In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Returnable December 16, 2015 1 In the

16‐266‐cv
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Returnable December 16, 2015
1
In the 2
United States Court of Appeals 3
For the Second Circuit 4
________ 5
6
A UGUST TERM , 2016 7
8
A RGUED: FEBRUARY 13, 2017 9
D ECIDED: S EPTEMBER 8, 2017 10
11
No. 16‐266‐cv 12
13
IN RE G RAND JURY S UBPOENAS R ETURNABLE D ECEMBER 16, 2015 14
________ 15
16
Appeal from the United States District Court 17
for the Eastern District of New York. 18
No. 15‐mc‐2346 – John Gleeson, District Judge. 19
________ 20
21
Before: WALKER , L IVINGSTON, Circuit Judges, AND B RICCETTI , District 22
Judge.
23
________ 24
25
A Chinese construction company (the Company) and seven of 26
its employees (collectively, Appellants) appeal from an order of the 27
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York 28
(Gleeson, J.) denying their motion to quash subpoenas requiring the 29
 Judge Vincent L. Briccetti, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, sitting by designation.

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2 16‐266‐cv
employees to appear before a grand jury. Appellants argue that the 1
district court erred in concluding that the employees are not entitled 2
to diplomatic immunity because they were not registered with the 3
United States Department of State. Appellants further contend that, 4
even if the employees were required to register, that requirement 5
was satisfied when the employees applied for their visas. Because 6
we conclude that the 2009 Bilateral Agreement between the United 7
States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) incorporates a 2003 8
Diplomatic Note that imposes a registration requirement on 9
construction personnel, which was not fulfilled here, we AFFIRM 10
the order of the district court. 11
________ 12
H AROLD J. R UVOLDT, JR . (Cathy A. Fleming & Eric 13
H. Jaso on the brief), Fleming Ruvoldt PLLC, New 14
York, NY, for Appellant. 15
16
A LEXANDER A. S OLOMON, Assistant United States 17
Attorney (Amy Busa, Douglas M. Pravda & Ian 18
Craig Richardson, Assistant United States 19
Attorneys, on the brief), for Bridget M. Rohde, 20
Acting United States Attorney for the Eastern 21
District of New York, for Appellee. 22
________ 23
JOHN M. WALKER , JR ., Circuit Judge: 24
A Chinese construction company (the Company) and seven of 25
its employees (collectively, Appellants) appeal from an order of the 26
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York 27

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3 16‐266‐cv
(Gleeson, J.) denying their motion to quash subpoenas requiring the 1
employees to appear before a grand jury. Appellants argue that the 2
district court erred in concluding that the employees are not entitled 3
to diplomatic immunity because they were not registered with the 4
United States Department of State. Appellants further contend that, 5
even if the employees were required to register, that requirement 6
was satisfied when the employees applied for their visas. Because 7
we conclude that the 2009 Bilateral Agreement between the United 8
States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) incorporates a 2003 9
Diplomatic Note that imposes a registration requirement on 10
construction personnel, which was not fulfilled here, we AFFIRM 11
the order of the district court. 12
BACKGROUND 13
Because this matter relates to a grand jury investigation, we 14
provide an abbreviated version of the facts and only discuss 15
information that will not compromise the integrity of the underlying 16
grand jury investigation. 1 The Company was selected by the PRC to 17
provide construction and related services for Chinese diplomatic 18
1 On February 16, 2016, we granted Appellants’ unopposed motion
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(6) to seal this appeal in its
entirety because it relates to a grand jury investigation. We have
determined, however, that we can resolve the question of diplomatic
immunity without disclosing information that would contravene the
secrecy of the grand jury proceedings mandated by Rule 6(e).

