CFHC v. CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols.

23-1118(L)
CFHC v. CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols.
In the
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
AUGUST TERM 2024
Nos. 23-1118(L), 23-1166(XAP)
CONNECTICUT FAIR H OUSING C ENTER AND C ARMEN ARROYO,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CONSERVATOR OF M IKHAIL ARROYO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees,
v.
CORELOGIC RENTAL P ROPERTY S OLUTIONS , LLC,
Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.*
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut
ARGUED: N OVEMBER 20, 2024
D ECIDED: FEBRUARY 20, 2026
Before: C ABRANES, W ESLEY , and MENASHI , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs Connecticut Fair Housing Center and Carmen
Arroyo, for herself and on behalf of her son Mikhail, claimed that
Defendant CoreLogic Rental Property Solutions—which reports the
* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.

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credit and criminal histories of prospective tenants to housing
providers—violated the Fair Housing Act when it facilitated the
denial of housing based on criminal history because that practice has
a disparate impact on African American and Hispanic rental
applicants. Arroyo also argued that CoreLogic’s policy regarding the
disclosure of consumer reports of individuals under conservatorships
was inadequate under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and had a
disparate impact on handicapped individuals in violation of the Fair
Housing Act. The district court concluded that (1) the plaintiffs failed
to show CoreLogic was covered by the Fair Housing Act, and
(2) CoreLogic violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act because it told
Arroyo that she needed to have a power of attorney to request
Mikhail’s consumer file even though she had a conservatorship over
him.
We vacate in part, affirm in part, and reverse in part. First, we
conclude that the Connecticut Fair Housing Center lacked standing
to bring this suit. “[A]n organization that has not suffered a concrete
injury caused by a defendant’s action cannot spend its way into
standing simply by expending money to gather information and
advocate against the defendant’s action.” FDA v. All. for Hippocratic
Med., 144 S. Ct. 1540, 1563-64 (2024). Second, while we disagree with
the district court that the Fair Housing Act excludes certain types of
defendants, we nevertheless agree that CoreLogic did not cause the
denial of housing in this case. For that reason, Arroyo failed to
establish a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination. Third,
Arroyo provided CoreLogic with a facially invalid copy of the
certificate of conservatorship. Because she did not provide valid
documentation of a conservatorship even after being informed of the
need to do so, she cannot show that CoreLogic’s documentation
requirements prevented her from obtaining Mikhail’s consumer file.

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ERIC D UNN, National Housing Law Project, Richmond,
VA (Christine Webber, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll
PLLC, Washington, DC; Greg Kirschner, Connecticut
Fair Housing Center, Hartford, CT, on the brief), for
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees.
TIMOTHY J. S T . GEORGE , Troutman Pepper Hamilton
Sanders LLP, Richmond, VA (Jill M. O’Toole, O’Toole +
O’Toole PLLC, Hartford, CT, on the brief), for Defendant-
Appellee-Cross-Appellant.
Y AEL B ORTNICK , Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department
of Justice, Washington, DC (Kristen Clarke, Nicolas Y.
Riley, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
Washington, DC; Damon Smith, Sasha Samberg-
Champion, Ayelet Weiss, Margaret Donahue, Paul
Osadebe, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Washington, DC, on the brief), for Amicus
Curiae United States.
Jennifer L. Sarvadi, Hudson Cook, LLP, Washington,
DC, for Amicus Curiae Consumer Data Association and
Professional Background Association.
Yiyang Wu, Zoila Hinson, Relman Colfax PLLC,
Washington, DC, for Amici Curiae National Fair Housing
Alliance, Fair Housing Justice Center, Long Island Housing
Services, Inc., Westchester Residential Opportunities, Inc.,
and CNY Fair Housing, Inc.

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23-1118(L)
CFHC v. CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols.
MENASHI , Circuit Judge:
Carmen Arroyo (“Arroyo”) applied to change apartments in a
building managed by WinnResidential, a national residential
property management company. WinnResidential and other
landlords use screening platforms to gather information about a
prospective tenant in order to evaluate the tenant’s rental application.
One such screening platform is CrimSAFE, a product of CoreLogic
Rental Property Solutions, LLC. When WinnResidential receives a
rental application, it enters the applicant’s information into
CrimSAFE and receives a credit and criminal history report. The
management of WinnResidential has access to details about the
applicant’s criminal history, but the on-site property manager will
know only whether the applicant’s criminal history meets the criteria
that WinnResidential has established to disqualify an applicant.
WinnResidential ultimately decides whether to accept or to reject an
applicant.
Arroyo already lived in the building, but she applied to move
into a new apartment with her son Mikhail, who had been injured in
a serious accident. WinnResidential rejected Mikhail’s application
because of his CrimSAFE criminal history report. For over a year
following the rejection, Arroyo and WinnResidential negotiated over
Mikhail’s application. During that time, Arroyo learned that
Mikhail’s report had identified a pending shoplifting charge in
Pennsylvania. She successfully sought the dismissal of the shoplifting
charge in Pennsylvania state court. She then reached a settlement with
WinnResidential after she—with the assistance of the Connecticut
Fair Housing Center (“CFHC”)—filed an action alleging housing
discrimination with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights
and Opportunities (“CHRO”).

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Arroyo learned of the pending shoplifting charge from
WinnResidential instead of CoreLogic because CoreLogic refused to
provide her a copy of Mikhail’s CrimSAFE report. Per CoreLogic’s
policies, Arroyo was required to submit a power of attorney
demonstrating that she was authorized to request materials on
Mikhail’s behalf. Arroyo provided a copy of her certificate of
conservatorship over Mikhail, but CoreLogic rejected that document
because the copy did not show that the certificate had an impressed
seal. Without such a seal, the certificate would be facially invalid.
Arroyo argues that CoreLogic violated the Fair Housing Act
(“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., when it provided the CrimSAFE
platform that allowed WinnResidential to deny a rental application
based on the applicant’s criminal history. She claims that such denials
have a disparate impact on Hispanic applicants. The CFHC joins her
complaint as a plaintiff, alleging the same harm with respect to
African American applicants. Arroyo additionally argues that
CoreLogic’s policy of requiring a third party seeking a consumer file
to submit a power of attorney violates the FHA as applied to
handicapped individuals who cannot execute a power of attorney but
are under a valid conservatorship. She argues that CoreLogic’s
conduct in this case showed willful noncompliance with the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., because
CoreLogic should have accepted Arroyo’s conservatorship certificate.
The district court “conducted a ten-day bench trial.” CFHC v.
CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols., LLC, No. 18-CV-705, 2023 WL 4669482,
at *1 (D. Conn. July 20, 2023). It concluded that the FHA does not
apply to CoreLogic because CoreLogic did not itself disqualify
applicants or make housing unavailable; instead, the housing
provider decided what criminal history it considered relevant and
whether to disqualify an applicant. See id. at *17-20. The district court

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additionally held that (1) Arroyo failed to show that CoreLogic had a
policy of rejecting record requests based on conservatorship
certificates, and (2) it was permissible for CoreLogic to require a
conservatorship certificate that was facially valid rather than accept
the facially invalid certificate Arroyo provided. See id. at *23. The
district court nevertheless held CoreLogic liable under the FCRA for
making it “impossible” for Arroyo to request Mikhail’s report during
the period in which it asked for a power of attorney. Id.
We vacate in part, affirm in part, and reverse in part. First, the
CFHC lacked standing to bring this suit, and the district court erred
in holding otherwise. “[A]n organization that has not suffered a
concrete injury caused by a defendant’s action cannot spend its way
into standing simply by expending money to gather information and
advocate against the defendant’s action.” FDA v. All. for Hippocratic
Med., 144 S. Ct. 1540, 1563-64 (2024). The CFHC has shown that it
committed resources to address the disparate impact it claims that
CrimSAFE has on African American applicants, but “[a]n
organization cannot manufacture its own standing in that way.” Id. at
1564. Because the CFHC did not suffer an injury in fact caused by
CoreLogic, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over its
claim, which should have been dismissed for lack of standing.
Second, while we disagree with the district court that the FHA
excludes certain types of defendants, we nevertheless agree that
CoreLogic did not cause the denial of housing in this case. For that
reason, Arroyo failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate-
impact discrimination.
Third, Arroyo provided CoreLogic with a facially invalid copy
of the certificate of conservatorship. Because she did not provide valid
documentation of a conservatorship even after being informed of the

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need to do so, she cannot show that CoreLogic’s documentation
requirements prevented her from obtaining Mikhail’s report.
We vacate the judgment insofar as the district court considered
the claim of the CFHC on the merits, and we dismiss the CFHC’s
appeal for lack of standing. We affirm the judgment insofar as the
district court held that CoreLogic was not liable to Arroyo under the
FHA. And we reverse the judgment insofar as the district court
imposed liability on CoreLogic under the FCRA.
BACKGROUND
Carmen Arroyo is a resident of ArtSpace, a residential building
in Windham, Connecticut. At the time the complaint was filed,
Arroyo lived there with her son Mikhail who suffered a traumatic
brain injury in a 2015 accident. At the time of the accident, however,
Arroyo lived alone and therefore was required to apply for Mikhail
to join the lease. To facilitate the background check for such an
application, WinnResidential, the property manager of ArtSpace,
used CoreLogic’s screening platform CrimSAFE.
I
CoreLogic is a company that offers tenant screening products
and services to housing providers, including criminal history
screening. One of CoreLogic’s products is CrimSAFE, a program that
searches for criminal records in CoreLogic’s database and generates
reports based on those records. CoreLogic’s database includes records
from over 800 jurisdictions across the United States. CoreLogic
classifies criminal records into three primary categories: (1) Crimes
Against Property, (2) Crimes Against Persons, and (3) Crimes Against
Society. Each category includes further sub-classifications.

