Shenzhen Jisu Technology Co., Ltd. v. the Entities

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
SHENZHEN JISU TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
THE ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFIED
IN ANNEX A, VHJWPDYD DRONE, STORES
FOKELYI, MYSTIGUE, ADXSHOP, BRILLIRARE,
CHIDA3D, CRAWFORD RICH, ERLEEQING,
FLUFUNM, GDQ STORE, GEOLINCA, GONGYI,
JAMONXI, KASX-US, KEKEROSE, MARCHSAN,
MRWALK DIRECT, NEZYLAF, OMNIGOODS
STORE, ONECASE, PRIME DIRECT NY, RAY-US,
STORE NO. 9, SUBLIME_SHOP, V&JGLOBAL
BUSINESS LLC, AMOUSA, DENGMORE, KAWELL,
KIPLYKI, MAG DEPARTMENT STORE LLC,
MANNYA CO., LTD., MSNF CO. LTD., OAVQHLG3B,
POMOKO, QILIAN TRADING CO., LTD.,
ROYALLOVE, SGDL HOLDINGS INC., SHENZHEN
COLOR SHENG LONG SILK TRADING CO., LTD.,
SHENZHEN HONGFU WUZHOU TECHNOLOGY
CO., LTD., SHENZHEN HUI XI TECHNOLOGY CO.,
LTD., SHENZHEN QUSHI TECHNOLOGY CO.,
LTD., SYNERGY INC., WSBDENLK CLEARANCE,
YOHOME PRODUCTS, KWSKY, MMWUS,
MEIBEIBEAUTY, BEAUTYSALON, E-EMALL,
COOL ELECTRONICS SHENZHEN,
HXSTARTINGLINE, WUXIAO2, BABAQINL009,
XHGSM3-32, GAIATOP DIRECT, BEST LIFE NEED,
SPLENDID ENERGY LIGHTING, SILDURX THI,
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SHENZHEN JISU TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. v.
THE ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFIED IN ANNEX A
2
SWEETFULL TECHNOLOGY, EKOUSN,
ENTASSER, FIUDX CO. LTD., FRSARA, HELDIG,
JSQBD, B BREATHTAKING, CHENPULUOS,
COLORED FLAG, DO MORE WITH LESS, HONHEY
DIRECT, MILTONRE, NARDENM, PRIYAITTAL,
RIANLEY, SHENZHEN HONGHAO RUIXIN
TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., SPARK INNOVATORS,
TANOMI, VITONG, WOPE, COMERSS,
ICOLORFULED,
Defendants
ZHOUTY, KAZEBLAST, ZSLST, SHENZHEN MAIMI
ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., XINYI
LIU,
Defendants-Appellees
______________________
2025-1617, 2025-1763
______________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois in No. 1:24-cv-02948, Judge
Jorge L. Alonso.
______________________
Decided: July 22, 2026
______________________
G E L EI, Getech Law LLC, Chicago, IL, argued for plain-
tiff-appellant.
ADAM E DWARD U RBANCZYK, AU LLC, Chicago, IL, ar-
gued for defendants-appellees.
______________________
Before P ROST , HUGHES , and STOLL , Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HUGHES .
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SHENZHEN JISU TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. v.
THE ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFIED IN ANNEX A
3
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge S TOLL .
HUGHES , Circuit Judge.
Shenzhen Jisu Technology Co., Ltd. appeals a decision
of the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois that (1) dissolved an earlier-issued prelimi-
nary injunction against defendant-appellee Zhouty, and
(2) denied a temporary restraining order against newly
added defendants. We affirm.
I
Appellant Shenzhen Jisu Technology Co., Ltd. (Shen-
zhen) owns U.S. Design Patent No. D886,982, which claims
a design for a foldable fan. In April 2024, Shenzhen as-
serted the ’982 patent against a group of entities identified
in an appendix to its complaint in what is known as a
Schedule A case. Defendants are all e-commerce vendors
accused of selling infringing products through online store-
fronts like Amazon and Temu. As is standard in Sched-
ule A cases, Shenzhen immediately moved for an ex parte
temporary restraining order (TRO), seeking to enjoin all
defendants from selling the accused products. The TRO
was granted, and Shenzhen subsequently moved to convert
it into a preliminary injunction (PI).