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4 16‐266‐cv
and consular missions to the United States pursuant to a 2009 1
Bilateral Agreement between the United States and the PRC 2
(Bilateral Agreement). Under this agreement, the Company brings 3
Chinese nationals into the United States to work on its projects. The 4
Bilateral Agreement provides for qualified individuals to enter the 5
United States pursuant to A‐2 or other appropriate visas issued by 6
the Department of State. 7
Seven employees of the Company, construction personnel 8
who were attached to a PRC mission, entered the United States on 9
A‐2 and G‐2 visas. When these employees were later served with 10
subpoenas requiring them to appear before a grand jury in the U.S. 11
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Appellants 12
moved, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 254(d), to quash these subpoenas on 13
the basis that the employees are entitled to diplomatic immunity. 14
The district court denied that motion and this timely appeal 15
followed. 16
DISCUSSION 17
We must resolve whether, in order to receive diplomatic 18
immunity, the employees were required to register with the State 19
Department upon being attached to a PRC mission and, if so, 20
whether the employees’ visa applications constituted such 21
registration. Appellants argue that they are entitled to diplomatic 22
immunity because: (1) the Bilateral Agreement does not impose a 23

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5 16‐266‐cv
registration requirement as a pre‐condition to receiving immunity 1
and (2) even if the Bilateral Agreement contains such a requirement, 2
the employees fulfilled it by providing the information required to 3
secure their visas. 4
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to quash a 5
grand jury subpoena for abuse of discretion, see In re Edelman, 295 6
F.3d 171, 173, 175 (2d Cir. 2002), but its interpretation of the terms of 7
a treaty or a diplomatic agreement de novo, see Swarna v. Al‐Awadi, 8
622 F. 3d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 2010). 9
I. The VCDR, Diplomatic Note, and Bilateral Agreement 10
The resolution of this appeal depends on our interpretation of 11
three related documents: (1) the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 12
Relations (VCDR); (2) a 2003 diplomatic note circulated by the State 13
Department (Diplomatic Note or Note); and (3) the Bilateral 14
Agreement. 15
The VCDR is an international treaty, signed on April 18, 1961 16
and effective on April 24, 1964 upon the ratification of twenty‐two 17
states. Now ratified by 191 signatories, the VCDR sets forth the 18
privileges and immunities to which certain diplomatic officials are 19
entitled. The VCDR specifies that “diplomatic agent[s]” are immune 20
from the criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction of the 21
receiving State, with only a few exceptions that are not relevant here. 22
See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 31(1), April 18, 23

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6 16‐266‐cv
1961, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter VCDR]; 1
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary‐General, 2
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx (last visited 3
Sept. 7, 2017). The purpose of bestowing these diplomatic privileges 4
under the VCDR is “to ensure the efficient performance of the 5
functions of diplomatic missions.” VCDR, preamble. 6
As is relevant to this appeal, the VCDR requires that “[t]he 7
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving State . . . shall be 8
notified of . . . the appointment of members of the mission [including 9
administrative and technical staff].” Id., art. 10(1)(a). The State 10
Department has a long‐standing policy, based on this provision of 11
the VCDR, that all foreign personnel must register with the State 12
Department to be entitled to diplomatic immunity. In 2003, the State 13
Department reminded the Chiefs of Mission of this policy by 14
unilaterally issuing the Diplomatic Note, which reiterated “the 15
requirement, under Article 10 of the VCDR . . . to notify the 16
Department promptly of the arrival or appointment . . . of all 17
members of the missions or consulates.” Appellee’s App. 9. 18
Pursuant to the VCDR, the United States and the PRC have 19
executed a series of bilateral agreements permitting each 20
government to conduct construction work on its embassy and 21
consulate facilities located in the other country. The 2009 Bilateral 22
Agreement, which is relevant here, applies to then “existing bilateral 23

