Angelo Clark v. Regional Medical First Correctional

BLD-035 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-1171
___________
ANGELO CLARK,
Appellant
v.
REGIONAL MEDICAL FIRST CORRECTIONAL; MANAGER
ANGELA WILSON; CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICE;
REGIONAL MANAGER ROBERT HOOPER
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-00465)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
____________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Possible
Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 5, 2009
Before: MCKEE, RENDELL AND CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 13, 2010)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
The appellant, Angelo Clark, is a Delaware state prisoner who, at all times relevant

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In January 2007, Clark was admitted to the Delaware Psychiatric Center (“DPC”).1
He remained there under psychiatric care for several months. In June 2007, he was
returned to the DCC, where he was housed in the Security Housing Unit and monitored
by medical staff. In April 2008, he was transferred back to the DPC, where he is
currently housed.
In his initial complaint, Clark named as defendants Regional Medical First2
Correctional, Correctional Medical Systems, Regional Manager Robert M. Hooper, and
Manager Angela Wilson. By order entered December 19, 2006, the District Court
dismissed the complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as to
all defendants except Correctional Medical Systems. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
(providing that the district court shall dismiss the complaint of a prisoner proceeding in
forma pauperis if the court determines that the action fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted). Although Clark subsequently amended his complaint on more than one
occasion, he did not name any other defendants. To the extent that Clark now challenges
the District Court’s order dismissing the three defendants noted above from the case, we
conclude that, for the reasons given by the court, such dismissal was proper.
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to this appeal, was housed at the Delaware Correctional Center (“DCC”). On July 31,1
2006, Clark filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware against Correctional Medical Systems, the medical care
provider at the DCC. In the complaint, Clark claimed that the defendant had violated his2
Eighth Amendment rights by providing inadequate medical care. Clark later amended his
complaint to allege that the defendant had improperly treated his heart condition,
wrongfully prescribed certain medications, and generally misdiagnosed him. He also
alleged that he had contracted Hepatitis C from nurses who worked for the defendant.
Following discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. In support of his
motion, Clark submitted an “affidavit brief” in which he stated that the defendant “not
only violate[d his] 8th Amendment due process as a human being, [but] they tortured [his]

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Clark also attached a document indicating that he filed a grievance with the3
Medical Grievance Committee.
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body and soul with Zyprexa, Trassadone, Trilladon, and etc.,” which turned him into “a
mad dog with no brain.” (Affidavit/Brief in Support of Summary Judgment 1.) In further
support of his motion, Clark attached a copy of his “patient medication education record,”
which listed his medications. On the chart, Clark noted that several of these medications
made his “brain bleed,” that he was given “rat poison,” and that he never experienced
seizures or heart problems until “they experimented on [him] like [he] was their personal
experiment!” (Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. I.) Clark also provided a
“Schizophrenia Fact Sheet” defining his illness, and several other medical records, the
significance of which is unclear.3
For its part, the defendant argued that Clark could not establish that the defendant
had been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs because the record
demonstrated that he received frequent and adequate medical care during the relevant
period. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–05 (1976). The defendant further
argued that, even if Clark could somehow show that the defendant had been reckless or
indifferent to his serious medical needs, he would nonetheless be unable to prevail on his
Eighth Amendment claim because he could not demonstrate that the defendant had a
policy or custom of deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs. See
Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003). In

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We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.4
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support of its motion, the defendant submitted medical records indicating that Clark
received regular psychiatric treatment from February 2006 though July 2007, as well as a
substantial amount of care for his other medical conditions.
By order entered December 22, 2008, the District Court granted the defendant’s
motion, denied Clark’s, and entered judgment in favor of the defendant. This appeal
followed.4
Upon review, it appears that the District Court properly entered summary judgment
in favor of the defendant because, even assuming that the defendant’s actions rose to the
level of deliberate indifference, Clark failed to allege facts or present evidence creating a
genuine issue of fact as to whether a “‘policy or custom’ of the [defendant] was the
‘moving force’ behind a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.” Grayson v.
Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 107 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Bd. of County
Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997); see also Natale v.
Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that, in order
to hold a corporation under contract with the state liable under § 1983, a prisoner “must
provide evidence that there was a relevant [state] policy or custom, and that the policy
caused the constitutional violation [the prisoner] allege[d]”).
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See Third Cir.

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LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. Clark’s motions for an injunction and appointment of counsel
are denied.
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