Unlike most Schedule A cases, where defendants typi-
cally do not participate in the proceedings, several defend-
ants appeared to oppose the PI. As relevant here,
defendant-appellee Zhouty appeared, arguing that there
were “readily-apparent and substantial differences” be-
tween its accused product and the ’982 patent’s claimed de-
sign. J.A. 1475. Given those differences, Zhouty argued
Shenzhen could not prove it was likely to succeed on the
merits of its infringement claim, and therefore Shenzhen
was not entitled to a PI. Cf. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Coun-
cil, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a pre-
liminary injunction must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits . . . .”). The district court disagreed,
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finding that the “overall ornamental visual impression” of
Zhouty’s accused product was “quite similar” to the design
claimed in the ’982 patent. Shenzhen Jisu Tech. Co. v. En-
tities & Individuals Identified in Annex A, No. 24 C 2948,
2024 WL 5440040, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2024) (Shen-
zhen I). As a result, the district court concluded Shenzhen
had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits of its infringement claim and issued the requested
PI. Id. at *2–3.
After Zhouty’s PI briefing was complete, the United
States Patent and Trademark Office issued U.S. Patent
No. D1,046,104 to a third party. The ’104 patent also
claims a design for a foldable fan, and it lists the ’982 pa-
tent as a prior art reference. See U.S. Patent
No. D1,046,104.
Citing the issuance of the ’104 patent as new evidence
disfavoring preliminary injunctive relief, Zhouty requested
that the district court reconsider its decision granting
Shenzhen’s PI. Zhouty argued that because novelty is a re-
quirement for patentability, the patent examiner must
have concluded that the ’982 patent’s design did not antic-
ipate the ’104 patent’s design—otherwise, the ’104 patent
would not have issued. And, because the test for design pa-
tent infringement and the test for anticipation are identi-
cal, the conclusion that the ’982 patent does not anticipate
the ’104 patent would suggest that products practicing the
’104 patent’s design do not infringe the ’982 patent. To-
gether with the representation that the ’104 patent pro-
tects the exact design of Zhouty’s accused product, Zhouty
argued that the ’104 patent’s issuance suggested there is
some material and patentable difference between the de-
sign of its accused product and the design protected by the
’982 patent. Zhouty suggested that this undermined the
likelihood Shenzhen would succeed in its infringement ac-
tion, which in turn undercut its entitlement to a PI. Shen-
zhen disagreed, and the district court ultimately denied
reconsideration.
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A month later, Shenzhen added five new defendants to
its suit, including the owner of the ’104 patent (New De-
fendants), and moved for an ex parte TRO against those
New Defendants. Despite its ex parte nature, the New De-
fendants appeared to oppose the TRO, advancing the same
argument that Zhouty made on reconsideration regarding
the impact of the ’104 patent’s issuance on the likelihood of
success of Shenzhen’s infringement claim. Shenzhen re-
plied in support of its request for injunctive relief, empha-
sizing the district court had already rejected this argument
and suggesting it should do so again.1
On February 28, 2025, the district court denied Shen-
zhen’s request for injunctive relief as to the New Defend-
ants and simultaneously dissolved the earlier-issued PI
against Zhouty. Shenzhen Jisu Tech. Co. v. Entities & In-
dividuals Identified in Annex A, No. 24 C 2948, 2025 WL
879994, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2025) (Shenzhen II). The
district court found it compelling that new facts were un-
covered since it denied reconsideration that suggested
Zhouty and the New Defendants were all authorized to sell
folding fans embodying the design claimed in the ’104 pa-
tent. Id. at *2. Given that the ’104 patent issued over Shen-
zhen’s ’982 patent, its issuance would suggest there is some
patentable difference between each patent’s claimed de-
sign, and, by extension, the ’982 patent and defendants’ ac-
cused products. See id. at *3. The district court concluded
this undermined Shenzhen’s likelihood of success on its in-
fringement claim, making preliminary injunctive relief in-
appropriate. See id. As a result, the court declined to enjoin
the New Defendants and dissolved the PI against Zhouty.
1 Shenzhen also requested that its TRO motion be
converted to one for a PI given that its request was no
longer ex parte and because both forms of injunctive relief
are assessed under the same standard. The district court
did not rule on this request.
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Id. Shenzhen timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(a)(1) and 1295(a)(1).2
II
On appeal, Shenzhen argues the district court erred in
two ways. First, Shenzhen contends that the district court
erred by failing to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel
to bar duplicative arguments. Second, Shenzhen contends
the district court misapplied principles of design patent
law when it assessed the merits of Shenzhen’s request for
preliminary injunctive relief.
