Sa’eedu Massaquoi v. Troy Williamson

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 09-1257
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SA’EEDU MASSAQUOI,
Appellant
v.
TROY WILLIAMSON
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-01234)
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 14, 2009
Before: FISHER, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 26, 2009)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Sa’eedu Massaquoi appeals an order of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. We will affirm.

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On July 13, 1999, Massaquoi was arrested by Pennsylvania authorities for state
parole violations; the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole later ordered him to
serve a 72-month sentence as a technical and convicted parole violator. Massaquoi
remained in state custody until September 16, 1999, when he was transferred to federal
custody pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to answer charges
stemming from two armed bank robberies committed while Massaquoi was on parole. He
was arraigned on those charges in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania on September 21, 1999, he was convicted on May 10, 2000, and he was
sentenced to 646 months of imprisonment on September 21, 2000. That sentence began
to run on February 27, 2001, the date Pennsylvania authorities released Massaquoi to the
exclusive custody of the federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”).
In calculating Massaquoi’s projected release date, the BOP contacted Pennsylvania
officials to determine what portion of the time served prior to February 27, 2001, had
been credited to his state parole violator sentences. Pennsylvania officials indicated that
Massaquoi’s parole violator term had been credited with only the period of time between
July 13, 1999 (the date of his state arrest) and September 21, 1999 (the date of his federal
arraignment). Therefore, because the 524 days from September 22, 1999 (the day after
his federal arraignment) to February 26, 2001 (the day before he began serving his federal
sentence) had not been credited to his parole violator term, the BOP credited that time to
his federal sentence.

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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). We exercise1
plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous
standard to its findings of fact. See Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2002).
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Massaquoi filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, claiming that those 524 days
should have been credited to his state parole violator term, rather than to his federal
sentence. The District Court denied the § 2241 petition, holding that the “time
[Massaquoi] spent in . . . custody which was not credited against his state parole
revocation term . . . was [properly] credited toward his federal sentence.” Massaquoi
appealed.1
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, district courts are authorized to issue a writ of
habeas corpus to a state or federal prisoner who “is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Massaquoi
alleged that the BOP improperly applied 28 U.S.C. § 3585(b), which prohibits the BOP
from crediting a defendant for time served prior to commencement of a federal sentence
if such time has already been credited towards another sentence. See Rios v. Wiley, 201
F.3d 257, 272 (3d Cir. 2000). In this case, Massaquoi was in the primary custody of
Pennsylvania from the date of his arrest (July 13, 1999) until the day before his federal
sentence commenced (February 26, 2001). See Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 125 (3d
Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a] prisoner detained pursuant to a writ ad prosequendum is
considered to remain in the primary custody of the first jurisdiction unless and until the

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Massaquoi does not challenge this determination and, to the extent he alleges that2
Pennsylvania authorities failed to properly calculate his sentence, he has not identified
any provision of the “Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States” that was
violated. In addition, the BOP has no obvious authority over the manner in which
Pennsylvania credits parole violator sentences.
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first sovereign relinquishes jurisdiction over the person”). A portion of that time (from
July 13, 1999, to September 21, 1999) was credited against Massaquoi’s parole violator
sentences. Under Pennsylvania’s Parole Act, however, a federal sentence for a crime2
committed by a convicted parole violator must be served before the state parole violation
sentence is served. See 61 P.S. § 331.21a(a). Therefore, Pennsylvania did not credit
Massaquoi’s parole violator sentences with the time he spent in primary state custody
from September 22, 1999, to February 26, 2001. Because that time had not been credited
toward another sentence, the BOP did not violate § 3585(b) by crediting that time to
Massaquoi’s federal sentence.
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

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