Bergin v. N.Y. State Unified Court System

1
25-721
Bergin v. N.Y. State Unified Court System
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
August Term 2025
Argued: March 5, 2026
Decided: July 15, 2026
No. 25-721
J ESSICA BERGIN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
N EW YORK STATE UNIFIED C OURT S YSTEM,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York
No. 22-CV-5264, Brian M. Cogan, Judge.
Before: R AGGI and N ATHAN, Circuit Judges, and FURMAN,
District Judge.*
* Judge Jesse M. Furman, of the United States District Court for the Southern

-- 1 of 17 --

2
Plaintiff was terminated for failure to comply with a COVID-19
vaccination requirement after her employer denied her request for a
religious exemption. She sued the employer under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting a single claim of failure to
accommodate her religion. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (Cogan, J.) granted partial summary
judgment for the plaintiff, holding that there was no genuine dispute
that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of religious
discrimination—resting in large part on statements made by the
employer during discovery—and that the employer did not
demonstrate that granting an accommodation would constitute an
undue hardship. The employer appeals, arguing that the district
court failed to modify the prima facie test for failure-to-accommodate-
religion claims in light of EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575
U.S. 768 (2015). Because we agree that Abercrombie abrogated our
earlier Title VII precedents, and because the district court improperly
deemed statements in the discovery record to be judicial admissions,
we VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
S TEVEN M. W ARSHAWSKY , The
Warshawsky Law Firm,
Mount Kisco, NY, for Plaintiff-
Appellee.
District of New York, sitting by designation.

-- 2 of 17 --

3
MICHAEL J. S IUDZINSKI , Of
Counsel, N.Y. State Office of
Court Administration, New
York, NY, for Defendant-
Appellant.
NATHAN, Circuit Judge:
Defendant New York State Unified Court System (“UCS”)
appeals from a judgment entered on March 10, 2025 in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Brian M.
Cogan, Judge) in favor of plaintiff Jessica Bergin on her claim of
employment discrimination based on UCS’s failure to accommodate
her religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
That Act makes actionable an employer’s failure to accommodate an
employee’s religious practice or belief, unless providing an
accommodation would pose an undue hardship.
In the past, our Circuit assessed whether a plaintiff stated a
prima facie case of failure to accommodate religion under Title VII by
asking whether the plaintiff (1) held a bona fide religious belief
conflicting with a work requirement, (2) informed her employer of
that belief, and (3) was disciplined for failure to comply with the
requirement. Knight v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d
Cir. 2001). Today we must decide whether the Supreme Court
abrogated that test in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S.
768 (2015). We hold that it did. Now, to state a prima facie case of
failure to accommodate religious belief or practice under Title VII, a
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that she actually required an

-- 3 of 17 --

4
accommodation of her religious practice, and (2) that the employer’s
desire to avoid the actually required prospective accommodation was
a motivating factor in (3) an adverse employment decision. Because
in this case the district court did not consider whether the plaintiff
satisfied Abercrombie’s standard, and because it improperly deemed
portions of the discovery record to be judicial admissions, we vacate
the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background1
Jessica Bergin started working as a court officer for UCS in 2016.
In September 2021, UCS notified its employees that they would be
required to receive COVID-19 vaccinations, or obtain a medical or
religious exemption from vaccination, to remain at work. Employees
were required to submit either proof of vaccination or a completed
exemption form by October 18, 2021.
Exemption requests were reviewed by UCS’s vaccine
exemption review committee (VEC), comprising 11 administrators
split into Working Groups A and B. Though either working group
had authority to approve an exemption request without the other
group’s input, either could recommend only a denial, which then
triggered review by the entire VEC. In total, the VEC “received 1,200
exemption requests, 960 of which required a multi-step review
process[.]” Joint App’x 269. To facilitate review at that scale, UCS
1 Because this appeal arises from the entry of summary judgment, we
recount the facts—here, largely undisputed unless noted otherwise—in the
light most favorable to the non-movant. See McGucken v. Shutterstock, Inc.,
166 F.4th 361, 368 (2d Cir. 2026).

