10,819,135
were invalid as obvious. Because the Board improperly
construed a limitation of one independent claim but not of
other independent claims, we affirm in part, reverse in
part, vacate in part, and remand.
BACKGROUND
I.
Charge Fusion Technologies, LLC (“Charge Fusion”)
owns U.S. Patent No. 10,819,135 (“’135 patent”). The ’135
patent is directed to an electric charging system for intelli-
gently charging battery-powered vehicles. In one embodi-
ment, a user “may safely leave a pet in a parked vehicle by
establishing and/or setting charging parameters designed
to keep the A/C on to maintain a cool vehicle and/or to keep
the heat on to maintain a warm vehicle.” ’135 patent,
15:50–53.
Independent claims 1, 8, and 14 are at issue in this ap-
peal. Although the independent claims include similar lim-
itations, the final limitation of claim 1 meaningfully differs
from that of claims 8 and 14. The independent claims at
issue state in relevant part:
1. A non-transitory computer readable storage me-
dium storing instructions that, when executed by a
processor, cause the processor to: . . .
[1h] operate a climate control mechanism of the
electric vehicle while the vehicle is in a parked
state and in accordance with the selected mode of
operation for a duration of time until the amount of
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TESLA, INC. v. CHARGE FUSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 3
charge residing in the battery reaches a predeter-
mined level.
’135 patent, 29:16–18, 43–47 (emphases added).
8. A method comprising: . . .
[8i] operating an A/C mechanism of the electric ve-
hicle in accordance with the selected mode of oper-
ation for a duration of time until it is determined
that the selected mode of operation cannot be main-
tained by the amount of charge residing in the bat-
tery for more than a threshold amount of time.
Id., 30:1, 34–39 (emphases added).
14. A method comprising: . . .
[14g] receiving, via the user interface, an indication
of an activation of the selected mode of operation of
the electronic vehicle and operating a climate con-
trol mechanism of the electric vehicle in accordance
with the selected mode of operation, [14h] wherein
the mode of operation defines (i) a stored tempera-
ture at which to maintain the interior of the electric
vehicle and (ii) a minimum battery charge level re-
quired to maintain the stored temperature for a
threshold amount of time.
Id., 30:56, 31:12–20 (emphases added). The parties refer
to limitations [1h], [8i], and the italicized portions of [14g]
and [14h] as the “Climate Control Limitations.”
II.
Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) petitioned for inter partes review of
claims 1–5, 7–11, and 14–16 of the ’135 patent. Tesla ar-
gued that the claims would have been obvious in light of
Japanese Patent Application No. JP H10-55496 (“Hibi”)
and other prior art references not at issue on appeal.
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TESLA, INC. v. CHARGE FUSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 4
On institution, the Board encouraged the parties to ad-
dress the meaning of the Climate Control Limitation of
claim 1. J.A. 1080. The limitation recites:
instructions that . . . cause the processor to . . .op-
erate a climate control mechanism of the electric
vehicle while the vehicle is in a parked state and
in accordance with the selected mode of operation
for a duration of time until the amount of charge
residing in the battery reaches a predetermined
level.
’135 patent, 29:17–18, 43–47 (emphasis added).
The Board specifically requested that the parties ad-
dress whether the limitation requires the selected mode of
operation to “cease operation” or “change operation” after
the system reaches the predetermined battery level.
J.A. 1080. Charge Fusion argued that the selected mode of
operation stops or ceases once the amount of charge
reaches the predetermined level. J.A. 9. Tesla argued that
the plain and ordinary meaning of the limitation does not
require the mode of operation to stop or cease after the bat-
tery reaches the predetermined level. J.A. 11. Telsa also
argued that the specification confirms this conclusion. Id.
In its final written decision, the Board agreed with
Tesla that the claim does not require that the selected
mode of operation cease after the battery reaches the pre-
determined level. However, the Board decided that “even
if claim 1 does not recite a particular event that occurs after
the predetermined battery level is reached, claim 1 at least
requires that the instructions take into consideration the
battery level in some manner when operating the climate
control mechanism.” J.A. 12. The Board reiterated that
the instructions that operate the climate control mecha-
nism “must take into account the predetermined battery
level” and “must be based in some manner on the predeter-
mined battery level.” Id.