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CrimSAFE filters criminal records based on criteria set by the
housing provider. The housing provider determines which records it
wants CrimSAFE to identify based on (1) the type of offense, (2) the
severity or disposition of the offense (such as a felony conviction, a
felony charge, a non-felony conviction, or a non-felony charge), and
(3) the age of offense, also called the “lookback period.” For
convictions, the housing provider may set a lookback period of
between zero and ninety-nine years; for charges, it may set a lookback
period of between zero and seven years. If CrimSAFE identifies a
criminal record based on the housing provider’s criteria, the provider
receives a report with all available information about the record in the
CoreLogic database. The provider decides whether to share with its
property managers and staff the full report or a more limited report
communicating only whether criminal records were found.
When a housing provider submits a rental application to
CrimSAFE, the resulting tenant screening report includes a “lease
decision” based on the provider’s criteria and the applicant’s credit
score and criminal history. The housing provider determines the
language in the report that accompanies a found criminal record. In
Mikhail’s case, the report stated: “Please verify the applicability of
these records to your applicant and proceed with your community’s
screening policies.” J. App’x 481. Even when CrimSAFE identifies a
criminal record, the housing provider may still decide to approve an
applicant. If the housing provider elects to deny the application,
CrimSAFE can generate an adverse action letter template. The
housing provider may customize the letter and decide whether and
when to transmit it.

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II
In April 2016, Carmen Arroyo informed the on-site property
manager that she wanted to move from her one-bedroom apartment
to a two-bedroom apartment so that her son Mikhail could live with
her following the accident. The on-site property manager informed
Arroyo that she would need to submit Mikhail’s information for
WinnResidential to conduct a background check. The background
check resulted in a report of “Record(s) Found,” reflecting a criminal
history. Id. WinnResidential sent an adverse action letter to the
Arroyos explaining that the application was denied based on the
CrimSAFE report and that Mikhail had the right to obtain the
information in his consumer file. It also indicated that CoreLogic did
not make the decision to take the adverse action.
The Arroyos never received the adverse action letter, but
Arroyo learned that Mikhail’s application was denied from the on-
site property manager, who gave her CoreLogic’s telephone number.
Arroyo contacted both WinnResidential and CoreLogic.
In her conversations with WinnResidential, Arroyo explained
that Mikhail was disabled and asked why his application was denied.
Management of WinnResidential became involved, and Arroyo asked
the CFHC for assistance with Mikhail’s application. In December
2016, Arroyo learned from WinnResidential that Mikhail’s
application had been denied because of a criminal record identified
in his CrimSAFE report that related to a pending shoplifting charge
in Pennsylvania. Arroyo contacted the court in Pennsylvania about
the charge, and in April 2017 she was informed that the charge had
been withdrawn. In the meantime, she filed a complaint with the
CHRO for a reasonable accommodation for Mikhail from
WinnResidential. In its answer to the complaint, WinnResidential

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denied that it knew “the exact details as to the denial of each
applicant” or “the facts behind the criminal background findings”
because it had “trust” in CoreLogic’s reports. Answer at 4-5, CFHC v.
CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols., LLC, No. 18-CV-705 (D. Conn. Oct. 18,
2019), ECF No. 105-6. The CHRO held an evidentiary hearing on June
13, 2017. Ten days later, WinnResidential allowed Mikhail to move
into ArtSpace.
While negotiations with WinnResidential were ongoing,
Arroyo asked CoreLogic to provide the details of Mikhail’s
CrimSAFE report. After Mikhail’s application was denied on April 26,
2016, Arroyo called CoreLogic to request Mikhail’s file, explaining
that she was her son’s conservator. CoreLogic sent her a consumer
disclosure form. Arroyo submitted an incomplete form on June 24,
2016. Arroyo included a copy of a State of Connecticut Probate Court
Certificate of Conservatorship. The certificate included the warning
that it was “NOT VALID WITHOUT COURT OF PROBATE SEAL
IMPRESSED,” but an impressed seal was not visible on the copy.
J. App’x 475.
After receiving Arroyo’s packet, CoreLogic sent her a letter
instructing her to contact the company. Even though it was sent to the
address Arroyo listed on the consumer disclosure form, the letter was
returned to the sender. CoreLogic’s internal note system documented
that it could not accept the conservatorship certificate and needed a
special authorization for a power of attorney as well as Mikhail’s
signature. Because she had not heard from the company since sending
the form, Arroyo contacted CoreLogic in September 2016. At that
time, CoreLogic advised Arroyo that it required a notarized power of
attorney from Mikhail and that it could not accept a conservatorship
certificate pursuant to its standard policies for third party
authorization. Those policies—as recorded in CoreLogic’s

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Authentication Procedure Guide—explained that CoreLogic could
“accept a third party request” in circumstances including “but not
limited to” when the third party submits a “[v]alid (including
notarization) Power of Attorney.” Id. at 577. The Authentication
Procedure Guide further provided that “[f]or any scenarios not
covered in this section, including how to determine if a POA is valid,
please reach out to the Supervisor.” Id.
Arroyo spoke with the attorney handling Mikhail’s probate
case, who told her that she should not need a power of attorney
because a conservatorship affords her broader rights under state law.
In fact, it would have been impossible for Arroyo to obtain a power
of attorney because Mikhail lacked the capacity to authorize one as a
conservatee. On November 1, 2016, she again called CoreLogic to
relay the lawyer’s advice. The matter was escalated to the legal
department at CoreLogic, and two weeks later CoreLogic called
Arroyo to inform her that the copy of the conservatorship certificate
would be acceptable if the seal were visible. The next day, Arroyo
resubmitted the form with the accompanying materials, but the copy
of the conservatorship certificate again lacked a visible seal.
CoreLogic called Arroyo three times about this submission, but she
did not respond. Instead, the CFHC called CoreLogic at Arroyo’s
request and was informed that the copy of the conservatorship
certificate needed a visible seal.
The interaction between Arroyo and CoreLogic was the first
and only instance of a “conserved individual who has requested a file
disclosure” from CoreLogic. CFHC v. CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols., LLC,
478 F. Supp. 3d 259, 282 (D. Conn. 2020).

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III
Arroyo and the CFHC filed this lawsuit against CoreLogic on
April 24, 2018, alleging six causes of action: on behalf of all plaintiffs,
(1) discrimination on the basis of race and national origin in violation
of the FHA and (2) discrimination on the basis of a handicap in
violation of the FHA; on behalf of the Arroyos, (3) discrimination on
the basis of a handicap in violation of the FHA and (4) violations of
the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”); and, on
behalf of Mikhail, (5) violations of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681g, and
(6) violations of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681h.
A
CoreLogic moved for summary judgment on each claim and to
dismiss the FHA discrimination claims on behalf of African American
applicants because the Arroyos are not African American and the
CFHC lacked organizational standing.1 Arroyo and the CFHC cross-
moved for summary judgment on the FCRA claims, the CUTPA
1 CoreLogic also moved to dismiss Arroyo’s claims under the FHA as to
discrimination on the basis of a handicap and under the CUTPA because
she lacked “statutory standing.” CFHC, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 284-85. The
statutory standing inquiry asks whether a plaintiff has interests that “fall
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked,” Lexmark Int’l,
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129 (2014) (quoting Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)), and therefore “has a cause of action
under the statute,” id. at 128. That inquiry “does not implicate subject-
matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 128 n.4 (quoting Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 643 (2002)). Because the question is not
jurisdictional and CoreLogic has not challenged the decision of the district
court that Arroyo falls within the zone of interests, we do not address the
issue. See City of Almaty v. Khrapunov, 956 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 2020).

