United States v. Robinson

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23-8022-cr
United States v. Robinson
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
August Term 2024
Argued: October 25, 2024
Decided: April 14, 2025
No. 23-8022-cr
UNITED S TATES OF AMERICA
Appellee,
v.
D ARRELL ROBINSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York
No. 1:22-cr-403-1, Frederic Block, Judge.
Before: Livingston, Chief Judge, Leval, and Nathan, Circuit
Judges.

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Defendant-Appellant Darrell Robinson appeals from a
judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York (Block, J.) sentencing him to 50 months’ imprisonment
and three years of supervised release for his conviction on a charge of
being a felon in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g). On appeal, Robinson argues that a special condition of
supervised release allowing for the search of his electronic devices
must be vacated because it was (1) not orally pronounced at
sentencing; (2) procedurally unreasonable; and (3) overbroad in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. We conclude that none of
Robinson’s challenges prevail. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.
D ANIEL H ABIB (Colleen P.
Cassidy, on the brief), Federal
Defenders of New York, Inc.,
New York, NY, for Defendant-
Appellant.
S EAN FERN (Susan Corkery, on
the brief), Assistant United
States Attorneys, for Breon
Peace, United States Attorney
for the Eastern District of New
York, Brooklyn, NY, for
Appellee.

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NATHAN, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-Appellant Darrell Robinson was convicted, after a
guilty plea, of one count of being a felon in possession of firearms in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). At sentencing, the district court
imposed a term of 50 months’ imprisonment and three years of
supervised release. The court also imposed a special condition of
supervised release, which requires Robinson to submit to searches of
his person, property, residence, vehicle, and electronic devices upon
reasonable suspicion of a violation of a condition of supervision.
On appeal, Robinson challenges the portion of the special
search condition pertaining to his electronic devices, arguing that it
was not orally pronounced, that it is procedurally unreasonable, and
that it violates his Fourth Amendment rights. We reject these
arguments and AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
BACKGROUND
On August 8, 2022, law enforcement officers stopped and
searched Defendant-Appellant Darrell Robinson’s vehicle pursuant
to a search warrant. The officers had learned that Robinson would be
transporting guns and cash from South Carolina to a firearms sale in
Queens, New York.
The search revealed a bag containing six firearms, including:
(1) a Smith & Wesson .380 caliber pistol; (2) a Taurus 9mm pistol; (3)
a Bersa .380 caliber pistol; (4) a Springfield Armory 9mm pistol; (5) a
Smith & Wesson 9mm pistol; and (6) a Smith & Wesson .22 caliber
rifle. In a post-arrest statement, Robinson denied knowing where the
firearms came from or that they were there.

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On April 12, 2023, Robinson pled guilty to a single-count
indictment charging him with being a felon in possession of a firearm
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
Approximately five months later, the U.S. Probation Office
issued its final Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). The PSR
described the offense conduct and detailed Robinson’s extensive
criminal history, which included nine prior adult criminal
convictions. Between 2010 and 2019, Robinson was convicted of
aggravated assault, burglary, and several theft and traffic offenses.
Three of these convictions involved the use of firearms. In 2010,
Robinson was convicted of aggravated assault due to his role in
planning a shooting in which his co-defendants shot multiple times
toward the intended victim. In 2018, he was convicted of being an
accessory-after-the-fact to first-degree burglary for breaking into a
victim’s home and stealing, among other things, numerous firearms.
And in 2019, Robinson was convicted of attempted armed robbery
after he and two co-defendants robbed two delivery workers at
gunpoint. These convictions placed Robinson in a Criminal History
of Category VI under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
Probation calculated the applicable Guidelines sentence to be
63 to 78 months but recommended 60 months of incarceration. It also
recommended three years of supervised release with the following
special condition:
The defendant shall submit his person, property, house,
residence, vehicle, papers, computers (as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1)), other electronic communications or
data storage devices or media, or office to a search

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conducted by a United States probation officer. Failure
to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation of
release. The defendant shall warn any other occupants
that the premises may be subject to searches pursuant to
this condition. An officer may conduct a search pursuant
to this condition only when reasonable suspicion exists
that the defendant has violated a condition of his
supervision and that the areas to be searched contain
evidence of this violation. Any search must be
conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable
manner.
Appellant’s Br. at 6-7.
Robinson did not object to this search condition in his
sentencing submission.
At sentencing, the district court confirmed that Robinson and
his counsel had reviewed and discussed the PSR and that the defense
had no objections to it. He then adopted the factual information from
the PSR without modification and stated that he would rely on the
PSR. After considering Robinson’s criminal history, upbringing, and
family circumstances, the court sentenced Robinson to a term of 50
months of imprisonment, followed by a three-year term of supervised
release. This sentence factored in a four-level sentencing
enhancement for trafficking in firearms and a Guidelines range of 92
to 115 months, which the court applied at the Government’s request.
As to conditions of supervised release, the district court stated,
“Certainly the special condition of search is obviously indicated
here.” App’x at 92. No objection was made nor clarification sought.

