United States of America v. William Currie

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 08-1167
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WILLIAM CURRIE,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 05-cr-00267)
District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on July 17, 2009
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES, and ROTH , Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 27, 2009 )
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
William Currie pled guilty to one count of distribution of heroin, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The District Court sentenced him to 151 months’ imprisonment, at
the bottom of the Sentencing Guidelines, and three years supervised release. On appeal,
he argues that the District Court erred procedurally by failing to compute the Guidelines
range properly, by not adequately considering the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), and by giving the Guidelines a presumptive effect. Second, Currie argues that
the District Court imposed an unreasonable sentence. We conclude that the District Court
imposed a procedurally proper and substantively reasonable sentence, and we will affirm
the court’s sentencing order.
Currie was a member of a drug trafficking operation that distributed heroin and
cocaine base (“crack”) in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. In July, 2005, police recovered
large quantities of heroin, crack, and marijuana, along with cash and eight firearms at
Currie’s business and residence in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. A grand jury indicted
him on seven counts of drug trafficking and weapons offenses. Currie cooperated with
the prosecution and pled guilty to the heroin distribution count and, in return, the
prosecution dismissed the remaining charges against him. In his plea agreement, Currie
agreed to a sentence of 162 months’ imprisonment and three years supervised release.

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DISCUSSION
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1291 and
18 U.S.C. § 3742. We review the District Court’s sentence for reasonableness under an
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007). The
prosecution argues for plain error review because Currie did not object to the court’s
procedural errors at sentencing, citing United States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir.
2006). However, this “Court's en banc decision in United States v. Grier precludes this
argument.” United States v. Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United
States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2007)). Grier held that “[a]n objection to the
reasonableness of the final sentence will be preserved if, during sentencing proceedings,
the defendant properly raised a meritorious factual or legal issue relating to one or more
of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” 475 F.3d at 571, n.11. In Sevilla, we
rejected the prosecution’s argument for plain error review because “Sevilla squarely
raised his difficult childhood and the crack/powder disparity, both in his sentencing
memorandum and at his sentencing hearing.” Sevilla, 541 F.3d at 231.
Here, as in Sevilla, Currie asked the District Court to consider various § 3553(a)
factors such as his nature and character, commitment to his family, pledge to become a
productive member of society, and recognition of the seriousness of his crimes and the
effect they had on innocent victims. It is evident that the District Court took these factors
into consideration, especially Currie’s remorseful nature and his responsibilities to his

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children and their mother. Thus, since Currie raised a factual issue before the court
relating to § 3553(a) factors, plain error review is not appropriate.
Under an abuse of discretion standard, we review the District Court’s sentence to
ensure that the court committed no significant procedural error and that the sentence
imposed was a reasonable one. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594 (2007). Although the District
Court could have been more explicit in reasoning through the Guidelines, we nevertheless
conclude that the District Court committed no significant procedural error amounting to
an abuse of discretion. The District Court accurately calculated the Guidelines range, did
not treat the Guidelines as binding, and adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors.
The District Court did not specifically mention the Guidelines range, but it is clear
from the record that the court calculated the range before imposing sentence. Currie’s
PSR assigned him a Criminal History Category of VI, the highest level available, because
of his extensive criminal history, and an offense level of twenty-nine because he was
involved in a drug trafficking and weapons conspiracy. This resulted in a Guidelines
range of 151-188 months. Currie originally objected to his PSR, but withdrew these
objections at his sentencing hearing. After referencing Currie’s PSR, the court elected to
impose a “[G]uideline[s] sentence” of 151 months, at the bottom of the Guidelines range.
(App. 87.) The court did not arrive at this figure by chance. Rather, the court reviewed
Currie’s PSR, consulted with his probation officer, calculated the Guidelines range, and
employed its discretion to impose an appropriate sentence.

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In addition to calculating the Guidelines range, it is evident that the District Court
did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory. In fact, the District Court noted several times
that it was the court’s own independent judgment – not its adherence to the Guidelines –
that brought the court to its decision. While the court was “obliged to consider” the
Guidelines range, ultimately, it was “the judgment of the court that [Currie] . . . be
imprisoned for a term of 151 months.” (App. 87) (emphasis added). The court also
considered giving Currie a lighter sentence, but, because Currie was a career offender,
there was “no way” the court could “stretch his record” and impose a sentence below the
Guidelines. (App. 87.) If the court indicated it considered departing from the Guidelines,
then it could not have considered them mandatory.
Finally, it is evident that the District Court recognized its duty to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors and took them into consideration. Each § 3553(a) factor need not be
explicitly addressed if the record demonstrates the court took the factors into account.
United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, the court stated that,
“in addition to [Currie’s sentence] being the [G]uideline[s] sentence because of his
record, . . . we have [considered] the provisions of [§ 3553(a)], which a judge has to take
into consideration, in fashioning a reasonable and responsible sentence.” (App. 87.) The
District Court addressed the history of the defendant, the serious nature of the crime, the
implications of Currie’s involvement in a drug and weapons conspiracy, and the need for
punishment and rehabilitation. The court also considered the types of sentences available

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to Currie and the kind of sentence the Guidelines called for in this instance. Finally, for
rehabilitation purposes, the District Court requested that Currie be placed in a drug
treatment program in prison and at a facility located near his family. The court summed
up its discussion by finding that “[t]he sentence satisfies the purposes of § 3553(a).” We
conclude that the District Court adequately addressed the factors.
We conclude that the sentence was substantively reasonable, too. A within-
Guidelines sentence is more likely to be a reasonable one. Rita v. United States, 127
S. Ct. 2456 (2007); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331 (3d Cir. 2006). We will
affirm a sentence as long as it “falls within the broad range of possible sentences that can
be considered reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
Currie’s sentence falls within that range. The District Court properly considered
Currie’s participation in a drug trafficking and weapons conspiracy that preyed on
innocent victims, as well as his remorse and his commitment to his family. Given
Currie’s extensive criminal history and the nature of his offense, the sentence was
reasonable and well within the range of possible sentences. Indeed, it is less than the
162 months Currie agreed to in his plea agreement.
In sum, the District Court accurately calculated the Guidelines range, did not treat
the Guidelines as mandatory, gave proper consideration to the § 3553(a) factors, and
imposed a reasonable sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines, and we will not disturb its
order.

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For the reasons set forth above, we will AFFIRM the Order of the District Court.

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