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claims, and the FHA claims regarding race and national origin. See
CFHC, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 272-73.
The district court held that the CFHC had standing to pursue
its claim under the FHA. According to the district court, organizations
that “allege that a defendant’s actions have ‘frustrated the
organization plaintiff’s services, with a consequent drain on
resources’ have standing to bring FHA claims.” Id. at 286 (alterations
omitted) (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 369
(1982)). In this case, the CFHC alleged that “the disparate impact of
CrimSAFE on African American and Latino applicants frustrates
CFHC’s mission [of] ensuring that all people have equal access to the
housing of the[ir] choice.” Id. And the CFHC has devoted resources
to providing “guidance on the use of criminal records” and to revising
“its public trainings and presentations to account for [CoreLogic’s]
policies regarding criminal records.” Id.
The district court held that Arroyo could not establish that
CoreLogic failed to disclose Mikhail’s consumer report in violation of
the FCRA because the FCRA obligates a consumer reporting agency
to require “that the consumer furnish proper identification” before
any information is disclosed. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(a)(1). The required
identification must be sufficient to “match consumers with their files”
and “commensurate with an identifiable risk of harm arising from
misidentifying the consumer.” 12 C.F.R. § 1022.123(a). The district
court explained that “[w]here state law defines the validity of an
identification document,” the state-law requirements for establishing
validity inform what qualifies as “‘proper identification’ under the
FCRA.” CFHC, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 307. Under the laws of
Connecticut—as the conservatorship certificate stated on its face—a
conservatorship certificate is “NOT VALID WITHOUT COURT OF
PROBATE SEAL IMPRESSED.” Id.

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The district court concluded, however, that CoreLogic might
have “violated its duty under 15 U.S.C. § 1681g by failing to ‘provide
a statement that the consumer’s identity cannot be verified; and
directions on how to complete the request, including what additional
information or documentation will be required to complete the
request, and how to submit such information.’” Id. at 308 (alteration
omitted) (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 1022.137(a)(2)(iii)(C)). The district court
said that this violation might have occurred between the June 2016
internal note that CoreLogic required a power of attorney and the
November 2016 decision to accept a conservatorship certificate. See id.
at 308-09. It therefore granted summary judgment to CoreLogic on the
FCRA claim only with respect to conduct preceding June 2016 and
following November 2016.
The district court granted summary judgment to CoreLogic on
the claim that it violated the FHA by adopting a policy with a
disparate impact on the handicapped. The district court concluded
that the record did not suggest that CoreLogic had a policy of not
allowing conservators to obtain the files of conservatees or of
requiring conservators always to submit a power of attorney to
receive those files. Instead, CoreLogic had a policy of referring
uncommon circumstances—such as a conservatorship—to a
supervisor. To the extent that Arroyo argued that CoreLogic should
have been clearer about how a conservator could obtain files, the
district court concluded that the record did not suggest that
CoreLogic had a policy of telling consumers that a power of attorney
is required when a conservatorship certificate would suffice.
The district court also granted summary judgment to
CoreLogic on the claims that it violated the FHA through disparate
treatment on the basis of a handicap and a failure to accommodate.
The district court concluded that the record did not suggest that the

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policy of supervisory review masked an intent to discriminate against
handicapped consumers. The district court further concluded that it
would not be a reasonable accommodation for CoreLogic to accept a
copy of the conservatorship certificate without a visible seal because
the FCRA requires CoreLogic to obtain proper identification, which
in this case meant a facially valid certificate. Thus, the district court
granted summary judgment to CoreLogic on the FHA handicap
claims. But it allowed the FHA claims asserting disparate impact and
disparate treatment on the basis of race and national origin—as well
as the CUTPA claim—to proceed to trial.
B
The district court held a bench trial. To resolve the claims under
the FHA, the district court considered the “initial matter” of “whether
CoreLogic is subject to the FHA.” CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *16. It
decided that CoreLogic was not subject to the FHA because it had not
been shown that CoreLogic “sets the terms, conditions, or privileges
of rental,” id. (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b)), or “makes unavailable
or denies housing,” id. (alterations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(a)). The district court explained that CrimSAFE does not
disqualify applicants because the housing provider decides whether
to accept or decline an application. The district court further
concluded that “[f]or the same reasons that the FHA claims failed, the
CUTPA claims relating to the use of CrimSAFE fail.” Id. at *26. It
dismissed as abandoned the CUTPA claims related to the file
disclosure. See id. at *27.
The district court decided that Arroyo showed a violation of the
FCRA for the June to November 2016 period. The district court
reiterated that Arroyo never submitted proper identification, see id.
at *21, but it concluded that CoreLogic was nevertheless liable for

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“making it impossible for a consumer to exercise its rights to their
consumer file” during the four-month period, id. at *23.2 The district
court decided that the violation was willful because CoreLogic
adopted policies that “supported the position [set out] by the
consumer representatives that they needed a power of attorney.”
CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *24. It was “entirely foreseeable” that a
person who might “lack physical and/or mental capacity to make a
valid power of attorney” would request records, and “CoreLogic’s
written policies entirely overlooked this group of people with the
effect of denying Mr. Arroyo his right to his consumer report.” Id.
Arroyo did not prove actual damages, however, because there was no
evidence that (1) Arroyo would have submitted a valid
conservatorship certificate or (2) CoreLogic’s delay caused
WinnResidential not to move the Arroyos into the two-bedroom
apartment. See id. at *25. As a result, the district court imposed $1,000
in statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n and treble
punitive damages. See id. at *26.
Arroyo and the CFHC appealed the judgment insofar as the
district court rejected the FHA race and national origin claims at trial
and the claims regarding a reasonable accommodation and
discrimination on the basis of a handicap at summary judgment.
CoreLogic cross-appealed the judgment insofar as the district court
imposed liability under the FCRA.
2 The district court did not rely on the regulation it referenced at summary
judgment, see CFHC, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 308 (citing 12 C.F.R.
§ 1022.137(a)(2)(iii)(C)), because “the regulation was only raised for the first
time in a reply brief without any meaningful analysis of its application to
the facts of this case,” CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *22.

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DISCUSSION
“We review a district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment de novo, resolving all ambiguities and drawing all
permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom
summary judgment is sought.” Garcia v. Heath, 74 F.4th 44, 47-48 (2d
Cir. 2023) (quoting Burg v. Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2010)).
“Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-movant, ‘there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.’” Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 118-19 (2d Cir.
2023) (quoting Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 344 (2d Cir. 2011)).
“On appeal from a judgment after a bench trial, we review the
district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of
law de novo.” Mayer v. Ringler Assocs. Inc., 9 F.4th 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2021)
(emphasis added) (quoting Hartford Roman Cath. Diocesan Corp. v.
Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 905 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 2018)). “The district
court’s finding of proximate cause is a factual finding that is subject
to clear error review.” Liberty Ins. Corp. v. Hudson Excess Ins. Co.,
147 F.4th 249, 258 (2d Cir. 2025). We will set aside a factual finding
only if “we are ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.’” Barrows v. Becerra, 24 F.4th 116, 135 (2d
Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948)).
I
Before reaching the merits, we address the threshold issue of
whether the CFHC has standing to raise its claim against CoreLogic.
The CFHC alleged that CoreLogic discriminates against African
American and Hispanic applicants in violation of the FHA. Because it
is “a jurisdictional requirement, standing to litigate cannot be waived

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or forfeited.” Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1951
(2019). We hold that the CFHC lacks standing to raise its
discrimination claim.
A
“Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal
courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Murthy v. Missouri, 144 S. Ct.
1972, 1985 (2024) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). By limiting the
judicial power to cases or controversies, Article III “confines the
federal courts to a properly judicial role.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578
U.S. 330, 338 (2016). For a dispute to qualify as a genuine case or
controversy, the plaintiff must have “such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to warrant [its] invocation of federal-
court jurisdiction.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). To establish standing to invoke that jurisdiction,
the plaintiff “must demonstrate (i) that [it] has suffered or likely will
suffer an injury in fact, (ii) that the injury likely was caused or will be
caused by the defendant, and (iii) that the injury likely would be
redressed by the requested judicial relief.” All. for Hippocratic Med.,
144 S. Ct. at 1555.
“[O]rganizations may have standing ‘to sue on their own behalf
for injuries they have sustained.’” Id. at 1563 (quoting Havens, 455 U.S.
at 379 n.19). When it sues on its own behalf, the organization must
show that “it was directly injured as an organization.” Conn. Parents
Union v. Russell-Tucker, 8 F.4th 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2021).
Two decisions of the Supreme Court address the issue of
organizational standing as it arises in this case. In Havens, the
Supreme Court considered whether a housing organization called
HOME had standing to sue under the FHA. HOME, which offered

