Lee v. Greenwood

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23-7432-cr
Lee v. Greenwood
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
August Term 2024
Argued: March 17, 2025
Decided: July 28, 2025
No. 23-7432-cr
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA
Appellee,
v.
K ARL S EBASTIAN G REENWOOD
Defendant-Appellee,
MARK S. SCOTT, RUJA IGNATOVA, AKA CRYPTOQUEEN, KONSTANTIN
IGNATOV, DAVID R. PIKE, FRANK SCHNEIDER, IRINIA DILKINSKA
Defendants,
v.
MATTHEW R USSELL L EE

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Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York
No. 1:17-cr-630-5, Edgardo Ramos, Judge.
Before: Parker, Park, and Nathan, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Matthew Lee appeals from an order of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Ramos, J.)
denying his motion to unseal and unredact Defendant-Appellee Karl
Greenwood’s sentencing submission. On appeal, Lee argues that he
enjoys a right of access to Greenwood’s sentencing memorandum and
sentencing exhibits. We conclude that a First Amendment right of
access attaches to Greenwood’s sentencing memorandum and
sentencing exhibits and therefore requires the district court to make
individualized findings to justify sealing those materials. Although
the district court’s findings adequately justified the narrowly tailored
redactions in Greenwood’s sentencing memorandum, the district
court did not adequately justify its decision to seal Greenwood’s
sentencing exhibits. Accordingly, we VACATE in part the order of the
district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

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Brian D. Ginsberg, Brendan P.
Hall, Harris Beach PLLC,
White Plains, NY, for
Appellant.
JULIA C ATANIA, Justin S.
Weddle, Weddle Law PLLC,
New York, NY, for Defendant-
Appellee.
NATHAN, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-Appellee Karl Greenwood pled guilty to various
charges related to a cryptocurrency scam. In advance of sentencing,
Greenwood submitted a partially redacted sentencing memorandum
and accompanying exhibits, most of which the district court sealed
entirely. Appellant Matthew Lee of Inner City Press submitted a
letter-motion requesting the district court unseal and unredact
Greenwood’s sentencing submission. The district court denied Lee’s
motion, and Lee appeals from that denial. Lee contends that the
district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for two
reasons: one, because he has a right to access the sentencing
submission; and two, because the district court did not sufficiently
explain the wholesale sealing of Greenwood’s sentencing exhibits.
We agree with Lee that the First Amendment right of access attaches
to Greenwood’s sentencing submissions and requires the district
court to make individualized findings to justify sealing. We conclude

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that the district court’s findings adequately justified the narrowly
tailored redactions to Greenwood’s sentencing memorandum but did
not adequately explain its decision to seal Greenwood’s sentencing
exhibits. For the reasons that follow, the order of the District Court is
V ACATED in part, and the case is R EMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
From 2014 to 2018, Karl Greenwood ran a cryptocurrency scam
through a company he co-founded, through which he defrauded
millions of investors out of more than $4.5 billion. In 2018, he was
indicted in the Southern District of New York on various conspiracy
and fraud charges. Greenwood eventually pled guilty to conspiracy
to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit money
laundering.
In advance of sentencing, Greenwood filed a sentencing
submission that included a partially redacted sentencing
memorandum and forty-five accompanying exhibits, thirty-four of
which were filed entirely under seal. The partially redacted
sentencing memorandum sought a sentence of time served and
discussed the harsh conditions under which Greenwood was
detained in Thailand and in the Metropolitan Correction Center,
including at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. The unredacted
exhibits consisted of certificates that Greenwood earned while
incarcerated. The remaining exhibits, though filed under seal,
included several character reference letters from family and friends,

