Anthony L. Pollitt, Jr. v. United States

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
ANTHONY L. POLLITT, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2025-1925
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:25-cv-00307-ZNS, Judge Zachary N. Somers.
______________________
Decided: February 13, 2026
______________________
ANTHONY L. POLLITT, JR., Turnersville, NJ, pro se.
STEPHANIE FLEMING, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
LISA LEFANTE DONAHUE, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT
SHUMATE.
______________________
PER CURIAM.
Case: 25-1925 Document: 66 Page: 1 Filed: 02/13/2026

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POLLITT v. US 2
Anthony L. Pollitt, Jr. appeals the United States Court
of Federal Claims’ dismissal of his complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
BACKGROUND
In February 2025, Mr. Pollitt filed a complaint against
the United States in the Court of Federal Claims alleging
a monetary claim for over $100 million “based on violations
of constitutional rights, federal statutes, and agency mis-
conduct.” S. Appx. 11–13.1 Mr. Pollitt’s claim relates to
the allegedly improper handling and denial of a previous
claim he submitted to the U.S. Department of State, which
asserted violations of the United States–Oman Free Trade
Agreement (FTA). See id.; S. Appx. 14–17. In particular,
Mr. Pollitt alleges that he, “as an American investor, was
denied procedural fairness and legal recourse by the very
agency responsible for enforcing international trade pro-
tections.” S. Appx. 11. His complaint states that his case
was being filed “under 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (The Tucker Act)”
and that his claim “arises from violations of [his] Due Pro-
cess rights under the Fifth Amendment and the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) &
§ 706(2)(D).” Id.
The Government moved to dismiss Mr. Pollitt’s com-
plaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 S. Appx 2.
The Court of Federal Claims granted the Government’s
motion, concluding Mr. Pollitt “fail[ed] to identify a single
money-mandating source of law that vests [the Court of
Federal Claims] with jurisdiction over his claims or the
1 “S. Appx.” refers to the Supplemental Appendix at-
tached to the Government’s Brief.
2 The Government also moved to dismiss for failure
to state a claim under which relief can be granted, an issue
the Court of Federal Claims did not reach. S. Appx 2, 5.
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POLLITT v. US 3
relief requested.” Id. at 4. Mr. Pollitt appeals. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
DISCUSSION
We review de novo the Court of Federal Claims’ deci-
sion to dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159,
1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In general, “a court must accept as
true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiff’s com-
plaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.” Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of establish-
ing the court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Id. And while courts generally review a pro se
litigant’s complaint leniently, they may not take a liberal
view of jurisdictional requirements. See Kelley v. Sec’y,
U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
We agree with the Court of Federal Claims that
Mr. Pollitt’s complaint failed to identify a money-mandat-
ing source of law that establishes his right to money dam-
ages—a fatal jurisdictional defect for claims brought under
the Tucker Act. See Allen v. United States, 88 F.4th 983,
986 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[T]he absence of a money-mandating
source [is] fatal to the [Court of Federal Claims’] jurisdic-
tion under the Tucker Act.” (first and second alterations in
original) (quoting Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167,
1173 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc))). While Mr. Pollitt’s com-
plaint states that his claim arises from violations of the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and the APA, nei-
ther is money-mandating. See Collins v. United States, 67
F.3d 284, 288 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he [Fifth Amendment]
due process clause does not obligate the government to pay
money damages.”); Wopsock v. Natchees, 454 F.3d 1327,
1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he APA does not authorize an
award of money damages at all.”). Moreover, to the extent
Mr. Pollitt’s complaint relies on the U.S.–Oman FTA for ju-
risdiction, this is insufficient because (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1502
generally precludes the court from exercising jurisdiction
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POLLITT v. US 4
over “any claim against the United States growing out of or
dependent upon any treaty entered into with foreign na-
tions,” and (2) Mr. Pollitt fails to identify any provision of
the FTA that suggests it is money-mandating.
On appeal, Mr. Pollitt raises a new argument that the
Court of Federal Claims should have liberally construed
his complaint as raising a claim under the money-mandat-
ing Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Appellant
Br. 10–20.3 But this argument cannot save Mr. Pollitt’s
complaint because his complaint is not merely ambiguous;
it is devoid of any allegations of a takings claim.
S. Appx. 11–13; see Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795,
799 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The fact that [a plaintiff] acted pro se
in the drafting of his complaint may explain its ambigui-
ties, but it does not excuse its failures.”). Furthermore, the
application of the Takings Clause is limited to “cases in
which the cause of action protects a legally-recognized
property interest.” Adams v. United States, 391 F.3d 1212,
1226 (Fed. Cir. 2004). As explained below, Mr. Pollitt fails
to identify any such interest to support a non-frivolous tak-
ings claim—both in his complaint and on appeal. See
Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (“[J]urisdiction under the Tucker Act is proper” “to
the extent the [plaintiff] ha[s] a nonfrivolous takings claim”
(emphasis added)).
Mr. Pollitt argues that the State Department effected
a taking of his “right to have a duly submitted and sup-
ported claim adjudicated.” Appellant Br. 10–11. But
Mr. Pollitt fails to demonstrate that the U.S.–Oman FTA
gives him any cause of action that must be adjudicated by
the State Department, much less one giving rise to a cog-
nizable property interest. See S. Appx. 25–35 (describing
3 “Appellant Br.” refers to ECF No. 50, which is a
consolidation of several of Mr. Pollitt’s filings with this
court.
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POLLITT v. US 5
investor-state dispute settlement process under the
U.S.–Oman FTA); Adams, 391 F.3d at 1226 (declining to
recognize a property interest in a claim of Government lia-
bility before an administrative agency). On the contrary,
the U.S.–Oman FTA allows an American investor to initi-
ate arbitration against the host government (i.e., Oman),
not seek damages from the United States. S. Appx. 25–35.
Mr. Pollitt also argues that the Court of Federal
Claims effected a taking by suppressing his filings and that
the Federal Circuit effected a taking by granting the Gov-
ernment additional time to respond to his appeal. Appel-
lant Br. 11–12. Again, neither allegation implicates a
cognizable property interest for takings purposes. Nor
would it be logical to construe Mr. Pollitt’s complaint as al-
leging these takings when they did not occur until after his
complaint was filed.
For these reasons, we see no error with the Court of
Federal Claims’ dismissal of Mr. Pollitt’s complaint, and
Mr. Pollitt’s new arguments on appeal do not compel a dif-
ferent outcome.4
4 Mr. Pollitt raises several other arguments that do
not address the fundamental jurisdictional defect in his
complaint (i.e., his failure to identify a money-mandating
source of law necessary for Tucker Act jurisdiction). For
example, Mr. Pollitt argues the Court of Federal Claims
failed to (1) consider some of his subsequent filings; (2) is-
sue default judgment based on the Government’s lack of
response to his subsequent motions; and (3) grant relief
from judgment due to fraud, constitutional error, or mani-
fest injustice. Appellant Br. 1–9. Because we conclude the
Court of Federal Claims did not have subject matter juris-
diction over Mr. Pollitt’s case at its outset, we do not reach
these later-arising non-jurisdictional issues.
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POLLITT v. US 6
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Pollitt’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
Case: 25-1925 Document: 66 Page: 6 Filed: 02/13/2026

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