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counseling and referral services, alleged that an owner-operator of
apartment complexes had provided false information to HOME as
part of the racial steering practices of the owner-operator. See 455 U.S.
at 368-69. HOME asserted standing to sue on its own behalf,
reasoning that (1) it “has been frustrated by [the] defendants’ racial
steering practices in its effort to assist equal access to housing through
counseling and other referral services,” and (2) it “has had to devote
significant resources to identify and counteract the defendant[s’]
racially discriminatory steering practices.” Id. at 379 (quoting the
complaint).
The Supreme Court agreed: “If, as broadly alleged, [the
defendants’] steering practices have perceptibly impaired HOME’s
ability to provide counseling and referral services for low- and
moderate-income homeseekers, there can be no question that the
organization has suffered injury in fact.” Id. The Court reasoned that
the “injury to the organization’s activities—with the consequent drain
on the organization’s resources—constitutes far more than simply a
setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.” Id.
Following the decision in Havens, our court held that the
“expenditure of resources and frustration of an organization’s
mission” are sufficient “to establish an injury in fact.” Moya v. DHS,
975 F.3d 120, 130 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Centro de la Comunidad Hispana
de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 868 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2017)
(“[W]here an organization diverts its resources away from its current
activities, it has suffered an injury that has been repeatedly held to be
independently sufficient to confer organizational standing.”).
More recently, however, the Supreme Court revisited the issue
and clarified that Havens has been overread. In FDA v. Alliance for
Hippocratic Medicine, four medical associations sued the FDA over

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modifications to the conditions of use for mifepristone. See 144 S. Ct.
at 1553. The associations asserted standing to sue on their own behalf
“based on their incurring costs to oppose [the] FDA’s actions.” Id. at
1563. The costs included “conduct[ing] their own studies on
mifepristone,” “drafting citizen petitions,” and “engaging in public
advocacy and public education” to “inform their members and the
public about mifepristone’s risks.” Id. Relying on Havens, the
associations argued that “standing exists when an organization
diverts its resources in response to a defendant’s actions.” Id. at 1564.
The Supreme Court rejected that proposition:
[A]n organization that has not suffered a concrete injury
caused by a defendant’s action cannot spend its way into
standing simply by expending money to gather
information and advocate against the defendant’s action.
An organization cannot manufacture its own standing in
that way.
The medical associations respond that under [Havens],
standing exists when an organization diverts its
resources in response to a defendant’s actions. That is
incorrect. Indeed, that theory would mean that all the
organizations in America would have standing to
challenge almost every federal policy that they dislike,
provided they spend a single dollar opposing those
policies. Havens does not support such an expansive
theory of standing.
Id. at 1563-64 (citations omitted). The Court explained that Havens
involved an organization that “not only was an issue-advocacy
organization, but also operated a housing counseling service.” Id. at
1564. The allegedly unlawful conduct—providing false information
to HOME—“directly affected and interfered with HOME’s core
business activities” in a way that was “not dissimilar to a retailer who

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sues a manufacturer for selling defective goods to the retailer.” Id. The
medical associations, by contrast, did not allege “any similar
impediment” to their businesses. Id.
The Court emphasized that “Havens was an unusual case” and
that courts must be “careful not to extend the Havens holding beyond
its context.” Id.
B
At summary judgment, the district court concluded that the
CFHC had standing to sue CoreLogic based on a showing that (1) “the
disparate impact of CrimSAFE on African American and Latino
applicants frustrates [the] CFHC’s mission [of] ensuring that all
people have equal access to the housing of the[ir] choice,” and (2) the
“CFHC has changed its public trainings and presentations to account
for [CoreLogic’s] policies regarding criminal records.” CFHC,
478 F. Supp. 3d at 286. That decision relied on the premise that an
advocacy organization may establish standing by showing a
frustration of mission and diversion of resources. The district court
did not have the benefit of the decision of the Supreme Court in
Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine rejecting that premise. In light of that
decision, we hold that the CFHC lacks standing to maintain its FHA
claim against CoreLogic.
The theory on which the CFHC relied in this litigation is
precisely the theory that the Supreme Court rejected in Alliance for
Hippocratic Medicine: that “standing exists when an organization
diverts its resources in response to a defendant’s actions.” 144 S. Ct.
at 1564. The CFHC alleged that it diverted resources to investigate
CoreLogic’s conduct, to assist individuals whom the CFHC suspected
were denied housing because of CoreLogic, and to develop
educational programs about the use of criminal record screening

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products by housing providers. See J. App’x 44-45. When asked at oral
argument to identify its injuries in fact, the CFHC said that
“frustration of mission and diversion of resources” are injuries that
fall “squarely within the Havens tradition.”3
The circumstances of the CFHC, however, do not resemble the
“unusual” context of Havens. The organization in Havens offered
counseling and referral services and alleged that the defendants’
conduct “perceptibly impaired” those “core business activities.” All.
for Hippocratic Med., 144 S. Ct. at 1564. The CFHC, by contrast, engages
in advocacy and informational programming. The choice of the CFHC
to focus its resources on CoreLogic “to the detriment of other
spending priorities” does not qualify as an injury in fact that confers
standing under Article III. Id. at 1563.
The CFHC suggests that the district court prevented it from
presenting evidence at trial that would have established an injury in
fact. Indeed, the district court decided prior to trial that the CFHC had
standing, and CoreLogic did not dispute that issue at trial. But the
CFHC nevertheless elicited testimony about its diversion of
resources. 4 To the extent that the CFHC would have presented
additional evidence, the CFHC acknowledges that the evidence
would have further demonstrated frustration of mission and
3 Oral Argument Audio Recording at 1:02.
4 See, e.g., J. App’x 700-15 (testimony from a former executive director of
the CFHC about the resources the organization devoted “to take on the
criminal history screening work,” its “diversion logs,” and the activities it
declined to pursue during the relevant time period).

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diversion of resources. 5 “That argument does not work to
demonstrate standing.” All. for Hippocratic Med., 144 S. Ct. at 1563.
The CFHC argues that this case is different from Alliance for
Hippocratic Medicine because the medical associations in that case
alleged only an ideological disagreement with the FDA rather than an
actual diversion of resources. 6 But that is incorrect. The Supreme
Court explained that the medical associations claimed “to have
standing not based on their mere disagreement with FDA’s policies,
but based on their incurring costs to oppose FDA’s actions.” All. for
Hippocratic Med., 144 S. Ct. at 1563. Those costs included the
expenditure of “considerable time, energy, and resources” in
petitioning the FDA “as well as engaging in public advocacy and
public education.” Id.
This case is indistinguishable from Alliance for Hippocratic
Medicine. The CFHC may oppose the products and policies of
CoreLogic, but it “cannot spend its way into standing simply by
expending money to gather information and advocate against the
defendant’s action.” Id. at 1563-64. We conclude that the district court
erred by holding that the CFHC had standing to sue. We vacate the
judgment of the district court insofar as it addressed the CFHC’s
claim on the merits, and we dismiss the CFHC’s appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
5 See Oral Argument Audio Recording at 3:56 (Q: “The evidence you
wanted to introduce was about diversion of resources and frustration of
mission, right?” A: “Exactly.”).
6 See Oral Argument Audio Recording at 2:18.

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C
Five months after oral argument in this appeal, the CFHC
moved to dismiss its claims with prejudice and without costs. 7
CoreLogic opposed the dismissal of the claims without costs.8 “An
appeal may be dismissed on the appellant’s motion on terms agreed
to by the parties or fixed by the court.” Fed. R. App. P. 42(b)(2). But
we may deny a motion for voluntary dismissal when it “raises
questions about procedural propriety on [the movant’s] part.”
JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d
418, 421 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161,
168 (2d Cir. 2004) (“For the government to agree to a vacatur two
weeks after oral argument suggests that it is trying to avoid having
this Court rule on that issue. We therefore decline to grant the order
that the parties have agreed to.”).
Other courts have denied such a motion when the movants
“may be acting strategically” to dismiss an “appeal on an issue they
can later press again before a different panel.” In re Nexium Antitrust
Litig., 778 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2015). Those courts have explained that a
“party should not be able to ‘manipulate the formation of precedent
by dismissing an appeal,’” id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Albers v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 354 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 2004)), especially when “the
motion was filed ‘after full briefing, extended oral argument, and
several months of deliberation,’” id. (quoting Ford v. Strickland, 696
F.2d 804, 807 (11th Cir. 1983)).
7 See Motion to Dismiss, CFHC v. CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols., No. 23-1118
(2d Cir. Apr. 16, 2025), ECF No. 138.
8 See Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, CFHC v. CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols.,
No. 23-1118 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2025), ECF No. 140.