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TESLA, INC. v. CHARGE FUSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 5
Based on this construction, the Board determined that
claim 1 would not have been obvious in view of Hibi. Spe-
cifically, the Board determined that Hibi does not disclose
claim 1’s Climate Control Limitation because “Hibi does
not care about its battery level for operation of its climate
control mechanism.” J.A. 22. The Board quoted Charge
Fusion’s argument that “if a user selects a climate control
temperature in system setting mode of Hibi, that tempera-
ture is unchanged in response to a low battery event” and
“[i]nstead, the temperature remains constant in response
to the low battery, as Hibi’s vehicle simply turns the gas
engine on and charges the battery.” Id. (citations omitted).
The Board concluded that “[b]ecause Hibi does not consider
battery level for the operating instructions associated with
its climate control system, Petitioner’s challenge to claim 1
fails.” Id.
Regarding claims 8 and 14, the Board found the claims
nonobvious in view of Hibi for two reasons. First, the
Board indicated that Hibi’s failure to disclose the Climate
Control Limitation of claim 1 is dispositive for claims 8 and
14 as well. J.A. 24. Second, the Board determined that
Hibi fails to disclose the “more specific” recitations in
claims 8 and 14, which, according to the Board, “require
knowing a specific relationship between the remaining
level of charge in the battery and the amount of time the
climate control mechanism can run on that remaining
charge.” Id. The Board found this feature absent from
Hibi. J.A. 26. The Board thus held that Tesla failed to
show that any of the challenged claims is unpatentable.
Tesla appealed. We have jurisdiction to review the
Board’s final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
D ISCUSSION
Tesla challenges the Board’s construction of the final
limitation of claim 1 and the Board’s finding of non-obvi-
ousness as to that claim and dependent claims 2–5, 7, and
15. Tesla likewise challenges the Board’s construction of
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TESLA, INC. v. CHARGE FUSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 6
similar limitations in independent claims 8 and 14, as well
as the Board’s finding of non-obviousness as to those claims
and dependent claims 9–11 and 16. Finally, Tesla argues
that the Board’s construction of the disputed limitations vi-
olated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).
We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and its
factual findings for substantial evidence. Almirall, LLC v.
Amneal Pharms. LLC, 28 F.4th 265, 271 (Fed. Cir. 2022).
Claim construction is ultimately a question of law, decided
de novo on review. Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th
801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Substantial evidence is such rel-
evant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade-
quate to support a conclusion. Consol. Edison Co. of New
York v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
We review the Board’s compliance with the procedural
requirements of the APA de novo. Axonics, Inc. v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 75 F.4th 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
I. Claims 1–5, 7, and 15
A.
The goal in claim construction is to attribute to claim
terms the meaning understood by a person of ordinary skill
in the art. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313
(Fed. Cir. 2005). There is a heavy presumption that claim
terms are to be given their ordinary and customary mean-
ing. Aventis Pharms. Inc. v. Amino Chems. Ltd., 715 F.3d
1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013). When construing claim terms,
we primarily rely on the intrinsic evidence, including the
claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution
history of the patent. Sunovion Pharms., Inc. v. Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 1271, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
We first consider whether the Climate Control Limita-
tion “must take into account the predetermined battery
level,” as the Board determined. Claim 1 recites in relevant
part:
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TESLA, INC. v. CHARGE FUSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 7
1. A non-transitory computer readable storage me-
dium storing instructions that, when executed by a
processor, cause the processor to: . . .
[1h] operate a climate control mechanism of the
electric vehicle while the vehicle is in a parked
state and in accordance with the selected mode of
operation for a duration of time until the amount of
charge residing in the battery reaches a predeter-
mined level.
’135 patent, 29:16–18, 43–47 (emphases added). The Board
concluded that “even if claim 1 does not recite a particular
event that occurs after the predetermined battery level is
reached, claim 1 at least requires that the instructions take
into consideration the battery level in some manner when
operating the climate control mechanism.” J.A. 12.
Tesla contends that the Board’s construction is errone-
ous as a matter of law. Appellant Br. 16. Tesla argues that
so long as the “climate control mechanism” operates “until”
the battery charge reaches a predetermined level, the plain
language does not require that the operation of the climate
control mechanism itself actually “take into account” the
battery charge level. Id. at 17. Tesla further argues that
there is no requirement in the specification that the oper-
ating of the climate control mechanism must take into ac-
count a “predetermined battery level” that may be reached.
Id. at 18. We agree.
The Board’s construction is not supported by the plain
language of the claims. The claims do not require that the
instructions “take into consideration” the battery level
when operating the climate control mechanism. The
claims merely require that the climate control mechanism
continue until the battery charge reaches a predetermined
level. As the Board recognized, “[t]he claim is silent as to
what happens after the ‘until.’” J.A. 12.
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TESLA, INC. v. CHARGE FUSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 8
The specification likewise offers no support to the
Board’s decision. Charge Fusion relies on FIG. 6 and the
description thereof in support of the Board’s construction.
