Vetetim Skenderi v. Attorney General of the United States

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-4587
___________
VETETIM SKENDERI,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A96-014-202)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Miriam K. Mills
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 12, 2009
Before: MCKEE, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 17, 2009)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Vetetim Skenderi petitions for review of a decision rendered by the Board of
Immigration Appeals on August 15, 2008. For the reasons that follow, we will deny the

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petition for review.
I. Background
Skenderi is a native and citizen of Albania. He entered the United States in
November 2002 and was placed in removal proceedings. In June 2003, Skenderi applied
for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”), based upon his support for Albania’s Democratic Party (“DP”).
After a February 2004 hearing, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied relief.
Skenderi appealed the decision to the BIA, which remanded the matter for further
consideration of Skenderi’s credibility and the merits of his claim. On remand, the IJ held
another hearing and permitted Skenderi to present additional evidence. In a May 16,
2007, decision, the IJ again denied Skenderi’s claims.
Skenderi appealed. On August 15, 2008, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and
dismissed the appeal. Because the decision was mailed to the incorrect address, the BIA
re-issued the decision on October 23, 2008. This timely petition for review followed.
II. Analysis
We generally review only final decisions by the BIA. See Li v. Att’y Gen., 400
F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005); Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 548-49 (3d Cir. 2001).
However, because the BIA substantially relied upon the IJ’s adverse credibility
determination, we review both the BIA’s and the IJ’s decisions with regard to the
credibility determination. See Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2004). We

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review legal conclusions de novo, see Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir.
2003), and uphold factual determinations if they are supported “by reasonable, substantial
and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d
556, 561 (3d Cir. 2004). Ultimately, this Court “must find that the evidence not only
supports that conclusion [that the application should have been granted], but compels it.”
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).
Concluding that the IJ’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, the BIA
affirmed the adverse credibility determination. We have recognized that an IJ is normally
in the best position to make a credibility determination and is “uniquely qualified to
decide whether an alien’s testimony has about it the ring of truth.” Abdulrahman v.
Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d
1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985)). We review adverse credibility determinations for substantial
evidence. Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2004). We will affirm the
adverse credibility finding if it is supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d
Cir. 2002). To reverse, the evidence of Skenderi’s credibility must be so strong “that in a
civil trial he would be entitled to judgment on the credibility issue as a matter of law.”
Chen, 376 F.3d at 222.
We conclude that the adverse credibility determination rests upon substantial
evidence. The IJ provided numerous specific and cogent reasons for concluding that

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Because Skenderi filed his asylum application in 2004, the REAL ID Act, effective1
May 11, 2005, does not apply to his claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B).
The IJ expressly noted that the inconsistencies between Skenderi’s airport statement2
and testimony did not provide the sole basis for the adverse credibility determination.
Cf., Balasubramanrin v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that
inconsistencies between hearing testimony and an airport statements are not sufficient,
standing alone, to support an adverse credibility determination).
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Skenderi lacked credibility, many of which go to the “heart” of his claims. See Berishaj1
v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 323 (3d Cir. 2004). Specifically, the IJ identified the
following inconsistencies within Skenderi’s testimony and/or between Skenderi’s
testimony, application, and prior statements :2
(1) Skenderi submitted a newspaper article concerning his alleged political
persecution. He originally testified that he obtained the article from a
friend, but later testified that his family sent it to him. He also originally
testified that the article was from a national Albanian newspaper, but later
testified that it was from a small local paper that could not afford to register
with the Library of Congress.
(2) Skenderi originally testified that when he was arrested on May 5, 2002, he
was met by the prosecutor; he later testified that the prosecutor met him the
following day.
(3) Skenderi originally stated in his airport interview that he was never arrested,
but later testified that he was arrested multiple times for his political
activities.
(4) Skenderi and his wife both stated that he left Albania on August 28, 2002.
His asylum application stated that he went immediately to the United States
without traveling through or staying in any other country. However,
Skenderi did not did not arrive in the United States until November 3, 2002.
(5) His airport interview, credible fear interview, and hearing testimony did not
consistently describe Skenderi’s history of alleged arrests, including arrests
taking place in the months immediately preceding his flight from Albania.

