United States v. Samuels

24-1801-cr
United States v. Samuels
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
August Term, 2025
(Submitted: November 21, 2025 Decided: May 26, 2026)
Docket No. 24-1801-cr
_____________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
DARRIN SAMUELS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before:
KEARSE, LOHIER, and MENASHI, Circuit Judges.
Appellant’s counsel moves to be relieved pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), and the Government moves to dismiss the appeal in part, or,
in the alternative, for summary affirmance. In the Anders brief submitted in
support of the motion to be relieved, Appellant’s counsel maintains that there are
no non-frivolous issues for appeal of Appellant’s conviction. After
independently reviewing the record, we have identified a potentially non-
frivolous issue with respect to a special condition of supervised release.

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Accordingly, we DEFER decision on the motions and order Appellant’s counsel
to either submit supplemental briefing on the motions or notify the Court that he
will file a merits brief.
Judge Menashi dissents in a separate opinion.
Randall D. Unger, Esq., Kew Gardens, NY, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Thomas John Wright (Olga I. Zverovich, on the brief),
Assistant United States Attorneys, for Jay Clayton,
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, New York, NY, for Appellee.
PER C URIAM:
Randall D. Unger, counsel for Appellant Darrin Samuels, moves for
permission to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967). The Government moves to dismiss the appeal in part as barred by the
appeal waiver contained in Samuels’s plea agreement, or, in the alternative, for
summary affirmance.
Before granting an Anders motion, we must be “satisfied that counsel has
diligently searched the record for any arguably meritorious issue in support of
his client’s appeal, and that counsel’s characterization of the appeal as frivolous
is, in fact, legally correct.” United States v. Reyes-Arzate, 91 F.4th 616, 621 (2d Cir.
2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). When counsel’s Anders brief is

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deficient, the deficiency is deemed “harmless when we can determine from the
record that there are no non-frivolous issues to raise” or “can be cured if counsel
represents that he has discussed with the defendant the potential benefits and
risks of challenging” any non-frivolous issues, “and that the defendant has
authorized counsel not to pursue an appeal with regard to those matters.”
United States v. Arguedas, 134 F.4th 54, 59–60 (2d Cir. 2025).
Based on our review of the record, we have identified a potentially non-
frivolous issue with respect to one of the special conditions of supervised release
imposed at Samuels’s sentencing by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. Special Condition 1 permits searches of, among
other things, Samuels’s “computer, other electronic communication, data storage
devices, [and] cloud storage or media” upon reasonable suspicion of a violation
of a condition of supervision or other unlawful conduct. App’x at 183. On the
law, our dissenting colleague thinks the issue is frivolous and that the condition
is clearly legal. But the legality of this particular condition or analogous
conditions is currently the subject of review by multiple panels of this Court. On
the facts, our colleague says that the record shows that Samuels “used electronic
devices to run his drug-trafficking operation.” Menashi, J., Dissenting Op. at 2.

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But on this record, as counsel should have known, we do not know if Samuels
used a cellphone or other electronic devices to carry out the offense conduct.
This is why we require Anders briefs—to spot issues that may have merit even
though they may ultimately not prevail. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 745. Because we
cannot conclude that counsel’s cursory review of this issue in his Anders brief is
harmless, we defer decision on the motions.
Within 30 days of entry of this order, counsel for Samuels must (1) submit
supplemental briefing either demonstrating that there are no non-frivolous
issues with respect to the District Court’s imposition of Special Condition 1 or
that Samuels does not wish to pursue any such issues, or (2) notify the Court that
counsel will file a merits brief. If Samuels does not wish to appeal any non-
frivolous issues, counsel should indicate that he has discussed with Samuels the
potential benefits and risks of pursuing the non-frivolous issues and that
Samuels has authorized counsel not to pursue an appeal with regard to such
matters. If counsel intends to file a merits brief, the brief should address Special
Condition 1 and any other non-frivolous issues, and the matter will be referred to
a new panel to be decided in the ordinary course.

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For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that decision on the
motions is DEFERRED.