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In its motion, the CFHC claims that it “became aware of recent
authority further supporting its position that it has standing.” Motion
to Dismiss, supra note 7, at 2. It has not identified that authority,
however, and instead of doing so argues that dismissal of its claims
would “save the parties’ resources and avoid further delay in
resolving the substantive claims which are fully addressed by …
Arroyo.” Id. Because dismissal of the claim after briefing and
argument would not save resources or avoid delay, we deny the
motion.
II
The FHA makes it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent … or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of race … or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a); see also
24 C.F.R. § 100.70(b). A plaintiff may establish a disparate-impact
claim under the FHA by showing that the challenged practice had “a
disproportionately adverse effect on minorities” and the practice is
“otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale.” Tex. Dep’t of Hous. &
Community Affs. v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 524
(2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Arroyo argues that CoreLogic discriminated against Mikhail
because its platform has a disproportionately adverse effect on the
availability of housing for Hispanic applicants. The district court
concluded that Arroyo failed to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that “CoreLogic’s use of CrimSAFE denies or makes
housing unavailable.” CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *17.
The district court framed its analysis as a threshold inquiry into
whether the FHA applied to CoreLogic. See id. at *16-17. We believe
the analysis is more straightforward. The FHA does not exclude any
class of defendants from its scope. Whether any defendant is subject

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to liability under the FHA turns on whether the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case of discrimination—including whether
the defendant proximately caused the alleged harm. Under that
understanding, we agree with the district court that Arroyo failed to
establish that CoreLogic violated the FHA because Arroyo did not
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that CoreLogic “denies or
otherwise makes unavailable housing.” Id. at *20. We affirm the
judgment insofar as the district court rejected Arroyo’s disparate-
impact claim on the basis of race and national origin.
A
We apply a three-step burden-shifting framework “in
discriminatory effects cases.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c); see Mhany Mgmt.,
Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 617-19 (2d Cir. 2016) (applying
§ 100.500(c)). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by
showing that that the “challenged practice caused or predictably will
cause a discriminatory effect.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1). Second, the
burden shifts to the defendant to show that “the challenged practice
is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate,
nondiscriminatory interests.” Id. § 100.500(c)(2). Third, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the “interests supporting the
challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less
discriminatory effect.” Id. § 100.500(c)(3).
This appeal implicates the causation requirement at step one.
To establish a prima face case, a plaintiff must show that the
challenged practice was the proximate cause of the alleged injury. See
Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 581 U.S. 189, 201-03 (2017). The
proximate cause analysis asks “whether the harm alleged has a
sufficiently close connection to the conduct the statute prohibits.” Id.
at 201 (quoting Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 133). “[F]oreseeability alone is not

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27
sufficient to establish proximate cause under the FHA” because it
“does not ensure the close connection that proximate cause requires.”
Id. at 201-02. Rather, the plaintiff must show a “direct relation
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct.” Id. at 202-03
(quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268
(1992)).
The requirement of a direct relation ensures that disparate-
impact liability under the FHA does not extend further than Congress
intended. “The housing market is interconnected with economic and
social life” such that a violation of the FHA may “‘be expected to
cause ripples of harm to flow’ far beyond the defendant’s
misconduct.” Id. at 202 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc.
v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters (AGC), 459 U.S. 519, 534 (1983)). The
FHA does not indicate “that Congress intended to provide a remedy
wherever those ripples travel.” Id.; see also In re Am. Express Anti-
Steering Rules Antitrust Litig., 19 F.4th 127, 139 (2d Cir. 2021)
(“Proximate cause stands for the proposition that ‘the judicial remedy
cannot encompass every conceivable harm that can be traced to
alleged wrongdoing.’”) (quoting AGC, 459 U.S. at 536).
As a result, the Supreme Court has cautioned that liability
under the FHA will not extend “beyond the first step.” Bank of Am.,
581 U.S. at 203 (quoting Hemi Grp. v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 10
(2010)). Under the first-step rule, “injuries that happen at the first step
following the harmful behavior are considered proximately caused by
that behavior.” Am. Express, 19 F.4th at 140. In that way, the directness
requirement “limits liability to parties injured at the first step of the
causal chain of the defendants’ actions.” Id. at 135. The directness
requirement “may also” make it “difficult to establish causation

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because of the multiple factors that go into [housing] decisions.”
Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. at 543.9
B
Arroyo argues that the district court erred by deciding as a
threshold matter that the FHA did not apply to CoreLogic rather than
proceeding to consider whether Arroyo had established a prima facie
9 The Supreme Court has described the FHA as including a “robust
causality requirement.” Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. at 542. This court
has said that “we do not read Inclusive Communities to set forth a new rule
requiring use of the words ‘robust causality’” in a jury instruction, Saint-
Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., 129 F.4th 124, 152 n.13 (2d Cir. 2025), but “we
agree that a defendant may not be held liable for racial disparities it did not
cause,” id. at 152. Other courts have suggested that the “robust causality”
language is more significant. See, e.g., Sw. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Maricopa
Domestic Water Improvement Dist., 17 F.4th 950, 962 (9th Cir. 2021)
(explaining that the FHA requires “robust causality that shows, beyond
mere evidence of a statistical disparity, that the challenged policy, and not
some other factor or policy, caused the disproportionate effect”); Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 902 (5th Cir. 2019)
(“We read the Supreme Court’s opinion in ICP to undoubtedly announce a
more demanding test than that set forth in the HUD regulation.”); Oviedo
Town Ctr. II, L.L.L.P. v. City of Oviedo, 759 F. App’x 828, 834 (11th Cir. 2018)
(“The Supreme Court’s solution was to impose a robust causality
requirement ensuring that racial imbalance does not, without more,
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.”) (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted); Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 860 F.3d 1106, 1111 (8th
Cir. 2017) (“The ‘cautionary standards’ announced in Inclusive Communities
include a ‘robust causality requirement.’”). Regardless of that possible
dispute, our precedents do not depart from the requirement that a plaintiff
must establish a direct relation. Cf. Saint-Jean, 129 F.4th at 152 n.13
(explaining that the “‘robust causality’ … language is not at odds with the
instructions in this case”).

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29
case of discrimination. Arroyo additionally argues that the district
court did not apply the proper causation standard.
We agree that the district court misconceived the three-step
framework for a disparate-impact claim under the FHA by adding an
additional threshold step. But that error did not fundamentally affect
the analysis. The district court concluded that the disparate-impact
claim failed because Arroyo did not establish that CoreLogic caused
the denial of Mikhail’s application. That means Arroyo failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination—not that CoreLogic is
beyond the reach of the FHA. Properly conceived, we see no error in
the conclusion of the district court. Nor did the district court err in
requiring a showing of direct causation.
1
The district court stated that it “cannot address the
discriminatory impact and discriminatory treatment claims without
deciding,” as “an initial matter,” “whether CoreLogic is subject to the
FHA.” CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *16. The district court thereby
treated the question of whether “CoreLogic denies or otherwise
makes housing unavailable” as a threshold inquiry that precedes the
three-step burden-shifting framework. Id. at *17. Arroyo argues that
the framework includes no such threshold inquiry. We agree.
We begin with the statutory text. CoreLogic does not “sell” or
“rent” housing, so its liability under the FHA must turn on whether
it has acted to “otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to
any person” because of a protected characteristic. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
“[T]he phrase ‘otherwise make unavailable’ refers to the
consequences of an action.” Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. at 534. The
“operative text” of the FHA thus “looks to results.” Id.

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30
The “results-oriented phrase” in the statute has two
implications here. Id. at 535. First, a defendant may not avoid liability
under the FHA simply because it is not itself the housing provider.
The district court reached the same conclusion. See CFHC, 2023 WL
4669482, at *19 (“An entity can be liable under the FHA even when
they are not the ultimate decisionmaker.”); id. (“[A]n entity other than
a landlord or property seller can be liable for violating the FHA.”).
And we have long recognized as much. See, e.g., Saint-Jean, 129 F.4th
at 140 (explaining that a bank might be liable under the FHA based
on its lending practices); Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 624 (affirming a
judgment against a municipality on a disparate-treatment claim);
Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 393 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that a
real estate agent might be liable under the FHA based on “racial
steering”).10
Second, the FHA does not insulate from liability certain types
of conduct. “The phrase ‘otherwise make unavailable’ has been
interpreted to reach a wide variety of discriminatory housing
practices.” Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 600 (quoting LeBlanc-Sternberg v.
10 So have other courts. See, e.g., Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 600 F.3d 1205, 1208
(9th Cir. 2010) (evaluating a discrimination claim under the FHA based on
“the denial and pricing of homeowner’s insurance”); Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1359-60 (6th Cir. 1995) (same); NAACP v. Am.
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 301 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); Mich. Prot &
Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 345 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
the FHA may reach “those who, in practical effect, assisted in those
transactions of ownership and disposition”); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Ct.
of P.R. for Dist. of Arecibo, 988 F.2d 252, 257 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that
the FHA “may proscribe discriminatory acts by persons who are neither
sellers nor lessors of property”); Edwards v. Johnston Cnty. Health Dep’t,
885 F.2d 1215, 1221 n.14 (4th Cir. 1989) (explaining that the operative
provisions of the FHA “are not directed only to those persons who sell, rent
or finance real estate”).

