Peña Garcia v. Department of Labor

23-8066
Peña Garcia v. Department of Labor
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
August Term 2025
No. 23-8066
L UIS PEÑA GARCIA,
Petitioner,
v.
D IRECTOR , O FFICE OF WORKERS’ C OMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED
S TATES D EPARTMENT OF L ABOR , IMS INSURANCE C OMPANY OF PUERTO
RICO, C ALZADILLA CONSTRUCTION C ORPORATION,
Respondents.
On Petition for Review from the United States Department of Labor
Benefits Review Board.
ARGUED: N OVEMBER 12, 2025
D ECIDED: MARCH 5, 2026
Before: WALKER , C ARNEY , and N ARDINI , Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Luis Peña Garcia is a resident of Puerto Rico who
sustained work-related injuries in May 1994 that rendered him

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permanently disabled. The United States Department of Labor found
that Peña’s former employer and its insurance carrier were required
to provide him with medical care and treatment pursuant to Section
7 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, as
extended by the Defense Base Act. In March 2019, consistent with
Puerto Rico’s regulatory scheme for physician-recommended medical
marijuana, a doctor licensed in Puerto Rico suggested “edibles such
as cookies infused with specific dosage of medical cannabis” as
treatment for Peña’s chronic pain. Peña subsequently sought
reimbursement for these cannabis-infused products, but his request
was denied. He then petitioned the Department of Labor’s Office of
Administrative Law Judges for an order stating that doctor-
recommended medical cannabis treatments are covered under
Section 7, but he was again rebuffed on the ground that marijuana’s
classification as a Schedule I substance under the Controlled
Substances Act meant that the drug had no accepted medical use
under federal law. Peña appealed this denial to the Department of
Labor’s Benefits Review Board, which again declined to order
reimbursement of his cannabis-infused edibles. We agree with this
determination, and thus DENY Peña’s petition for review.
E MILIO F. S OLER , E SQ., San Juan, Puerto
Rico, for Petitioner.
WILLIAM M. B USH, Attorney, Office of the
Solicitor (Jonathan L. Snare, Jennifer
Feldman Jones, and Sean Bajkowki on the
brief), U.S. Department of Labor,
Washington, DC, for Respondent Director,
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs,
U.S. Department of Labor.

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Manuel Porro Vizcarra, San Juan, Puerto
Rico, for Respondents IMS Insurance Company
of Puerto Rico and Calzadilla Construction
Corporation.
WILLIAM J. N ARDINI , Circuit Judge:
Petitioner-Appellant Luis Peña Garcia (Peña) initiated the
present action to obtain an order from the United States Department
of Labor (“DOL”) requiring his former employer and its insurance
carrier to reimburse the costs of medicinal cannabis-infused edibles
under Section 7 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), 33 U.S.C. § 907, as extended by the
Defense Base Act (“DBA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651–1654. This Section
requires employers to “furnish” eligible workers injured on the job
with “medical, surgical, and other attendance or treatment . . . for such
period as the nature of the [covered] injury . . . may require.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 907(a). The DOL denied this request on the ground that marijuana
is classified as a Schedule I substance under the Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”), 21 U.S.C. § 812, and thus cannot have any
accepted medical use as a matter of federal law. By a 2-1 vote, the
DOL’s Benefits Review Board affirmed this decision. We agree with
the determination of the Benefits Review Board, and therefore DENY
Peña’s petition for review.

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I. Background
Peña is a resident of Puerto Rico who sustained work-related
injuries to his neck, back, and upper and lower extremities in May
1994, resulting in permanent total disability. On December 29, 1998,
the DOL found that Peña’s former employer and its insurance carrier
were required to provide him with medical care and treatment
pursuant to Section 7 of the LHWCA, as extended by the DBA.1
On March 23, 2019, Dr. Michael Soler, a physician licensed to
practice in Puerto Rico, observed the following:
[Peña] has steadily responded well and with no
complications to edibles such as cookies infused with a
specific dosage of medical cannabis for over one year.
This seems to be one of the only treatments that best
works for [Peña] at night time due to its absorption and
dose doubling effect. Please expedite approval in order
to avoid discontinuation and patient’s decompensation.
App’x at 2. Dr. Soler’s request was consistent with Puerto Rican law,
which provides that “medical use of cannabis” can be recommended
to treat certain conditions established by the Commonwealth’s
Medical Cannabis Regulatory Board. 2017 P.R. Laws Act 42 (July 9,
2017); see also P.R. Regs. SALUD Reg. 9038.
On October 22, 2019, Peña asked IMS Insurance Company of
Puerto Rico (“IMS”), the insurance carrier for his former employer
1 The DBA extends the LHWCA to United States territories, including the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. See 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a).