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The court entered a written judgment that contained the special
search condition exactly as phrased in the PSR. After entry, Defense
counsel moved to correct the judgment by removing the search
condition as to Robinson’s “computers . . ., [and] other electronic
communications or data storage devices or media.” App’x at 111.
Robinson objected to this portion of the special condition on the
ground that it was “not order[ed]” at sentencing. Id. The district
court denied the motion, finding that the court had “met its obligation
to orally impose the special condition . . . by its clear reference” to the
PSR. App’x at 117.
Robinson timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Robinson raises three challenges to the electronic search
portion of the special condition of supervised release imposed at
sentencing. He argues that the special electronic search condition
must be stricken because (1) it was not orally pronounced at
sentencing; (2) the district court did not state its reasons for imposing
the condition; and (3) the condition deprives him of his Fourth
Amendment liberties. We disagree.
I. Adequacy of the Pronouncement
Robinson first argues that the special electronic search
condition must be vacated because it was not orally pronounced. He
contends that the district court “orally imposed only a general ‘search
condition,’” not an electronic search condition. Appellant’s Reply Br.
at 7 (emphasis added). That argument rests on the premise that the
court did not clearly communicate its intent to impose the full search

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condition recommended in the PSR because its pronouncement (1)
did not mention the PSR, and (2) was too vague to be understood as
extending to Robinson’s electronic devices. We reject that premise for
the following reasons.
“We generally review the imposition of conditions of
supervised release for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Boles, 914
F.3d 95, 111 (2d Cir. 2019). Since “any error of law necessarily
constitutes an abuse of discretion,” “[w]hen a challenge to a condition
of supervised release presents an issue of law,” our review is de
novo. Id. (quotation marks omitted). “[W]hether the spoken and
written terms of a defendant’s sentence differ impermissibly” is a
question of law. United States v. Washington, 904 F.3d 204, 207 (2d Cir.
2018). Accordingly, our review of a preserved objection to any such
asserted discrepancy is de novo. Id.
If, however, a defendant has notice that a condition of
supervised release will be imposed and fails to object in the district
court, our review is for plain error. See Washington, 904 F.3d at 207-
08. “To establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) error,
(2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” United States
v. Rivera, 115 F.4th 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2024). If these three prongs are
met, we may remedy the error if it “seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
Although Robinson contends that he lacked sufficient notice of
the electronic search condition, the condition was included in the PSR,
which defense counsel confirmed she had reviewed with Robinson.
Despite this, Robinson, through counsel, stated that he had no
objections to the PSR. Nor did he object to the court’s pronouncement

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of the search condition at sentencing. Instead, Robinson contends that
his post-sentencing motion to correct the judgment is sufficient to
preserve his objection. We need not decide that question. Since we
see no error in the district court’s pronouncement of the special
condition of supervised release, Robinson’s challenge fails under
either standard of review.
“Both the Constitution and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure grant a criminal defendant the right to be present during
sentencing.” United States v. Jacques, 321 F.3d 255, 262-63 (2d Cir. 2003)
(citing United States v. A-Abras Inc., 185 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1999), and
F ED. R. C RIM. P. 43(a)). That right generally requires district courts to
pronounce special conditions of supervised release in open court. See
United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2024); Jacques, 321 F.3d
at 263. Accordingly, “when there is a conflict between the court’s
unambiguous oral pronouncement of a special condition and the
written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.” Sims, 92 F.4th
at 125. In that scenario, we typically remand for the district court to
strike “any burdensome punishments or restrictions added in the
written judgment.” United States v. Rosado, 109 F.4th 120, 124 (2d Cir.
2024). We have suggested, however, that a district court may impose
special conditions of supervised release by clear and unambiguous
reference to conditions listed in the PSR. See United States v. Thomas,
299 F.3d 150, 152, 155 (2d Cir. 2002).
At Robinson’s sentencing, the district court pronounced the
special condition of search by clearly, albeit implicitly, referencing the
PSR, and then confirmed its imposition in the written judgment.
Although the court did not expressly cite to the PSR in imposing the