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31
Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 424 (2d Cir. 1995)). Congress appears even to
have envisioned that the FHA would reach the use of criminal records
to make housing decisions. Congress amended the statute in 1988 to
state that “[n]othing in [subchapter I of the FHA] prohibits conduct
against a person because such person has been convicted by any court
of competent jurisdiction of the illegal manufacture or distribution of
a controlled substance.” Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-430, § 6(d)(2), 102 Stat. 1619, 1623 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3607(b)(4)). Congress would not have needed to add this safe harbor
if the FHA did not otherwise apply to denials of housing based on
criminal history. See Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. at 538 (“[C]ertain
criminal convictions are correlated with sex and race. By adding an
exemption from liability for exclusionary practices aimed at
individuals with drug convictions, Congress ensured disparate-
impact liability would not lie if a landlord excluded tenants with such
convictions.”) (citation omitted). We avoid interpretations of statutes
under which some provisions “would be superfluous.” Id. at 537.
The applicable regulation reflects this understanding of
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). The regulation provides that a discriminatory
housing practice is “an act that is unlawful under section 804, 805, 806,
or 818 of the Fair Housing Act.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.20. And a “practice
has a discriminatory effect” when “it actually or predictably results in
a disparate impact on a group of persons.” Id. § 100.500(a).
Because the FHA does not categorically exclude types of actors
or actions, we see no basis for engaging in a threshold inquiry before
proceeding to the plaintiff’s prima facie case. In fact, the issue the
district court treated as a threshold question—whether Arroyo
proved that “CoreLogic denies or otherwise makes housing
unavailable,” CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *17—is an element of the
prima facie case. At step one, “[t]he charging party … has the burden

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of proving that a challenged practice caused or predictably will cause
a discriminatory effect.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1).
The district court should have started its analysis by
considering whether Arroyo had established a prima facie case of
discrimination, including whether she had established by a
preponderance of the evidence that CoreLogic proximately caused
the unavailability of housing. We recognize that the district court did
not exclude CoreLogic from the scope of the FHA simply because
CoreLogic was “not the ultimate decisionmaker.” CFHC, 2023 WL
4669482, at *19. But the district court still purported to address
whether CoreLogic makes housing unavailable “before” it could
“evaluate whether the Plaintiffs have met their burden on the
elements” of their claims. Id. at *17. That was erroneous.
2
Despite the error in how the district court described the
applicable framework, CoreLogic argues that the district court
properly considered whether CoreLogic proximately caused the
denial of housing to Mikhail. We agree. The district court considered
whether Arroyo had established a direct relation between the alleged
injury and the allegedly unlawful practice of CoreLogic. We see no
error in the determination of the district court that she failed to do so.
Although the district court did not use the phrase “proximate
cause,” it properly applied that standard. The district court observed
that “the FHA does not reach entities whose involvement is
‘tenuous.’” Id. at *19 (quoting Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 621). And it
determined that Arroyo had “shown only a tenuous connection
between CoreLogic and the housing provider’s decision, which is not
enough to find CoreLogic ‘makes unavailable or denies’ housing.” Id.
at *20. After reviewing the role of CoreLogic in evaluating a rental

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application, the district court concluded that Arroyo had “failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that CoreLogic’s use of
CrimSAFE denies or otherwise makes unavailable housing pursuant
to section 3604(a).” Id. In other words, the district court decided that
Arroyo had failed to establish proximate cause.
That conclusion followed from the trial record and the district
court’s factual findings. Although CoreLogic categorized available
criminal records and offered filtering options to housing providers, it
was the housing provider that controlled every other aspect of the
application process. In addition to establishing its own screening
policies, the housing provider decided (1) the configuration of
CrimSAFE, including the criminal records that would be considered
relevant and the lookback period that would apply; (2) which
employees would have access to the full criminal record report;
(3) what message would accompany the CrimSAFE report and
appear in any adverse action letter; (4) whether a report would result
in an action or further investigation and whether an adverse action
letter would be sent; and (5) whether the application would be
approved or denied.
CoreLogic also informed the housing provider of its control
over the platform and the application process. CoreLogic instructed
the housing provider to apply its own screening policies and to
designate an employee to receive the full criminal record report. The
default message in the CrimSAFE report instructed the housing
provider to “verify the applicability of these records to your applicant
and proceed with your community’s screening policies.” J. App’x 481.
At the time of Mikhail’s application, WinnResidential had configured
the CrimSAFE settings to include that default message.

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Based on this record, we agree with the district court that
CoreLogic’s CrimSAFE product did not disqualify housing applicants
or prevent housing providers from assessing each candidate. The
attenuated connection between CoreLogic’s creation of a tool that
allows a housing provider to access criminal records and the ultimate
decision of the provider to deny an application falls short of the
required “direct relation” between the conduct and the harm. Bank of
Am., 581 U.S. at 202 (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268). CrimSAFE may
assist a housing provider by filtering records the housing provider
deems relevant, but “no housing provider who uses CrimSAFE could
reasonably believe that CoreLogic makes housing decisions for
them.” CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *18.
3
Arroyo raises several objections to the conclusion of the district
court. None is persuasive.
First, Arroyo argues that the proximate cause standard
required her to establish only that CrimSAFE made housing “more
difficult to obtain.” Appellants’ Br. 22-24. But the Supreme Court has
explained that because “[t]he housing market is interconnected with
economic and social life,” any number of actions by any number of
actors might make housing more difficult to obtain. Bank of Am.,
581 U.S. at 202. The FHA does not “provide a remedy wherever those
ripples travel.” Id. It instead imposes liability for harms that occur at
the first step following the alleged misconduct. In this case, what
followed CoreLogic’s provision of the CrimSAFE platform were a
number of discretionary decisions of the housing provider—
including the ultimate decision of the housing provider to approve or
to deny an application. The denial of housing did not occur at the first

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step following CoreLogic’s conduct and therefore was not directly
caused by that conduct.
Arroyo purports to accept that the FHA requires a direct
relation between the alleged injury and the challenged conduct, see
Appellants’ Br. 24, but she repeatedly frames her argument in terms
of foreseeability, see id. at 24, 29, 31, 38-39. We agree with the Fourth
Circuit that, although Arroyo “claims that this provision reaches
every practice having the effect of making housing more difficult to
obtain, the text of the statute does not extend so far.” Jersey Heights
Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 192 (4th Cir. 1999). “In
the context of the FHA, foreseeability alone does not ensure the close
connection that proximate cause requires.” Bank of Am., 581 U.S. at
202.
Second, Arroyo argues that “CoreLogic was in a position to
prevent [the housing provider] from using discriminatory criminal
history screening policies by limiting the parameters within which
CrimSAFE would return adverse reports.” Appellants’ Br. 46-47.
Arroyo claims, for example, that CoreLogic could have excluded non-
conviction records and older records from the CrimSAFE database.
But federal law allows CoreLogic to report criminal records and non-
conviction records that are less than seven years old. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681c(a)(2), (5). Making that information available to a housing
provider does not separately violate the FHA. To impose liability on
CoreLogic for failing to restrict the accessibility of information that a
housing provider might consider—on the theory that restricting the
information would reduce the likelihood that the housing provider
will ultimately make a discriminatory decision—would extend
liability far “beyond the first step” in the causal chain. Bank of Am.,
581 U.S. at 203.

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Third, Arroyo claims that CoreLogic “chose to report adverse
CrimSAFE results to property staff while denying them access to the
underlying criminal records relevant to individualized reviews.”
Appellants’ Br. 45. But that is incorrect. The district court found that
“[e]ach new user” of CrimSAFE “is, by default, authorized to receive
the full data” and that “CrimSAFE does not limit how many users can
have full access.” CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *5. The housing
provider “must affirmatively go into the CrimSAFE configuration
settings” to limit the information to “senior level managers.” Id.
Arroyo does not challenge those findings. See Appellants’ Reply Br.
15.
In this case, WinnResidential configured CrimSAFE to
“suppress reports from onsite staff” because of a concern that “the
staff will use personal interests (such as leasing commissions) in
making a leasing decision that the executives believe should be made
by someone in a more elevated position.” CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482,
at *5. The leasing agent, who lacked access to the full report, did not
follow the message to “verify the applicability of these records to your
applicant and proceed with your community’s screening policies” but
instead told Arroyo that Mikhail’s application was denied. Id. at *9-
10. And indeed the only reason that CrimSAFE identified a criminal
record for Mikhail is that WinnResidential configured CrimSAFE to
search for those records.
WinnResidential’s discretionary decisions that followed
CoreLogic’s provision of the platform—its configuration of the
settings, selection of relevant records, and decision on the housing
application—led to the initial denial of housing to Mikhail. CoreLogic
did not proximately cause that denial.