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which were excerpted in unredacted form in Greenwood’s sentencing
memorandum. See App’x 94–99.
The day after Greenwood filed his sentencing submission,
Appellant Matthew Russell Lee filed a letter motion. Lee is with Inner
City Press, which covers, among other things, criminal cases in the
Southern District of New York. Lee’s letter-motion indicated that
Inner City Press was reporting on Greenwood’s criminal case and
opposed the redactions and sealings in the sentencing submission.
He asked the district court to deny the redactions and sealings or to
provide Inner City Press an opportunity to be heard on the scope of
the redactions. Greenwood opposed Lee’s motion, arguing that he
had appropriately redacted information regarding his mental and
physical health, the health of his family and friends, and descriptions
that could be viewed as raising complaints about law enforcement.
Greenwood further offered that the sealed exhibits consisted of
medical records, health reports, and letters of support from family
and friends, and that sealing was warranted to protect the privacy of
Greenwood and his supporters. The government took no position.
The district court denied Lee’s motion to unseal Greenwood’s
sentencing submission. The order explained the denial as follows:
The Court finds that unsealing is not warranted in that
the redactions in Defendant’s sentencing submission are
appropriately limited to Defendant and his family’s
medical information, his family’s identities and personal
information, and other similarly protected information.
Accordingly, the motion to unseal Defendant’s
sentencing submission, Doc. 567, is DENIED.

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Special App’x 1.
The district court subsequently sentenced Greenwood. Lee
then appealed from the order denying his motion to unseal and
unredact.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Lee argues that the district court abused its
discretion in denying the motion to unseal the exhibits and to
unredact Greenwood’s sentencing memorandum because he had a
right of access to the sentencing submission. We hold that the First
Amendment right of access applies to sentencing memoranda and
accompanying exhibits, which therefore can be sealed only if
“specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that closure
is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.” Matter of N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987)
(quotation marks omitted). Although the district court’s findings
adequately justified the narrowly tailored redactions in Greenwood’s
sentencing memorandum, we conclude that the district court did not
adequately explain the decision to seal the thirty-four exhibits in their
entirety. Accordingly, we vacate and remand the district court’s
denial of Lee’s motion as to the sealed exhibits.
I. Jurisdiction
This Court typically has jurisdiction over appeals from denials
of motions to unredact or unseal. See In re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d at
113. However, Greenwood contends that Lee’s appeal should be
dismissed because Lee’s notice of appeal was filed over 14 days after

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the order from which he appeals, in purported violation of Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 4(b).
Rule 4(b) provides in relevant part that, “[i]n a criminal case, a
defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within
14 days after . . . the entry of . . . the order being appealed,” and that
the government has thirty days to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App.
P. 4(b)(1)(A)(I), (B). As both parties recognize, Rule 4(b) does not
contemplate appeals from criminal cases filed by third parties.
We conclude that Lee’s appeal is not governed by the 14-day
deadline set out for criminal defendants in Rule 4(b). A proceeding
that is “ancillary” to a criminal case and that “carries many of the
hallmarks of a civil proceeding” is civil in nature and therefore need
not comply with Rule 4(b). United States v. Bradley, 882 F.3d 390, 393
(2d Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). Bradley concerned an appeal
from a proceeding in which third parties claim an interest in
criminally forfeited property. There, we looked to the applicable
burden of proof, the underlying legal issue, and the lack of a punitive
aim, concluding that the appeal was properly treated as a civil appeal.
Id. at 392-93. These factors also counsel in favor of treating as civil a
third-party claim seeking to unredact or unseal documents in a
criminal proceeding. A motion to unseal or unredact is ancillary to
the underlying criminal case; the underlying legal issue is civil in
nature; and the motion has no punitive aim. Indeed, this Court has
recognized that a motion for disclosure of sealed papers “could have
been treated by the district court as a new civil case, as opposed to an
intervention in the pending criminal case.” In re N.Y. Times Co., 828
F.2d at 113; see also United States v. Aldawsari, 683 F.3d 660, 664 (5th

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Cir. 2012) (holding that a journalist’s challenge to a gag order barring
parties in a criminal case from communicating with news media
about the case is not governed by Rule 4(b), as “nothing in the text of
Rule 4(b) suggests that the time limit for appeals by criminal
defendants is meant to apply to third-party appeals from collateral
orders”).
Accordingly, we hold that this appeal from Greenwood’s
criminal case by a third-party claimant seeking to unredact or unseal
documents from the criminal proceeding is civil in nature. Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), providing the deadline for notices
of appeal in civil cases, therefore applies to Lee’s appeal. Under Rule
4(a)’s thirty-day deadline, Lee’s notice of appeal was timely.
II. Legal Standard
“When reviewing a district court’s decision to seal a filing or
maintain such a seal, we examine the court’s factual findings for clear
error, its legal determinations de novo, and its ultimate decision to
seal or unseal for abuse of discretion.” Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41,
47 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted). However, “since the First
Amendment is implicated, we give the documents and proceedings
close appellate scrutiny.” United States v. Erie County, 763 F.3d 235,
238 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).
“Federal courts employ two related but distinct presumptions
in favor of public access to court proceedings and records: a strong
form rooted in the First Amendment and a slightly weaker form based
in federal common law.” Newsday LLC v. County of Nassau, 730 F.3d
156, 163 (2d Cir. 2013). These presumptions derive from the principle
that “it is essential that the people themselves have the ability to learn

