DANTE RENAULT WILLIAMS, AKA James Trice, AKA Pierre v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Dante Renault Williams

*The Honorable Paul S. Diamond, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 08-4225
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DANTE RENAULT WILLIAMS,
AKA James Trice, AKA Pierre;
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Dante Renault Williams,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Criminal No. 92-cr-00065)
District Judge: Honorable Gustave Diamond
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 1, 2009
Before: FISHER, CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, and DIAMOND, District Judge *.
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(Filed: July 7, 2009)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Dante Williams appeals from an order of the District Court denying his motion for

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a reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Williams sought a reduction
in his sentence based on the Sentencing Commission’s recent amendments to the
Sentencing Guidelines that retroactively lowered the base offense levels for crack cocaine
offenses. Williams was convicted, in part, of a drug offense involving crack cocaine, but
his sentencing range was ultimately calculated based on his status as a career offender.
Because the crack cocaine amendments do not lower Williams’s applicable sentencing
range, the District Court did not err in refusing to modify Williams’s sentence. We will,
therefore, affirm.
I.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly recite
the essential facts.
On February 18, 1994, Dante Williams pled guilty to distribution and possession
with intent to distribute more than 5 grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii), as well as money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and (2). Williams was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. §
4B1.1 under the mandatory sentencing guidelines regime then in effect. His offense level
was calculated at 34, with a criminal history category of VI, amounting to a guidelines
range of 262-327 months of imprisonment. The sentencing court sentenced Williams to a
prison term of 264 months on the drug charges and 240 months on the money laundering
charge, to run concurrently. Williams did not file a direct appeal.
In 1997, Williams sought a reduction in his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582.
The sentencing court denied that motion on September 30, 1997. Thereafter, in

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1Section 3582(c)(2) allows a court to reduce a term of imprisonment “in the case of
a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing
range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 994(o).” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). A court “may reduce the term of imprisonment,
after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission.” Id.
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November, 2007, the Sentencing Commission amended the crack cocaine guidelines by
revising a portion of the drug quantity table at § 2D1.1(c). U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C,
Amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007). The effect of Amendment 706 was to decrease by two levels
the base-offense sentencing levels for crack cocaine offenses. United States v. Mateo,
560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir.
2008). The Sentencing Commission later determined that Amendment 706 was to be
applied retroactively. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) (Supp. March 3, 2008). Williams then filed a
new motion for a reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), seeking a full
resentencing.1
The District Court denied Williams’s motion on September 30, 2008, finding that
Amendment 706 does not reduce the sentencing range applicable to Williams because the
sentencing court had calculated his guidelines range under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, the career-
offender provision. The District Court further held that, even if Williams was entitled to
the benefit of the retroactive amendment, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) did not render the Sentencing Guidelines advisory for
retroactive prison term reductions through the collateral vehicle of 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2).

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II.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo a district court’s interpretation of the criminal statutes, see United States
v. Howerter, 248 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2001), as well as the construction of the
Sentencing Guidelines, see United States v. Wood, 526 F.3d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 2008).
III.
Williams argues that his sentence should be reduced because that sentence was
“based on” the crack cocaine offense to which he pleaded guilty, the base offense level of
which was lowered by the Sentencing Commission. Williams further argues that a
district court adjusting a sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) must also treat the amended
Guidelines range as advisory, and impose a sentence based on the procedures set forth in
the Booker line of cases to ensure that his sentence is “sufficient but not greater than
necessary” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We disagree.
This Court’s opinion in United States v. Mateo forecloses the relief that Williams
now seeks. There, we reasoned that, to be entitled to a reduction of sentence under §
3582(c)(2), “a defendant’s sentencing range must have been lowered by recalculation
based on the amended base offense level.” 560 F.3d at 154 (citing U.S.S.G. §
1B1.10(a)(2)(B)) (emphasis in original).
If the sentencing court sentenced Williams under § 2D1.1(c), the crack cocaine
amendment would serve to lower Williams’s base offense level. Here, however, the
sentencing court determined Williams’s sentencing range using the alternative career
offender provisions. Because Williams was sentenced under § 4B1.1, and not § 2D1.1,

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he was not sentenced “based on” a sentencing range that was later lowered by the
Sentencing Commission. Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155; see United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d
305, 309 (3d Cir. 2009). Amendment 706 does not affect Williams’s applicable
sentencing range, and therefore, as in Mateo, § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a reduction
in his sentence. See 560 F.3d at 155; see also United States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6, 10
(1st Cir. 2008).
Williams next relies on the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005) and Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) for the proposition
that, when considering a motion to reduce a sentence pursuant to § 3582(c), district courts
have discretion to deviate from the advisory Guidelines where the Guidelines do not serve
the goals of sentencing. We have previously held that Booker does not affect eligibility
for a § 3582(c) sentence reduction. See Doe, 564 F.3d at 313-314; Mateo, 560 F.3d at
155 (“Section 3582(c) provides the only authority to reduce sentence here, and ‘[n]othing
in [Booker] purported to obviate the congressional directive on whether a sentence could
be reduced based on subsequent changes in the Guidelines.’”) (quoting Wise, 515 F.3d at
221 n. 11).
Because the District Court lacked statutory authority to provide Williams with the
relief requested, it properly declined to conduct a review of the original sentence under
the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.

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