Ronald W. Telepo, Jr. v. Todd A. Martin

DLD-076 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-3509
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RONALD W. TELEPO, JR.,
Appellant
v.
TODD A. MARTIN; SUZANNE MCCOOL;
DONNA ASURE, individually and official capacities; THERESA MERLI
___________________________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-02132)
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
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Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 17, 2009
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed:December 29, 2009)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Ronald W. Telepo, Jr., a state prisoner, appeals an order of the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granting the defendants’ motion to

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dismiss a complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We will affirm.
On April 14, 2008, and May 12, 2008, Telepo appeared in the Monroe County
Courthouse for hearings related to his criminal sentence. In his complaint, Telepo alleged
that the defendants, the Monroe County Sheriff and three County Commissioners, failed
to provide him with “adequate consultation facilities within the . . . County Courthouse.”
As a result, he was “forced to meet with [his] attorney in the presence of sheriffs[’]
deputies as well as other inmates within a holding cell area.” Because he was not “able to
speak privately with his public defender,” Telepo claimed that “the public defender was
ill prepared to argue the issues . . . concern[ing] . . . my prior record score[,] which
subsequently led to the judge sentencing me to a longer period of incarceration than I
should have been sentenced to.” Telepo later asserted that “[i]f I was given a more proper
area to confer with my Public Defender, (which is challenging the conditions of my
confinement), I would have been able to relay information pertinent to a shorter term of
incarceration (challenging my sentence and conviction).” As relief, Telepo sought a
declaration that the defendants violated his right of access to the courts, an injunction
ordering the defendants to provide “an area [in the Courthouse] that permits . . .
unobstructed and confidential communication [between inmates and] the attorneys
assigned to them,” and compensatory and punitive damages.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). The Magistrate Judge recommended that the motion be granted and

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that the compliant be dismissed with prejudice. Over Telepo’s objections, the District
Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and granted the defendants’ motion to
dismiss. The District Court held that Telepo failed to allege that the defendants’ conduct
caused an “actual injury,” that his claims against the County Commissioners were barred
by the doctrine of respondeat superior, that the defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity, and that Telepo lacked standing to seek equitable or injunctive relief. Telepo
appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s grant of the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Phillips v.
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). We may affirm on any basis
supported by the record. See Fairview Township v. EPA, 773 F.2d 517, 525 n.15 (3d Cir.
1985).
After considering the record below, we conclude that Telepo’s claims are not
cognizable in a § 1983 action. Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), “when a
state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction
or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487. In
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), the Court extended Heck and found a claim for
declaratory relief not cognizable under § 1983 because it would “necessarily imply the

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invalidity of the punishment imposed.” Id. at 648. Heck and Balisok foreclose § 1983
claims only in a “narrow subset of actions,” where the deprivation of rights is such that it
necessarily affects the fact or length of detention. Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540
(3d Cir. 2002). “[W]henever the challenge ultimately attacks the ‘core of habeas’ -- the
validity of the continued conviction or the fact or length of the sentence -- a challenge,
however denominated and regardless of the relief sought, must be brought by way of
habeas corpus petition. Conversely, when the challenge is to a condition of confinement
such that a finding in plaintiff’s favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction,
an action under § 1983 is appropriate.” Id. at 542.
Telepo initially couched his claims in terms of his First Amendment right of
“access to the courts.” As the District Court noted, the right to access the courts has
typically been applied to “attempts by inmates to pursue direct appeals from the
convictions for which they were incarcerated, . . . habeas petitions, . . . or ‘civil rights
actions,’ i.e., actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate ‘basic constitutional rights.’”
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996) (internal citations omitted). But Telepo did not
claim that he was denied “a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations
of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.” Id. at 351. Rather, his claims are
based on alleged violations of his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel during
the sentencing phase of his criminal trial. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 295
(1980) (“the Sixth Amendment, of course, protects the confidentiality of communications

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We deny Telepo’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel and his Motion for Leave to1
File a Reply to the Appellees’ Response to the Motion for Appointment of Counsel.
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between the accused and his attorney.” (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); United States v.
Johnson, 534 F.3d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 2008) (“‘[T]he Sixth Amendment guarantees the
right to counsel at all critical stages of the prosecution,’ and this right is applicable during
sentencing hearings.” (internal citations omitted)). Telepo’s claim, if successful, would
“spell speedier release,” and therefore “lies at the core of habeas corpus.” Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005) (internal quotation and citation omitted); cf. Perry v.
Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 278-80 (1989) (addressing habeas claim that state trial court’s order
directing petitioner not to consult his attorney during 15-minute recess violated
petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel).
For the foregoing reasons, this appeal presents no substantial question. See I.O.P.
10.6. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm.1

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