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of, monitor, and respond to the actions of their representatives and
their representative institutions.” Erie County, 763 F.3d at 239.
The common law right of public access turns on whether the
document at issue is a judicial document, to which the common law
presumption applies. Id. “In order to be designated a judicial
document, the item filed must be relevant to the performance of the
judicial function and useful in the judicial process.” Lugosch v.
Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation
marks omitted). Once a record is deemed a judicial document, the
court must determine the weight of the common law presumption of
access based on “the role of the material at issue in the exercise of
Article III judicial power and the resultant value of such information
to those monitoring the federal courts.” Id. (quotation marks
omitted). The court must then balance the weight of the presumption
of access against considerations counseling against disclosure, such
as “the danger of impairing law enforcement or judicial efficiency and
the privacy interests of those resisting disclosure.” Id. at 120
(quotation marks omitted).
A qualified First Amendment right of access, “understood to be
stronger than its common law ancestor and counterpart,” also
attaches to certain judicial documents. Erie County, 763 F.3d. at 239.
To determine whether the First Amendment right of access attaches
to a judicial document, this Court “considers the extent to which the
judicial documents are derived from or are a necessary corollary of
the capacity to attend the relevant proceedings.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at
120 (cleaned up).1 If the First Amendment right attaches, a court
1 A separate test, the “experience-and-logic” test, considers “whether the documents have

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record may still be sealed if “specific, on the record findings are made
demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher values and
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” In re N.Y. Times Co., 828
F.2d at 116 (quotation marks omitted).
III. Analysis
Greenwood’s sentencing submissions are judicial documents,
as Greenwood conceded in his briefing. Like other judicial
documents, sentencing submissions are “relevant to the performance
of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process.” Lugosch,
435 F.3d at 119 (quotation marks omitted). “[W]e have emphasized
that a document filed with the court is a judicial document if it would
reasonably have the tendency to influence a district court’s ruling . . .
without regard to which way the court ultimately rules or whether
the document ultimately in fact influences the court’s decision.”
Olson v. Major League Baseball, 29 F.4th 59, 89 (2d Cir. 2022) (quotation
marks omitted). Sentencing submissions are highly relevant to and
influential in sentencing proceedings, and in this way are not unlike
summary judgment motions or evidence submitted in connection
with such motions. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 49. Unsurprisingly, district
courts in our Circuit have consistently found sentencing submissions
to qualify as judicial documents. See, e.g., United States v. Munir, 953
F. Supp. 2d 470, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); United States v. Tangorra, 542 F.
historically been open to the press and general public and whether public access plays a
significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.” Newsday
LLC, 730 F.3d at 164 (quotation marks omitted). Because courts can apply either test to
court records, and because neither party argues for application of the experience-and-logic
test, we do not apply it here.

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Supp. 2d 233, 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); United States v. Sattar, 471 F. Supp.
2d 380, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
The First Amendment right of access applies to judicial
documents that are “a necessary corollary of the capacity to attend the
relevant proceedings.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120. Sentencing
memoranda and exhibits fit this bill. A “qualified First Amendment
right of access extends” to “documents submitted in connection with
judicial proceedings that themselves implicate the right of access.” In
re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d at 114. And “[t]here is little doubt that the
First Amendment right of access extends to sentencing proceedings.”
United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 2005). Sentencing
proceedings and their outcome are “of paramount importance” not
only to the criminal defendant, but also to members of the public,
including the defendant’s friends and family, victims of crimes, and
members of the community where the crime occurred. Alcantara, 396
F.3d at 198. “[I]t would be difficult to single out any aspect of
government of higher concern and importance to the people than the
manner in which criminal trials are conducted.” In re Nat’l Broad. Co.,
635 F.2d 945, 951 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980)); see also United States v. Suarez, 880
F.2d 626, 630 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the presumption of public
access “applies to documents filed in connection with criminal
proceedings”).
Because the First Amendment right of access attaches to
Greenwood’s sentencing submission, sealing of the memorandum
and exhibits must be justified by “specific, on-the-record findings that
sealing is necessary to preserve higher values and only if the sealing