-- 4 of 17 --

5
imposed “strict deadlines to prevent employees from submitting an
endless amount of inquiries, late requests, and ‘appeals’ of denials
which would have required the VEC to dedicate an arduous amount
of time away from their regular daily duties[.]” Id.
In the course of reviewing religious exemption requests, the
VEC soon realized that most applicants expressed concerns about
either “the connection between fetal stem cells and the development
of the COVID-19 vaccine” or “the sanctity or purity of his or her own
body.” Id. at 261. Because many of those objections “did not provide
sufficient information to adequately address . . . whether the
applicant adhered to his or her belief consistently in regard to other
vaccines and medical treatments,” the VEC “developed a
supplemental form to obtain additional information” about the
applicant’s stated beliefs. Id. The supplemental form—split into
Section A, regarding stem cells, and Section B, regarding bodily
integrity—asked questions about the applicant’s past use of vaccines,
medical treatments, and over-the-counter drugs.
Bergin submitted her initial religious exemption form on
September 26, 2021. Attached were (1) a typed personal statement
claiming that coerced vaccination would violate her religious beliefs,
(2) a list of scripture verses, and (3) a letter from her pastor objecting
to the use of fetal stem-cell lines in the development of the major
COVID-19 vaccines. According to UCS, because Bergin stated
concerns about stem cells and bodily integrity in her application—as
well as identified some non-religious objections to the vaccine
requirement—the VEC requested that she submit the supplemental
form. Bergin returned the form without answering most questions,

-- 5 of 17 --

6
instead attaching a statement that she “lived [her] entire life devoted
to Jesus Christ” and that she and her family “strive to keep [their]
individual medical information private.” Id. at 71.
On December 29, 2021, UCS denied Bergin’s application for a
religious exemption and directed her to submit proof of vaccination
by January 10, 2022. One week before that deadline, Bergin submitted
a new copy of the supplemental form with the required fields filled
in. The VEC responded that its “decisions are final, and the new
request [would] not be considered.” Id. at 245. Bergin did not submit
proof of vaccination, and when the January deadline arrived, she was
directed not to report to work until she was vaccinated. She remained
on administrative leave until she was terminated on April 7, 2022 for
failure to comply with the vaccination requirement. On February 15,
2023, UCS rescinded its vaccination requirement and permitted
terminated employees to seek reinstatement. Bergin was reinstated
on June 22, 2023.
B. Procedural History
On September 2, 2022, Bergin sued UCS, asserting a single
count under Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision. Though she
clarified she was not “challenging the legality of the policy itself,”
Bergin claimed that UCS failed to accommodate her religious belief in
denying her exemption request. Id. at 9. UCS moved to dismiss the
complaint, arguing that Bergin failed to state a prima facie case of
failure to accommodate her religious belief or practice. The district
court denied the motion. Discovery largely concerned UCS’s
knowledge of the sincerity of Bergin’s religious objection, as
discussed in its interrogatory responses and in the deposition of its

-- 6 of 17 --

7
Chief of Administration, Justin Barry.
At the conclusion of discovery, both parties cross-moved for
summary judgment. The district court entered partial summary
judgment for Bergin, holding that she stated a prima facie case under
Title VII and that UCS did not establish an undue hardship defense.
See Bergin v. N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys. (Bergin I), No. 22-CV-5264, 2024
WL 4444434, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2024). The district court rested
largely on UCS’s purported admission that Bergin’s initial exemption
request “was ‘perfectly adequate’ and ‘explained a religious belief.’”
Id. at *3. The district court confined its analysis to Bergin’s initial
request, agreeing that permitting her to submit an untimely
supplemental form would have constituted an undue hardship. Id. at
*4. In denying UCS’s subsequent motions for a certificate of
appealability and for reconsideration, the district court reiterated that
its decision rested on UCS having “acknowledge[d] that [Bergin’s]
original religious exemption request was valid.” Bergin v. N.Y. State
Unified Ct. Sys. (Bergin II), No. 22-CV-5264, 2024 WL 4665266, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2024). The parties thereafter stipulated to an
amount of damages, and this appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A
“dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’ . . . if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We
review the district court’s entry of summary judgment de novo.