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Calzadilla Construction Corporation, to reimburse him for “payment
of medical cannabis-infused cookies and edibles as treatment for [his]
[chronic] pain and anxiety.” App’x at 2. IMS denied this request.
Peña then requested a hearing before the DOL’s Office of
Administrative Law Judges, seeking a determination that doctor-
recommended medical cannabis treatments are reimbursable under
the LHWCA. On September 15, 2020, an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) ruled that marijuana’s classification as a Schedule I substance
under the CSA necessarily entailed that the drug had no accepted
medical use under federal law. Consequently, the ALJ concluded,
marijuana could not be a “reasonable and necessary medical
treatment” under the LHWCA, and Peña’s employer and insurance
carrier were not obligated to reimburse him for his cannabis-infused
edibles. App’x at 3.
Peña appealed this denial to the DOL’s Benefits Review Board.
By a 2–1 vote, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision on the same
grounds. It also rejected Peña’s argument that Congressional
appropriations riders prohibiting the United States Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) from interfering with state laws facilitating marijuana
use rendered the drug a reasonable and necessary medical treatment.
A dissenting member of the Benefits Review Board reached the
opposite conclusion, reasoning that Dr. Soler’s recommendation that
Peña use marijuana products to treat his chronic condition created a
prima facie case for a compensable medical treatment, and that the
reference to “medical marijuana” in the appropriations riders was an

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implicit acknowledgement that marijuana can have medical use. This
appeal followed.2
II. Standard of Review
On this petition for review from the Benefits Review Board,
this Court reviews questions of law de novo and the ALJ’s findings of
fact for substantial evidence. G4S Int’l Emp. Servs. (Jersey), Ltd. v.
Newton-Sealey, 975 F.3d 182, 185–86 (2d Cir. 2020).
III. Discussion
Section 7 of the LHWCA requires employers to “furnish”
injured workers with “medical, surgical, and other attendance or
treatment . . . for such period as the nature of the [covered] injury . . .
may require.” 33 U.S.C. § 907(a). This Section and its implementing
regulations require reimbursement of “all reasonable and necessary
medical expenses” for eligible work-related injuries. Amerada Hess
2 Peña initially filed this petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit. See Dkt. No. 1 at 5–12. However, because review of DBA
decisions lies in “the judicial district wherein is located the office of the deputy
commissioner whose compensation order is involved,” Serv. Emps. Int’l, Inc. v.
Dir., Off. of Workers Comp. Program, 595 F.3d 447, 452 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 1653(b)), and the DOL’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs’
suboffice in New York adjudicated Peña’s claim, jurisdiction over Peña’s appeal
was proper in this Court. Accordingly, the First Circuit transferred the case to the
Second Circuit. See Dkt. No. 1 at 1–2.

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Corp. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs, 543 F.3d 755, 761 (5th
Cir. 2008).3
However, the CSA makes it “unlawful knowingly to
manufacture, distribute, or possess with intent to distribute
controlled substances.” McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186, 188
(2015) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)). “[C]ontrolled substances,” for
purposes of the CSA, are divided into five schedules. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 812. A drug is classified in Schedule I if (1) it “has a high potential
for abuse,” (2) it “has no currently accepted medical use in treatment
in the United States,” and (3) “[t]here is a lack of accepted safety for
use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision.” Id. at
§ 812(b)(1). Congress currently lists marijuana as a Schedule I drug.
Id. at § 812(c), sched. I (c)(10).
Peña argues that medical marijuana is a reasonable and
necessary treatment for pain management and that he is thus entitled
to reimbursement for the drug under the LHWCA. However, this
argument is foreclosed by the plain text of the CSA, which states that
Schedule I substances, like marijuana, have “no currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States.” Id. at § 812(b)(1)(B);
see also id. at § 812(c), sched. I (c)(10). Indeed, in Gonzales v. Raich, the
Supreme Court held that marijuana’s classification as a Schedule I
substance amounts to an express Congressional finding that the drug
3 Other circuits and the Benefits Review Board itself have also adopted the
“reasonable and necessary” standard. See Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Preston, 380 F.3d
597, 610–11 (1st Cir. 2004); M. Cutter Co. v. Carroll, 458 F.3d 991, 993–94 (9th Cir.
2006); Romeike v. Kaiser, 22 BRBS 57, at *3 (1989).

