James Edward Britt, Ii v. United States

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
JAMES EDWARD BRITT, II,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2025-1851
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:24-cv-01519-RAH, Judge Richard A. Hertling.
-----------------------------------------------
JAMES EDWARD BRITT, II,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES, FEDERAL DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION, UNKNOWN AGENTS
OF THE FDIC,
Defendants-Appellees
______________________
2026-1371
______________________
Case: 25-1851 Document: 18 Page: 1 Filed: 01/23/2026

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BRITT v. US 2
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia in No. 1:22-cv-03488-CKK, Judge Col-
leen Kollar-Kotelly.
______________________
Decided: January 23, 2026
______________________
JAMES EDWARD BRITT, II, Knoxville, TN, pro se.
AUGUSTUS GOLDEN, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY,
BRETT SHUMATE.
______________________
Before MOORE, Chief Judge, DYK and TARANTO, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM.
James Edward Britt II appeals two orders, one from
the District Court for the District of Columbia and one from
the Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”), each dis-
missing claims related to his former employment at the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). For the
claims appealed from the Claims Court, we affirm. Be-
cause we lack jurisdiction to consider the claims raised in
Mr. Britt’s appeal from the district court, we transfer the
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”).
BACKGROUND
Mr. Britt was an employee of the FDIC. The facts of
his employment history at the FDIC are undisputed. From
2014 to 2018, Mr. Britt worked in a position classified un-
der the FDIC Corporate Grade (“CG”) system at CG-12. On
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BRITT v. US 3
June 4, 2018, he voluntarily accepted an appointment as a
Risk Management or Compliance Examiner (Mid-Career)
at a CG-11 level. With the appointment to a lower grade,
Mr. Britt signed a document titled “Voluntary Change to
Lower Grade Statement.” S. App’x 37.1 In this document,
Mr. Britt acknowledged that his acceptance of the CG-11
position would subject him to the FDIC’s re-promotion pol-
icy. The re-promotion policy in effect at that time limited
Mr. Britt to the higher of his then-current base salary or
his highest previous salary earned during his FDIC ap-
pointment if he were to be promoted again to a CG-12 po-
sition within the next 24 months. Mr. Britt alleges that
this created a contract—one controlling the government’s
pay policy as to re-promotions even after 24 months.
After Mr. Britt accepted the CG-11 position, the FDIC
increased the duration of the re-promotion policy to 48
months and made the change retroactive. In 2021, after
about 38 months of service at the CG-11 level, the FDIC re-
promoted Mr. Britt to a CG-12 position. Under the revised
48-month policy, Mr. Britt did not receive a pay increase
with the repromotion.
Mr. Britt then filed a complaint at the District Court
for the District of Columbia against the United States, the
FDIC, and unknown agents of the FDIC. Mr. Britt as-
serted twenty-five claims, including breach of contract,
breach of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing,
breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent misrepresentation, in-
tentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress,
civil conspiracy, violation of constitutional rights, and
other various claims. Mr. Britt sought $13,574,336 in
1 Citations to “S. App’x” refer to the Supplemental
Appendix filed by the United States in this appeal. Dkt.
No. 7.
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BRITT v. US 4
compensatory damages and double that amount in puni-
tive damages.
On March 18, 2024, the district court issued an opinion
dismissing several claims for lack of subject-matter juris-
diction and for failure to state a claim. The district court
held that the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act
(“FECA”) was the exclusive remedy for Mr. Britt’s work-
related injury claims, making inapplicable the Federal Tort
Claims Act, which Mr. Britt relied on to bring his tort
claims. The court also held that FECA provided an alter-
native remedial scheme that precluded Mr. Britt’s consti-
tutional-tort claim, and that the civil conspiracy claim
failed for lack of an underlying tort. The district court con-
cluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the contract claims
and transferred those claims to the Claims Court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. S. App’x 12–13.
On October 23, 2024, Mr. Britt filed a “transfer com-
plaint” against the United States in the Claims Court, al-
leging breach of contract and seeking $4,703,103 in
damages. The government moved to dismiss. After finding
that Mr. Britt’s employment with the FDIC was by ap-
pointment and concluding that no contract existed between
Mr. Britt and the United States, the Claims Court dis-
missed the breach-of-contract claim for lack of subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction.2
Mr. Britt now appeals both district court and Claims
Court dismissals. With respect to the appeal from the
2 Mr. Britt also alleged a taking without due process,
which the Claims Court dismissed for lack of subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction. The Claims Court, applying a liberal con-
struction to Mr. Britt’s pro se complaint, also considered
and rejected relief under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596.
On appeal, Mr. Britt does not contest these determina-
tions.
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BRITT v. US 5
Claims Court, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(3), and Mr. Britt’s appeal is timely. With respect
to the appeal from the district court, we conclude that
transfer of the appeal to the D.C. Circuit is appropriate.
DISCUSSION
I
We first consider Mr. Britt’s appeal relating to the
breach-of-contract claims in the Claims Court. Where no
contract exists with the government, the Claims Court
should dismiss a contractual claim for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. See Collier v. United States, 379 F.3d
1330, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We review de novo the
Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Biltmore Forest Broadcasting FM, Inc. v. United
States, 555 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The existence
of a contract is a mixed question of law and fact. Cal. Fed.
