Edwin E. Naythons v. Stradley, Ronan, Stevens & Young Llp

Honorable Renee M. Bumb, District Judge for the United States District Court for the1
District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.
1
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-2527
EDWIN E. NAYTHONS
Appellant
v.
STRADLEY, RONAN, STEVENS & YOUNG LLP
AND ANDRE L. DENNIS, ESQ.
Appeal from the Order of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 07-cv-04489)
District Judge: Honorable Renee M. Bumb1
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on July 14, 2009
____________
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 30, 2009 )
OPINION

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The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction2
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Edwin E. Naythons appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint
against the law firm of Stradley, Ronan, Stevens, and Young, LLP and Andre L. Dennis,
Esq. (“Stradley”). Naythons alleges one count of common law abuse of process and one
count claiming wrongful use of civil process. For the reasons stated below, we will
affirm.2
I. Facts and Procedural History
Because we write exclusively for the parties, we only discuss the facts and
proceedings to the extent necessary for resolution of this case.
The underlying litigation in this case began in 1995 when Anthony Patterson, a
member of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith in Philadelphia,
filed an action in state court against church leaders alleging that they had looted millions
of dollars from the church’s bank accounts. In November 2006, the parties agreed to
submit the case to binding arbitration. The parties selected Edward Naythons
(“Naythons”), a retired United States Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, as the neutral arbitrator. The arbitration concluded in April 2006, and
Naythons found against the church leaders. Naythons ordered a full accounting of the
missing funds. After the accounting was completed, Naythons worked on the written,

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final adjudication until July 25, 2006. However, on July 27, 2006, before Naythons filed
the final adjudication, he received an anonymous “threat” via an online social networking
site. Naythons informed the parties of the threat on August 3, 2006, at which time the
defendants in the underlying action urged Naythons to recuse himself for fear that the
threat would result in bias against them. Naythons declined to do so. Thereafter, the
defendants in the underlying action, represented by Stradley and other law firms, began to
aggressively pursue Naythons’s recusal in the state court proceeding. For the purposes of
this litigation, the most important filing was Stradley’s petition to recuse Naythons based
on bias, misconduct, dishonesty, and fraud.
Naythons issued the final adjudication in October 2006, but dated it July 25, 2006,
the date he completed it. In November 2006, Stradley filed a motion to vacate the final
arbitration award. In December 2006, Stradley filed a petition for a hearing on their
petition to vacate, as well as their previous petition for recusal.
About ten months later, Naythons filed a complaint against Stradley. In it,
Naythons alleged abuse of process and wrongful use of civil proceedings due to the
“scorched earth” litigation strategy Stradley employed and the accusations Stradley
leveled against Naythons in the course of making arguments for his recusal. Stradley
moved to dismiss the case because Naythons, a non-party to the underlying litigation,
lacked standing. After hearing oral argument, the District Court granted Stradley’s
motion to dismiss. Specifically, the District Court found that there was no authority under

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We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s order granting Stradley’s motion to3
dismiss. United States Dept. of Transp., ex. rel. Arnold v. CMC Eng’g, et al., 564 F.3d
673, 676 (3d Cir. 2009).
4
Pennsylvania law to support Naythons’ position, and that Naythons lacked standing to
pursue his claims. The District Court also found that the doctrine of judicial privilege
protects attorneys, arbitrators and judges from these types of claims, and that if courts
abrogated the doctrine in the way Naythons advocates, it would “chill zealous advocacy.”
The District Court also held that Naythons could not demonstrate harm as a result of the
alleged “abuse of process.”
II. Discussion3
Under Pennsylvania law, “abuse of process is defined as the use of legal process
against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed.” Cruz v.
Princeton Ins. Co., 972 A.3d 14, 15 n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (citations omitted). To
establish a claim for abuse of process the plaintiff must show that the defendant “(1) used
a legal process against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the
process was not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to the plaintiff.” Id. Abuse of
process is, in essence, the use of legal process as a tactical weapon to coerce a desired
result that is not the legitimate object of the process. Id. (citing McGee v. Feege, 535
A.2d 1020, 1026 (Pa. 1987)). Although substantially similar to a claim of abuse of
process, a claim of “wrongful use of civil proceedings” incorporates an additional
causation element: the defendant did not have probable cause for his action. Id. at 19

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We note that the District Court based its decision, in part, on the fact that Stradley was4
not the law firm that initially listed Naythons as a respondent in the state court petition at
issue in this case.
Because we find the issue of judicial privilege so overarching in this matter, we do not5
reach the alternative bases for the District Court’s decision.
5
n.5.
Under Pennsylvania law, the District Court correctly dismissed Naythons’s claims
of abuse of process and wrongful use of civil proceedings. Stradley did not “use legal
process” against Naythons. Naythons was the arbitrator in the state proceeding, not a4
party to the action, and the fact that he was named as a respondent in one of the state
court petitions is of no import. Permitting Naythons to sustain either of these claims
against Stradley would abrogate the doctrine of judicial privilege, whereby “pertinent and
material” communications made in in the context of judicial proceedings are absolutely
privileged from civil liability. Moses v. McWilliams, 549 A.2d 950, 956 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988) (citing Post v. Mendel, 507 A.2d 351, 355 (Pa. 1986)). The proper recourse for any
unethical conduct on behalf of Stradley is through judicial review of the arbitration
proceedings, which could result in sanctions against Stradley if their conduct was as
egregious as Naythons alleged in his complaint.5
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of
Naythons’s complaint.

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