Mary E. White v. CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER, SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY On Appeal from the United…

BLD-307 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-3021
___________
MARY E. WHITE,
Appellant
v.
CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER, SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 2:08-cv-06106)
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 03, 2009
Before: MCKEE, FISHER AND CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 18, 2009)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
In December 2008, Appellant Mary White commenced this action by filing a
“Notice of Appeal” in the District Court, which the court treated as a complaint. This
filing sought review of several rulings made by New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice

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The court noted that White had recently filed a similar complaint before another1
judge in the same District. In that earlier case, the court dismissed White’s complaint sua
sponte, and we summarily affirmed on appeal. See White v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., No. 08-
3818 (3d Cir. Mar. 27, 2009) (non-precedential opinion).
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2
2
Stuart Rabner in White’s various state court proceedings. White requested that the
District Court “[u]phold my Constitutional Rights, including but not limited to a fair
hearing in an unbiased court,” provide her with “the transcripts and representation needed
for equal access to justice,” and “[r]ecuse [Chief Justice Rabner] . . . from presiding over
any of [White’s] hearings and to conduct a Judicial Review based on the six complaints
filed against him this year.” In June 2009, the District Court dismissed White’s claims
sua sponte, concluding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and principles of judicial
immunity barred the court’s review. This appeal followed.1 2
The District Court did not err in dismissing White’s claims. The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars a federal district court from considering “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Although this doctrine is narrow, see id., we agree with the District Court that it applies
here to White’s challenge to the decisions in her various state court proceedings. Her
claim against Chief Justice Rabner individually is barred as well. Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in

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such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” In requesting Chief Justice
Rabner’s recusal and “judicial review,” White did not establish that he violated a
declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable.
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order dismissing
White’s claims. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
3

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