See Appellee Br. 48. FIG. 6 is shown below in relevant
part.
’135 patent, FIG. 6. Describing FIG. 6, the specification
indicates that when the driver selects a pet menu option,
the driver may also select a button to receive alerts regard-
ing the car’s battery. The specification states the following:
An operator of the user device 680 may, for example,
select the menu option 682 (and the user device 680
may receive an indication of such selection), which
is depicted as being a menu option defining a situa-
tion of a pet being in the vehicle 660. The operator
may then, for example, . . . determine whether it is
desired that the operator be notified if the current
charge level of the vehicle 660 falls below a level that
allows the Air Conditioning (A/C) to remain on for
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TESLA, INC. v. CHARGE FUSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 9
fifteen (15) minutes (e.g., the second preference op-
tion 684b) . . . .
Id., 13:34–39, 44–48. In this disclosure, the specification
merely indicates that the driver may be notified when the
battery drops below a predetermined level. The Board fails
to identify any other passage from the specification that
links such notification to the operation of the climate con-
trol system. Thus, the specification does not indicate that
the instructions “take into consideration” the battery level
in some manner when operating the climate control mech-
anism.
Because the intrinsic evidence does not support the
Board’s construction that the instructions must take into
consideration the battery level in some manner when oper-
ating the climate control mechanism, we vacate that por-
tion of the Board’s construction.
B.
We now turn to patentability. The Board found that
Hibi in combination with other references failed to disclose
the Climate Control Limitation of claim 1. The Board’s
finding, however, “depended on an incorrect interpretation
of that claim” and therefore was “not supported by substan-
tial evidence.” See Praxair Distribution, Inc. v. Mallinck-
rodt Hosp. Prods. IP Ltd., 890 F.3d 1024, 1036 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
We hold that under the correct claim construction,
claim 1 is unpatentable. The Board made sufficient find-
ings regarding Hibi to determine that claim 1 would have
been obvious under the proper meaning of the claim. The
Board found that Hibi taught operating its climate control
system in AUTO mode for a duration of time. J.A. 22. The
Board further found that such duration of time can be up
to and beyond the low battery abnormality condition. Id.
These findings are supported by substantial evidence, as
Hibi states that when “the capacity of the battery has been
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TESLA, INC. v. CHARGE FUSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 10
reduced by conducting cooling over a long period, . . . the
engine is started by the engine starter 96 and heating or
charging of the battery is conducted.” J.A. 294, ¶ 0043.
The Board’s findings about Hibi, which are supported by
substantial evidence, demonstrate that Hibi teaches the
Climate Control Limitation under the proper construction.
Because we conclude that claim 1 would have been obvious,
we reverse the Board’s decision on patentability.
The Board’s decision as to the patentability of claims
2–5, 7, and 15, which depend upon claim 1, rested entirely
on its conclusion that claim 1 was not unpatentable. Since
the Board did not separately address the dependent claims,
we vacate its determination as to those claims and remand
for further proceedings.
II. Claims 8–11, 14, and 16
A.
Tesla argues that the Board improperly construed the
Climate Control Limitations of claims 8 and 14. Tesla con-
tends that the Board made two errors. First, the Board
applied its improper construction of the Climate Control
Limitation of claim 1 to claims 8 and 14. Appellant Br. 14.
Second, Tesla argues that the Board erroneously imposed
“an additional construction, albeit implicitly” that the
claims require an actual determination of the time availa-
ble for climate control operation, based on the “threshold
amount of time” limitation. Id. Even if Tesla’s first point
is correct, it does not help Tesla, because Tesla does not
establish error on the second point. Accordingly, we affirm
the Board’s construction for the following reasons.
Claims 8 and 14 each recite “a threshold amount of
time”—a term not included in claim 1. Claim 8 requires
operating the vehicle’s A/C mechanism in accordance with
the selected mode of operation “for a duration of time until
it is determined that the selected mode of operation cannot
be maintained by the amount of charge residing in the
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TESLA, INC. v. CHARGE FUSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 11
battery for more than a threshold amount of time.” ’135 pa-
tent, 30:34–39 (emphasis added). Claim 14 recites that
“the mode of operation defines (i) a stored temperature at
which to maintain the interior of the electric vehicle and
(ii) a minimum battery charge level required to maintain
the stored temperature for a threshold amount of time.” Id.,
31:16–20 (emphasis added).