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7 16‐266‐cv
diplomatic and consular locations,” including the PRC embassy in 1
Washington, D.C., the United States embassy in Beijing, China, the 2
United States and PRC consulates, and the PRC Permanent Mission 3
to the United Nations located in New York. Appellants’ App. 45. 4
The Bilateral Agreement specifies that the United States and the 5
PRC, when engaging in construction at these sites in the other 6
country, may use “project‐related personnel and companies of 7
[their] own choosing” and bring their own nationals to serve as 8
“construction personnel.” Id. at 48. Such personnel “shall be 9
attached . . . to the . . . diplomatic mission as administrative and 10
technical staff” and “shall enjoy the privileges and immunities 11
accorded administrative and technical staff . . . under the VCDR.” 12
Id. at 49. Although the Bilateral Agreement does not explicitly 13
require that construction personnel register with the State 14
Department to receive immunity, it incorporates “relevant 15
diplomatic notes” regarding issues “not addressed.” Id. at 55. 16
Here, the district court determined that the Bilateral 17
Agreement, which recognizes immunity for construction personnel, 18
incorporates the Diplomatic Note, which imposes a registration 19
requirement on construction personnel. Appellants take issue with 20
this determination. We therefore address in this opinion: (1) 21
whether, pursuant to the Diplomatic Note, construction personnel 22
must be registered with the State Department before they are 23

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8 16‐266‐cv
entitled to diplomatic immunity and (2) if so, whether the Bilateral 1
Agreement incorporates the Note, thereby subjecting the Appellants 2
to the registration requirement contained therein. 3
II. Jurisdiction 4
Before proceeding to the merits, however, we first must 5
determine whether we have jurisdiction over this matter. We must 6
consider whether we are deprived of jurisdiction because the denial 7
of Appellants’ motion to quash the subpoenas is not a final 8
judgment of the district court from which an appeal can be taken 9
and whether, even if we possess jurisdiction, prudential 10
considerations counsel against exercising it. 11
Our jurisdiction usually is limited to appeals from final 12
judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A final judgment is a judgment 13
that effectively ends the litigation such that there is nothing left to 14
decide. An order disposing of a motion to quash a grand jury 15
subpoena generally is not such a final judgment. See United States v. 16
Punn, 737 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 17
690‐91 (1974). There is an exception to the final judgment rule, 18
however, when the order in question meets the requirements of the 19
collateral order doctrine. Under this exception, an appellate court 20
has jurisdiction over a non‐final judgment “if such order (1) 21
’conclusively determined the disputed question’; (2) ’resolved an 22
important question completely separate from the merits of the 23

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9 16‐266‐cv
action’; and (3) ‘was effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 1
judgment.’” In re Air Crash at Belle Harbor, 490 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2
2007) (citations omitted). 3
Here, the district court’s order denying the Appellants’ 4
motion meets all three of these requirements. The district court 5
conclusively determined that the employees were not entitled to 6
diplomatic immunity, an issue that is “important” and “completely 7
separate” from the merits of the case. See id. And because the issue 8
of whether these individuals are entitled to immunity determines 9
whether they will be subjected to any further processes in the United 10
States courts, a later recognition of immunity does not mitigate the 11
harm and the order is “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a 12
final judgment.” See id.; cf. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525‐27 13
(1985) (the collateral order doctrine exception applies to the defenses 14
of double jeopardy, absolute immunity, and qualified immunity 15
because each possesses the same “essential attribute”—the recipient 16
is guaranteed the right not to be subjected to further court 17
processes—which is lost if appellate review awaits a final 18
judgment). Accordingly, under the collateral order doctrine, we 19
have jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of Appellants’ 20
motion to quash the subpoenas. 21
Although we properly have jurisdiction, Appellants argue 22
that neither we nor the district court should exercise jurisdiction 23

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10 16‐266‐cv
over this matter due to prudential considerations. Specifically, 1
Appellants contend that this case presents a non‐justiciable political 2
question because Section 16 of the Bilateral Agreement specifies that 3
“the Parties shall first address [any] dispute through informal 4
working‐level consultations” and that any remaining dispute “shall 5
be resolved through diplomatic channels.” Appellants’ App. 55. 6
This argument is waived. 7
The political question doctrine is prudential in that it 8
implicates the exercise of jurisdiction rather than the question of 9
whether jurisdiction exists. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199‐200 10
(1962). Because “[w]e ordinarily will not consider issues raised for 11
the first time in a reply brief,” McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. 12
Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009), a party may waive a challenge to 13
our jurisdiction on the basis of the political question doctrine if the 14
argument is not properly raised before the district court or in its 15
opening brief on appeal, Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 49 n.2 16
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting party’s argument regarding political 17
question doctrine because it was “raised for the first time in the 18
appellants’ fourth and final brief on appeal”); 767 Third Ave. Assocs. 19
v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugoslavia, 218 F.3d 152, 20
162 (2d Cir. 2000) (rejecting party’s argument regarding political 21
question doctrine because it was raised for the first time on appeal). 22