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Skenderi argues that the IJ’s finding in this regard is erroneous because the IJ stated3
that the testimony concerning the escape from the hospital was internally consistent. See
A.R. 229 (Hrg. Tr., 03/07/07, at 140 (“All right. That’s consistent enough.”)). However,
consistent does not mean credible. An adverse credibility determination may be based on
implausibility or inherent improbability. See Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 324 (3d
Cir. 2004).
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In addition, the IJ identified the following inherent implausibilities within Skenderi’s
testimony:
(1) Skenderi obtained a passport reflecting his name, signature, and photograph
and was able to leave Albania without incident, despite the alleged presence
of his name on a police “blacklist.”
(2) Skenderi claims he was beaten and arrested by the police in May 2002, but
also testified that the police took him to the hospital for treatment after the
beating and were sufficiently careless that he was able to escape by walking
through a back door of the hospital.3
(3) Skenderi’s family was allegedly involved so deeply in DP activities that
they remained in politics despite the fact that family members were
assassinated in the 1990s, but he testified that his family left politics
completely when he departed from Albania.
Skenderi argues that the adverse credibility determination was “based upon [the
IJ’s] failure to review the transcripts, her refusal to allow the Petitioner to testify
completely at his hearings and her refusal to listen to Petitioner’s credible and consistent
explanation of alleged inconsistencies.” We cannot agree.
The record demonstrates that the IJ permitted Skenderi to testify at the evidentiary
hearings. She also closely reviewed the transcripts of Skenderi’s testimony, as reflected
by her decision’s detailed summary of Skenderi’s testimony, complete with transcript

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We note that some of the IJ’s transcript references cite to an incorrect page number.4
Relying upon these apparent typographical errors, Skenderi argues rather disingenuously
that the IJ did not review his testimony. For instance, Skenderi argues that although “the
IJ stated ‘the Respondent originally testified that the article [supporting his claim of
persecution] was from a ‘national newspaper published and distributed throughout
Albania’ See [transcript] at 45 . . . . a simple review of page 45 of the transcripts
establishes that the Petitioner never made the statement cited by the IJ.” See Petitioner’s
Brief at 22. However, while Skenderi did not make that statement on page 45, he did
make that precise statement a few pages later. A.R. 132 (Hrg. Tr., 2/26/04, at 148) (“This
is a national paper published and distributed throughout Albania.”).
By way of example, with regard to the IJ’s finding of implausibility concerning5
Skenderi’s ability to obtain a passport despite being blacklisted, Skenderi contends that
“Petitioner did not obtain a valid passport. He testified that his brother obtained the
document.” However, Skenderi also testified that he signed the passport documents in his
own name, submitted his picture with them, and had no trouble obtaining the passport or
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references. In our view, the IJ based her conclusions concerning Skenderi’s lack of4
credibility upon a logical, commonsense interpretation of the facts that were presented.
Cf., Butt v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 430, 436 (3d Cir. 2005).
Skenderi responds with a series of what he proposes are “credible and plausible”
explanations for each of the credibility problems that the IJ identified. We find no error
in the decision not to credit Skenderi’s proposed explanations. As the BIA appropriately
noted, the Supreme Court has instructed that “[w]here there are two permissible views of
the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, North Carolina, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). Skenderi
has not demonstrated that the IJ’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous. His contention
that there could be other plausible interpretations of the evidence is not sufficient to
undermine the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.5

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leaving the country despite the fact that his name was allegedly on a “blacklist” and that
the police knew him by name and appearance. See A.R. 52 (IJ Decision at 9), see also
A.R. 221-22 (Hrg. Tr., 03/07/07, at 132-33). Thus, even considering that his brother
submitted the application, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that
Skenderi’s ability to obtain a passport undermined the credibility of his claim.
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The BIA concluded that the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was dispositive and
relied upon it as the basis to deny Skenderi’s appeal. “An alien's credibility, by itself,
may satisfy his burden, or doom his claim.” Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 247 (3d
Cir.2003) (en banc). In this case, the adverse credibility determination dooms Skenderi’s
claim. Skenderi bore the burden of supporting his asylum claim through credible
testimony. Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 482 (3d Cir. 2001). He failed to meet that
burden.
Finally, Skenderi claims that we must remand his case because he appealed the IJ’s
decision to deny withholding of removal and CAT protection, but the BIA “inexplicably”
deemed those claims abandoned. We disagree. Although the notice of appeal initially indicated
an intent to pursue those claims, see A.R. 331, in his brief to the BIA, Skenderi did not present
any argument in support of withholding of removal or CAT protection. See A.R. 14-41.
Because Skenderi only briefed his asylum claim, we find no error in the BIA’s conclusion that he
abandoned the other claims. See, e.g., Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 221 (3d Cir. 2004); Kost
v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).

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III. Conclusion
We have considered all of Skenderi’s remaining arguments and conclude that none has
merit. Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.

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