A
We first consider Shenzhen’s collateral estoppel argu-
ment. We review the district court’s application of collat-
eral estoppel de novo under the law of the regional circuit,
here the Seventh Circuit. See e.Digital Corp. v. Futurewei
Techs., Inc., 772 F.3d 723, 726 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Collateral
2 Shenzhen appeals a decision that, in part, denied a
TRO. Unlike orders involving PIs, we generally lack juris-
diction to review TRO-related orders. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1) (defining appellate jurisdiction over interlocu-
tory orders); Geneva Assurance Syndicate, Inc. v. Med.
Emergency Servs. Assocs. (MESA) S.C., 964 F.2d 599, 600
(7th Cir. 1992). However, the name a district court assigns
to its order is not determinative of the availability of appel-
late relief. Id. If the district court’s decision is best under-
stood as deciding the merits of a PI, we may treat it as such,
and appellate jurisdiction is proper. See id. Because the
New Defendants appeared to oppose the TRO and the dis-
trict court benefited from formal briefing on its merits, we
understand the court’s decision to be denying a PI against
the New Defendants, and so its decision is immediately ap-
pealable. Cf. id. (“The essence of a [TRO] is its brevity, its
ex parte character, and . . . its informality . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
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estoppel generally precludes parties from relitigating is-
sues that they have already finally litigated in a prior pro-
ceeding. See Meyer v. Rigdon, 36 F.3d 1375, 1379 (7th Cir.
1994).
Shenzhen argues that the district court violated the
doctrine of collateral estoppel by allowing the New Defend-
ants to advance arguments regarding the ’104 patent’s is-
suance that the district court had previously rejected.
Shenzhen notes that Zhouty argued in its motion for recon-
sideration that the ’104 patent’s issuance over Shenzhen’s
asserted ’982 patent suggested that Shenzhen was unlikely
to succeed on the merits of its infringement claim. And
Shenzhen emphasizes that the district court rejected that
argument when it denied reconsideration. Shenzhen then
contends that this rejection operated as a final decision on
the merits of the ’104 patent’s relevance such that the New
Defendants were estopped from later relitigating the same
question in opposition to Shenzhen’s request for a TRO.
Not quite.
The suggestion that the district court’s denial of recon-
sideration had collateral estoppel effects that barred the
court’s reconsideration of its rationale, or the arguments
the district court previously considered, lacks merit. Col-
lateral estoppel does not prevent a trial judge from revisit-
ing an earlier, non-final decision within a continuing case.
See Williams v. Comm’r, 1 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 1993)
(“There is no basis for using res judicata or collateral estop-
pel to prevent a judge from reconsidering an earlier ruling
in the same, ongoing case.”). Indeed, collateral estoppel
“has no role within a unitary, ongoing proceeding.” In re
Hovis, 356 F.3d 820, 822 (7th Cir. 2004). Rather, what mat-
ters “within a single suit are the deadlines set by statute
and rule, plus the law of the case and judicial estoppel.” Id.
For this reason, Shenzhen’s invocation of collateral estop-
pel is misplaced and its argument inapplicable. Collateral
estoppel principles did not prevent the district court from
reconsidering the ’104 patent’s relevance to the merits of
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SHENZHEN JISU TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. v.
THE ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFIED IN ANNEX A
8
Shenzhen’s request for preliminary injunctive relief. We
decline to disturb the district court’s decision on this
ground.
B
We next consider Shenzhen’s argument that the dis-
trict court misapplied principles of design patent law when
denying Shenzhen’s request for preliminary injunctive re-
lief.
We review a district court’s grant or denial of a prelim-
inary injunction under the law of the regional circuit.
Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2017). But we give “dominant effect” to our “body
of precedent applying the general preliminary injunction
considerations to a large number of factually variant pa-
tent cases . . . insofar as it reflects considerations specific
to patent issues.” Id. (citation omitted). The Seventh Cir-
cuit reviews a district court’s grant or denial of a prelimi-
nary injunction for an abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of
discretion may be established by showing that the court
made a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors
or exercised its discretion based upon an error of law or
clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Seventh Circuit has identified four requirements
for a preliminary injunction, of which only one is relevant
here: whether the plaintiff has shown they have a reason-
able likelihood of succeeding on the merits of their claim.
See Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 325
(7th Cir. 1984). On appeal, Shenzhen generally contends
that the district court erred when it assessed the likelihood
of success element because it conflated the standards of pa-
tentability and infringement. Specifically, Shenzhen ar-
gues that the district court adopted the legally erroneous
position that Shenzhen must provide evidence of the
’104 patent’s invalidity to succeed on its claim that the de-
fendants infringed its ’982 patent. Shenzhen argues that it
need not prove invalidity of a later patent to succeed on its
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infringement claim given that the test for validity—specif-
ically the test for assessing obviousness under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103, which is one component of validity—differs from the
test for infringement. We are unconvinced.
As an initial matter, Shenzhen is correct that the test
for obviousness differs from the test for infringement. Ob-
viousness is examined from the perspective of a designer of
ordinary skill who designs products of a similar kind,
whereas infringement is assessed from the perspective of
the ordinary observer. Compare Apple, Inc. v. Samsung El-
ecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (obvious-
ness), with Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528
(1871) (infringement). However, any suggestion that the
district court held otherwise is unsupported by the record.
See generally Shenzhen II, 2025 WL 879994. Rather, the
district court noted that the test for anticipation mirrors
the test for infringement of design patents. See id. at *3 (“It
has been well established for over a century that the same
test must be used for both infringement and anticipation.”
(cleaned up)). There is no error in that observation. See Int’l
Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233,
1239 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
To the extent that Shenzhen suggests the district court
announced a generally applicable rule that infringement of
a design patent necessarily requires the patent owner to
also demonstrate invalidity of any relevant later-issued pa-
tents, we disagree with that characterization. To be clear,
any such rule would be improper and has no roots in our
caselaw. But we do not understand the district court to
have suggested such a rule. Rather, we understand the dis-
trict court to have assessed the strength of Shenzhen’s in-
fringement claim via an analysis rooted in this court’s
caselaw holding that anticipation and infringement are the
same inquiry for design patents. See Int’l Seaway, 589 F.3d
at 1239; Shenzhen II, 2025 WL 879994, at *2–3. We see no
abuse of discretion in the district court doing so.
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To assess the likelihood Shenzhen would succeed on its
infringement claim, the district court was required to pre-
liminarily apply this court’s test for design patent infringe-
ment—the ordinary observer test. This test asks whether,
“in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention
as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially
the same.” Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528. As noted, the district
court was correct when it observed that, in the case of de-
sign patents, the test for anticipation and infringement are
the same. See Int’l Seaway, 589 F.3d at 1239; see Shen-
zhen II, 2025 WL 879994, at *3. Thus, if an ordinary ob-
server would view two designs as substantially the same,
the later design is anticipated, and an accused product
practicing its design would infringe any patent claiming
the earlier design. See Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S.
530, 537 (1889) (“That which infringes, if later, would an-
ticipate, if earlier.”). By extension, when a design patent
issues over an earlier one, the presumption of patent valid-
ity suggests that the later claimed design is not anticipated
by—i.e., not substantially the same as—the earlier pa-
tented design. Cf. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348,
1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 35 U.S.C. § 282(a). Indeed, by
statute a patent is presumed valid once issued, and in-
cluded within that is a presumption that its claimed design
is novel and thus not obvious or anticipated. Cf. Pfizer,
480 F.3d at 1359–60.
We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ap-
plication of these themes to the facts before it as an aid in
estimating the likelihood that Shenzhen would succeed in
its claim for infringement. Because the accused products
were purported to be coextensive with the later-issued
’104 patent, the district court was within its discretion to
note that the ’104 patent’s issuance may suggest that an
ordinary observer would not find the accused products sub-
stantially similar to the design claimed by Shenzhen’s
’982 patent. While that is true as to this request for a pre-
liminary injunction, Shenzhen may, of course, ultimately
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establish infringement on its merits. Nevertheless, in the
context of reviewing the denial and dissolution of a PI,
which involves estimating the likelihood Shenzhen will
succeed in its infringement suit, we see no abuse of discre-
tion in the district court’s consideration that the accused
products purportedly practice the later-issued and pre-
sumed-valid ’104 patent.