-- 7 of 17 --

8
Nambiar v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP, 158 F.4th 349, 363 (2d Cir. 2025).
“The same standard applies where, as here, the parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment and the district court granted one
motion, but denied the other.” Morales v. Quintel Ent., Inc., 249 F.3d
115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001). “[E]ach party’s motion must be examined on
its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be
drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Id.
DISCUSSION
Title VII makes unlawful an employer’s refusing to hire,
discharging, or otherwise discriminating against a person because of
the person’s religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “The term
‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as
well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to
reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s
religious observance or practice without undue hardship[.]” Id.
§ 2000e(j). “The intent and effect of this definition was to make it an
unlawful employment practice . . . for an employer not to make
reasonable accommodations, short of undue hardship, for the
religious practices of his employees and prospective employees.”
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). In
prohibiting discrimination by withholding accommodations, “Title
VII does not demand mere neutrality with regard to religious
practices but instead gives them favored treatment in order to ensure
religious persons’ full participation in the workforce.” Groff v. DeJoy,
600 U.S. 447, 461 n.9 (2023) (quotation marks omitted).
A. The Prima Facie Case
We treat failure-to-accommodate-religion claims in two steps.

-- 8 of 17 --

9
First, we ask whether the plaintiff has stated a “prima facie case” of
religious discrimination. Russo v. Patchogue-Medford Sch. Dist., 129
F.4th 182, 185 (2d Cir. 2025). Second, if so, we determine whether the
employer “offer[ed] him or her a reasonable accommodation, unless
doing so would cause the employer to suffer an undue hardship.” Id.
at 186 (quotation marks omitted). This case concerns the first step.
Our Circuit originally defined the prima facie case to require a
plaintiff to demonstrate that “(1) he or she has a bona fide religious
belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he or she
informed the employer of this belief; [and] (3) he or she was
disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment
requirement.” Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 481 (2d
Cir. 1985) (quotation marks omitted); see also Knight, 275 F.3d at 167;
Baker v. Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 2006). Concluding that
Bergin made out a prima facie case under this standard, the district
court granted her motion for partial summary judgment and denied
UCS’s. This was error, UCS argues, because the Supreme Court
changed the requirements of the prima facie case in EEOC v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768 (2015). We agree.
In Abercrombie, the Supreme Court considered whether an
employer violated Title VII when it refused to hire a prospective
employee who the employer assumed would require a religious
exemption from the employer’s dress code. Id. at 770. The Tenth
Circuit, applying a test identical to our own, held that the employer
was entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff had not
actually requested a religious accommodation, and the employer’s
mere speculation did not amount to discrimination. See 731 F.3d 1106,

-- 9 of 17 --

10
1122 (10th Cir. 2013).
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s
requirement that a plaintiff actually request an accommodation, and
holding that “an applicant need only show that his need for an
accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.”
Abercrombie, 575 U.S. at 772. The Supreme Court explained that
failure-to-accommodate-religion claims fall within Title VII’s
disparate treatment provision, which “prohibits certain motives,
regardless of the state of the actor’s knowledge.” Id. at 773 (emphasis
in original). Therefore, “[a]n employer who has actual knowledge of
the need for an accommodation does not violate Title VII by refusing
to hire an applicant if avoiding that accommodation is not his motive,”
just as “an employer who acts with the motive of avoiding
accommodation may violate Title VII even if he has no more than an
unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation would be needed.”
Id. (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court thus rejected one
requirement of our old rule (that a plaintiff inform an employer of the
need for an accommodation) and clarified that what a plaintiff must
plead and, ultimately, prove (that the employer was motivated in part
by the desire to avoid offering a religious accommodation). See also
Lowman v. NVI LLC, 821 F. App’x 29, 31 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing
Abercrombie, 575 U.S. at 773–74). The Supreme Court explained that a
“request for accommodation, or the employer’s certainty that the
practice exists, may make it easier to infer motive,” but it “is not a
necessary condition of liability.” Abercrombie, 575 U.S. at 774.
Bergin musters a variety of reasons for deviating from the
Supreme Court’s version of the prima facie test as articulated in