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has “no acceptable medical uses.” 545 U.S. 1, 27 (2005). Federal law
thus categorically bars marijuana from being deemed a reasonable
and necessary medical expense for purposes of the LHWCA.
Peña’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. To start, Peña
contends that annual appropriations riders prohibiting the DOJ from
preventing states from implementing laws authorizing the use,
distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana amount
to congressional recognition of marijuana’s medicinal value. We
disagree. These riders govern the manner in which the DOJ spends
funds that Congress allocates; they amount only to a constraint on the
DOJ’s exercise of enforcement discretion. See, e.g., Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235
§ 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014). They do not change federal law with
respect to controlled substances and cannot be interpreted as having
implicitly repealed Congress’s statutory classifications of controlled
substances in the CSA. See Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United States,
590 U.S. 296, 315 (2020) (“This Court’s aversion to implied repeals is
especially strong in the appropriations context.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Further, the term “medical marijuana” is used in the
riders only to describe the nature of state laws, not to alter existing
federal law with respect to controlled substances. And finally, the
riders say nothing about marijuana’s classification as a reasonable
and necessary medical expense for purposes of federal workers
compensation programs like the LHWCA.
Peña also cites recent actions taken by both the President and
Congress as evidence of a more permissive federal policy with respect

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to marijuana. However, these actions are unrelated to whether
marijuana can be reimbursed under the LHWCA. Specifically,
former-President Biden’s pardons of individuals convicted of
marijuana possession have no effect on statutory provisions
regarding the medical value vel non of marijuana. See Proclamation
No. 10467, 87 Fed. Reg. 61441 (Oct. 6, 2022). Similarly, Congress’s
enactment of a statute that facilitates research into medical marijuana
does not amount to a congressional finding of marijuana’s medical
value; at most, it signals a willingness to explore whether such
medical value exists. See Medical Marijuana and Cannabidiol
Research Expansion Act, Pub. L. No. 117–215, 136 Stat. 2257 (2022). In
addition, former-President Biden’s directive that the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services and the Attorney General
initiate a review process for marijuana’s classification under federal
law, falls far short of a decision to actually reschedule marijuana
under the CSA. See Statement on Marijuana Reform, Administration
of Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (Oct. 6, 2022). So too does President Trump’s
December 18, 2025, Executive Order directing the Attorney General
to “take all necessary steps to complete the rulemaking process
related to rescheduling marijuana to Schedule III of the CSA in the
most expeditious manner in accordance with Federal law.” Exec.
Order No. 14370, 90 Fed. Reg. 60541, 60542 (Dec. 18, 2025). As the
Executive Order indicates, removing marijuana from Schedule I
cannot be done by executive fiat; it requires either an Act of Congress
or a duly completed administrative rulemaking proceeding. Neither,
to date, has occurred.

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Peña argues that state law has trended toward reimbursement
of claims for medical marijuana in state worker’s compensation
regimes. Perhaps so. But state policies on medical marijuana bear no
relation to whether medical marijuana can be reimbursed under
federal law. The Supreme Court in Gonzalez acknowledged that
where federal regulations of controlled substances are more stringent
than state analogs, the restrictions imposed by federal law govern.
545 U.S. at 27−29. The mere existence of more permissive state
policies regarding medical marijuana therefore does not constrain
federal law. See id. at 29 (“The Supremacy Clause unambiguously
provides that if there is any conflict between federal and state law,
federal law shall prevail.”).
Finally, Peña argues that the CSA’s criminal prohibition on
aiding and abetting the distribution of controlled substances does not
implicate his request for reimbursement under the LHWCA. But
whether or not the CSA imposes criminal penalties for the
reimbursement of medical marijuana is irrelevant. All that matters is
marijuana’s classification as a Schedule I substance under the CSA,
which unequivocally provides, for purposes of federal law, that it has
no accepted medical use.
It may very well be the case that the federal government will at
some point—perhaps even in the near future—remove marijuana
from Schedule I of the CSA. But that is a decision for the political
branches of the federal government, not for the judiciary. This Court
is obliged to apply the law as it currently stands.

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IV. Conclusion
Because marijuana is presently classified as a Schedule I
substance under the CSA, it cannot be treated as reimbursable
medical treatment for purposes of Section 7 of the LHWCA. We
therefore DENY Peña’s petition for review.

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