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order is narrowly tailored to achieve that aim.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at
124. “Broad and general findings by the trial court . . . are not
sufficient to justify [sealing].” In re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d at 116.
Higher values that may justify redactions include “the privacy
interests of innocent third parties as well as those of defendants that
may be harmed by disclosure,” id., as well as “[f]inancial records . . . ,
family affairs, illnesses, [and] embarrassing conduct with no public
ramifications,” United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir.
1995) (“Amodeo II”).
Here, the district court’s order explained “that the redactions in
Defendant’s sentencing submission are appropriately limited to
Defendant and his family’s medical information, his family’s
identities and personal information, and other similarly protected
information.” Special App’x 1. This explanation identifies three
categories of information in the sentencing submission that
warranted redactions or sealing: medical information, third-party
information, “and other similarly protected information.” Id.
We conclude that this explanation fails to justify the full scope
of withholdings at issue. The district court’s conclusion that the
withholdings are limited to medical and personal information “and
other similarly protected information,” id., adequately explains the
redacted portions of the sentencing memorandum, which are
narrowly tailored to protect Greenwood’s privacy interests, the
privacy interests of his family and friends, and their safety. See In re
N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d at 116. The subject matter of the redacted
portions “is traditionally considered private rather than public,” and
the sensitivity of the information warrants withholding. Amodeo II, 71

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F.3d at 1051. Other redactions in the sentencing memorandum serve
the higher interest of protecting law enforcement interests. Id. at 1050.
However, the district court’s explanation fails to adequately
justify the full sealing of the exhibits to the sentencing submission.
Unlike the narrow redactions in the sentencing memorandum, thirty-
four exhibits were sealed in their entirety. And the three categories
of protected information identified by the district court do not explain
the full sealing of these exhibits. Some of the exhibits do not contain
any information related to the identities or information of
Greenwood’s family, Greenwood’s medical information, or other
traditionally sensitive information. Moreover, the sentencing
memorandum quotes, in unredacted form, passages from sealed
exhibits. See App’x 94–99. Such circumstances suggest that wholesale
sealing was not justified, and that targeted redactions may strike a
better balance in serving the First Amendment right while protecting
the privacy interests of those affected. See In re N.Y. Times Co., 828
F.2d at 116 (“To protect whatever privacy interests may be prejudiced
by disclosure of the motion papers, redaction of names and perhaps
portions of the [private] materials contained in the motion papers, or
other appropriate measures, as opposed to the wholesale sealing of
the papers, might be appropriate in this case.”). We remand for the
district court to conduct an individualized review of the sealed
exhibits, as the district court can directly communicate with parties
about particular objections and elicit the parties’ assistance in
identifying any necessary partial redactions, and therefore is “best
situated to conduct this review.” Id. at 51.

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Although we vacate in part, we stress that district courts need
not provide granular justifications for each redaction or even each
sealing, as such a requirement would place an unworkable burden on
district courts. District courts are presumed to proceed in accordance
with the law and to conduct individualized review of sealed and
redacted materials as necessary and appropriate under the
circumstances of each case. District courts need not provide line-by-
line justifications for each redaction to demonstrate that they have
conducted such an individualized review. A brief explanation may
be enough to justify the sealing or redaction of multiple filings, as long
as it demonstrates that the district court made an individualized
inquiry. Indeed, in the face of a contested motion to unseal in this
case, the district court’s one-sentence explanation was enough to
justify the redactions in Greenwood’s sentencing memorandum.
However, an explanation for sealing dozens of exhibits in their
entirety must reasonably apply to the content of all of the sealed
materials. Where it does not, we cannot confidently conclude that the
district court made an individualized inquiry.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part the district court’s denial of
Lee’s motion to unredact, as to Greenwood’s sentencing
memorandum. We VACATE in part as to the district court’s denial
of Lee’s motion to unseal the exhibits to the sentencing memorandum
and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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