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11 16‐266‐cv
Appellants first raised this argument in supplemental briefing 1
on appeal after filing both their opening and reply briefs. There is 2
no justifiable excuse for their failure to raise this argument earlier 3
before the district court or this Court. Appellants try to explain their 4
delay in raising the political question argument by pointing to a 5
series of diplomatic notes recently exchanged between the United 6
States and the PRC that further evince a disagreement as to the 7
interpretation of the Bilateral Agreement, purportedly rendering this 8
dispute a political question pursuant to Section 16. But the 9
underlying basis of this claim—Section 16 of the Bilateral 10
Agreement—could have supported Appellants’ political question 11
argument from the outset of this case. 12
Having concluded that we properly have jurisdiction and that 13
Appellants have waived their argument that we should not exercise 14
our jurisdiction based on prudential considerations, we now turn to 15
the merits of the appeal. 16
III. Registration of the employees was a pre‐condition for 17
diplomatic immunity 18
The parties agree that the employees were present in the 19
United States pursuant to the Bilateral Agreement and that the 20
Agreement itself does not explicitly contain a registration 21
requirement. But the Bilateral Agreement also incorporates 22
“relevant diplomatic notes” regarding issues “not addressed.” 23
Appellants’ App. 55. The question, therefore, is whether the 24

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12 16‐266‐cv
Bilateral Agreement imposes a registration requirement as a 1
pre‐condition to immunity by incorporating the Diplomatic Note. 2
As a general matter, “[t]he clear import of treaty language controls 3
unless application of the words of the treaty according to their 4
obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or 5
expectations of its signatories.” Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 6
457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (citation omitted). In determining the intent 7
of the signatories, we customarily give “great weight” to the 8
Executive Branch’s interpretation of such a treaty. See Swarna, 622 9
F.3d at 133. 10
Appellants argue that the clear import of the Bilateral 11
Agreement and the Diplomatic Note is that construction personnel 12
are not required to register in order to receive immunity because: (1) 13
the Note does not condition immunity on the registration of any 14
foreign personnel, including construction personnel and (2) even if it 15
does, the Note cannot implicitly and unilaterally amend the Bilateral 16
Agreement. We address each of these arguments in turn. 17
A. Construction personnel must register to receive 18
immunity under the Diplomatic Note 19
Appellants contend that the Diplomatic Note does not require 20
construction personnel to formally register with the State 21
Department for two reasons: (1) the Note does not explicitly require 22
any foreign personnel to register before they are entitled to 23

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13 16‐266‐cv
immunity and (2) construction personnel do not fall within the 1
scope of the Note. Neither argument has merit. 2
First, Appellants correctly assert that the Diplomatic Note 3
does not explicitly make immunity conditional upon registration. A 4
reasonable reading of the Note, however, leads us to conclude that 5
registration is required for foreign personnel to possess diplomatic 6
immunity. The Note specifies, for instance, that “notif[ication]” of 7
the State Department is a “requirement[] under Article 10 of the 8
[VCDR].” Appellee’s App. 9 (reminding all Chiefs of Mission “of 9
the requirement, under Article 10 of the [VCDR] to notify the 10
Department promptly of the arrival or appointment . . . of all 11
members of the missions.” (emphasis added)). The Note further 12
elaborates that these reporting requirements are “essential to 13
continued enjoyment by members of the missions . . . of the rights, 14
privileges and immunities to which they may be entitled.” Id. at 10 15
(emphasis added). These provisions strongly suggest that foreign 16
personnel receive immunity only after they have been officially 17
attached to a mission and the receiving state has been duly 18
informed. 19
The Note is wholly consistent with both the text and purpose 20
of the VCDR. Article 10 of the VCDR explicitly requires notification 21
of the receiving state upon the attachment of diplomatic personnel: 22
“[t]he Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving State, or such 23