III
We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED
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N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
SHENZHEN JISU TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
THE ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFIED
IN ANNEX A, VHJWPDYD DRONE, STORES
FOKELYI, MYSTIGUE, ADXSHOP, BRILLIRARE,
CHIDA3D, CRAWFORD RICH, ERLEEQING,
FLUFUNM, GDQ STORE, GEOLINCA, GONGYI,
JAMONXI, KASX-US, KEKEROSE, MARCHSAN,
MRWALK DIRECT, NEZYLAF, OMNIGOODS
STORE, ONECASE, PRIME DIRECT NY, RAY-US,
STORE NO. 9, SUBLIME_SHOP, V&JGLOBAL
BUSINESS LLC, AMOUSA, DENGMORE, KAWELL,
KIPLYKI, MAG DEPARTMENT STORE LLC,
MANNYA CO., LTD., MSNF CO. LTD., OAVQHLG3B,
POMOKO, QILIAN TRADING CO., LTD.,
ROYALLOVE, SGDL HOLDINGS INC., SHENZHEN
COLOR SHENG LONG SILK TRADING CO., LTD.,
SHENZHEN HONGFU WUZHOU TECHNOLOGY
CO., LTD., SHENZHEN HUI XI TECHNOLOGY CO.,
LTD., SHENZHEN QUSHI TECHNOLOGY CO.,
LTD., SYNERGY INC., WSBDENLK CLEARANCE,
YOHOME PRODUCTS, KWSKY, MMWUS,
MEIBEIBEAUTY, BEAUTYSALON, E-EMALL,
COOL ELECTRONICS SHENZHEN,
HXSTARTINGLINE, WUXIAO2, BABAQINL009,
XHGSM3-32, GAIATOP DIRECT, BEST LIFE NEED,
SPLENDID ENERGY LIGHTING, SILDURX THI,
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SHENZHEN JISU TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. v.
THE ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFIED IN ANNEX A
2
SWEETFULL TECHNOLOGY, EKOUSN,
ENTASSER, FIUDX CO. LTD., FRSARA, HELDIG,
JSQBD, B BREATHTAKING, CHENPULUOS,
COLORED FLAG, DO MORE WITH LESS, HONHEY
DIRECT, MILTONRE, NARDENM, PRIYAITTAL,
RIANLEY, SHENZHEN HONGHAO RUIXIN
TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., SPARK INNOVATORS,
TANOMI, VITONG, WOPE, COMERSS,
ICOLORFULED,
Defendants
ZHOUTY, KAZEBLAST, ZSLST, SHENZHEN MAIMI
ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., XINYI
LIU,
Defendants-Appellees
______________________
2025-1617, 2025-1763
______________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois in No. 1:24-cv-02948, Judge
Jorge L. Alonso.
______________________
S TOLL , Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I agree with the majority except as to Part II.B. Be-
cause I would vacate and remand the district court’s deci-
sion to dissolve the preliminary injunction against Zhouty
and deny a temporary restraining order against the New
Defendants, I respectfully dissent.
The majority reads the district court as applying a sat-
isfactory framework for evaluating Shenzhen’s likelihood
of success on the merits of proving design patent infringe-
ment in the context of a preliminary injunction. See Ma-
jority Op. 10–11. I do not. To assess whether a patentee
has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of proving
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infringement of a design patent, “the court must conduct a
three[-]way analysis comparing the accused product, the
patented design, and the prior art.” ABC Corp. I v. P’ship
& Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Schedule “A”,
52 F.4th 934, 942 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing Egyptian God-
dess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 677–78 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (en banc)) (reversing the grant of a preliminary in-
junction where the district court failed to apply the proper
test for assessing likelihood of success on the merits of
proving design patent infringement). In conducting this
three-way analysis, the district court is “to apply the ordi-
nary observer test on a product-by-product basis,” id.
at 943—i.e., asking whether “an ordinary observer, famil-
iar with the prior art designs, would be deceived into be-
lieving that the accused product is the same as the
patented design.” Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
598 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Egyptian God-
dess, 543 F.3d at 681). This framework for assessing po-
tential design patent infringement must be used in every
case. But such a framework was not used here. Instead,
the district court only applied a shortcut to its analysis by
assuming that, because the relevant defendants asserted
that their accused product practices another, later-issued
design patent (which is presumptively valid), Shenzhen
had failed to show a likelihood of infringement of its as-
serted patent. See Shenzhen Jisu Tech. Co. v. Entities &
Individuals Identified in Annex A, No. 24 C 2948, 2025 WL
879994, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2025). While such a
shortcut may reach an accurate result in some cases, it is
not the framework required by our precedent. Use of the
proper legal framework cannot be sacrificed for the pur-
poses of judicial efficiency, and I would vacate and remand
for the district court in this case to conduct the required
three-way analysis assessing the accused product, the as-
serted patent’s design, and the prior art as part of the ordi-
nary observer test. Accordingly, I dissent.
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