Based on this language, the Board concluded that
“[c]laims 8 and 14 require an actual determination of time
available for climate control operation based on battery
level as part of their recited operation of the climate control
mechanism.” J.A. 26. We agree with this construction be-
cause it is supported by the intrinsic record.
Claims 8 and 14 each draw a correlation among the se-
lected mode of operation, the charge residing in the battery,
and a threshold amount of time. We first note that the
mode of operation “is defined by” (claim 8) or “defines”
(claim 14) a temperature at which to maintain the interior
of the vehicle. ’135 patent, 30:24–26, 31:16–18. Thus, the
mode of operation corresponds to a target temperature.
In claim 8, the correlation among the selected mode of
operation, the charge residing in the battery, and a thresh-
old amount of time is recited in a determination. The claim
requires operating the vehicle’s A/C mechanism until it is
determined that the selected mode of operation, i.e., the se-
lected temperature, cannot be maintained for more than a
threshold amount of time with the power that remains in
the battery. See ’135 patent, 30:34–39. As the Board cor-
rectly explained, this determination would not be possible
without determining the time available for maintaining
the mode of operation based on battery level. See J.A. 26.
We agree with the Board’s construction of claim 8.
In claim 14, the correlation among the three features is
recited in a definition. The mode of operation defines a
minimum battery charge required to maintain the target
temperature for a threshold amount of time. See
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TESLA, INC. v. CHARGE FUSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 12
’135 patent, 31:16–20. Like the “determin[ing]” in claim 8,
this “defin[ing]” requires knowing the time that the mode
of operation can be maintained based on battery level.
J.A. 26. Thus, the Board correctly determined that both
claims 8 and 14 reflect a requirement for a determination
of time available for climate control based on battery level.
The claims’ plain language supports the Board’s construc-
tion.
The specification lends further support. The ’135 pa-
tent discloses that a user may select to be notified “if the
current charge level of the vehicle 660 falls below a level
that allows the Air Conditioning (A/C) to remain on for fif-
teen (15) minutes.” ’135 patent, 13:45–47. The system
could not accurately notify the user regarding the 15-mi-
nute threshold time without determining when the car will
deplete the battery at the current A/C setting. Based on
the plain language of the claims and the support in the
specification, we agree with the Board’s construction of the
Climate Control Limitations of claims 8 and 14.
B.
In light of the Board’s construction, we now consider
whether substantial evidence supports its finding of non-
obviousness. The Board found that the determination of
time available for climate control operation based on bat-
tery level is missing in Hibi. J.A. 26. We hold that sub-
stantial evidence supports this finding.
Tesla argues that Hibi renders obvious the Climate
Control Limitations of claims 8 and 14. Tesla relies on
Hibi’s disclosure of a “Low battery” abnormality that is de-
tected with a “Voltmeter.” Appellant Br. 35. Tesla con-
tends that Hibi’s low battery level necessarily corresponds
to an amount of time that the system can maintain the de-
sired temperature. Appellant Br. 35–36. We disagree.
Hibi is directed to a system for detecting and respond-
ing to an abnormality in the operation of a parked vehicle.
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TESLA, INC. v. CHARGE FUSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 13
J.A. 284, Abstract. Upon detection, the system notifies the
vehicle’s driver of the abnormality and executes measures
to address the abnormality. Id. The system enables a
driver to maintain a safe climate for a child or pet in the
car. J.A. 294, ¶ 0047; J.A. 302, FIG. 6. If the driver leaves
a child in the car, the car can automatically control the air
conditioner to conduct cooling. J.A. 294, ¶¶ 0043, 0047.
Hibi states, “[w]hen . . . the capacity of the battery has been
reduced by conducting cooling over a long period, . . . the
engine is started by the engine starter 96 and heating or
charging of the battery is conducted.” Id. ¶ 0043.
We agree with the Board that Hibi’s system can deter-
mine when the battery reaches a predetermined level. See
J.A. 24–25. But, as the Board notes, “Hibi is silent as to
any relationship between operating its climate control sys-
tem and remaining battery charge level.” J.A. 25. The
Board properly rejected Tesla’s argument that Hibi’s low
battery level necessarily defines a minimum battery charge
level required to maintain the stored temperature for a
threshold amount of time. J.A. 25–26. As the Board ob-
served, adopting Tesla’s characterization of the claims
would render much of the Climate Control Limitations of
claims 8 and 14 meaningless. J.A. 26. The “determin[ing]”
in claim 8 and the “defin[ing]” in claim 14 require deter-
mining the time available for the mode of operation based
on battery level. Hibi’s disclosures cited by Tesla—the abil-
ity to “automatically control” air conditioning (J.A. 294,
¶ 47), to detect a “Low battery” abnormality with a “Volt-
meter” (J.A. 300, Fig. 5(a)), and to execute a “countermeas-
ure” of starting the engine and charging the battery (id.;
J.A. 294, ¶ 43)—falls short of the claimed “determin[ing]”
and “defin[ing].” As the Board noted, Hibi provides no
teaching regarding any duration of time for operation of the
climate control system relative to a remaining charge level
of the battery. J.A. 25. We conclude that the Board’s find-
ing of non-obviousness as to independent claims 8 and 14
is supported by substantial evidence. Claims 9–11 and 16
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TESLA, INC. v. CHARGE FUSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 14
depend from claim 8 and are likewise non-obvious by virtue
of their dependence.