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14 16‐266‐cv
other ministry as may be agreed, shall be notified of . . . the 1
appointment of members of the mission.” VCDR, art. 10(1)(a) 2
(emphasis added). The VCDR’s preamble sheds additional light on 3
the reason for this notification requirement: “the purpose of 4
[diplomatic] privileges and immunities is . . . to ensure the efficient 5
performance of the functions of diplomatic missions.” Id., preamble. 6
If the receiving state were unaware of which personnel are entitled 7
to immunity, and a determination could be made only after a 8
lengthy judicial inquiry, the efficient performance of a diplomatic 9
mission’s functions would be frustrated. 10
Second, the Appellants argue that, even if the Diplomatic 11
Note requires registration as a condition for receiving immunity, the 12
Diplomatic Note does not apply to construction personnel. This 13
argument, however, is contrary to the express language of the 14
relevant documents. The VCDR and the Note both specify that the 15
registration requirement applies to members of a country’s mission, 16
id., art. 1(c), 10(1)(a); Appellee’s App. 5‐6, and the VCDR further 17
defines these members as including “administrative and technical 18
staff,” VCDR, art. 1(c). The Bilateral Agreement explicitly mandates 19
that construction personnel are attached to the “diplomatic mission 20
as administrative and technical staff.” Appellants’ App. 49. The 21
construction personnel described in the Bilateral Agreement plainly 22
fall within the scope of the VCDR and the Diplomatic Note. Indeed, 23

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15 16‐266‐cv
the very purpose of the Bilateral Agreement is to provide 1
construction personnel the same privileges and rights as those 2
afforded to all other mission personnel “in accordance” with the 3
VCDR. Id. at 44. Carried to its logical end, Appellants’ argument 4
would seem to require us to hold that construction personnel are 5
entitled to greater rights and privileges than other mission personnel, 6
i.e., diplomatic immunity without satisfying the registration 7
requirement. 8
B. The Bilateral Agreement incorporates the 9
Diplomatic Note 10
Appellants next contend that the Diplomatic Note should not 11
have any bearing on our interpretation of the Bilateral Agreement 12
because, if it did, it would “implicitly” or unilaterally modify the 13
Agreement contrary to the Agreement’s own terms. The Bilateral 14
Agreement, however, incorporates “relevant diplomatic notes” that 15
regard matters “not addressed” in the Bilateral Agreement. 16
Appellants’ App. 55. Such notes, therefore, do not modify the 17
agreement; they are part of it. The Diplomatic Note falls within this 18
category: the parties do not dispute that (1) registration is not 19
addressed in the Bilateral Agreement; and (2) the subject of the 20
Diplomatic Note—a reminder of the registration requirement under 21
the VCDR—is relevant to the Bilateral Agreement, which references 22
the rights afforded to construction personnel under the VCDR. 23

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16 16‐266‐cv
Appellants contend, however, that the Diplomatic Note is a 1
unilateral attempt to amend the Bilateral Agreement and that 2
Section 16.2 of the Bilateral Agreement permits amendments only 3
upon mutual agreement. Section 16.2 does require that certain 4
amendments be made pursuant to mutual agreement: “If any issue 5
is not addressed in [the Bilateral Agreement], the Parties shall refer 6
to their past agreements and relevant diplomatic notes for 7
resolution. Any issue not addressed in these documents shall be 8
addressed through mutual consultation between the Parties.” Id. 9
As we have noted, however, Section 16.2 makes clear that the 10
Diplomatic Note does not alter the Bilateral Agreement; it is part of 11
it. Mutual consultation is required only if there are no relevant 12
diplomatic notes to be incorporated. That is not the case here. 13
Although Section 16.2 provides otherwise, Appellants also 14
suggest that a unilateral diplomatic note cannot bear upon the 15
requirements of a mutual agreement because it is unilateral. 16
Appellants are incorrect, see, e.g., United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 17
905, 912‐13 (2d Cir. 1984) (acknowledging the validity of unilateral 18
diplomatic notes sent to Chiefs of Mission specifying that “all 19
mission personnel entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities 20
[pursuant to the VCDR] . . . must reside in the Washington area”), 21
particularly where, as here, the mutual agreement explicitly 22