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Fourth, Arroyo argues that even if WinnResidential denied
Mikhail’s application, CoreLogic should still be considered the
proximate cause of the denial based on the “cat’s paw” theory
described in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411 (2011). In Staub, a
supervisor submitted false complaints about an employee due to bias.
See id. at 414. The vice president of human resources credited the
complaints and “decided to fire him.” Id. at 415. The Supreme Court
held that the company could be liable for the discriminatory conduct
of the supervisor even though a different person made the adverse
employment decision. The Court explained that “the ultimate
decisionmaker’s exercise of judgment” did not “automatically
render[] the link to the supervisor’s bias ‘remote’ or ‘purely
contingent.’” Id. at 419 (quoting Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 9). “[T]he
ultimate decisionmaker’s judgment” could “be deemed a
superseding cause of the harm” only if it was “a ‘cause of
independent origin that was not foreseeable.’” Id. at 420 (quoting
Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996)). “But the
supervisor’s biased report may remain a causal factor if the
independent investigation [by the decisionmaker] takes it into
account without determining that the adverse action was, apart from
the supervisor’s recommendation, entirely justified.” Id. at 421.
In other words, the cat’s paw theory applies when the
decisionmaker does not exercise independent judgment. Instead,
another person “manipulates [the decisionmaker] into acting as a
mere conduit for his discriminatory intent.” Menaker v. Hofstra Univ.,
935 F.3d 20, 38 (2d Cir. 2019) (alteration omitted) (quoting Vasquez v.
Empress Ambulance Serv., Inc., 835 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2016)). The
theory does not apply to the facts established in this case. CoreLogic
provided a service that allowed WinnResidential to access accurate
information based on WinnResidential’s own decisions about which

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records were relevant. And CoreLogic expressly disclaimed any
suggestion that the information in its database dictated a particular
disposition of the rental application. The disposition was instead a
matter of applying the housing provider’s own “screening policies.”
CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *5. Even assuming that those policies
could be shown to have a disparate impact that violates the FHA,
those policies did not originate with CoreLogic. The trial did not
establish that WinnResidential was “acting as a mere conduit” for
CoreLogic’s policies when it evaluated Mikhail’s application.
Menaker, 935 F.3d at 38 (quoting Vasquez, 835 F.3d at 272). As a result,
the cat’s paw theory does not apply. It cannot rescue Arroyo’s
disparate-impact claim regarding race and national origin.
III
In addition to the disparate-impact claim, Arroyo alleged that
CoreLogic violated the FHA by discriminating against Mikhail on the
basis of his handicap. The FHA makes it unlawful to “discriminate
against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection with such dwelling” based on the person’s “handicap.”
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). “Discrimination” includes “a refusal to make
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services,
when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
Arroyo argued that CoreLogic discriminated on the basis of
Mikhail’s handicap in two ways. First, CoreLogic’s policy regarding
the disclosure of consumer reports had a disparate impact on the
handicapped. Second, CoreLogic refused to provide the reasonable
accommodation of allowing Arroyo to access Mihail’s report based
on the documentation she provided.

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The district court granted summary judgment to CoreLogic on
both claims. The district court concluded that the requirement of
submitting a copy of the conservatorship certificate with a visible seal
before disclosing Mikhail’s file was reasonable rather than
discriminatory. We agree with the district court.
A
We evaluate this disparate-impact claim under the burden-
shifting framework described above. See Rodriguez v. Vill. Green
Realty, Inc., 788 F.3d 31, 40 n.11 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff first must
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Then “the burden shifts
to the defendant to assert a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale
for the challenged decision.” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Shane, 350 F.3d
39, 47 (2d Cir. 2003)). At that point, “the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to demonstrate that discrimination was the real reason for
the defendant’s action.” Id. (quoting Mitchell, 350 F.3d at 47).
Arroyo alleged that CoreLogic discriminated against Mikhail
by requiring that all third parties requesting a disclosure provide a
power of attorney. Because a person subject to an involuntary
conservatorship cannot provide a power of attorney, this purported
requirement “effectively prevent[s] substantially any conserved
person in Connecticut from obtaining copies of their tenant-screening
reports from CoreLogic.” Appellants’ Br. 49.
The record at summary judgment, however, did not suggest
that CoreLogic maintained a policy of requiring a court-appointed
conservator to provide a power of attorney to receive the
conservatee’s consumer file. Arroyo was “responsible for isolating
and identifying the specific [housing] practices that are allegedly
responsible for any observed statistical disparities.” Smith v. City of
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005) (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v.

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40
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989)); see Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. at
533 (noting that Smith and other cases “provide essential background
and instruction” for the FHA).
Although CoreLogic initially told Arroyo that she needed to
submit a power of attorney to receive Mikhail’s file, the record did not
indicate that CoreLogic generally imposed this requirement.
CoreLogic’s Authentication Procedure Guide stated that a requester
could receive a third party’s file by providing a power of attorney and
instructed employees to “reach out to the Supervisor” regarding “any
scenarios” in which the requester could not satisfy that requirement.
J. App’x 192. The failure of an employee to follow the written policies
in a particular instance does not establish a policy that may serve as
the basis of disparate-impact liability. See Inclusive Communities, 576
U.S. at 543 (“[A] plaintiff challenging the decision of a private
developer to construct a new building in one location rather than
another will not easily be able to show this is a policy causing a
disparate impact because such a one-time decision may not be a
policy at all.”).11
On appeal, Arroyo argues that the district court’s post-trial
finding that CoreLogic willfully violated the FCRA contradicts the
11 A single discriminatory incident might lead to liability under a theory of
disparate treatment rather than disparate impact. See Rodriguez v. Bear
Sterns Cos., Inc., No. 07-CV-1816, 2009 WL 5184702, at *16 (D. Conn. Dec. 22,
2009) (“While isolated incidents may give rise to a discriminatory treatment
claim under the FHA, they do not support a disparate impact claim.”); see
also Bennett v. Roberts, 295 F.3d 687, 698 (7th Cir. 2002) (“To establish a prima
facie case of disparate impact, … [i]solated and singular incidents generally
are insufficient.”). Arroyo raised a disparate-treatment claim in her
complaint, but she did not oppose CoreLogic’s motion for summary
judgment on that claim, see CFHC, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 312, and she does not
raise it as an issue on appeal.

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conclusion it reached at summary judgment. Following the trial, the
district court determined that CoreLogic willfully violated the FCRA
because the insistence on a power of attorney was “not a one-off
circumstance involving one or two employees who made a mistake”
but reflected the fact that “[t]he policy only identifies a power of
attorney as a means of validating a third party’s agency over a
consumer.” CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *24. But the need to account
for conservatorships was “an entirely foreseeable circumstance as
many people are subject to conservatorships,” and “CoreLogic’s
written policies entirely overlooked this group of people.” Id.
Even if the written policies overlooked the foreseeable
circumstance that a conservator might request a consumer file—and
that the request might therefore result in a period in which the
company requested a power of attorney before the intervention of a
supervisor—it does not follow that the policies “predictably result[]
in a disparate impact.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a). Arroyo argues that she
did not need to provide statistical evidence of a disparate impact
because the policies inevitably result in a disparate impact. See
Appellants’ Reply Br. 48 & n.175. But in this case, the record
established that the policies had no such impact. The uncontroverted
evidence identified at summary judgment—and then presented at
trial—showed that CoreLogic had never encountered a request from
a conservator for a conservatee’s consumer file. See CFHC, 478
F. Supp. 3d at 282. Not only did Arroyo present “no statistics or other
proof demonstrating that the [challenged] practices have a
significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on the physically
disabled,” Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1218 (11th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 306 (9th
Cir. 1997)), but the record established the absence of such an impact.
Cf. id. (“[I]t ‘is not sufficient for disparate impact purposes’ to show

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only that an ordinance ‘prevents a handicapped person from living in
a particular house.’”) (quoting Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352
F.3d 565, 576 (2d Cir. 2003)).
Arroyo argues that some statistical evidence identified at
summary judgment suggested a disparate impact. She says that
“people with disabilities comprise only 11% of Connecticut’s
population, but comprise 100% of those harmed by CoreLogic’s
policy.” Appellants’ Reply Br. 50 n.184. But it does not follow from
these data that conservatees other than Mikhail were or will be
affected by CoreLogic’s policies. It is also not correct that all
conservatees will necessarily be considered disabled for purposes of
the FHA. The FHA excludes from the definition of “handicap” an
“addiction to a controlled substance.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). But
“substance use disorder” is a reason to impose a conservatorship in
Connecticut.12
Arroyo argues that at summary judgment the district court
should not have credited the affidavit of a CoreLogic employee
asserting that CoreLogic had never received another conservator’s
request for a consumer file. But the district court was not required to
discount testimony by making a credibility determination at
summary judgment. See Kaytor v. Electric Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545-
46 (2d Cir. 2010). Arroyo was instead required to identify evidence
sufficient to raise a question of material fact as to whether another
conservatee had been affected by CoreLogic’s policies. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).13
12 Office of the Probate Court Administrator, Connecticut Probate Courts,
2018-2019 Biennial Report, at 11 (Jan. 13, 2021).
13 The district court later decided that trial testimony by the same affiant
about a different issue was unpersuasive. See CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at