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special condition, it adopted the factual information from the PSR
earlier in the sentencing proceeding and expressed its intention to rely
on the PSR. The search condition, moreover, was the only special
condition of supervised release recommended in the PSR. No other
special conditions were recommended by the government or
otherwise raised at sentencing. Against this backdrop, the court’s
statement that “the special condition of search is obviously indicated
here” was clearly alluding to the sole special search condition in the
PSR. App’x at 92. There was simply no other special condition that
the court could have been referencing.
Nor was there any indication that the district court was
referencing anything other than the entirety of the condition in the
PSR, including the search of electronics.1 It was not the case, for
example, that the court mentioned the search of Robinson’s person,
property, residence, or vehicle while omitting his electronic devices.
See, e.g., United States v. Leyva, No. 22-202, 2023 WL 5024723, at *1 (2d
Cir. Aug. 4, 2023) (remanding for the district court to clarify which
special condition it intended to impose in such a case).
Indeed, there is no “substantive discrepancy between the
spoken and written versions of the sentence.” Rosado, 109 F.4th at 125
(quotation marks omitted); cf., e.g., id. at 123, 126 (remanding where
the district court added multiple requirements that had not been
1 Robinson’s argument that the district court’s reference to “the search condition” was too
“opaque” to communicate that an electronic search condition was being imposed hinges in
part on the assumption that the need for such a condition was not apparent because
Robinson was neither convicted of a sex offense nor of an offense involving the use of
electronic devices. Appellant’s Br. at 20. Since this assumption overlaps with Robinson’s
procedural reasonableness challenge, we address—and reject—it in the following section.

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pronounced at sentencing to three special conditions); Washington,
904 F.3d at 207-08 (remanding where the district court had orally
pronounced some, but not all, terms of a particular special condition
and then added a term in the judgment that was recommended by
Probation but was not mentioned during sentencing); United States v.
Rosario, 386 F.3d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 2004) (remanding where the written
judgment required court approval for an exemption to a special
condition to apply but the oral ruling required no such approval);
Thomas, 299 F.3d at 152, 154 (remanding where the district court did
not set forth a special condition during the sentencing hearing,
“nor . . . indicate that it would incorporate the conditions listed in the
PSR” and then included the condition in the written judgment). The
written judgment here, therefore, did not impermissibly modify the
oral ruling, but rather served to “clarify the terms of the spoken
sentence.” Rosado, 109 F.4th at 124.
Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in
pronouncing the special electronic search condition.
II. Procedural Reasonableness
Robinson next argues that the special electronic search
condition should be stricken because the district court did not state its
reasons for imposing the condition. He contends that the condition is
not supported by the record because he has not been convicted of a
sex offense or of any offense involving the use of a computer or other
electronic device. We reject this argument.

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Even assuming that Robinson’s claim had been properly
preserved and subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review,
see Sims, 92 F.4th at 122, Robinson’s challenge would fail.2
“[F]or the imposition of special conditions of supervised release
to be procedurally reasonable, a district court must make an
individualized assessment . . . and state on the record the reason for
imposing [the condition].” Sims, 92 F.4th at 123 (cleaned up). At its
core, the procedural reasonableness inquiry seeks to ensure that the
district court has “properly accounted for the factors that constrain its
sentencing discretion.” United States v. Kunz, 68 F.4th 748, 759 (2d Cir.
2023). Thus, the court must “make findings specific to the defendant,
connecting those findings to the applicable § 3553(a) factors,” such as
the nature of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant. Sims, 92 F.4th at 123. The court must also consider
whether a special condition will impact a cognizable liberty interest
and, if so, make “particularized findings that it does not constitute a
greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary to
accomplish the goals of sentencing.” Id. at 124-25. The failure to
articulate this reasoning on the record is error. See United States v.
Betts, 886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018).
But even in the absence of an explanation, we may still uphold
a condition if “the district court’s reasoning is self-evident in the
2 We assume, without deciding, that if Robinson’s post-sentencing motion to correct the
judgment were sufficient to preserve his oral pronouncement challenge, it would also be
sufficient to preserve his procedural unreasonableness challenge. See United States v.
Wilson, 920 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that “if a defendant objects at a
sentencing hearing in a manner which fairly alerts the court and opposing counsel to the
nature of the claim, the objection is sufficient to preserve the argument on appeal, even if
the defendant fails to raise a specific rationale for the objection” (cleaned up)).

