Debra Blackwell v. United States

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
DEBRA BLACKWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2024-2190
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:21-cv-01075-LAS, Senior Judge Loren A. Smith.
______________________
Decided: March 24, 2026
______________________
MICHAEL F ALLINGS , Tully Rinckey PLLC, Austin, TX,
argued for plaintiff-appellant.
L IRIDONA S INANI, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented
by CLAUDIA BURKE, P ATRICIA M. MCC ARTHY , BRETT
SHUMATE.
______________________
Before L OURIE, CHEN, and STOLL , Circuit Judges.
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BLACKWELL v. US 2
CHEN, Circuit Judge.
Ms. Debra Blackwell appeals from a United States
Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) grant of summary
judgment denying her claim under the Equal Pay Act
(EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1), that she was allegedly paid
less than a male colleague for working overtime. Blackwell
v. United States, 171 Fed. Cl. 682 (2024) (Decision). Apply-
ing the test outlined in Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,
417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974), the Claims Court determined that
Ms. Blackwell failed to demonstrate that her position and
her colleague’s position required “equal skill, effort, and re-
sponsibility” and were “performed under similar working
conditions.” The Claims Court also determined that, even
if Ms. Blackwell had made a prima facie showing of a vio-
lation of the EPA, the government adequately rebutted her
claim. Because we agree with the Claims Court that
Ms. Blackwell did not raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to her prima facie case and, in any event, the gov-
ernment successfully raised its affirmative defense, we af-
firm.
BACKGROUND
Since 2004, Ms. Blackwell has worked as a Supervisory
Program Manager in the U.S. Department of Homeland Se-
curity, Customs and Border Patrol (Agency). Decision, 171
Fed. Cl. at 684. Her home office is the Agency’s Office of
Field Operations, located in Houston, Texas (Houston Field
Office). Id. Her position falls within the 340 – Program
Management Series1 and is classified as a GS-14 pay
grade. Id. at 684–85.
1 During the pendency of the litigation, the Agency
conducted a “desk audit” which determined that Ms. Black-
well’s position should be reclassified from 340 – Program
Management Series to 1801 – Supervisory Immigration
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BLACKWELL v. US 3
The scope of Ms. Blackwell’s position includes manag-
ing twenty-seven border security programs, supervising a
three-person team, interpreting Agency policy, communi-
cating with stakeholders, and counseling supervisors and
staff on immigration and nationality law and admissibility
decisions. Id.; see also id. at 689. Ms. Blackwell’s tour of
duty is Monday through Friday from 7:30 AM to 4:00 PM.
Ms. Blackwell periodically is asked to work after-hours as
needed. See J.A. 208 [18:11–18]. This work consists of
fielding phone calls and replying to emails from her super-
visors.
Mr. Jeremy Luczkowski is a federal employee who
works as a Border Security Coordinator in the same Hou-
ston office as Ms. Blackwell. Decision, 171 Fed. Cl. at 685.
His position falls within the 1895 – Customs and Border
Protection Series and is also classified as a GS-14 pay
grade. Id. Additionally, the position is covered by the Cus-
toms Officer Pay Reform Act (COPRA), 19 U.S.C. § 267,
which requires overtime compensation paid at two times
the basic hourly rate for work that is “officially assigned”
and exceeds 8 hours in a day or 40 hours in a week. Id.
The scope of Mr. Luczkowski’s position includes coordi-
nating more than thirty-nine enforcement programs, su-
pervising a four-person team, overseeing eighteen officers
in various task forces, and counseling for the Federal
Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Incident Com-
mand System, National Incident Management System, and
Continuity Operations. Decision, 171 Fed. Cl. at 685.
Mr. Luczkowski’s expertise in emergency management re-
sults in his “frequent deployments to national and interna-
tional operations away from the Houston Field Office.” Id.
(quoting J.A. 362 ¶ 9).
Advisor Series. Decision, 171 Fed. Cl. at 686–87. This re-
classification does not affect our analysis.
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BLACKWELL v. US 4
Mr. Luczkowski’s tour of duty is the same as
Ms. Blackwell’s—Monday through Friday from 7:30 AM to
4:00PM. Id. Between 2018 to 2019, Mr. Luczkowski was
deployed to the CBP Baltimore Field Office to support Hur-
ricane Florence operations as the Operations Section Chief;
Eagle Pass and Del Rio, Texas to mitigate a border crisis;
and San Diego, California to serve as the Logistics Section
Chief during Operation Secure Line. Id. at 685–86.
Mr. Luczkowski recorded and earned overtime compensa-
tion for these deployments.
Mr. Erik Shoberg, Assistant Director of Field Opera-
tions, is the direct supervisor for both Ms. Blackwell and
Mr. Luczkowski. In 2019, Mr. Shoberg took a brief absence
and Ms. Blackwell took over his duties, serving as acting
Assistant Director of Field Operations. Id. at 686. While
reviewing overtime cap waiver requests in her acting As-
sistant Director role, Ms. Blackwell learned Mr. Luczkow-
ski earned approximately $45,000 in overtime
compensation under COPRA in 2019 for emergency man-
agement response duties. Id.