Bank v. United States, 245 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
Employees appointed to positions in the federal govern-
ment do not generally have enforceable contract rights. See
Army & Air Force Exch. Serv. v. Sheehan, 456 U.S. 728,
738–41 (1982) (finding no contractual rights created by ci-
vilian employment in the military); Chu v. United States,
773 F.2d 1226, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting the “well-es-
tablished principle that, absent specific legislation, federal
employees derive the benefits and emoluments of their po-
sitions from appointment rather than from any contractual
or quasi-contractual relationship with the government”);
Kania v. United States, 650 F.2d 264, 268 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
(noting that a “contract between government and one of its
employees is possible, but it must be specifically spelled out
as a contract”).
Mr. Britt attempts to distinguish his case because he
claims the FDIC placed him in a “one of a kind” situation,
as the documents from which the district court determined
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BRITT v. US 6
he did not have a contract with the government are not
used “routinely among substantially all federal employ-
ees.” Appellant’s Informal Opening Br. at 7. Mr. Britt also
argues that, unlike other agencies, the FDIC is statutorily
authorized to set compensation and thus to create employ-
ment contracts. He urges that the FDIC demonstrated an
intent to be bound when it presented him with an agree-
ment that would become a permanent part of his personnel
file.
These circumstances do not support the conclusion that
a contract exists. The FDIC’s statutory powers are not rel-
evant to the question whether the relationship between the
FDIC and Mr. Britt was specifically spelled out as a con-
tract. See Kania, 650 F.2d at 268. Mr. Britt relies on two
documents he signed at the time of his acceptance of the
CG-11 position as evidence of a contract. One document is
an “agreement” requiring Mr. Britt to agree to obtain a
Risk Management or Compliance commission within two
years but makes no mention of the re-promotion policy. S.
App’x 36. The other document is titled “Voluntary Change
to Lower Grade Statement” but reflects only Mr. Britt’s ac-
knowledgment that he would be subject to the re-promo-
tion policy, which the document explains had certain
effects on payment following a re-promotion during the
next 24 months. S. App’x 37. Even if we accept Mr. Britt’s
contention that these documents were drawn uniquely for
him, they do not meet the high standard for establishing a
contractual relationship governing the government’s con-
duct as employer. In particular, the Voluntary Change doc-
ument, in simply explaining the re-promotion policy,
cannot reasonably be construed as an employment con-
tract—still less as one imposing on the FDIC an obligation
restricting the agency’s policy choices regarding re-promo-
tions past the 24-month mark. Notably, Mr. Britt’s em-
ployment documents confirm that his employment was by
appointment. S. App’x 33 (“Appointment Affidavit” signed
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BRITT v. US 7
by Mr. Britt); S. App’x 36 (“Agreement Relating to the Ap-
pointment as an Examiner” signed by Mr. Britt).
The undisputed facts establish that no pertinent con-
tract existed between Mr. Britt and the government, and
the Claims Court properly dismissed Mr. Britt’s breach-of-
contract claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.3
II
We finally consider Mr. Britt’s appeal relating to non-
contract claims presented to the district court. Mr. Britt
argues that, because the district court transferred part of
his case to the Claims Court, he could not appeal the dis-
trict court merits order until the Claims Court entered fi-
nal judgment for its portion of the case. He further argues
that, as an interlocutory order, the district court dismissal
merged with the final judgment of the Claims Court and
may be appealed to this court.
We read the district court to have transferred only the
portion of the case pertaining to contract claims and re-
tained jurisdiction as to the dismissed tort and constitu-
tional tort claims. S. App’x 13 (“[T]he Court shall transfer
this case to the Court of Federal Claims with respect to
Plaintiff’s contract claims.” (emphasis added)). We have
held that 28 U.S.C. § 1631 permits district courts to trans-
fer matters to the Claims Court on a claim-by-claim basis.
United States v. Cnty. of Cook, Ill., 170 F.3d 1084, 1089
(Fed. Cir. 1999). The D.C. Circuit has interpreted such
3 In the absence of a contract, Mr. Britt alternatively
seeks a declaration “that it was a wrongful act of the De-
fendants to have represented to him that he was entering
into an agreement pertaining to his employment with the
Defendant.” Appellant’s Informal Opening Br. at 3. This
was not a claim presented to the Claims Court, and we de-
cline to address it for the first time on appeal. See Boggs
v. West, 188 F.3d 1335, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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BRITT v. US 8
partial transfers to bifurcate the transferred claims from
the retained claims. Murthy v. Vilsack, 609 F.3d 460, 464
(D.C. Cir. 2010). Mr. Britt’s tort and constitutional tort
claims thus remained with the district court.
We have jurisdiction over appeals from district courts
only in actions involving specific subject matter. See 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)–(2). The untransferred claims dis-
missed by the district court here do not fall within our ju-
risdiction. We therefore lack jurisdiction to hear this direct
appeal from the district court.
The government moves to “transfer Mr. Britt’s appeal
as it pertains to the decisions of the [district court] to the
D.C. Circuit.” Response Br. at 9. Mr. Britt also consents
to such transfer if we conclude, as we have, that we lack
jurisdiction. Where we lack jurisdiction over an appeal, we
have authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 to “transfer such ac-
tion or appeal to any other such court . . . in which the ac-
tion or appeal could have been brought at the time it was
filed or noticed.” We transfer to the D.C. Circuit Mr. Britt’s
appeal from the district court.
AFFIRMED-IN-PART AND TRANSFERRED-IN-
PART
COSTS
No costs.
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