IN RE: MARYSE MACTRUONG and MAC TRUONG v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 3d Cir. 1999

BLD-212 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 08-3365
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IN RE: MARYSE MACTRUONG and MAC TRUONG,
Debtors
Mac Truong,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 08-02932)
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
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Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 11, 2009
Before: MCKEE, FISHER and CHAGARES,, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 25, 2009)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Mac Truong appeals from the District Court’s order denying, among other things,

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We incorporate hereinafter the facts and procedural history of this case as set forth in1
our opinion disposing of Truong’s related appeal, In re Truong, CA No. 08-3365.
2
his motion to reopen his bankruptcy appeal. The District Court had initially dismissed1
the appeal for failure to designate the record on appeal and for failure to pay the required
filing fees. Truong then moved to reopen his appeal, proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”),
and stay proceedings “pending adjudication of other related appeals.” The District Court,
while not addressing the IFP motion directly, denied relief and noted that the Bankruptcy
Court had not granted IFP status, nor had Truong paid the required filing fees. This
appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the District Court’s
denial of Truong’s motion to proceed IFP, dismissal for failure to pay fees and motion to
reopen his appeal for abuse of discretion. See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou Ann, Inc.
v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999); Jones v. Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76, 78 (3d
Cir. 1985). Having granted Truong leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, we
must dismiss his appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) if it is frivolous, i.e., if it
has no arguable basis in law. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
IFP determinations are to be made solely on the basis of indigence. See Deutsch v.
United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1084 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995); Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194
n.1 (3d Cir. 1990). In the IFP application that Truong submitted to the District Court, he
indicated that he had rental income of $3000 a month, two cars (though one had its “title

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The IRA account’s worth has apparently dropped by $2000 since Truong last applied2
for IFP status.
in litigation”), “less than $500 average” in a bank account, and an IRA account worth
$6000. Given that information, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its2
discretion when it dismissed Truong’s appeal and denied his subsequent motions.
Accordingly, the appeal is devoid of legal merit and we will dismiss it pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

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