On September 13, 2019, Ms. Blackwell filed an admin-
istrative grievance seeking compensation for “ten hours of
overtime work per week for the last several years.” Id.
Mr. Shoberg denied her request in March 2020 because
(1) she had not been ordered nor approved to perform the
weekly overtime work; (2) her duties differed substantially
from Mr. Luczkowski’s; and (3) she had not provided docu-
mentation supporting her claim. Id. Mr. Shoberg encour-
aged Ms. Blackwell to search for and submit records that
corroborated her request. Id. In response, Ms. Blackwell
filed a formal grievance which was denied by the Agency
on April 9, 2020. Id.
Ms. Blackwell filed a complaint on September 18, 2020
in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas; the case was later transferred to the Claims
Court with both parties’ consent. Id. at 687.
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BLACKWELL v. US 5
Ms. Blackwell’s complaint requested compensation under
the EPA and COPRA “for loss of promotional potential, rep-
utation, lost wages, [and] lost job benefits she would have
received.” Id. (alteration in original). The government
moved for partial dismissal of her claims. Id.
On January 21, 2022, the Claims Court dismissed
Ms. Blackwell’s EPA claim for overtime allegedly earned
before September 18, 2018, because the statute of limita-
tions precluded claims accruing before that date, and dis-
missed Ms. Blackwell’s COPRA claim because that statute
did not cover her employment position. Blackwell v. United
States, No. 21-1075, 2022 WL 2315088, at *4, *6 (Fed. Cl.
Jan. 21, 2022).
After a period of discovery, the government filed a sum-
mary judgment motion which the Claims Court granted.
In its decision, the Claims Court determined that
Ms. Blackwell had fallen short in her prima facie case. The
Claims Court determined that Mr. Luczkowski was an “in-
apt comparator” because Ms. Blackwell’s and Mr. Lucz-
kowski’s jobs required (1) different skills, (2) different
effort, (3) different responsibilities, and (4) different work-
ing conditions. Decision, 171 Fed. Cl. at 689–90. The
Claims Court also found that the government had success-
fully raised an affirmative defense. Id. at 690.
Ms. Blackwell timely appealed. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
D ISCUSSION
“[W]e review a grant of summary judgment by the
Court of Federal Claims de novo.” Anderson v. United
States, 23 F.4th 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citation omit-
ted).
The EPA codifies “the principle of equal pay for equal
work regardless of sex.” Boyer v. United States, 97 F.4th
834, 839 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting Corning Glass, 417 U.S.
at 190). In order to make a prima facie case of violation of
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BLACKWELL v. US 6
the EPA, a plaintiff must show “that an employer pays dif-
ferent wages to employees of opposite sexes ‘for equal work
on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, ef-
fort, and responsibility, and which are performed under
similar working conditions.’” Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at
195 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)). To survive summary
judgment, Ms. Blackwell need only raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether Mr. Luczkowski is a proper
comparator. See First Com. Corp. v. United States, 335
F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003); RCFC 56(a).
“Once established, the burden of proof shifts to the em-
ployer to prove that the differential is made pursuant to
one of the four affirmative defenses[:]” “(i) a seniority sys-
tem; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a dif-
ferential based on any other factor other than sex.” Boyer,
97 F.4th at 839, 841 (citations omitted).
I. Prima Facie Case
Ms. Blackwell’s prima facie case for her EPA claim
rests solely on Mr. Luczkowski as her comparator. In ad-
dition to contesting the Claims Court’s “skill” and “effort”
analysis, Ms. Blackwell argues that the Claims Court erred
by finding Mr. Luczkowski had differing responsibilities.
The Claims Court concluded that Ms. Blackwell’s and
Mr. Luczkowski’s responsibilities materially differed be-
cause—in addition to supervising individuals and oversee-
ing CBP programs—Mr. Luczkowski oversaw “four special
task forces.” Decision, 171 Fed. Cl. at 690. Further, the
Claims Court noted that during Mr. Luczkowski’s overtime
deployments, he led “special assignments.” Id.
Ms. Blackwell does not dispute the Claims Court’s de-
termination that Mr. Luczkowski’s task force and special
assignment responsibilities are not similar to any of her job
responsibilities. Rather, she highlights their similar peo-
ple management roles and notes responsibilities unique to
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BLACKWELL v. US 7
her position that she believes make up for everything else.
This argument is unavailing.
Ms. Blackwell is correct that she and Mr. Luczkowski
both supervise a small team of CBP employees (teams of
three and four, respectively) and manage a similar volume
of border security programs (twenty-seven and thirty-nine,
respectively). See id. at 684–85. However, in Mr. Luczkow-
ski’s task force work, he oversees an additional eighteen
officers to which Ms. Blackwell offers nothing comparable.