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record.” Betts, 886 F.3d at 202 (quotation marks omitted). When the
reason for a special condition “is self-evident in the record . . . and the
condition[] meet[s] the purposes of supervised release,” any error in
this respect is harmless. United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 41 n.1 (2d
Cir. 2004).
Here, there is no question that the district court erred in failing
to conduct an individualized assessment when imposing the special
search condition. However, given Robinson’s extensive history of
recidivism and his dishonesty with law enforcement officers, we find
that the need for this special condition is self-evident on the record.
Robinson’s criminal history is prolific. As the record shows, he
has accumulated nine criminal convictions before the age of 30. And,
importantly, he committed the instant offense while under post-
release supervision. The district court stressed this history at
sentencing, noting Robinson’s high risk of recidivism, the need for
individual deterrence, and the threat to public safety.
The record also reflects that Robinson lied to the police in his
post-arrest statement when he denied knowledge of the presence or
provenance of the firearms in his vehicle. Viewed in light of his
criminal history, Robinson’s dishonesty speaks to his willingness to
use deceit to conceal criminal conduct, and so casts further doubt on
his ability to deal in good faith with law enforcement while on
supervised release.
Under these circumstances, the special search condition,
including of Robinson’s electronics, is necessary for ensuring the
effectiveness of supervision. Indeed, it operates as an important
means for enforcing the court’s other conditions and enabling the

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detection of evidence of supervised release violations. For these
reasons, the condition is reasonably related to Robinson’s history and
characteristics, and it meets the purposes of supervised release.3
Although the justification for electronic search portion of the
condition would be even more apparent if Robinson’s convictions
involved sex offenses or the use of electronics, see U.S.S.G.
§ 5D1.3(d)(7)(C) (recommending electronic search conditions for
those convicted of sex offenses); United States v. Thomas, 827 F. App’x
72, 75 (2d Cir. 2020) (noting that “[w]e have frequently approved of
[electronic search] conditions where the conduct underlying a
conviction or prior conviction has involved the use of computers or
other electronic devices”), we have never held that an electronic
search term would only be appropriate in those circumstances. 4 We
conclude on the present facts that the justification for imposition of
the condition is self-evident on the record.5
3 To the extent that Robinson further asserts that the special search condition was so
restrictive as to require an on-the-record justification, we reject that assertion. For the
reasons explained in Part III, we do not believe that the condition imposes such an onerous
burden on Robinson’s Fourth Amendment liberties so as to render the self-evident
rationale insufficient justification. Cf. Kunz, 68 F.4th at 762 (finding that, “in the absence of
any showing” of a “sufficiently onerous burden” on the supervisee’s liberty, the “self-
evident rationale” supported a special condition requiring him to bear the costs of his
computer monitoring restrictions).
4 Indeed, both electronic and non-electronic search conditions are often crucial for ensuring
the effectiveness of supervision; on the facts of this case, we see no reason to treat one more
stringently than the other.
5 Neither United States v. Jimenez, No. 22-1022-CR, 2024 WL 1152535 (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 2024)
(summary order), nor United States v. Morrishow, No. 23-7622-CR, 2024 WL 4690524 (2d Cir.
Nov. 6, 2024) (summary order), on which Robinson relies, suggest the opposite conclusion.
Although the district court’s reasoning for imposing an electronic search condition was not
self-evident on the record in those cases, Robinson has accumulated more prior adult
criminal convictions than either of those defendants and lied to law enforcement following
his arrest, which distinguishes his case.

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Therefore, the district court’s failure to state its reasons for
imposing the challenged special condition is harmless error.
III. Fourth Amendment
Robinson’s final argument challenges the constitutionality of
the electronic search condition, which he contends deprives him of
his Fourth Amendment liberties.6 We are unpersuaded.
Once again, we assume that Robinson’s challenge was
preserved and subject to an abuse of discretion standard. See Boles,
914 F.3d at 111. We also note that “where a condition of supervised
release implicates a constitutional right, we conduct a more searching
review in light of the heightened constitutional concerns” at issue.
United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298, 304 (2d Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).
In any event, given his reduced expectation of privacy while on
supervised release, we hold that the special electronic search
condition, which requires reasonable suspicion, does not deprive
Robinson of any Fourth Amendment liberties.
The Fourth Amendment guards “against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. C ONST . AMEND. IV. A search generally
is unreasonable “unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial
warrant issued upon probable cause.” Oliveras, 96 F.4th at 305. Under
the special needs doctrine, however, warrantless search conditions
6 As part of this argument, Robinson asserts that the electronic search condition “involves
a greater deprivation of . . . liberty than is reasonably necessary” to achieve the goals of
sentencing. Appellant Br. at 22. Accordingly, his constitutional challenge might also be
understood as a substantive unreasonableness challenge. See Kunz, 68 F.4th at 759
(suggesting that challenging a special condition as “necessarily more restrictive than is
called for under the[] circumstances” is a substantive unreasonableness argument
(emphasis omitted)).