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43
The district court considered whether the disparate-impact
claim could survive summary judgment on the theory that CoreLogic
required conservators to “provide more onerous documentation of
their authority than an individual holding a power of attorney.”
CFHC, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 310. We agree with the district court that
CoreLogic was still entitled to summary judgment on the claim even
if this theory established a prima facie case of discrimination. At the
second step of the burden-shifting framework, CoreLogic identified a
legitimate business justification for requiring Arroyo to submit
additional documentation before disclosing Mikhail’s file. Federal
law requires CoreLogic to obtain “proper identification” from a party
before disclosing a consumer report. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(a)(1).
CoreLogic must also “adopt reasonable procedures … with regard to
the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such
information.” Id. § 1681(b). In this case, Arroyo submitted with her
disclosure request a copy of her conservator certificate that lacked a
visible seal. The certificate, however, stated that it was “not valid
without court of probate seal impressed.” J. App’x 463. Requiring that
the documentation establish the validity of the conservatorship
certificate was a legitimate reason for requiring Arroyo to submit a
copy of the certificate with a visible seal.
B
Arroyo’s failure-to-accommodate claim fails for similar
reasons. She needed to show at summary judgment that “the
accommodation requested was reasonable.” Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc.,
*12 n.6 (disagreeing with her “interpretation of the internal notes”). Not
only was that issue unrelated to the summary judgment decision, but “the
district court’s grant of summary judgment must be examined
independently of the evidence presented at trial.” Griffin v. Sirva Inc., 835
F.3d 283, 287 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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44
759 F.3d 140, 156 (2d Cir. 2014). “Requested accommodations are
reasonable where the cost is modest and they do not pose an undue
hardship or a substantial burden on the housing provider.” Id. Arroyo
requested that CoreLogic accommodate Mikhail’s handicap by
accepting the conservatorship certificate as she submitted it—without
a visible seal. But that was not a reasonable accommodation request
because it would have required CoreLogic to ignore the certificate’s
own proviso that it was valid only with an impressed seal, which was
not visible in the copy Arroyo submitted.
Arroyo relies on cases involving other documents and laws. In
Warfield v. Byron, for example, the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument
that the lack of a seal on a photocopy of a summons deprived the
district court of jurisdiction. See 137 F. App’x 651, 656 (5th Cir. 2005).
But the conservatorship certificate, unlike the summons, expressly
required an impressed seal to establish its validity. In Schwab v.
GMAC Mortgage Corporation, the Third Circuit held that the lack of a
notary’s embossment on a photocopy of a mortgage did not affect the
validity of the mortgage for recording purposes. See 333 F.3d 135, 137-
38 (3d Cir. 2003). The applicable statute required a visible seal on the
photocopy but did not require that the embossment be visible. “The
statute thus makes a sharp distinction between the seal, which must
be visible on photographic recording processes, and the embossing,
which need not have that attribute.” Id. at 138. The Third Circuit
adhered to the statutory requirement regarding the visibility of the
seal. Its opinion did not suggest that it would be unreasonable to
adhere to the requirement of the conservatorship certificate that it be
impressed with a seal by requesting a copy that reflected one.
Arroyo says that “there is no apparent reason to apply visible
seal requirements more strenuously in Connecticut than other states.”
Appellants’ Br. 53. But the certificate states on its face that it is not

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45
valid without the impressed seal. See J. App’x 463. It was not
unreasonable for CoreLogic to confirm the validity of the certificate
and thereby Arroyo’s legal authority to obtain Mikhail’s report. The
FCRA requires CoreLogic to “adopt reasonable procedures … with
regard to … confidentiality.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b), and it did not exceed
that mandate here.14
Arroyo suggests that CoreLogic’s delay in telling her that a
copy of the conservatorship certificate would be acceptable if the copy
had a visible seal was “tantamount to a denial of a reasonable
accommodation.” Appellants’ Br. 56 (citing Logan v. Matveevskii, 57
F. Supp. 3d 234, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). Even if in some circumstances
an “indeterminate delay” may be equated with “an outright denial,”
Groome Res. Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 199-200 (5th Cir.
2000), that equation does not hold when Arroyo’s behavior
contributed to the delay. Cf. Logan, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 271 (“In assessing
whether a defendant has constructively denied a plaintiff’s request
for an accommodation through unreasonable delay, courts often
consider whether the delay was caused by the defendant’s
unreasonableness … as opposed to mere bureaucratic incompetence
or other comparatively benign reasons.”).
14 Arroyo references 12 C.F.R. § 1022.137, which imposes special
requirements on a “nationwide specialty consumer reporting agency.” The
district court rejected any argument based on the regulation because “the
regulation was only raised for the first time in a reply brief without any
meaningful analysis of its application to the facts of this case” and Arroyo
“presented no legal authority or argument that this regulation establishes a
private right of action.” CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *22. On appeal, Arroyo
acknowledges that the regulation might “not provide a private cause of
action” and that she “never pleaded a claim” pursuant to the regulation.
Appellants’ Reply Br. 38-39. Under these circumstances, we see no error in
the conclusion of the district court.

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Arroyo’s first disclosure request form was incomplete and
CoreLogic attempted to send her a letter in June 2016 to notify her of
the deficiency. See J. App’x 148-49. She called back two months later,
but she did not submit any new forms after that call. See id. at 149.
CoreLogic referred the matter to a supervisor and legal counsel, and
Arroyo finally sent new materials in November 2016. See id. at 150.
When CoreLogic called to discuss that form, it did not hear back until
mid-December, when the CFHC became involved on her behalf. See
id. at 151. This record does not permit the inference that the delay
amounted to a constructive denial of Arroyo’s request. See Logan, 57
F. Supp. 3d at 271-72 (relying on “affirmative evidence of [the
housing authority’s] good faith in responding to Plaintiff’s request,”
including that “[d]espite th[e] lack of response, THA nevertheless
followed up”).
IV
A claim under the FCRA may be asserted on Mikhail’s behalf
because a defendant that violates the statute “with respect to any
consumer” is “liable to that consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).
Mikhail’s claim relies on the proposition that he had a right for his
mother to receive his consumer report. A consumer has a right to a
disclosure only if he “furnish[es] proper identification.” Id.
§ 1681h(a)(1). The furnishing of proper identification is a “condition
precedent” to Mikhail’s right to receive his file. Ogbon v. Beneficial
Credit Servs., Inc., No. 10-CV-3760, 2013 WL 1430467, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 8, 2013); see also Clay v. Equifax, Inc., 762 F.2d 952, 960 (11th Cir.
1985) (“We emphasize that a disclosure under section 1681g is
required only ‘upon proper request and identification’ of the
consumer.”). Neither Arroyo nor Mikhail submitted “proper
identification” that would allow CoreLogic to conclude that a valid
request came on behalf of Mikhail. See CFHC, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 306.

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For that reason, Mikhail was never entitled to have his mother receive
his consumer file.
Arroyo argues that the FCRA imposes liability based not on
CoreLogic’s failure to disclose the consumer report but on its “willful
failure to properly inform Ms. Arroyo what additional identification
was needed,” which “effectively prevented her from obtaining the file
disclosure on Mr. Arroyo’s behalf.” Appellants’ Reply Br. 33. The
district court similarly concluded that CoreLogic set an impossible
condition that functioned as a constructive denial of the disclosure
request. See CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *23 (“A consumer reporting
agency cannot circumvent its legal obligation to disclose a consumer
report by making it impossible for a consumer to properly request
it. … CoreLogic required Ms. Arroyo to produce a document that she
legally could not produce, thereby making it impossible for her to
obtain her conserved son’s consumer report.”) (emphasis added).
The argument fails because Arroyo could not establish that,
absent the “impossible condition,” she would have submitted proper
identification. The undisputed evidence showed that even after
Arroyo received clear instructions to submit the conservatorship
certificate with a visible seal, she did not do so. As a result, she did
not show that her failure to submit proper identification and to obtain
the disclosure resulted from CoreLogic’s conduct. See id. at *25 (“[T]he
evidence does not show whether, and if so when, Ms. Arroyo would
have furnished proper identification for the consumer
report …. There was no evidence presented that she ever furnished
proper identification even after she knew what was needed.”).15
15 CoreLogic argues that the FCRA claims should be dismissed for lack of
standing because whether Mikhail suffered an injury from the late
disclosure relies on undue speculation. But the disclosure of the file would

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CONCLUSION
We vacate the judgment of the district court insofar as it
considered the claim of the CFHC on the merits, and we dismiss the
CFHC’s appeal for lack of standing. We affirm the judgment insofar
as it held that CoreLogic was not liable to Arroyo under the FHA. We
reverse the judgment insofar as the district court imposed liability on
CoreLogic under the FCRA.
have allowed Arroyo to obtain an earlier dismissal of Mikhail’s then-
pending charge in Pennsylvania. That suffices to establish an injury caused
by the delayed disclosure.

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