-- 10 of 17 --

11
Abercrombie. We are unpersuaded.
First, Bergin argues that our prior cases control. It is true, of
course, that we are bound by a prior published opinion of this Court
“unless and until it is reconsidered [en banc] or is rejected by a later
Supreme Court decision.” United States v. Sterkaj, 138 F.4th 95, 99 (2d
Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). It is true, also, that the exception for
abrogation by the Supreme Court “is not to be construed liberally”
but “cautiously,” keeping in mind that a “less-than-stringent
application” of the rule “increases uncertainty in the law by revisiting
precedent without cause.” Id. at 100 (cleaned up). Still, if an
intervening Supreme Court decision has “broken the link on which
we premised our prior decision, or undermined an assumption of that
decision,” Garcia Pinach v. Bondi, 147 F.4th 117, 126 n.5 (2d Cir. 2025)
(quotation marks omitted), our duty to follow Supreme Court
precedent overrides our duty to follow our own. That is the case here.
In Abercrombie, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need not
inform her employer of the need for accommodation in order to state
a Title VII claim, but that she must demonstrate that the employer
acted out of a desire to avoid offering an accommodation. Our prior
rule—which did include an employer-knowledge requirement and
did not expressly require a showing of motive—was abrogated by
Abercrombie. We hold that Philbrook’s statement of the prima facie case
of failure to accommodate religion under Title VII, reiterated in Knight
and Baker, is no longer good law.
Second, Bergin tells us that, “in the ten years since Abercrombie,
this Court has not endorsed the view that Title VII accommodation
claims require plaintiffs to prove discriminatory motive as part of

-- 11 of 17 --

12
their prima facie case” and that, if anything, one recent case suggests
the opposite. Appellee’s Br. 38. But this is because we have yet to
confront an appeal in which Abercrombie’s effect on the prima facie
case made the difference. For example, in Russo v. Patchogue-Medford
School District, we referenced the old formulation of the prima facie
case in order to establish context for the defendant’s invocation of the
undue-hardship defense, which was at issue in the appeal. See 129
F.4th at 185–86. Far from endorsing the pre-Abercrombie formulation,
we “assum[ed] arguendo that [the plaintiff] stated a prima facie
religious discrimination claim” before proceeding to the second step
of the analysis. Id. at 186. Such a “passing observation” on the
requirements of a prima facie case is dictum, rather than binding
precedent. Baraket v. Holder, 632 F.3d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 2011). Just as our
pre-Abercrombie cases need not control, the absence of precedent in
the years since does not bind us now.
Third, now on Abercrombie’s terms, Bergin argues that the case
is confined to the failure-to-hire context, and thus does not govern her
wrongful-termination claim. But that runs headlong into the
statutory text, which treats hiring and firing alike. Title VII makes it
unlawful “for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion[.]” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). “As a textual matter, Title VII’s disparate-treatment
provision draws no distinctions between” hiring and firing. Cf. Ames
v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303, 309 (2025) (making a similar
observation about Title VII’s treatment of majority- and minority-

-- 12 of 17 --

13
group plaintiffs). Nor did the Supreme Court make any such
distinction in Abercrombie. Instead, it explained broadly that “the rule
for disparate-treatment claims based on a failure to accommodate a
religious practice is straightforward: An employer may not make an
applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in
employment decisions.” 575 U.S. at 773; see also Bailey v. Metro
Ambulance Servs., Inc., 992 F.3d 1265, 1272, 1275 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2021)
(applying Abercrombie to claims of allegedly discriminatory
termination). We think it better to interpret the statute as the Supreme
Court told us, to “construe Title VII’s silence as exactly that: silence.”
Abercrombie, 575 U.S. at 774 (referencing urged requirement that
employer have “actual knowledge of a conflict between an applicant’s
religious practice and a work rule”). Because Bergin’s request that we
read a special rule for hiring into Title VII “asks us to add words to
the law to produce what is thought to be a desirable result,” id. (same),
we must decline.
Accordingly, we hold, as required by Abercrombie, that to state
a prima facie case of failure to accommodate a religious belief or
practice under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that she
actually required an accommodation of her religious practice, and
(2) that the employer’s desire to avoid the actually required
prospective accommodation was a motivating factor in (3) an adverse
employment decision. Though knowledge of the need for an
accommodation may be evidence of motive, the absence of such
evidence is not (as our pre-Abercrombie cases held) dispositive. See id.
at 774. Because the district court explicitly declined to apply this
standard, see Bergin I, 2024 WL 4444434, at *4 n.2, we vacate its