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17 16‐266‐cv
provides for the incorporation of documents that may be issued 1
unilaterally. 2
IV. The employees’ visa applications did not satisfy the 3
registration requirement 4
Appellants further argue that, even if registration were a pre‐ 5
condition for immunity, this condition was satisfied when the 6
employees submitted their A‐2 and G‐2 visa applications. We 7
disagree. 8
A‐2 and G‐2 visas are issued to foreign personnel or their 9
immediate family members who intend to engage solely in official 10
activities for the foreign government while in the United States, see 11
22 C.F.R. §§ 41.12, 41.22(a), or to enter or transit the United States in 12
pursuance of official duties related to a qualifying international 13
organization, see id. §§ 41.12, 41.24(b)(1). The State Department has 14
specified, however, that such visas are “issued to a broad range of 15
persons,” including those who “enjoy no privileges and immunities 16
in the United States.” Appellants’ App. 88. Because these visas can 17
be issued to individuals who are not entitled to diplomatic 18
immunity, they do not necessarily fulfill the purpose that underlies 19
registration—to inform the State Department as to the identities of 20
foreign personnel who should be entitled to diplomatic immunity in 21
the United States. 22
Indeed, in the instant case, the State Department certified that 23
the employees were not formally registered with the State 24

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18 16‐266‐cv
Department, even though they had applied for and received these 1
visas. Such a certification is generally conclusive where, as here, the 2
State Department’s interpretation of when diplomatic immunity 3
applies under the relevant agreements is reasonable. See In re Baiz, 4
135 U.S. 403, 421 (1890) (“[T]he certificate of the secretary of state . . . 5
is the best evidence to prove the diplomatic character of a person.”); 6
United States v. Al‐Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 573 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e 7
hold that the State Departmentʹs certification, which is based upon a 8
reasonable interpretation of the Vienna Convention, is conclusive 9
evidence as to the diplomatic status of an individual.” (citing United 10
States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984))); Abdulaziz v. 11
Metropolitan Dade Cnty., 741 F.2d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 12
1984) (“[C]ourts have generally accepted as conclusive the views of 13
the State Department as to the fact of diplomatic status.” (citing 14
Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1949))). 15
Before the district court, the State Department certified that 16
“[p]ersons enjoying immunity [under the Bilateral Agreement] 17
would be reflected in the records of the Office of Foreign Missions, 18
United States Department of State.” Appellee’s App. 13. The State 19
Department further certified that the construction personnel at issue 20
in this case either “[were] never registered with the U.S. Department 21
of State,” or their registration was terminated prior to the issuance of 22
the grand jury subpoenas. Id. at 13‐15. We accept the State 23

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19 16‐266‐cv
Department’s certification that the Appellants did not satisfy the 1
registration requirement, notwithstanding their visa applications. 2
This affords appropriate deference to the Executive Branch in the 3
realm of foreign relations, particularly where, as here, the Executive 4
Branch’s interpretation of the relevant agreements is reasonable, 5
consistent with the apparent purposes underlying the agreements, 6
and essential to the State Department’s ability to perform its duties. 7
CONCLUSION 8
In sum, because we conclude that the Executive Branch 9
reasonably interpreted the relevant agreements as requiring 10
construction personnel to register with the State Department before 11
receiving immunity and because that condition was not satisfied 12
here, the Appellants are not entitled to diplomatic immunity. We 13
therefore AFFIRM the district court’s order denying the Appellants’ 14
motion to quash their subpoenas. 15

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