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24-1801-cr
United States v. Samuels
MENASHI , Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The court declines to grant counsel’s motion to be relieved—
and instead orders more briefing—because it has “identified a
potentially non-frivolous issue with respect to one of the special
conditions of supervised release.” Ante at 3. Special Condition 1 is a
familiar requirement that the defendant must submit to a search of
his electronic devices when there is reasonable suspicion of unlawful
conduct or of a violation of a condition of supervised release. See
App’x at 6, United States v. Samuels, No. 24-1801 (2d Cir. Apr. 7, 2025),
ECF No. 60.1 (minute entry of June 20, 2024).
The defendant here, Darrin Samuels, operated a narcotics-
trafficking organization. He was charged with (1) conspiracy to
distribute and to possess with intent to distribute a controlled
substance, including cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
§ 841(b)(1), and § 846, (2) using and carrying firearms during and in
relation to a drug-trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c),
and (3) causing death through the use of a firearm in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(j). He pleaded guilty to a lesser-included drug-
conspiracy offense, and the government dismissed the firearms
charges. The district court imposed the stipulated sentence of 240
months of imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised
release. The district court reasonably included Special Condition 1 as
a condition of supervised release.
Samuels’s counsel is correct that “it would be futile to raise a
challenge to this condition.” Appellant’s Br. at 19, United States v.
Samuels, No. 24-1801 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 2025), ECF No. 53.1. “[B]oth
electronic and non-electronic search conditions are often crucial for
ensuring the effectiveness of supervision.” United States v. Robinson,
134 F.4th 104, 112 n.4 (2d Cir. 2025). And “we have never held that an

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electronic search term would only be appropriate” when the
“convictions involved sex offenses or the use of electronics.” Id. at 112.
To the contrary, we have explained that a search condition does “not
need to have a direct relationship to [the defendant’s] offense.” United
States v. Lawrence, 139 F.4th 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2025). We have held that
the “need” for an electronic search condition was “self-evident,” for
example, when the record showed a defendant’s “extensive history of
recidivism and his dishonesty with law enforcement officers.”
Robinson, 134 F.4th at 111.
The “district court may impose a condition unrelated to ‘the
nature and circumstances of the offense’ if (1) it is ‘reasonably related’
to ‘the history and characteristics of the defendant’ or ‘the need to
afford adequate deterrence,’ ‘protect the public from further crimes,’
and ‘provide the defendant with correctional treatment’; and (2) the
condition ‘involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is
reasonably necessary.’” Lawrence, 139 F.4th at 125 (alterations
omitted) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)). In light of “this flexibility,” we
have rejected a defendant’s challenge to an electronic search condition
that “allows for searches of his computer, even though he used only
a cellphone to sell drugs.” Id. at 124-25.
In this case, the record showed that Samuels used electronic
devices to run his drug-trafficking operation. See United States v.
Jimenez, No. 26-1661, 2026 WL 1338242, at *5 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 2026)
(“[W]here electronic devices were instrumentalized in the
commission of the instant offense conduct and surrounding
circumstances, we have regularly held that an electronic search
condition is permissible.”). The government proffered—and Samuels
admitted—that he coordinated drug transactions “on multiple
occasions in telephone conversations.” Anders App’x at 48-49, United
States v. Samuels, No. 24-1801 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 2025), ECF No. 50.1. The

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trial record established that his co-conspirators used electronic
devices that were recovered pursuant to a warrant. See App’x, supra,
at 87. During a suppression hearing, his counsel acknowledged that
Samuels’s girlfriend gave the police his cellphone, which “was an
android phone, LG phone.” Id. at 157. In fact, his counsel said that the
girlfriend gave the police “[m]ore than one phone,” and “they all
belong to my client.” Id. at 158.
As Samuels’s counsel explains in support of his motion to be
relieved, Samuels “admitted that he had engaged in drug trafficking
for a number of years, beginning when he was approximately 16 years
of age, and that he communicated telephonically with others to carry
out those activities. Those activities certainly established that the
search condition was reasonably related to ‘the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant.’” Appellant’s Br., supra, at 19-20 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)). As a result, “it cannot be concluded that Judge Kaplan
abused his discretion in imposing a search condition during the
appellant’s term of supervised release.” Id. at 19.
He is right. Our court will “uphold the condition imposed ‘if
the district court’s reasoning is self-evident in the record,’” as it is
here. United States v. Lewis, 125 F.4th 69, 75 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting
United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018)). There is
accordingly no need for supplemental briefing. Ordering such
briefing adds another “burdensome ritual” to the burgeoning body of
needless formalities we require to impose commonplace conditions of
supervised release. United States v. Maiorana, 153 F.4th 306, 328 (2d
Cir. 2025) (Menashi, J., dissenting). I would instead grant the motion
of counsel to be relieved and grant the motion of the government for
summary affirmance. I dissent from the decision of the court not to
do so.

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