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may be constitutionally reasonable where (1) the government asserts
a special need, “the importance of which derives both from the
particular context in which it seeks to implement searches . . . and
what the searches are designed to discover,” (2) those subject to the
search “enjoy a diminished expectation of privacy, partly occasioned
by the special nature of the situation, and party derived from the fact
that they are notified in advance of the search policy,” and (3) the
search program at issue “seek[s] a minimum of intrusiveness coupled
with maximum effectiveness so that the searches bear a close and
substantial relationship to the government’s special needs.” Id.
(cleaned up). The condition must thus be “sufficiently supported by
the record.” Id. at 301.
As relevant here, we have long recognized that convicted
persons on supervised release have a diminished expectation of
privacy due to the special needs of supervised release and the
defendant’s notice of the condition. See United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d
446, 458-61 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Oliveras, 96 F.4th at 309-11 (applying
Reyes). This recognition springs from the principle that the
government “interest[] in reducing recidivism and thereby
promoting reintegration and positive citizenship . . . warrant[s]
privacy intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under the
Fourth Amendment.” Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 853 (2006).7
7 Although Samson v. California, 547 U.S. at 857, concerned suspicionless searches of
parolees, we have observed that the diminished Fourth Amendment rights of parolees
“appl[y] with equal force to individuals . . . subject to federal supervised release—the
reformed successor to federal parole,” Reyes, 283 F.3d at 458, and relied on Fourth
Amendment case law involving parolees to justify warrantless searches of supervisees, see,
e.g., Oliveras, 96 F.4th at 305-13; Reyes, 283 F.3d at 458-61.

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The question thus becomes whether the special electronic search
condition imposed on Robinson is sufficiently narrowly tailored to
pass constitutional muster. We conclude that it is.
Under the terms of the condition, a search of Robinson’s
person, property, residence, vehicle, or electronics would only be
permitted “when reasonable suspicion exists” that (1) Robinson
violated a condition of supervision, and (2) the area to be searched
contains evidence of the violation. App’x at 101. These potential
searches must also occur at a “reasonable time and in a reasonable
manner.” Id. Given these limitations and the supervisee’s diminished
expectation of privacy, we find that it does not violate the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches.
In asking us to invalidate the special search condition as
unconstitutional, Robinson relies heavily on Riley v. California, 573
U.S. 373 (2014). In that case, the Supreme Court held that warrantless
searches of cellphones seized incident to arrest violate the Fourth
Amendment, reasoning that the search of digital information did not
further the government interests animating this exception to the
warrant requirement and worked a more substantial intrusion into an
individual’s privacy rights than the brief physical searches previously
contemplated by the case law. Id. at 386-98, 401. But Riley recognized
that “other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless
search of a particular phone.” Id. at 401-02. That is the case here. The
comparatively circumscribed privacy interests of supervisees and the
substantial government interest in “determin[ing] whether the
supervisee is violating the terms of his supervised release, including
the condition that he not commit any further crimes,” Oliveras, 96

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F.4th at 312 (quotation marks omitted), remain sufficient to justify the
warrantless search of electronic devices as permitted here.
We have already recognized as much in United States v.
Lajeunesse, 85 F.4th 679 (2d Cir. 2023). Indeed, Lajeunesse expressly
rejected the argument that Riley’s heightened protections for cell
phones rendered a probation condition requiring submission to
electronic searches an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, at least
upon reasonable suspicion that evidence of illegal activity could be
found on defendant’s phone. Id. at 686-89. Since “probationers are
entitled to a greater degree of privacy than are parolees,” id. at 686,
and the diminished Fourth Amendment rights of parolees “appl[y]
with equal force” to supervisees, Reyes, 283 F.3d at 458, that
conclusion defeats Robinson’s Riley argument.
Our decision to uphold the electronic search condition at issue
here comports with the broader arc of our Fourth Amendment case
law. Of particular note, our Court has held that the special needs
doctrine permits suspicionless search conditions “when sufficiently
supported by the record.” Oliveras, 96 F4th at 313. Suspicionless
search conditions are, in an important sense, more intrusive than
those requiring reasonable suspicion. Here, because the condition
requires reasonable suspicion, is narrowly tailored, and is supported
by the record, it is less intrusive than the Oliveras condition. 8
8 The search condition at issue in that case allowed “the probation officer to conduct a
suspicionless search of the defendant’s person, property, vehicle, place of residence or any
other property under his or her control.” Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298 at 301-02.

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Accordingly, we find that special electronic search condition
does not unconstitutionally infringe upon Robinson’s Fourth
Amendment liberties.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York is AFFIRMED.

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