-- 13 of 17 --

14
judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with
Abercrombie and this opinion.
B. The District Court’s Judicial Admission Finding
On remand, the district court should reassess whether
summary judgment in favor of either party is appropriate under the
Abercrombie standard. In doing so, it may treat evidence of UCS’s
knowledge of Bergin’s need for religious accommodation as relevant
to, but not necessarily dispositive of, UCS’s motive to deny the
accommodation. We do not agree with the district court, however,
that during discovery UCS made a judicial admission that Bergin
adequately communicated a sincerely held religious belief in conflict
with the vaccine mandate.
The district court based its judicial-admission finding on UCS’s
statement—made in response to an interrogatory and during a Rule
30(b)(6) deposition—that Bergin’s initial exemption request was
“perfectly adequate” and “explained a religious belief.” Id. at *3. On
a motion for reconsideration, the district court reiterated that it
considered UCS’s statements “within the litigation” to
“acknowledge[] that the employee’s original religious exemption
request was valid[.]” Bergin II, 2024 WL 4665266, at *4. We agree with
UCS that the statements it made during discovery about the adequacy
of Bergin’s application, taken in context, did not rise to the level of a
judicial admission that Bergin’s initial application demonstrated a
sincerely held religious belief in conflict with the vaccine mandate.
“[A] judicial admission . . . must . . . be intentional, clear, and
unambiguous.” In re Motors Liquidation Co., 957 F.3d 357, 360 (2d Cir.
2020). Statements by counsel must “have sufficient formality or

-- 14 of 17 --

15
conclusiveness to be a judicial admission.” Berner v. Brit.
Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 542 (2d Cir. 1965). In
its interrogatory response, UCS admitted that it “[did] not contend
that Plaintiff lacked a bona fide, good faith religious objection[.]”
Joint App’x 168. But it also referred to an earlier answer in which it
“contend[ed] that Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient information
about her beliefs which would have allowed the committee to grant
her request.” Id. Likewise, in UCS’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, Justin
Barry admitted that Bergin’s “initial submission was perfectly
adequate and it explained a religious belief,” but also that the VEC
“wanted to explore it some more.” Id. at 189. Because Bergin’s stated
beliefs concerned “bodily integrity” and “objections related to the use
of stem cells,” Barry explained, “to gauge . . . the sincerity of both of
those beliefs, the work[ing] group[] would typically and very
frequently, if not almost all the time with those two objections or
concerns, request that the individual fill out the supplemental form.”
Id. at 188.
On review of an award of summary judgment to Bergin, we
must view UCS’s statements during discovery in the light most
favorable to UCS. When we do so, we cannot conclude as a matter of
law that they constitute a judicial admission that Bergin’s application
raised a sincere religious objection to the vaccine mandate. To the
contrary, UCS repeatedly emphasized that it required additional
information to determine whether Bergin was sincere in her objection
to the COVID-19 vaccine. Though “[m]otive and knowledge are
separate concepts,” Abercrombie, 575 U.S. at 773, if UCS did not know
from Bergin’s initial application if she was sincere, that would likely

-- 15 of 17 --

16
bear on whether UCS was motivated to deny her a necessary religious
accommodation. There is thus at least “a doubt . . . as to the statement
of counsel” which precludes finding a judicial admission here. In re
Motors Liquidation Co., 957 F.3d at 361 (quoting Oscanyan v. Arms Co.,
103 U.S. 261, 263 (1880)).2
We intimate no view on whether the record as a whole creates
a genuine dispute about UCS’s knowledge, nor whether such
knowledge would be sufficient to support an inference of
discriminatory motive. Nor do we decide the import of a plaintiff’s
failure to challenge her employer’s vaccine exemption procedure
generally, and how that failure might bear on her ability to show
discriminatory motive. Though UCS asks us to resolve these issues
in its favor on appeal, we think it appropriate for the district court to
consider these questions in the first instance. We hold only that the
district court should not have treated UCS’s isolated statements about
Bergin’s initial exemption requests as dispositive judicial admissions.
CONCLUSION
After Abercrombie, to prevail on a claim of failure to
accommodate a religious practice or belief under Title VII, a plaintiff
must plead and prove, (1) that she actually required an
accommodation of her religious practice, and (2) that the employer’s
desire to avoid the required accommodation was a motivating factor
2 For similar reasons, we disagree with the district court that UCS’s claim
that it lacked sufficient information to determine the sincerity of Bergin’s
religious objections, rather than arguing that the “belief was not sincerely
held,” established at summary judgment the sincerity of her belief. Bergin
II, 2024 WL 4665266, at *3.

-- 16 of 17 --

17
in (3) an adverse employment decision. Because the district court
entered partial summary judgment for Bergin without determining
whether she met this standard, we VACATE the judgment and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

-- 17 of 17 --