III. The Administrative Procedure Act
IPR proceedings are subject to the APA. Hamilton
Beach Brands, Inc. v. f’real Foods, LLC, 908 F.3d 1328,
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Pursuant to the APA, we will set
aside a PTAB decision that is “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
Tesla contends that the Board’s construction of the Cli-
mate Control Limitation of claim 1, “requiring that the op-
eration of the climate control mechanism ‘must take into
account the predetermined battery level,’” was presented
for the first time in the final written decision and thus vio-
lative of the APA. Appellant Br. 27. Because we vacate the
portion of the Board’s construction that Tesla challenges,
we do not reach the question of an APA violation for claim
1.
Regarding claims 8 and 14, Tesla argues that the Board
violated the APA when it imported its erroneous construc-
tion of claim 1 into those claims as well. Appellant Br. 39.
Tesla also contends that the Board’s “further constructions
for claims 8 and 14 . . . were never proposed or adopted
prior to implicitly adopting them in the [final written deci-
sion].” Id. We disagree.
The Board did not violate the APA. In its institution
decision, the Board “strongly encourage[d]” the parties to
address the meaning of the Climate Control Limitation of
claim 1. J.A. 1080. The Board also recognized that the lim-
itations in claims 8 and 14 are similar to those in claim 1.
J.A. 1081. The parties discussed the Climate Control Lim-
itations of claims 8 and 14 in detail at the hearing before
the Board. See J.A 2057–60; J.A. 2080; J.A. 2083–85. The
Board expressed doubt regarding Tesla’s construction as
reflected in its reliance on Hibi. J.A. 2083–84 (“I’ll be
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TESLA, INC. v. CHARGE FUSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 15
honest with you. It seems like a little bit of a leap to get
from that low battery to that being tied to a duration of
time that you can operate this climate control. Right?”).
The Board also questioned Tesla regarding the specific re-
quirements of claims 8 and 14. J.A. 2080 (“[D]o you have
to determine the charge amount to -- an actual amount for
climate control operation? . . . Do [c]laims 8 and 14, at least,
require an actual determination of charge level for climate
control operation?”); J.A. 2084 (“Especially when you get to
[c]laim 14, where it says that now you define a minimum
battery charge level to maintain restored temperature for
a threshold amount of time. So now you have to determine
basically how much charge I need. I have to know an
amount of time, too. Right?”). Based on the Board’s re-
quest for input in its institution decision and its questions
and comments during oral argument, we conclude that
Tesla had notice of the Board’s understanding of the Cli-
mate Control Limitations prior to issuance of the Final
Written Decision. See TQ Delta, LLC v. DISH Network
LLC, 929 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding party
had notice of Board’s understanding where Board ques-
tioned party’s narrow construction at the Oral Hearing);
see also Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. Ericsson Inc., 686 F.
App’x 900, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (rejecting patent owner’s
APA and due process arguments as meritless because it
was on notice of the at-issue construction before the final
written decision issued because it had the “opportunity to
seek a sur-reply or rehearing” and there was a “continuous
focus on [the claim term] before and during oral argu-
ments”).
We hold that Tesla was afforded sufficient notice and
opportunity to address the construction of the Climate Con-
trol Limitations of claims 8 and 14 and thus the Board did
not run afoul of the APA here.
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TESLA, INC. v. CHARGE FUSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 16
CONCLUSION
We have considered Tesla’s remaining arguments and
find them unpersuasive. For the reasons stated above, we
vacate the Board’s construction and reverse its judgment
regarding obviousness of claim 1. We vacate it judgment
regarding dependent claims 2–5, 7, and 15 and remand to
the Board for consideration of the patentability of those
claims. We affirm the Board’s construction and finding of
non-obviousness for claims 8–11, 14, and 16.
AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART,
VACATED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED
COSTS
Each party shall bear its own costs for this appeal.
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