Angel M. Pinet v. J. GRONDOLSKY, Warden

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 09-1491
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ANGEL M. PINET,
Appellant
v.
J. GRONDOLSKY, Warden
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-02908)
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 25, 2009
Before: BARRY, SMITH AND GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 15, 2009)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Angel M. Pinet appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey denying his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
We will affirm.

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Pinet is currently serving a 360-month federal imprisonment term imposed in
December 1998. In addition to the imprisonment term, the sentencing court assessed a
$2,000.00 fine to be paid immediately. In 2005, Pinet entered into what he calls a “duress
agreement” with the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) under the Inmate Financial
Responsibility Program (“IFRP”), whereby he agreed to make quarterly payments to
satisfy his fine. On May 7, 2007, Pinet refused to make any further payments while
incarcerated. Consequently, the BOP placed him on “IFRP Refuse” status. Pinet
proceeded to pursue administrative remedies and appeals, asserting that the sentencing
court should set the payment schedule for the imposed fine, and that the BOP lacked
authority to do so. Ultimately, Pinet was unsuccessful in obtaining administrative relief.
In June 2008, Pinet filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, maintaining
that the BOP unlawfully established a schedule for paying the fine when that duty
belonged to the sentencing court. He alleged that despite the BOP’s characterization of
the IFRP as a voluntary program, his refusal to participate results in the loss of certain
benefits relating to, as examples, his prison employment wages, commissary spending
limits, and housing status. Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions, the District
Court denied the section 2241 petition, concluding that the BOP was not precluded from
setting a payment schedule via the IFRP for Pinet to pay his criminal fine. Pinet appeals.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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Pinet misplaces his reliance on cases such as United States v. Foote, 413 F.3d 12401
(10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Workman, 110 F.3d 915 (2d Cir. 1997); and United
States v. Miller, 77 F.3d 71 (4th Cir. 1996). In each of these cases, the sentencing courts
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At the outset, we note that because Pinet challenges the execution of his sentence
by claiming that the BOP acted unlawfully in establishing a payment schedule regarding
the imposed fine, the claim falls squarely within the purview of a section 2241 petition.
See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001). Pinet first argues that the
District Court misconstrued his habeas petition as a challenge to the constitutionality of
the IFRP. We disagree. The District Court did reaffirm the constitutionality of the IFRP,
citing James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627 (3d Cir. 1989). However, in denying habeas relief,
it duly considered and rejected Pinet’s claim that the BOP acted unlawfully in setting a
payment schedule to satisfy the fine.
Pinet’s main argument is that 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d) precludes the sentencing court
from delegating the task of setting a payment schedule for fines. In support, Pinet relies
on the language of the statute allowing the sentencing court to provide for installment
payments, and that the sentencing court (not the BOP) is to establish the schedule and
period for payment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1), (2). However, section 3572(d)(1) also
provides that an imposed fine shall be paid “immediately” unless the sentencing court
directs installment payments in the interest of justice. There is no dispute here that the
sentencing court ordered Pinet to pay the fine immediately. No payment schedule was at
issue, and no delegation of judicial function occurred. Contrary to Pinet’s assertions,1

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ordered the defendants to pay fines in installments and expressly delegated the task of
establishing payment schedules, unlike the situation in Pinet’s case.
nothing in section 3572(d)’s language precludes the BOP under its IFRP regulations from
setting a payment schedule to satisfy a fine that was due to be paid immediately.
Pinet also cites our decision in United States v. Coates, 178 F.3d 681, 684 (3d Cir.
1999), emphasizing our statement that section 3572(d)(1) applies to all monetary
penalties, including fines and orders of restitution. However, we also highlighted in
Coates the distinction between section 3572(d)(1) and the affirmative requirement for the
sentencing court to set a payment schedule under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act.
Since Coates, we decided United States v. Corley, 500 F.3d 210, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2007),
where we held that a sentencing court impermissibly delegates its authority to the BOP
when, knowing that the defendant was financially unable to make immediate restitution
payment, it orders payments due immediately but to be made via the IFRP. The holdings
of Coates and Corley are based on 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2), which directs the sentencing
court to establish a restitution payment schedule taking the defendant’s finances into
consideration. In Pinet’s case, he is not challenging a restitution order. There is no
analogous statutory provision governing the imposition of fines that requires the
sentencing court to set payment schedules with consideration of the defendant’s finances.
We will affirm the District Court’s order denying Pinet’s section 2241 petition.
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