The same is true for Mr. Luczkowski’s special assignment
responsibilities. Ms. Blackwell’s attempts to make up for
that divergence in responsibilities merely emphasize that
their jobs are indeed different. See Appellant Reply Br. 7
(highlighting that, unlike Mr. Luczkowski, Ms. Blackwell’s
position “required meeting with consultants, contractors,
and/or business executives in the private sector” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Ms. Blackwell also argues that the Claims Court erro-
neously determined Ms. Blackwell and Mr. Luczkowski
were subject to different working conditions. We disagree.
The Claims Court reasoned that Ms. Blackwell’s and
Mr. Luczkowski’s working conditions were different be-
cause, in addition to being primarily stationed at the Hou-
ston Field Office, Mr. Luczkowski also performed duties
while “working outdoors, in emergency situations, and in
adverse conditions with the possibility of physical attacks.”
Decision, 171 Fed. Cl. at 690.
Ms. Blackwell contends that Mr. Luczkowski’s lack of
testimony that he experienced danger on the job or “chased
down people of interest” indicates his role possesses no
“possibility of physical attacks.” Appellant Br. 19–20.
Without providing a cite, she further insists that Mr. Lucz-
kowski’s San Diego deployment “was performed in a hotel
room, making car and hotel reservations.” Appellant Reply
Br. 9.
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BLACKWELL v. US 8
Even assuming arguendo that Ms. Blackwell’s allega-
tions are true, she does not address that at least some of
the time, Mr. Luczkowski was deployed, outdoors, in a dif-
ferent location than the Houston Field Office. In contrast,
Ms. Blackwell testified that she had never been assigned
to do work outside of the Houston Field Office. See J.A. 310
[141:10–16]. Moreover, Mr. Luczkowski’s deployments
were the source of his overtime pay; the entirety of
Ms. Blackwell’s overtime pay claims consist of work she did
in the Houston Field Office. Therefore, Ms. Blackwell can-
not show her job and Mr. Luczkowski’s job, and more spe-
cifically their overtime assignments, are “performed under
similar working conditions.” Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at
195.
Because Ms. Blackwell must demonstrate each ele-
ment articulated in Corning Glass for her prima facie case,
see Moore v. United States, 66 F.4th 991, 996–97 (Fed. Cir.
2023) (en banc), and she has failed to do so, we do not fur-
ther address her arguments related to equal skill and ef-
fort.
II. Affirmative Defense
The Claims Court further determined that, even if
Ms. Blackwell could demonstrate a prima facie case, the
government nonetheless had also sufficiently established
an affirmative defense: that the pay disparity between
Ms. Blackwell and Mr. Luczkowski was due to differing
statutory and regulatory schemes. The Claims Court noted
that Mr. Luczkowski’s overtime pay was governed by
COPRA, while Ms. Blackwell’s overtime pay was governed
by Title 5, which permits overtime compensation for work
that is “officially ordered or approved” and “performed by
an employee” in excess of 8 hours in a day or 40 hours in
an administrative workweek. 5 U.S.C. § 5542(a); 5 C.F.R.
§ 550.111(a). According to the Claims Court, because
Ms. Blackwell had not proven that she performed the
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BLACKWELL v. US 9
overtime work, as was required under Title 5, the govern-
ment had shown the pay differential was justified.
Ms. Blackwell argues she did perform the overtime
work by highlighting her total email traffic in 2018 and
2019 as evidence. See Appellant Br. 22–23. From the email
traffic, she “estimate[s] ten hours of work performed per
week.” Id. She also states that her overtime work included
phone calls.
This argument must fail. Because Ms. Blackwell
makes no showing that she actually performed the over-
time work she says she has done, she cannot rebut the gov-
ernment’s affirmative defense. The record does support
Ms. Blackwell’s claim that she performed some overtime
work in the relevant period. See, e.g., J.A. 212 [34:5–35:2]
(Mr. Shoberg testimony indicating Ms. Blackwell worked
overtime during a 2019 conference). However, she did not
contemporaneously record her work and has no call records
to support the extra time—despite claiming that her over-
time work included fielding phone calls.
Instead, she offers evidence about her total email vol-
ume in 2018 and 2019 and claims that “her expertise” al-
lows her to convert those emails into overtime hours. This
is not enough. Ms. Blackwell does not compare her email
volume in 2018 or 2019 to years she did not work overtime
or discuss how many of those emails she sent or received
after her normal tour of duty. She offers no conversion of
her email volume to overtime pay beyond mere speculation.
Yet another problem with her argument is that overtime
pay must be “officially ordered or approved.” See Lesko v.
United States, 161 F.4th 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (en
banc) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 5542(a)). Ms. Blackwell has not
produced evidence that any of her alleged overtime work
was officially ordered or approved. Thus, we agree with the
Claims Court that the government has sufficiently raised
an affirmative defense to Ms. Blackwell’s EPA claim.
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CONCLUSION
We have considered Ms. Blackwell’s remaining argu-
ments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing rea-
sons, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
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